Consultations and the ECB as prudential regulator: enhancing legitimacy?

ABSTRACT

This paper examines whether the ECB’s consultations, imposed by the SSM Regulation, enhance legitimacy in terms of openness, transparency, inclusiveness, efficacy and judicial accountability. The paper argues that the ECB has, in general, established a solid consultation practice. However, although there is a need for efficacy, the lack of a profound feedback statement, the low participation rate of groups other than the sector actors, and weak judicial review can be considered to constitute its Achilles’ heel. Thus, while in theory the consultation obligation leads to more throughput legitimacy, reality has turned out to be far more complex.     

Learning from Japan: The European Central Bank and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis

What shapes central banks’ learning from the policy experiments of their peers? Both economic ideas and organizational interests play important roles. Thus, New Keynesian ideas led central banks to interpret Japan's experience with quantitative easing (2001–2006) through the impact on risk spreads, although the Japanese central bank never intended such effects. In turn, scholars and policy-makers alike ignored one critical lesson: successful policy innovations depend on banks’ funding models. It is argued here that this was a crucial omission because the shift to market-based funding impairs the effectiveness of the traditional crisis toolkit. Central banks must intervene directly in asset markets of systemic importance for funding conditions, as the Bank of Japan did by buying government bonds. Hence, market-based finance engenders a trade-off between financial stability and institutional stability defined through central bank independence. During critical periods, central banks cannot preserve both. The ECB illustrates this trade-off well. Early in the crisis, it outsourced financial stability to a (largely) market-dependent banking system to protect its independence. With the introduction of Outright Monetary Transactions in September 2012, the Bank recognized that the market-based nature of European banking required outright purchases of sovereign bonds. This new instrument gave the ECB additional powers to shape national fiscal decisions in the name of an independence that no longer has theoretical justifications.     

Market reaction to supranational banking supervision in Europe: Do firm- and country-specific factors matter?

This paper investigates the financial market´s perception regarding the effectiveness of the Single Supervisory Mechanism in Europe. Do investors believe that centralized supervision adds value compared to multiple supervision? . Do they feel uncertain about the supervisory role of the ECB? To answer these questions, a sample of 118 European Banks has been used finding that whereas in early dates the market reaction was positive reflecting the expectation of greater stability, it turned negative at the time the scope of the supervision was limited to only a group of banks. As might be expected, the reaction is significantly more negative for the directly supervised entities, anticipating a different and more demanding style of supervision that could lead to higher cost. This negative wealth effect is intensified for banks with higher price-to-book ratios or those located in countries with more developed financial systems and better investor protection. However, solvency and productivity firm indicators or low levels of perceived corruption moderate it. This research not only highlights the doubts and uncertainty of investors about the final applications of the SSM, but it could be also useful for policy makers and regulators in order to achieve a more harmonized supervision that improves the credibility of the systems and promote financial stability.

     

On the Effects of Asset Purchase Programs on Emerging Stock Markets

ABSTRACT

It is well documented that there has been a relationship between stock markets and unconventional monetary policies. However, most research concentrates on developed economies and analyzes the effects of shocks from such polices on stock prices. This paper is different from this research in that we investigate the impact of surprises from the Fed’s and the ECB’s announcements on the stock returns and volatility in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries using GARCH models. We find that a positive surprise associated with a fall in the U.S. Treasury yield causes an increase in ADX returns. We show significant effects of the ECB’s shocks on price returns. In particular, announcement that induces a decline in yield spreads in Italian sovereign bonds leads to higher stock prices. We also document a significant impact of surprises both by the Fed and ECB on volatility. However, the estimates are mixed. We note that volatility went down in response to the ECB’s policies, while they increased after the Fed’s asset purchases. Finally, when we distinguish surprises by their sign, the GJR-GARCH model estimates indicate that the effect on the volatility which is, perhaps surprisingly, symmetric for both types of news.     

Corporate governance and efficiency in banking: evidence from emerging economies

ABSTRACT

This article investigates the impact of corporate governance on bank efficiency across a sample of 139 commercial banks from 17 countries of Central and Eastern Europe during the period 2005–2012. Data on governance characteristics are hand-collected from banks’ reports. The empirical findings indicate that implementing rigorous corporate governance structures is associated with higher costs for banks and a lower level of efficiency. However, during the crisis, a tight governance mechanism significantly increases banks’ cost and technical efficiencies. We also show that prudent risk management is associated with both higher cost and technical efficiency for more capitalized banks, while rigid supervisory boards are linked with greater technical efficiency for more capitalized banks.     

