Why Any Seatbelt Mandate is an Infinitely Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Health Economics Perspective

Abstract

Among the most controversial of public health measures are those that restrict people’s freedom of choice presumably for the purpose of protecting their own health and safety. Mandatory use of automobile seatbelts can inspire allusions to the “tyranny of health” and the ‘health police.” This study revisits state seatbelt legislation, which is in force in all but one state of the USA. In modeling seatbelt mandates as indefinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) games, the study qualifies and overcomes the limitations of conventional interest group and expressive voting theories. It indicates why and how utility-maximizing players, particularly carmakers, insurance companies, consumer advocates and regulators, may choose to cooperate, even in instances where mutual defection would bring each of them higher payoffs. The study suggests why state seatbelt mandates endure, despite ongoing concerns that they undermine individual autonomy or that their social costs outweigh the benefits of law-enforcement. The evolution and mediating effects of reputation and reciprocity in otherwise highly contestable healthcare decisions are consequently explored. Finally, the study identifies the implications of indefinitely repeated games on the continuing nature of strategic relationships and for mitigating conflict over traffic safety regulation, regardless of time and place.     

On Ramseyʼs conjecture

Studying a one-sector economy populated by finitely many heterogeneous households that are subject to no-borrowing constraints, we confirm a conjecture by Frank P. Ramsey according to which, in the long run, society would be divided into the set of patient households who own the entire capital stock and impatient ones without any physical wealth. More specifically, we prove (i) that there exists a unique steady state equilibrium that is globally asymptotically stable and (ii) that along every equilibrium the most patient household owns the entire capital of the economy after some finite time. Furthermore, we prove that despite the presence of the no-borrowing constraints all equilibria are efficient. Our results are derived for the continuous-time formulation of the model that was originally used by Ramsey, and they stand in stark contrast to results that – over the last three decades – have been found in the discrete-time version of the model.     

Indiaʼs mysterious manufacturing miracle

Using data on formal manufacturing plants in India, we report a large but imprecise speedup in productivity growth starting in the early 1990s (e.g., 1993–2007 compared to 1980–1992). We trace it to productivity growth within large plants (200 workers or more), as opposed to reallocation across such plants. As many economists believe Indian reforms during this era improved resource allocation, the absence of a growth pickup from reallocation is surprising. Moreover, when we look across industries we fail to robustly relate productivity growth to prominent reforms such as industrial de-licensing, tariff reductions, FDI liberalization, or lifting of small-scale industry reservations. Even under a generous reading of their effects, these reforms (at least as we measure them) account for less than one-third of the rapid productivity growth in Indian manufacturing from 1980–2007.     

Dynamic control of a monopolist’s product and process innovation with reference quality

ABSTRACT

Our main purpose is to investigate the dynamic control problem of a monopolist’s product and process innovation under reference quality. The main features of this article are: (i) a monopolist dealing with customer behaviour in the spirit of the principle of behaviour economics determines the product price, and carries out the activities of product and process innovation; (ii) the consumers’ demand depends on price, product quality and reference quality, and adopts an additive separable demand function form. Our main results show that under the cases of the monopolist optimum and the social planner optimum, (i) there exists an unique stable, which is a saddle-point steady-state equilibrium; (ii) the change rates of the monopolist’s investments in product and process innovation are increasing with the reference quality, while the monopolist’s steady-state investments in product and process innovation are decreasing with the reference quality; (iii) as the memory parameter increases with other parameters kept constant, it is very likely that the monopolist’s investment in process innovation be greater than the investment in product innovation; and (iv) the social incentive towards both investments in product and process innovation is always larger than the private incentive characterizing the profit-seeking monopolist.     

Dynamic group formation in the repeated prisoner?s dilemma

We consider dynamic group formation in repeated n-person prisoner?s dilemma. Agreements in coalitional bargaining are self-binding in that they are supported as subgame perfect equilibria of repeated games. Individuals are allowed to renegotiate the cooperating group agreement through a process of voluntary participation. We prove that a cooperating group forms as an absorbing state of a Markov perfect equilibrium after a finite number of renegotiations if and only if the group is Pareto efficient, provided that individuals are patient. The cooperating group can only expand.     

Japanʼs intangible capital and valuation of corporations in a neoclassical framework

This paper estimates the economic value in the 1980s and 1990s of corporate assets in Japan, including both tangible and intangible assets, based on the neoclassical framework of McGrattan and Prescott (2005). Our estimates use a new micro-data set that comprises the accounting statements of all listed, non-financial companies in Japan. We find that in 1980–1986, a period that immediately preceded Japan?s so-called “bubble economy”, our assessed value of corporate productive assets, net of the value of corporate debt, is approximately equal to the actual stock market value of Japanese corporate equity. The finding differs from previous results based on studies of aggregate data sets or based on studies of micro-data sets that neglected intangible capital. We also show that the Japanese ratio of the amount of intangible capital stock to the amount of tangible capital stock is comparable to the analogous ratios for the U.S. and U.K.     

