The effectiveness of anti-leakage policies in the European Union: results for Austria

With the third trading period of the EU emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) starting in 2013, the system of allocating emission allowances will significantly change: In contrast to the previous two trading periods, auctioning of the allowances should now be the rule rather than the exception. Accompanying this policy change, concerns over competitiveness of energy intensive, trade exposed sectors as well as over limited environmental effectiveness via the channel of carbon leakage, have regained prominence. In this paper, we thus explore the impacts of potential EU policies to counter losses in international competitiveness and carbon leakage from the perspective of Austria. Based on numerical simulations with a computable general equilibrium model, we evaluate three policy options: an input subsidy for carbon allowances (thus reflecting the planned partially free allocation mechanism in the third EU ETS phase), a subsidy for domestic production, and an export rebate based on sectoral CO₂ costs. Our results show that each policy has the potential to support domestic production in exposed sectors relative to a full auctioning scenario and thus increase competitiveness. However, none is imperatively effective at reducing Austria’s net carbon emissions: while the carbon trade balance is improved and hence leakage declines, the tradability of emission permits within the EU ETS allows CO₂ emissions from Austria’s ETS output to increase. A cost benefit analysis indicates that the two policies promoting domestic output and exports are more cost effective than the CO₂ input subsidy.     

Hot air for sale: a quantitative assessment of Russia’s near-term climate policy options

Since January 2005 the European Union has launched an EU-internal emissions trading scheme (EU ETS) for emission-intensive installations as the central pillar to comply with the Kyoto Protocol. The EU ETS will be linked to a Kyoto emissions market where greenhouse gas emission allowances of signatory Kyoto countries can be traded. In this paper we investigate the implications of Russian market power for environmental effectiveness and regional compliance costs to the Kyoto Protocol taking into account potential linkages between the Kyoto emissions market and the EU ETS. We find that Russia may have incentives to join the EU ETS as long as the latter remains relatively separated from the Kyoto international emissions market. In this case, Russia can exert monopolistic price discrimination between two separated markets thereby maximizing revenues from hot air sales. The EU will be able to substantially reduce compliance costs if it does not restrain itself to EU-internal emission regulation schemes. However, part of the gains from extra-EU emissions trading will come at the expense of environmental effectiveness as (more) hot air will be drawn in.      

Strategic partitioning of emission allowances under the EU Emission Trading Scheme

The EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is breaking new ground in the experience with emission trading regimes across multiple jurisdictions. Since the EU ETS covers only some industries, it implies a hybrid emission control scheme where EU member states must apply complementary domestic emissions regulation for the non-trading sectors of their economies in order to comply with their national emission reduction targets. The EU ETS thus opens up for strategic partitioning of national emissions budgets by the member states between trading and non-trading sectors. In this paper we examine the potential effects of such strategic behavior on compliance cost and emissions prices. We show that concerns on efficiency losses from strategic partitioning are misplaced. In turn, our analysis implicitly indicates significant political economy forces behind EU climate policy, as both cost-effective and strategically motivated partitioning of national emission budgets are far off from the actual break-down between trading and non-trading sectors.     

Higher Price,Lower Costs? Minimum Prices in the EU Emissions Trading Scheme

In this paper, we examine the introduction of a price floor in an emissions trading system (ETS) when some emissions are regulated outside the ETS. We theoretically characterize the conditions under which a price floor enhances welfare. Using a numerical simulation model of the European Union (EU), we find that moderate minimum prices in the EU ETS can reduce the costs of EU climate policy by up to 30 percent. We also find that, because of tax‐interaction effects, the optimal minimum price in the EU ETS should be about four times higher than the average marginal abatement cost in non‐ETS sectors.     

The Triple Inefficiency of Uncoordinated Environmental Policies

When pollution is transboundary and there is international trade, a domestic inefficiency may arise in addition to the well‐known inefficiencies at the international level. More precisely, there will be a Nash equilibrium in which each country chooses a policy that gives it lower welfare than would otherwise be possible given the emission levels of all countries. However, there will also be a Nash equilibrium in which each country chooses tradable emission quotas as its policy instrument to achieve its desired level of emissions. In this Nash equilibrium, welfare in each country is maximised given the emission levels of all countries.     