Are monetary policy shocks causal to bank health? Evidence from the euro area

Despite considerable efforts of the European Central Bank (ECB) to support bank intermediation after the 2008 financial crisis, the recovery of euro area banks remained incomplete. Although many studies indicate that central banks can influence the stock prices of firms through their policy actions and communication, a knowledge gap exists as to whether the ECB's monetary policy can influence bank health. Through a high-frequency identification approach, this study reveals that the causal effect of conventional monetary policy action and communication by the ECB on bank stock prices differed over time, whereas its influence on bank financing costs was robust. This study provides new evidence showing that information effects related to policy easing surprises in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis hampered the ECB efforts to improve bank health and that its Odyssean communication signals (related to forward-looking announcements of policy easing) supported bank health during this phase. Local projections suggest that the response of banks to monetary policy shocks displayed some persistence, where ECB policy surprises and communications that shifted up (down) the yield curve were normally positive (negative) for bank health. The findings solicit a new perspective when assessing the influence of the ECB's monetary policy measures on euro area banks.     

Doing Away with the Sovereign: Neoliberalism and the Promotion of Market Discipline in European Economic Governance

ABSTRACT

This article proposes a critical reading of market discipline and its limitations as a mechanism in European economic governance. Consistent with neoliberal beliefs about market-based governance, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is premised on the functioning of the government bond market as a fiscal-policy discipliner. However, the operation of market discipline requires that neither governments nor their private creditors can rely on an authority to bail them out. It, therefore, precludes the kinds of intervention by Eurozone’s supranational institutions witnessed during the euro crisis. In the post-crisis context, efforts to strengthen market discipline continue to be frustrated by the growing reliance of financial institutions on government bond markets as well as the European Central Bank’s (ECB) active participation in those markets. Having undermined the credibility of the market as an autonomous and apolitical mechanism of discipline, European economic governance struggles to come to terms with the rise of a supranational ‘economic sovereign’ in the Eurozone.     

What matters when? The impact of ECB communication on financial market expectations

This article analyses financial markets’ reaction to European Central Bank's (ECB) communication. We apply a novel indicator that quantifies the contents of the ECB's introductory statements and allows disentangling ECB statements on prices, the real and the monetary sector. We provide evidence that it matters what issue the ECB is speaking about: especially, the ECB's statements on price developments represent important news to financial markets. It also matters when the ECB affects markets: communication drives maturities above 4 months.     

The Myth of Market Neutrality: A Comparative Study of the European Central Bank’s and the Swiss National Bank’s Corporate Security Purchases

ABSTRACT

Monetary policy operations in corporate security markets confront central banks with choices that are traditionally perceived to be the prerogative of governments. This article investigates how central bankers legitimise corporate security purchases through a comparative study of the European Central Bank (ECB) and the Swiss National Bank (SNB). As we show, central bankers downplay the novelty of corporate security purchases by relying on familiar pre-crisis justifications of Central Bank Independence. Citing an ideal of ‘market neutrality’, central banks present corporate security purchases as pursuing a narrow objective of price stability and obfuscate their distributive consequences. In this way, central bankers depoliticise corporate security purchases: they reduce the potential for choice, collective agency, and deliberation concerning both the pursuit of corporate security purchases and the choices made in implementing these policies. We also describe the undesirable democratic, social and environmental dimensions of these practices, which we propose to address through enhanced democratic accountability.     

What is on the ECB’s mind? Monetary policy before and after the global financial crisis

This paper analyzes the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB) both before and after the outbreak of the global financial crisis in 2008. In the literature, researchers typically select one Taylor rule-based model to analyze monetary policy of central banks and to derive determinants for the interest rate setting. However, uncertainty about the choice of this respective model is typically neglected. In contrast, we apply a Bayesian model averaging (BMA) approach to extend the Taylor rule to account for model uncertainty driven by heterogeneity in the ECB’s decision-making body, the Governing Council. Our results suggest the following: First, the ECB focuses on the inflation rate when setting interest rates. Second, economic activity indicators were in the focus of the ECB before the financial crisis. Third, over the last decade, the role of economic activity decreased, indicating that inflation is the main driver of monetary policy decisions in the post-crisis period. Fourth, when setting interest rates, central bankers appear to consider more than one model.     

The negative side of inflation targeting: revisiting inflation uncertainty in the EMU

ABSTRACT

This article tests the Friedman–Ball hypothesis for the European Monetary Union (EMU) countries, using a GARCH methodology. The empirical results show a positive relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty, largely supportive of the Friedman–Ball hypothesis. Furthermore, the ECB’s price stability mandate is found to have asymmetric, if not limited, effects on inflation uncertainty since 1999, with the findings different for the so-called peripheral countries when compared to the core. For the majority of the EMU countries, shifts away from the 2% target served to increase inflation uncertainty. The credibility of the ECB since the financial crisis, in attempting to meet its 2% inflation target has seen inflation uncertainty increase for some, likely driven by inflation failing to re-anchor. Furthermore, recent periods of deflation are found to generate inflation uncertainty, with short-term price variability increasing in line with observed negative price growth for the majority of the EMU countries. The results are supportive of a U-shaped relationship between inflation and inflation uncertainty. Using spline techniques, we formally provide support for such a U-shaped relation where inflation uncertainty broadly increases below a certain threshold for each country’s inflation rate. Asymmetric effects across countries are found in the level of this threshold.     

