我国商业银行的竞争格局分析

随着我国加入世贸组织保护期限的结束,我国银行业已经全面开放,外资银行将和中资银行在同一市场规则下直接参与市场竞争,促使我国银行业的竞争格局发生重大变化.本文对当前我国银行业的行业竞争环境进行分析,为银行业战略制定者提供一点参考.     

我国商业银行的竞争格局分析

随着我国加入世贸组织保护期限的结束,我国银行业已经全面开放,外资银行将和中资银行在同一市场规则下直接参与市场竞争,促使我国银行业的竞争格局发生重大变化。本文对当前我国银行业的行业竞争环境进行分析,为银行业战略制定者提供一点参考。     

基于可竞争市场理论构建民航业价格约束机制研究

我国民航业规制改革是典型的渐进式改革,至今仍未建立起完善的价格约束机制。可竞争市场理论对于美国航空业放松规制起到了重要作用,同样可以指导中国民航业的规制改革。依据该理论,降低进入壁垒,增加行业的可竞争性是构建我国民航业运输价格约束机制的关键。     

保险业竞争格局

<正> 目前我国保险产业正处于开发和深化的高增长阶段。2001年,全国保险公司年保费收入为2109亿元。从1997年至2001期间,全国保险公司年保费收入的年平均增长率达到18％。这一增长率远高于同期7％～8％的经济增长率。同一期间,保险公司的资产总量也从1725亿元增长到4591亿元,年均增长率达到将近28％。保险产业的高速发展将在市场扩容和机构投资理念形成等方面对我国资本市场产生深远影响。90年代以来,发达国家如美国的养老保险基金,人寿和财产保险基金占GDP的比例达到90％～150％,形成了一笔巨大的社会     

我国担保业市场结构及区域竞争格局演变研究

自1992年开始探索建立中小企业信用担保体系至今,我国担保行业走过了近二十年的历程.在中央和各级政府的关心支持下,我国信用担保行业的基本制度、运行规则、运行模式和业务操作规范已基本建立并趋于成熟,并已初步形成了一个特定的行业.随着担保业的快速发展,担保行业的市场结构及竞争格局的演变成为政府、企业及研究人员关注的热点,本文就我国担保行业的市场结构及区域竞争格局演变进行研究,以期对我国担保业未来发展方向提供参考.     

我国工业区域竞争格局演进分析

工业化是人类生产方式的重大变革,它的发展道路绝对不可能是平坦的。新中国成立60多年来,我国工业区域布局走过了一条从均衡到不均衡再到统筹协调的发展道路,工业区域竞争格局也随之呈现出从沿海向内地扩散再到各区域之间竞相发展的态势,表现出不断趋于均衡的变化特征,促使区域经济差距不断缩小。研究和提升我国工业区域竞争力,不仅需要深入了解我国工业区域竞争格局的历史演变过程,而且还需要弄清楚不断变动和演进的重要特征。只有这样,才能对我国工业区域竞争趋势做出准确的判断。     

哈萨克斯坦石油行业竞争格局分析

本文在分析哈萨克斯坦石油行业现状的基础上,对上游勘探开发市场的竞争趋势、中游原油管道外输能力与运输成本以及劳务许可的规定进行了研究,认为哈萨克斯坦石油上游市场竞争激烈,已形成垄断格局,中游的原油外输管道油源不足,同时外国公司间还存在着潜在的劳务许可的竞争,文章就此提出了相关的建议。     

股票市场运行效率问题研究

本文从信息效率，资金配置效率，交易速度等方面分析我国股市运动效率，并结合股市场现状，提出完善我国证券市场，提高市场效率的政策建议。     

我国民航业对区域平衡发展的贡献

改革开放以来,我国经济取得了长远稳定的发展,但是随着经济的迅速增长,地区经济发展不平衡已成为制约我国经济发展的瓶颈之一。民航业在改革开放以来发展极为迅速,目前我国已成为世界民航大国之一,在其发展过程中,不仅拉动了交通运输网络的完善,还带动了旅游业的发展,并在一定程度上促进了产业结构的优化升级,此外,民航业对带动就业也有着不可小觑的作用。尤其是在我国的边远地区,民航业在这些方面的带动作用尤其明显。     

锂电池行业全球竞争格局分析

锂电池指的是锂离子电池,这是一种充电电池,通过锂离子在两极之间的移动来实现供能.当前锂电池已经成为现代高性能电池的代表.早在上个世纪七十年代的时候,锂电池就已经诞生,为了顺应绿色环保的时代发展趋势,锂电池性能的也朝着绿色环保的方向不断优化,到了九十年代,锂离子电池就已经成为电池方面的主流.人们日常生活中所必须的手机和电...     

On competition and endogenous firm efficiency

Summary. Conventional wisdom holds that product market competition disciplines firms into efficiency of operation. However, in a well known paper, Martin (1993) has shown that in a linear Cournot setting (with costs determined first and product market competition taking place in a second stage) the exact opposite obtains – a larger number of firms competing in the market implies lower firm efficiency. The note clarifies further the links between market structure and efficiency. Specifically, it argues why (and how) the result derived by Martin (1993) depends upon the assumptions made regarding the structure of demand and nature of conjectures held by firms as to their rivals' behavior. An illustrative counter-example (with Bertrand behavior and non-linear demand) in which entry increases efficiency is provided as well. Received: March 2, 2000; revised version: September 19, 2000     

Foreign competition and social efficiency of entry

We consider social efficiency of firm-entry in the presence of foreign competition. If the labour markets are competitive, entry is insufficient for the domestic country if the transportation cost is low and the marginal costs of the domestic firms are sufficiently higher than the marginal cost of the foreign firm. In the presence of a domestic labour union, entry is always socially insufficient for the domestic country. Hence, the anti-competitive entry-regulation policy may not be justified in an industry facing foreign competition, and it may depend on the transportation cost, the marginal cost difference between the firms and the domestic labour market structure.     

