Electricity provision and industrial development: Evidence from India

I investigate the effect of electricity provision on industrialization using a panel of Indian states for 1965-1984. To address the endogeneity of investment in electrification, I use the introduction of a new agricultural technology intensive in irrigation (the Green Revolution) as a natural experiment. As electric pumpsets are used to provide farmers with cheap irrigation water, I use the uneven availability of groundwater at the start of the Green Revolution to predict divergence in the expansion of the electricity network and, ultimately, to quantify the effect of electrification on industrial outcomes. I present a series of tests to show that the electrification channel remains the most important one among alternative explanations that could link groundwater availability to industrialization directly or indirectly. Results show that an increase in one standard deviation in the measure of electrification is associated with an increase of around 14% in manufacturing output for a state at the mean of the distribution.     

我国能源消费存在的主要问题及对策分析

本文分析了我国能源消费具有消费结构以煤炭为主、能源价格改革滞后和能源金融市场发展不足的特点，能源消费存在对环境污染严重、能源利用效率较低和能源技术创新不足的问题。文章最后提出了提高能源使用效率、鼓励能源技术创新的途径和对策。     

我国能源消费存在的主要问题及对策分析

本文分析了我国能源消费具有消费结构以煤炭为主、能源价格改革滞后和能源金融市场发展不足的特点,能源消费存在对环境污染严重、能源利用效率较低和能源技术创新不足的问题.文章最后提出了提高能源使用效率、鼓励能源技术创新的途径和对策.     

Electricity market mergers with endogenous forward contracting

We analyze the effects of electricity market mergers in an environment where firms endogenously choose their level of forward contracts prior to competing in the wholesale market. We apply our model to Alberta’s wholesale electricity market. Firms have an incentive to reduce their forward contract coverage in the more concentrated post-merger equilibrium. We demonstrate that endogenous forward contracting magnifies the price increasing impacts of mergers, resulting in larger reductions in consumer surplus. Current market screening procedures used to analyze electricity mergers consider firms’ pre-existing forward commitments. We illustrate that ignoring the endogenous nature of firms’ forward commitments can yield biased conclusions regarding the impacts of market structure changes such as mergers. In particular, we show that the price effects of mergers can be largely underestimated when forward contract quantities are held at pre-merger levels. Whether the profits of the merged firm are greater with fixed or endogenous forward quantities is ambiguous.     

One-sided private provision of public goods with implicit Lindahl pricing

We consider a sequential game in which one player produces a public good and the other player can influence this decision by making an unconditional transfer. An efficient allocation requires the Lindahl property: the sum of the two (implicit) individual prices has to be equal to the resource cost of the public good. Under mild conditions this requires a personal price for the providing player that lies below half of the resource cost. These results can, for example, justify high marginal taxes on wages of secondary earners.     

Dynamic provision of public goods

Summary. This paper deals with implementing the efficient level of public good provision in a dynamic setting. First, we prove that when the good is provided in several stages, no sequence of Groves' mechanisms guarantees that agents will reveal their true valuations as a dominant strategy. The contribution of this paper is the characterization of those mechanisms which guarantee truthful revelation in this environment.Received: 30 December 2001, Revised: 27 March 2003, JEL Classification Numbers: D61, D78, D82, H41.This paper has greatly benefited from the ideas and comments of Sandro Brusco, Luis Corchón and Roberto Burguet. I would also like to thank José Alcalde, Luis J. Alías, Javier López-Cuñat, Juan Vicente Llinares, Ashley Piggins, Juan Perote and Antonio Quesada for very helpful suggestions. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee whose suggestions aided the quality of exposition in the paper and led me to Proposition 4.     

State provision of constitutional goods

This paper investigates the impact of constitutional rights on the level of public expenditure in a large sample of countries. To do so, we construct a panel of 73 countries from 1960 to 2011. We first investigate factors that drive constitutional changes regarding constitutional rights. To address potential endogeneity concerns in the choice of constitutional rules, we rely on an instrumental variable within estimation (country and time fixed effects) to estimate the impact of constitutional rights on government size. We find that larger governments tend to inscribe fewer rights in their constitutions, but we do not detect any impact of constitutional rights on the government size.     

Under–provision of Inputs in Joint Ventures with Market Power

A joint venture with market power benefits from restricting its output which, in turn, requires the partners to restrict the supply of their inputs. However, since each partner benefits only partially from restricting its input, both over–supply their inputs from the viewpoint of the optimal use of market power. We show that this pecuniary negative externality in the partners' input decisions mitigates the standard under–provision problem that arises in joint ventures. We also show that the degree of this problem declines as demand becomes less elastic.     

中国电价扭曲与电力强度的影响因素

利用改进的C-D生产函数,估算了1978—2012年中国的电价扭曲程度。以电力强度为被解释变量,以电价扭曲程度、要素结构、城市化水平、产业结构等为解释变量,构建了协整模型,基于此对截至2020年中国电力强度的变化趋势进行了情景分析预测。研究结果表明:改革开放以来,中国电力能源价格发生了明显的负向扭曲,20世纪90年代初扭曲程度最大,此后整体上呈缓慢下降态势,但扭曲现象仍非常明显;电价扭曲程度每变化1%,中国电力强度同向波动约0.2155%,重工业发展对中国电力强度的刺激作用最强,推进城市化进程和优化产业结构可明显抑制中国的电力强度;2020年中国的电力强度将下降至约150千瓦时/千元。     

Public provision of private child goods

This paper analyzes the public provision of private goods for children in a politico-economic model with endogenous fertility. The government provides every child with goods that can also be purchased by parents in private markets, and the level of provision is determined by majority rule. Households with many children benefit from the public provision more than those with fewer children; thus, a political conflict arises between them. The distribution of the number of children across households, which is a crucial factor for determining which group is politically dominant, is endogenously determined by households' fertility decision. The sequential interaction between fertility and political decisions might lead to multiple equilibria: equilibrium with high fertility and low-private/public-spending ratio and equilibrium with low fertility and high-private/public-spending ratio. Our model could explain the large differences in fertility and structure of child-related spending across countries.     