Is there a case for carbon-based border tax adjustment? An applied general equilibrium analysis

Concern that unilateral Greenhouse Gas (GHG) emission reductions could foster carbon leakage and undermine the international competitiveness of domestic industry has led to growing calls for carbon-based Border-Tax Adjustments (BTAs). This article uses a global general equilibrium model to assess the economic effects of BTAs and comes to three main conclusions. First, BTAs can reduce carbon leakage if the coalition of countries taking action to reduce GHG emissions is small, because in this case leakage (while typically small) mainly occurs through international trade competitiveness losses rather than through declines in world fossil fuel prices. Second, even though the economic effects of BTAs vary somewhat depending on how they are implemented, their welfare impact is typically small, and slightly negative at the world level. Third, and perhaps more strikingly, BTAs do not necessarily curb the output losses incurred by the domestic Energy Intensive-Industries (EIIs) they are intended to protect in the first place. This is in part because EIIs in industrialized countries make important use of carbon-intensive intermediate inputs produced by EIIs in other geographical areas. Another, deeper explanation is that EIIs are ultimately more adversely affected by the existence of a carbon price itself than by any international competitiveness losses. These findings are shown to be robust to key model parameters, country coverage, targets and design features of BTAs.     

Enforcement and environmental quality in a decentralized emission trading system

Should the powers of monitoring compliance and allocating tradeable emissions allowances be appointed to a unique supranational regulator or decentralized to several local regulators? To answer this question, we develop a two stage-two country game where environmental regulators set the amount of emission allowances and the level of monitoring effort to achieve full compliance while the regulated firms choose actual emissions and the number of permits to be held. Various, possibly conflicting, spillovers between countries arise in a decentralized setting. We show that decentralization is socially harmful if no asymmetry among institutional settings is introduced and can be suboptimal even when decentralization features lower monitoring costs than a centralized setting. Lower monitoring costs are therefore necessary, but not sufficient, to justify decentralization. Also, our analysis reveals that welfare can be higher under decentralization even if the corresponding environmental quality is worse than under centralization. Indeed, better environmental quality is sufficient but not necessary for higher welfare under decentralization. Finally, we discuss how these results can provide a theoretical rationale for the recent evolution of the EU ETS design.     

Addressing leakage in the EU ETS: Border adjustment or output-based allocation?

The EU ETS has been criticised for threatening the competitiveness of European industry and generating carbon leakage, i.e. increasing foreign greenhouse gas emissions. Two main options have been put forward to tackle these concerns: border adjustments and output-based allocation, i.e. allocation of free allowances in proportion to current production. We compare various configurations of these two options, as well as a scenario with full auctioning and no border adjustment. Against this background, we develop a model of the main sectors covered by the EU ETS: electricity, steel, cement and aluminium. We conclude that the most efficient way to tackle leakage is auctioning with border adjustment, which generally induces a negative leakage (a spillover). This holds even if the border adjustment does not include indirect emissions, if it is based on EU (rather than foreign) specific emissions, or (for some values of the parameters) if it covers only imports. Another relatively efficient policy is to combine auctioning in the electricity sector and output-based allocation in exposed industries, especially if free allowances are given both for direct and indirect emissions, i.e. those generated by the generation of the electricity consumed. Although output-based allocation is generally less effective than border adjustment to tackle leakage, it is more effective to mitigate production losses in the sectors affected by the ETS, which may ease climate policy adoption.     

The Competitive Advantage of Collaboration – Throwing New Light on The Nordic Model

ABSTRACT

In one of the most influential contributions to modern political economy, Hall and Soskice have launched a distinction between ‘liberal’ and ‘coordinated’ market economies, placing the Nordic countries firmly in the latter category. We argue that, while the H&S distinction may serve classificatory purposes, seeing the Nordic model in terms of ‘coordinated capitalism’ blurs the distinctive features of the Nordic countries’ success as productive and fair economies. We contend that the central formula behind this success lies in what we call the Nordic model’s ambidexterity – the capacity to combine collaborative and competitive elements and skilfully navigate between them. Using an interdisciplinary perspective (inspired by organisation theory, cultural semiotics and evolutionary analysis), we provide a conceptual basis for reinterpreting the Nordic Model as an ambidextrous combination of culturally rooted, collaborative strategies that are subsequently competitively exposed. The article illustrates the workings of this ambidexterity in three societal domains: work life (including female participation), resource management – illustrated by the Norwegian petro-economy – and international business management and regulation with a focus on CSR. In each case we will show how collaboration is intertwined with pragmatic competitive exposure, yielding high productivity, high welfare, as well as fair income and wealth distribution.     

