The incidence of metropolitan property tax base sharing and rate equalization

The incidence of metropolitan property tax base sharing and rate equalization is analyzed in a two-jurisdiction model of a metropolitan economy. Analytical results indicate how the effects of this reform proposal can be separated into efficiency gains, redistributions among metropolitan residents, and redistributions among residents and nonresidents of the metropolitan area; the effects of enactment on suburban housing prices are also analyzed. Numerical results suggest that enactment of metropolitan base sharing and rate equalization would result in fairly small efficiency gains even with significant factor reallocations and would be accompanied by sizable income redistributions among city and suburban landowners.     

Community Classification and Growth in Effective Property Tax Rates: A Case Study of Rate Divergence in 39 Rhode Island Towns

Abstract . A multiple regression analysis of cross-sectional data for 39 Rhode Island towns indicates that variation in the level of effective property tax rates among communities can be substantially explained. The determinants are a community's population density, median family income, real property per capita, and the ratio of commercial to total property tax, revenue. Population density serves as a criterion for judging the “cityness” (1) of a community, that is, its degree of urbanization. A positive relationship exists between population density and effective property tax rate. Communities with the highest population density tend to have the highest tax rates. This relationship is shown in each analyzed year. Covariance analysis applied to the regression coefficients for the various years reveals a significant change in the population density coefficient. This coefficient change indicates a divergence in effective property tax rates among city, suburban, and rural communities.     

Market power of large cities and policy differences in metropolitan areas

When a single city, the ‘central city’, has a large share of the metropolis population, it will influence housing prices in other, smaller cities, the ‘suburbs’. This market power leads to differences in government policy and property values between the central city and suburbs even when residents and amenities in the two regions are identical. When the central city's government is controlled by property-owning residents, its property tax rate exceeds the rate in the suburbs. The central city will also have lower property values than suburbs.     

An Address by a Georgist Sympathizer: Practical Issues in Georgist Thought

The justice and soundness of the taxation of land rent is acknowledged but problems in assessing imply a need to introduce better methods. This is particularly true when attempting to introduce the more saleable idea of two-rate tax systems because the allocation of total value of real estate parcels between land and buildings is even more arbitrarily done than determining the total assessment. The ideas fit best at the local level and there is little chance of replacing income or sales taxes. A 100% tax would be impossible since it would lead to an avalanche of tax appeals and the abandonment of some land since a high percentage of assessments are in error. The idea of a single tax does not fit modern times when revenue needs determine taxes, rather than the amount of revenue collected determining proper or necessary government expenditure levels. One tax source may be unpopular and regarded as a dangerous concept. Land is probably less important and less relatively valuable than it used to be because of technological change. Some advances in social legislation may mitigate the need for the drastic reform, George who was a moralist deeply concerned about poverty, felt reform was needed in his day. He was right about the impacts of various taxes on economic activity and income distribution.     

Henry George and the Institution of Private Property in Land: A Property Rights Approach

Abstract . Conflicting statements concerning whether the implementation of Henry George's single tax proposal would destroy the institution of private property in land have appeared in the literatures of economics and other disciplines. A number of writers have implied that the taxation of Ricardian rent is equivalent to land nationalization. In the main, followers of George have denied that the single tax would abolish private property in land. Their claim is based on the fact that land titles would remain in private hands under the single tax. Since the whole question of private property is beset with ideological difficulties, a property rights approach is applied to this issue in an attempt to resolve the controversy. The conclusions are that the actual implementation of George's system would not destroy private property in land and that it is incorrect to equate the single tax with land nationalization.     

Property tax and urban sprawl: Theory and implications for US cities

We develop a model that adopts a log-linear utility function with a variable elasticity of substitution greater than one and show that increasing the property tax reduces city size unambiguously. We then test this result using a dataset of effective property tax rates we developed using GIS methods for 448 urbanized areas. The empirical analysis estimates a regression equation relating an urbanized area's size to the property tax rate measure and other control variables such as population, income, agricultural rent, and transportation expenditure. We find that higher property taxes indeed result in smaller cities.     

Absentee Ownership of Farmland and State and Local Tax Policy: Income Tax Promotes Absenteeism, But the Property Tax Can Be Used to Strengthen Family Farms

Abstract . The incentive effects of state and local tax policies in promoting or inhibiting the ownership of farmland by non-operators are evaluated. Previous research on the economic, social and environmental effects of absentee ownership is reviewed as well as evidence regarding the impact of tax laws on absentee owners versus owner-operators. The Federal tax laws, it is found, work to increase land prices, reduce entry into farming by young farmers, and increase absentee ownership. State income tax policies may reinforce these effects. Property tax policies, on the other hand, may counteract income tax laws by giving tax relief preferentially to owner-operators. Several modifications of property tax relief programs are suggested.     