Transboundary pollution,tax competition and the efficiency of uncoordinated environmental regulation

Under capital tax competition, surprisingly, Ogawa and Wildasin (2009) find that uncoordinated policymaking leads to a first‐best outcome even in the presence of transboundary pollution. However, I show that if the level of environmental regulation is endogenized, the regulation level becomes too loose compared with the optimum (“race to the bottom”). Thus, despite the efficiency result of Ogawa and Wildasin (2009), efforts to achieve international environmental policy coordination are needed. I then examine the dependence of this result on the level of decisive voter's capital endowment. The regulation is inefficiently loose in many cases, but it can be too strict if the decisive voter's capital endowment is above the average. Thus, the possibility of “race to the top” cannot be eliminated. The inefficiency result does not generally depend on the timing of policymaking, although the efficiency may be restored in the limit case where the decisive voter has no capital at all.     

Banking efficiency and competition in low income countries: the case of Uganda

There is a concern that the state dominated, inefficient and fragile banking systems in many low-income countries, especially Sub-Saharan Africa, are a major hindrance to economic growth. In this context, this article systematically analyses the impact of the far-reaching banking sector reforms undertaken in Uganda on banking sector competition and efficiency. Using models of banking competition and efficiency that have been predominantly estimated in industrial countries, we find that the level of competition has significantly increased and has been associated with a rise in efficiency of the sector. Moreover, on average, larger banks and foreign-owned banks are more efficient than others while smaller banks have fallen back in efficiency with the increase in competitive pressures.     

Market maker competition and price efficiency: Evidence from China

We test the relationship between market maker competition and stock price efficiency. Using the number of market makers as a proxy for competition, the results show a strong positive correlation between competition and stock price efficiency. Moreover, price efficiency is higher when competing market makers have higher research ability. We suggest that market maker competition increases price efficiency through two channels: 1) Competition decreases transaction costs, and 2) Uninformed market makers learn from orders submitted by informed market makers through competition. The latter happens only in the group of market makers with higher experiences. The results imply that the price efficiency can be improved by enhancing the competition of market makers with high research ability and experiences.     

Dynamic efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand competition: input versus output spillovers

We consider the efficiency of Cournot and Bertrand equilibria in a duopoly with substitutable goods where firms invest in process R&D that generates input spillovers. Under Cournot competition firms always invest more in R&D than under Bertrand competition. More importantly, Cournot competition yields lower prices than Bertrand competition when the R&D production process is efficient, when spillovers are substantial, and when goods are not too differentiated. The range of cases for which total surplus under Cournot competition exceeds that under Bertrand competition is even larger as competition over quantities always yields the largest producers’ surplus.     

Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives

The idea of perfect competition for an economy with asymmetric information is formalized via an idiosyncratic signal process in which the private signals of almost every individual agent can influence only a negligible group of agents, and the individual agents’ relevant signals are essentially pairwise independent conditioned on the true states of nature. Thus, there is no incentive for an individual agent to manipulate her private information. The existence of incentive compatible, ex post Walrasian allocations is shown for such a perfectly competitive asymmetric information economy with or without “common values”. Consequently, the conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency is resolved exactly, and its asymptotic version is derived for a sequence of large, but finite private information economies.     

Testing the relationship between competition and efficiency in banking: A panel data analysis

The relationship between competition and efficiency in the banking sectors of five EU countries is investigated using Granger-type causality test estimations. We find positive causation between market power and efficiency, whereas the causality running from efficiency to competition is weak.     

Unemployment and product market competition in a Cournot model with efficiency wages

This paper analyzes the impact of product market competition on unemployment, wage and welfare in a model where unemployment is caused by the efficiency wage consideration and oligopolistic firms compete in quantity. It is shown that while more intense competition in the product market increases output and reduces price, it does not necessarily lead to a lower unemployment rate or a higher wage for workers. Depending on the technologies, the relationship between the intensity of competition and the level of employment (respectively, wage, welfare) is not always monotonic, and, in some instances, has an inverted U‐shape.     

Commodity tax competition between member states of a federation: equilibrium and efficiency

The purpose of this paper is to characterize the outcome of tax competition between autonomous fiscal authorities. It treats the case of a two-region economy, where an origin-based commodity tax is levied by each region on some private good to finance a local public good. A second private good is untaxed.We first describe ‘regional market equilibria’, whereupon consumers of each region allocate their purchases of private goods between domestic and nondomestic ones according to the structure of relative prices, taxes, and transportation costs. Next, regional optimal tax levels and public good quantities are derived, the tax of the other region being held constant. Fiscal competition arises from the ability of one region in choosing its tax to alter the tax base of the other.A ‘noncooperative fiscal equilibrium’ (NCFE) is then defined as the pair of fiscal choices such that each region's tax and public good supply are optimal for itself, given those of the other region. After examining the conditions for the existence of a NCFE, its efficiency properties are considered. Pareto efficient tax levels are computed and compared with the NCFE ones, showing the sources and nature of fiscal externalities. Finally, it is established that, in this model, fiscal choices that are Pareto improving with respect to a NCFE never reduce the taxes in both regions, and always increase the tax of a tax importing region.