欧盟碳排放交易发展最新趋势及其启示

欧盟碳排放交易体系是目前全球最完备、影响面最大的温室气体排放权交易市场,对其发展历程、有关经验教训的深入剖析,有助于指导我国的碳市场建立实践。通过对欧盟碳市场的发展历程、主要特点、市场效果等进行系统梳理,特别是对其最新动向与发展趋势进行了深入分析,并探讨欧盟碳市场的成功经验与不足之处,在此基础上,给出了对中国建立和发展碳排放交易体系的几点启示。     

Cap and trade to solve environmental problems ——an analysis of approach in the EU

Environmental problem is a global problem, which has been emphasized by many countries all over the world. To handle the climate change, international community has tried many means. This paper will focus on the approach called "cap and trade", and analyze its application in the EU—the EU Emissions Trading System (EU ETS). The effectiveness of the EU ETS in different phases will be analyzed in detail, as well as the benefits of the EU ETS comparing with other means of reducing greenhouse gas. It can be found that "cap and trade" is a successful mechanism to reduce the greenhouse gas s and other countries are supposed to learn from the experience of the EU ETS.     

The demand for skills and labour costs in partner countries

We analyse the consequences of trade integration in Europe (1995–2005) detecting how the labour costs in partner countries affect the domestic demand for high‐ and low‐skilled labour in ‘Old’ (EU‐15) and five ‘New’ EU member states. In general, independently of the skill level of workers, the results suggest complementarity between domestic and foreign labour. However, when we take into account the typology of sectors, the demand for the high skilled in low skill intensive sectors in ‘New’ EU members is boosted by the increase of the average labour cost in ‘Old’ EU members. Thus in low skill intensive sectors, the high skilled in ‘New’ member countries can substitute for employment in EU‐15 countries.     

A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements

In this paper we develop a model that uses a dynamic framework to analyze the process through which countries join international environmental agreements (IEAs). In the model, while all countries suffer from the same environmental damage as a result of total global emissions, non-signatory countries decide on their emission levels by maximizing their own welfare, whereas signatory countries decide on their emission levels by maximizing the aggregate welfare of all signatory countries. It is assumed that signatory countries will be able to punish non-signatories, at some cost to themselves. When countries decide on their pollution emissions, they account for the evolution of the stock of pollution over time. Moreover, we propose a mechanism to describe how countries reach a stable IEA. The model is able to capture situations characterized by partial cooperation within an IEA that is stable over time. It also captures situations where all countries participate in a stable agreement, and situations where no stable agreement is feasible. Where more than one possibility coexist, the long-term outcome of the game depends on the initial conditions (i.e., the initial number of signatory countries and pollution level).     

The Impact of Equity-preferences on the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

This paper uses a coalition formation model to explore how equity considerations affect countries’ cooperation on global environmental issues, e.g. on climate change. When developing countries are exempted from obligations to reduce their emissions, I find that opening them for abatement projects financed by industrialized countries changes the incentives to cooperate in a way which can increase emissions and decrease welfare. Equity- concerns in industrialized countries regarding the difference between their per capita emission levels and those of developing countries lead to increased abatement but do not qualitatively change the incentives to cooperate. Inequality-aversion with respect to differences to abatement targets across industrialized countries generally induces larger coalition sizes and stricter abatement. Here, the inclusion of developing countries improves upon the prospects of cooperation.     

Carbon Trading Reporting: The Case of Spanish Companies

Policy makers, scientists, industry leaders, and academicians all have debated how to restrain global warming and reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. Three main methods are used: command and control laws and regulations, carbon taxes, and cap and trade schemes. Recognizing the consequences of global warming, all Scandinavian countries introduced a carbon emissions tax in the 1990s. They also ratified the Kyoto Protocol that ran from 2005 through 2012. The European Union (EU) instituted a carbon trading scheme (Emissions Trading System (ETS)) in February 2005 when Kyoto became operative. The three Scandinavian EU members had two methods in place during the 2005–08 period to encourage GHG reduction: taxing and trading. Norway, not in the EU, used just taxes. The other EU members, including Spain, applied just the carbon trading ETS scheme to encourage compliance with the Kyoto Protocol. The fundamental issue addressed is this one: Did publicly held firms headquartered in Spain adequately report participation in the EU carbon emissions trading mechanism? Data to answer this question were obtained from the 2011 and 2012 annual reports for domestic Spanish public companies that received tradable emissions permits. In addition to assessing investor-owned firms’ disclosure posture, the specific method of reporting about carbon emissions permits, whether companies used, banked, or sold the permits granted by the government, also is reviewed. This empirical research effort reports on a complete survey of all available data for the two financial reporting periods that concluded the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol.     