Income taxes and urban spatial structure

This paper examines the impact of an income tax in a monocentric city where households equilibriate their allocation of time between work, commuting, and leisure. An increase in the income tax rate lowers the implicit value of time, and hence transportation costs. “Compensated equilibrium” comparative statics analysis shows that under certain conditions, this results in a larger, more dispersed urban area, with lower land rents at the city center and less population within any given distance from the center. The welfare effect of an income tax rate change is also studied, and an expression for the marginal excess burden is derived. The income tax produces welfare losses both because it induces substitution in favor of leisure and in favor of travel—the latter accompanied by excessive spatial dispersion and consumption of space. The marginal excess burden depends not only on the compensated demand elasticity for leisure, but also on that for space. Finally, the problem of benefit measurement for transportation projects in this tax-distorted spatial economy is examined. Benefit measures should be deflated to adjust for the fact that further transportation improvements lead to reduction of land use intensity, exacerbating the problem of spatial resource misallocation in an already excessively dispersed urban area.     

Federal Income Tax Reform in the United States: How Did It Happen? What Did It Do? Where Do We Go from Here?

Abstract . The 16th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution in 1913 provided the legal basis for progressive federal income taxes. They now yield revenues of about $450 billion annually. Tax base erosion eventually produced a levy in serious violation of norms of allocation efficiency, distributional equity, and macroeconomic performance. Vested private interests influenced legislators by propaganda and campaign contributions to minimize their tax burdens at the expense of less wealthy taxpayers. The result was an irrational and badly flawed tax structure. In 1981 the maximum marginal tax rate on income from property and wealth was significantly reduced along with other bracket reductions. The income tax reform movement culminated in 1984 to 1986. It expanded the base of the tax while reducing marginal rates as well as brackets, with little change in the distribution of the burden among different income groups but achieving some greater equity in tax liabilities for those with similar incomes.     

Property Tax Assessment Reform: A Source of Local Revenue Windfall or Fiscal Retrenchment

Abstract . Researchers, state officials and taxpayers have often speculated that property tax assessment reform would lead to an increase in the overall tax burden. They contend that, given the large non-discretionary increase in the tax base during the reform, local governments can raise more resources without increasing the nominal tax rate. An empirical analysis of 74 towns in New York supports that position. However, two types of tax shifts that occurred in the wake of reassessment—interclass shifts of tax burden to the owners of residential propertieskovn the other property classes and intra-class shifts observed among residential property owners—have caused significant moderation in this pattern of local government behavior. Therefore, tax reform, while it bestows revenue windfalls upon some local governments, may require fiscal retrenchment by others.     

Siting noxious facilities: A siting lottery with victim compensation

This paper proposes a scheme to facilitate the siting of noxious facilities. A regional government announces that it will (a) use a lottery to choose a site for a noxious facility and (b) transfer income from tenants to host-city landowners to at least partly offset the effects of the noxious facility on local property values. The government will hold the lottery only if all citizens agree, in advance, to abide by the resulting siting decision. The lottery approach is superior to the conventional approach to siting (advance notification) in the sense that the lottery approach achieves unanimous support for the siting decision with less compensation. The compensation scheme can be financed with a regionwide tenant tax or a tax on residents in the nonhost city. For “small” compensation programs, the nonhost tax is superior to the regional tax.     

Capitalization,population movement,and the local public sector: a probabilistic analysis

Using data collected from household interviews in a 1965 San Francisco Bay Area Transportation Study, a probabilistic model is developed to explain the relationship between population movement and the capitalization of changes in the public sector in the price of housing. This model is constructed to compare 2 competing explanations for the flight of higher income households to the suburbs: 1) the accessibility model and 2) the flight from blight model. The accessibility model explains the decay of cities as a natural outgrowth of decreasing transportation costs, whereas the flight from blight model suggests that the wealthy leave the central city for the suburbs because of urban decay. An analysis of the San Francisco data demonstrates that high income households are more sensitive than the rest of the population to changes in the median income of the neighborhood and in expenditures and general government and education, but less sensitive to changes in property tax rate and expenditures on public safety, parks, and recreation. It is unlikely that undesirable changes in the public sector will result in a mass exodus of higher income households; capitalization in the price of housing appears sufficient to prevent this. The 2 models combined help explain the flight from the central cities, while the combined variables increase the logit estimation's prediction of bids for housing.     

Simplified Alonso–Mills–Muth model with a monopoly vendor

One important but unrealistic assumption in the simplified Alonso–Mills–Muth (AMM(0)) model is that the composite good is ubiquitous and thus there is zero shopping cost for residents. This paper assumes that the composite good is only sold by a monopoly vendor inside the city and hence a shopping cost is inevitable for residents. It is shown that the vendor will locate at the city boundary in equilibrium. In contrast to the symmetric land rent pattern in the AMM(0) model, the current AMM(k) model offers an asymmetric land rent pattern in equilibrium. Moreover, this paper shows that a rent-maximizing government either regulates the vendor to locate at the central business district (CBD) (when income is high) or does not enact any regulation (when income is low).     

Property Tax Circuit-breakers: Good Causes but Bad Economics

A bstract . Since 1965, 30 states and the District of Columbia have enacted programs designed to reduce the effective rate of property taxation for some low income households and for the elderly. Most often this relief is provided by so-called "circuit-breakers." It is contended that the economic arguments favoring circuit-breakers are empirically unproven and theoretically suspect. The tax may be progressive , not regressive , and the device may transfer income from low to high income households. Any short run redistribution of income to favor the poor or the elderly would, in the long run, merely shift the timing of their tax payments. Circuit-breakers encourage over-consumption of housing and misallocation of housing resources. Reducing the tax base, they produce higher rates and so increase the tax burden.     