Using or hiding private information? An experimental study of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information

This paper studies the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions in which there is a trade-off between (i) the short-run gain of using information, and (ii) the long-run gain of concealing it. We implement simple examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information. While the empirical value of information does not always coincide with the theoretical prediction, the qualitative properties of the value of information are satisfied in the laboratory: (i) it is never negative, (ii) it decreases with the number of repetitions, (iii) it is bounded below by the value of the infinitely repeated game, and (iv) it is bounded above by the value of the one-shot game. In line with the theory, the empirical use of private information is almost complete when it should be, and decreases in longer interactions.     

Testing Okun’s law with Swiss industry data

Okun’s law postulates a stable relationship between quarterly output growth and changes in (un)employment. This proposition has so far been tested with macroeconomic data at the highest level of aggregation. The article goes beyond that in extending the analysis to industry data from Switzerland, applying a method suggested by the International Monetary Fund. Another focus is on whether expansions in production have become more ‘jobless’ over the most recent business cycle compared to earlier ones. This does not seem to be the case in Switzerland, except in the construction industry.     

Playing the trust game with other people’s money

We experimentally investigate to what extent people trust and honor trust when they are playing with other people’s money (OPM). We adopt the well-known trust game by Berg et al. (in Games Econ. Behav. 10:122–142, 1995), with the difference that the trustor (sender) who sends money to the trustee (receiver) does this on behalf of a third party. We find that senders who make decisions on behalf of others do not behave significantly different from senders in our baseline trust game who manage their own money. But receivers return significantly less money when senders send a third party’s money. As a result, trust is only profitable in the baseline trust game, but not in the OPM treatment. The treatment effect among the receivers is gender specific. Women return significantly less money in OPM than in baseline, while there is no such treatment effect among men. Moreover, women return significantly less than men in the OPM treatment.     

Angus Deaton’s Nobel Prize for Confronting Theory with Facts

Angus Deaton, recipient of the 2015 Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, is broadly recognized as an outstanding applied economist who is well deserving of the prize. He has made a myriad of important contributions—alone and with renowned co-authors—across many fields. In this review of his work, I argue that it is his methodological consistency and focus on the two-way connection between empirics and theory, together with his attention to detail of how things are measured, that support his recognition by his peers. Informed by a career of doing careful econometric work using household surveys—especially on consumption, development, well-being and health—in his popular writing, Deaton chooses to focus on the importance of institutions, history and other disciplines.     

Firm’s tax evasion in a principal-agent model with self-protection

Gatekeepers have an increasing role in taxation and regulation. Whereas burdening them with legal liability for misconducts that benefit those who resort to their services actually discourages wrongdoings—as will be clarified in the article—an alienation effect can also arise. The gatekeeper might become more interested in covering up the illegal behavior. This article studies the problem with respect to tax evasion by firms in a principal-agent framework. It highlights the role of legal rules pertaining to liability for tax evasion in shaping the choices of the parties, as concealment costs vary according to whether the risk-neutral principal or the riskaverse agent is held responsible when tax evasion is detected. The main result of the analysis is that there is a simple ex post test that can be carried out to infer whether harnessing the agent was socially beneficial.     

Experimental tests of Tullock’s contest with and without winner refunds

We examined experimentally the two-agent, complete-information Tullock’s contest, with and without refund for the winner. We find that the average bids in the refund group are higher than the average bids in the group without a refund, consistent with the theory. However, the auctioneer does not increase his profit if he changes the design of the contest by reimbursing the winner’s cost of effort. We also find underbidding for the low-valuation players and overbidding for the high-valuation player in a contest with a refund. Some players chose the corner solution of staying out of the game by biding zero.     

Age effects in Okun’s law with different indicators of unemployment

We reassess the results from the literature on the relationship between the youth unemployment rate and GDP growth (Okun’s law), based on the concern that the unemployment rate is not an ideal indicator for teenagers and young adults. Using the unemployment ratio instead, we find that youth unemployment (15–24 years old) is not significantly more responsive to economic growth than prime-age (25–64) unemployment. However, compared to prime-age unemployment, teenagers’ unemployment (15–19) is relatively unresponsive, whereas young adult’s (20–24) unemployment is more strongly correlated with economic growth. These results are quite different than those obtained with the unemployment rate as the dependent variable.