How the ECB and the US Fed set interest rates

Monetary policies of the European Central Bank (ECB) and US Fed can be characterized by ‘Taylor rules’, that is both central banks seem to be setting rates by taking into account the ‘output gap’ and inflation. We also set up and tested Taylor rules which incorporate money growth and the euro–dollar exchange rate, thereby improving the ‘fit’ between actual and Taylor rule based rates. In general, Taylor rules appear to be a much better way of describing Fed policy than ECB policy. Simulations suggest that the ECB's short-term interest rates have been at a much lower level in the last 2 years compared with what a Taylor rule would suggest.     

Balancing market liquidity: Bank Structural Reform caught between growth and stability

Abstract

The European Commission’s proposal for a Bank Structural Reform (BSR) aimed at increasing banks’ resolvability through separating risky trading activities from deposit-taking institutions. In contrast to initial plans, the final proposal exempted market-making activities of banks. This exemption, we argue, was brought about by the Commission’s discursive framing of the BSR as a balancing act between stability and growth. Coupled with the incapacity to unambiguously measure the effects of the reform on market liquidity and on growth, this pushed the assessment of market-making from the technical to the political realm, leading to a reproduction of the prevalent market-based banking system.     

Money and the ‘Level Playing Field’: The Epistemic Problem of European Financial Market Integration

ABSTRACT

Financial market integration processes in the European Union (EU) are characterised by an epistemic problem of economic theory. This problem encompasses what ‘the market’ is, how it is to be ‘integrated’, and the nature and role of ‘money’ as infrastructure of the fully integrated market. The EU’s legal framework has imported this epistemic problem along with the competitive conception of the market as described in economic theory – as a ‘level playing field’ for private exchange, under free, fair and ideally unrestrained competition. It manifests itself in European financial market integration processes, as exemplified in the article, via two otherwise disconnected areas of European Central Bank (ECB) activity: (a) the provision of central bank credit for the purpose of financial transaction settlement in the Eurozone; and (b) the conduct of ordinary monetary policy in the Eurozone. While the problem can be stabilised through legal, technical and other means, it remains latent, and may manifest itself again in unexpected ways, as happened in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis. Thus, contrary to ideologies that are widely understood as more or less coherent systems of doctrines, epistemic problems are characterised by specific tensions, contradictions and conceptual uncertainties.     

Central bank communication on fiscal policy

The issue of central bank communication on fiscal policy has so far received very little attention in the literature. This article aims to shed light on the determinants of central bank communication on fiscal policy by analysing the intensity of central banks’ fiscal communication for five central banks (the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England and the Swedish Riksbank) over the period 1999–2011. The ECB communicates intensively on fiscal policies, in a normative way. The other central banks emphasise foreign fiscal developments, fiscal policy as input to forecasts, or the use of government debt instruments in monetary policy operations. The empirical analysis indicates that the financial crisis has overall increased the intensity of central bank communication on fiscal policy. The evolution of the government deficit ratio is a driver of the intensity of fiscal communication in the euro area, the US and Japan, and for Sweden since the start of the crisis, while in the UK its intensity is related to government debt developments as of the start of the crisis.     

Has the ECB’s monetary policy prompted companies to invest,or pay dividends?

This paper focuses on the influence of the European Central Bank’s (ECB) monetary policies on non-financial firms. It sheds light on non-financial firms’ decisions regarding leverage, and on how the ECB’s conventional and unconventional policies may have affected them. The paper also examines how these policies influenced non-financial firms’ decisions on capital allocation – primarily capital spending and shareholder distribution (for example, dividends and share repurchases). We use an exhaustive and unique dataset comprised of income statements and balance sheets of leading non-financial firms operating in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). The main results suggest that ECB’s monetary policies have encouraged firms to raise their debt burden, especially after the global recession of 2008. Finally, the ECB’s policies, especially after 2011, also seem to have led non-financial firms to allocate more resources not just to capital spending but to shareholder distribution as well.     

Bank ownership structure,lending corruption and the regulatory environment

We empirically examine whether bank lending corruption is influenced by the ownership structure of banks, a country’s regulatory environment and its level of economic development. We find that corruption in lending is higher when state-owned banks or family-owned banks provide a higher proportion of credit to the economy, in both developed and developing countries. A stronger regulatory environment, either through a stronger supervisory regime or a higher quality of external audits, helps to curtail bank lending corruption if induced by family-controlled ownership, but not if induced by state-controlled ownership. We further find that controlled-ownership of banks by other banks contributes to reduce corruption in lending; the same applies to widely-held ownership of banks, but only for developed countries.     

The Repo Auctions of the European Central Bank and the Vanishing Quota Puzzle*

Until June 2000 the European Central Bank (ECB) used fixed rate tenders for its weekly repo auctions. A switch to variable rate tenders became necessary due to massive overbidding by banks. In this paper we introduce a stylized game among banks to investigate this overbidding phenomenon. Our results confirm the weakness of the fixed rate tender format and indicate that the ECB's liquidity management has significantly improved since the switch to the variable rate system. Yet recent episodes of rate cut expectations suggest that the ECB's practice of setting a minimum bid rate should be abandoned in favor of a more symmetric interest rate target.