Identifying the sources of energy use change: Multiple calibration decomposition analysis and structural decomposition analysis

Decomposition methodologies are requisite to identify the sources of changes in energy use or carbon dioxide emissions. This paper is an inquiry into the theoretical properties of such decomposition methodologies. The study first presents our new decomposition methodology – the Multiple Calibration Decomposition Analysis (MCDA) – as a tool for the investigation. Then, it theoretically reexamines an established decomposition methodology – the Structural Decomposition Analysis proposed by Casler and Rose (1998). Subsequently, the study empirically investigates the properties of both methodologies, applying them to an actual case: the changes in energy use and carbon dioxide emissions in Japan during the oil crises period, when the oil price had a significant influence on the economy. The result shows that understanding the theoretical properties of decomposition methodologies is essential for a precise interpretation of empirical results.     

Private provision of discrete public goods

We investigate private provision of discrete public goods under refund and cost-sharing. If it is commonly believed that individuals may be warm-glow altruists and the group-size is a Poisson random variable, then the equilibrium distribution of collected contributions is uniquely determined. If composition uncertainty is very small and the expected group-size sufficiently large, the distribution of contributions can be described by concentrating in a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium. As the expected group-size increases, the probability a randomly selected player contributes and the associated expected number of contributions converge to the corresponding ones in the symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium of the game with no uncertainty.     

Support to renewable energy sources and carbon capture and sequestration: comparison of alternative green tax reforms

We compare the economic and environmental effects of several specifications of a green tax reform (GTR) where tax revenues are used to support renewable energy sources (RESs) and carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) activities. With this aim, we propose an equilibrium model where final-goods production uses labour and energy, and energy production uses nonpolluting RES and polluting fossil fuels. The comparison is based on three key indicators: output per worker, energy intensity and the ratio of renewables over nonrenewables. We test five variations of the GTR in addition to the no-policy case. Results show that a GTR as the one we propose here never provides a double dividend. There are environmental benefits but at the expense of the economy. Additionally, for lower tax levels, prioritizing RES support has lower economic costs and potential environmental benefits. For higher tax levels, CCS support becomes more competitive.     

Reliability Differentiation of Electricity Transmission

In many jurisdictions, electric utility restructuring has included the creation of an independent system operator (ISO) to dispatch generation, establish the market-clearing price, and allocate limited transmission capacity among users. This paper differentiates reliability through rate unbundling. We propose a capacity reservation tariff (CRT) to induce the users to self-select their preferred levels of reliability. Based on these self-selected reliability levels, the ISO can efficiently allocate limited transmission capacity. Our proposed CRT can be a practical solution to the transmission congestion problem faced by the California ISO in the implementation of retail access.     

On the private provision of fiat currency

This paper considers whether fiat money can be provided by a revenue-maximizing monopolist in an environment where money is essential. Two questions arise concerning the private supply of money: Is it feasible and is it optimal? Concerning the feasibility question, I show that the revenue-maximizing policy is time-consistent if the trading history of the issuer is public information and if money demanders respond to the revelation of defection by playing autarky. Concerning the optimality question, the model suggests that any private organization of the market for fiat currency is suboptimal.     

On the private provision of public goods

We consider a general model of the non-cooperative provision of a public good. Under very weak assumptions there will always exist a unique Nash equilibrium in our model. A small redistribution of wealth among the contributing consumers will not change the equilibrium amount of the public good. However, larger redistributions of wealth will change the set of contributors and thereby change the equilibrium provision of the public good. We are able to characterize the properties and the comparative statics of the equilibrium in a quite complete way and to analyze the extent to which government provision of a public good ‘crowds out’ private contributions.     

Efficiency and group size in the voluntary provision of public goods with threshold preference

What is the optimal group size in the voluntary provision of public goods in a purely altruistic economy? The popular consensus on this fundamental question is that the free-rider problem worsens as the group size increases. This study provides a counterexample of the consensus by featuring plausible threshold preferences for certain typical public goods. Under these preferences, marginal utility hardly diminishes below a threshold level, but declines significantly in close proximity to the threshold and nearly drops to zero above the threshold. We find that threshold preferences significantly reduce inefficiency. We also show that if marginal costs increase, then the threshold preferences lead to a partly positive relationship between efficiency and group size, which allows us to detect the locally efficient group size. Moreover, the locally efficient group size is proportional to the slope of the marginal costs as well as the threshold of marginal utility.     

Electricity Production in a Hydro System with a Reservoir Constraint*

In this paper, our purpose is to analyze how market power might affect the allocation of production between seasons (summer and winter) in a hydropower system with reservoir constraints and inflow uncertainty. We find that, even without market power, the price in the summer season might be lower than the expected price in the winter season. In some situations, market power can lead to higher sales and a lower price in summer than would be observed in the competitive outcome; in other situations, it can lead to the opposite result. Furthermore, market power can lead to a smaller price difference between summer and winter.