Export,R&D and new products. a model and a test on European industries

In this article we extend the model developed by Bogliacino and Pianta (Industrial and Corporate Change 22 649, 2013, b) on the link between R&D, innovation and economic performance, considering the impact of innovation on export success. We develop a simultaneous three equation model in order to investigate the existence of a ‘virtuous circle’ between industries’ R&D, share of product innovators and export market shares. We investigate empirically – at the industry level – three key relationships affecting the dynamics of innovation and export performance: first, the capacity of firms to translate their R&D efforts in new products; second, the role of innovation as a determinant of export market shares; third, the export success as a driver of new R&D efforts. The model is tested for 38 manufacturing and service sectors of six European countries over three time periods, from 1995 to 2010. The model effectively accounts for the dynamics of R&D efforts, innovation and international performance of European industries. Moreover, important differences across countries emerge when we split our sample into a Northern group – Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom – and a Southern group – France, Italy and Spain. We find that the ‘virtuous circle’ between innovation and competitiveness holds for Northern economies only, while Southern industries fail to translate innovation efforts into export success.     

Normative Power Europe and the Moral Economy of Africa–EU Ties: A Conceptual Reorientation of ‘Normative Power’

‘Normative power’ is an increasingly popularised concept in the study of EU external relations in fields including military policy, human rights, and international trade. Defined by Manners, it acknowledges the normative foundations of the European project, examines how Europe acts to (re)shape internationally accepted norms, and makes the claim that Europe ought to influence external partners' conception of ‘normal’ behaviour in pursuit of a just global order. This article, however, argues that a moral economy perspective is central to a critical reorientation of the concept of normative power towards appraisal of discrepancies between nominal EU norms and material EU policy outcomes. Examining Europe's ‘normative power’ in its relations with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries, it demonstrates how a moral economy of ACP–EU ties has been instituted in negotiation with European ethical norms as to solidarity with ‘the poor’. Nevertheless, the moral economy of ACP–EU ties is seen not to be ‘moral’ in terms of outcomes for vulnerable citizens in ACP countries. Rather the embedding of moral norms concerning pro-poor ‘development’ has rationalised asymmetric economic ties. ‘Normative power’ is understood as the EU's utilisation of moral norms in the public legitimisation and self-rationalisation of geopolitical interest and commercial gain in its relations with external ‘partners’.     

Technology transfers and the clean development mechanism in a North–South general equilibrium model

This paper analyses the potential welfare gains of introducing a technology transfer from Annex I to non-Annex I in order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. Our analysis is based on a numerical general equilibrium model for a world-economy comprising two regions; North (Annex I) and South (non-Annex I). In a cooperative equilibrium, a technology transfer from the North to the South is clearly desirable from the perspective of a ‘global social planner’, since the welfare gain for the South outweighs the welfare loss for the North. However, if the regions do not cooperate, then the incentives to introduce the technology transfer appear to be relatively weak from the perspective of the North; at least if we allow for Southern abatement in the pre-transfer Nash equilibrium. Finally, by adding the emission reductions associated with the Kyoto agreement, our results show that the technology transfer leads to higher welfare in both regions.     

On Emissions Trading and Market Structure: Cap-and-Trade versus Intensity Standards

This paper examines the interdependence between imperfect competition and emissions trading. We particularly analyze the long run equilibrium in a two-sector (‘clean’ and ‘dirty’) model with Cournot competition among firms who face a fixed cost of production. The clean sector is defined as the sector with the highest long run cost margin on emissions. We compare the welfare implications of a cap-and-trade scheme with an emissions trading scheme based on relative intensity standards. It is shown that a firm’s long run equilibrium output in the clean or dirty sector does not depend on the emissions trading format, but only depends on the fixed cost of producing in the respective sector. Intensity standards can result in clean firms selling allowances to dirty firms, or dirty firms selling to clean firms. The former outcome yields higher welfare. It is demonstrated that cap-and-trade outperforms the intensity-based trading scheme in terms of long run welfare with free entry and exit. With intensity standards the size of the clean sector is too large.