Property taxation and the demand for housing: An econometric analysis

There is disagreement among economists regarding the effect of a local increase in property taxation on the housing market. In defining the price of housing services studies of the demand for housing have treated the property tax exclusively as an excise tax on housing consumption. Two recent theoretical developments suggest this is a misrepresentation of the tax. One theory holds that the excise effects of property taxation may be shifted backward to the factors employed in the production of housing. The other theory concludes that the property tax is not an excise, but rather serves as an efficient price for local public services. To investigate these hypotheses, data from the Annual Housing Survey were employed to estimate a housing demand model which included the net effective property tax rate among the set of independent variables. In addition to revealing the property tax-housing demand relationship, the model provides more reliable estimates of income and price elasticities by eliminating specification errors found in previous studies. Results indicate that the property tax reduces the housing consumption of central city homeowners, but does not distort the suburban housing market.     

Income taxes and the destination of movers to multistate MSAs

We examine how differences in state income tax rates, as well as other state and local taxes and public service expenditures, influence the choice of state of residence for households (federal tax filers) moving into multistate metropolitan areas (MSAs) using data from the IRS on the migration of taxpayers. MSAs that are on borders provide a spatial discontinuity—discrete differences in state tax rates within a single labor market. These MSAs allow residents to live in one state and work in another state. We find that differences in state income tax rates have a significant impact on the relative rate of migration to the states within an MSA. However, contrary to what would be expected, this impact is only significant in MSAs in which the filing state is based on employment (states without reciprocity) and not for those states in which the filing state is the state of residence (states with reciprocity). In MSAs where states do not have reciprocity agreements, a difference of ten percent in tax rates leads to a 4.1 percent difference in the relative rate of incoming taxpayers. Analogously, we find that a ten percent difference in state tax rates in these MSAs results in a 3.3 percent difference in the rate of tax base inflow (AGI). Our results suggest that one reason that differences in state income taxes appear to have more impact in multistate MSAs without reciprocity is that only relatively large differences in state income tax rates have any impact on migration and these differences are much more pronounced in MSAs without reciprocity.     

Property Tax Circuit Breakers Reconsidered: Continuing Issues Surrounding a Popular Program

A bstract . Property tax circuit-breaker programs—provision for tax relief for selected groups of the population believed to be adversely affected by rising state and local taxation on residences—exist in 30 states and the District of Columbia. They are still in controversy. The best available evidence on some of the basic issues being debated is considered in an effort to evaluate their policy implications. The device is found to be desirable and, if the residential property tax were regressive in certain respects, a move in the direction of tax equity. "Current income" is found more useful in determining eligibility; net worth tests would be difficult to apply. Relief for tax burdens above an acceptable share of household income is preferable to one based on a sliding scale formula. However, the tendency dearly is to liberalize benefits. This creates the danger of eroding the tax base.     

Local public goods and the demand for high-income municipalities

Affluent towns often deliver high-quality public services to their residents. I estimate the willingness to pay to live in a high-income suburb, above and beyond the demand of wealthy neighbors, by measuring changes in housing prices across city–suburban borders as the income disparity between the two municipalities changes over time. I find that a $10,000 increase in town-level median income is associated with a seven percent increase in housing values at the border. The estimated demand for high-income municipalities is primarily driven by school quality and lower property tax rates.     

Do Urban Tax Rates Converge?

A bstract . Using a multiple regression model that seeks to explain why tax rates vary, the hypothesis is tested that similarly sized cities with similar economic functions would tend to have property tax rates that converged. What variations there are in an array of urban tax rates of 20 cities in the 100,000 to 200,000 class seem to be explained by density of settlement and by the extent to which non-property tax sources bulk importantly in total urban revenues. The inference is drawn that convergence is in fact observable. Convergence would, of course, imply tax competition as among these cities.     

Curing Slums: The Jane Jacobs Way and the Henry George Way

Henry George and Jane Jacobs were both self‐taught public figures who shared an appreciation of the density, productivity, diversity, and cultural creativity of big cities. A century separated them, during which architects and planners designed cities according to abstract principles, but George and Jacobs expected the creative potential of a city to emerge from its inhabitants, not from a central planner. Although the interests and concerns of George and Jacobs overlapped on only a few topics, they both believed that slum dwellers could solve their own problems, given the right tools. For Jacobs, the solution to dilapidated housing lay not in bulldozing neighborhoods, but in rehabilitating them through a process she called “unslumming,” a gradual process of self‐improvement that has at times been accused of being gentrification. Henry George offered a different solution, involving taxation of land values, one that did not focus on particular neighborhoods and thus avoided the paradox that local improvements would raise the price of real estate too high for local residents to stay. An example is given of how George's solution actually worked in the Rosslyn neighborhood of Arlington, Virginia. In this case, no change in tax policy was needed to bring about a local economic renaissance in the 1960s, merely the realignment of property assessments that correctly reflected the actual value of land.