The determinants of foreign direct investment: An analysis of US manufacturing industries

This study explores the determinants of foreign direct investment by analyzing the variation across US manufacturing industries in the extent of outward foreign direct investment. Three types of industry characteristics are hypothesized to explain this variation. Empirical support is found for four sources of ownership-specific advantages favoring foreign direct investment, new technology created through research and development, marketing abilities, organizational techniques and capital cost advantages. Support is found for the role of production scale economies in favoring centralization and hindering foreign direct investment, but results suggest only a weak role for transport costs in favoring decentralization and foreign direct investment. Producer concentration, perhaps reflecting oligopolistic competition, is positively related to foreign direct investment.     

Trust and corruption revisited: how and why trust and corruption shape each other

Graeff and Svendsen argue that low trust leads to corruption but corruption does not lower trust. I challenge this argument as well as their critique of Uslaner. I present evidence to show that there is a reciprocal relationship between trust and corruption.     

Following the money: The political determinants of E-fiscal transparency in US states

ABSTRACT

This research utilizes a unique panel data set (2009 to 2013) on the evolution of US state fiscal transparency websites and explores the political determinants of E-fiscal transparency. The dynamic panel data analysis reveals that divided government and Democratic governor exert a positive effect on state e-fiscal transparency, while the effect of political polarization is shown to be negative. Furthermore, there is some evidence to show that the fiscal variable of debt stock moderates the relationship between democratic political ideology and state E-fiscal transparency. Finally, there is a positive spillover effect in state E-fiscal transparency.     

Social welfare,corruption and credibility

Abstract

Economic development requires that investments by entrepreneurs are not subject to expropriation by government. Unfortunately, public agencies often serve as the instruments by which political elites engage in corruption and extracting rents from the economy. The question is how to design institutions that credibly commit to a stable system of guarantees of property rights and contract enforcement.

Principal agent theory and the new public management favor greater accountability of public managers to elected officials or eliminating public agencies through privatization. We argue for institutional designs that provide a degree of public agency autonomy. We show that public agency autonomy is a by-product of the competition between elites in democracies with multiple veto players. We show that transparency, professionalism, and legality help ensure that public managers do not engage in rent-extraction. The institutional design problem is how to induce public managers to serve the public interest without being fully responsive to elected political officials.     

Growth and welfare effects of corruption penalties

This paper analyses the steady-state effect of business corruption penalties on economic growth, corruption and welfare. To that end, the baseline horizontal R&D growth model is extended to include corruption, which is generated in intermediate goods production. Taxation on corruption depresses profits in production but also wages, leading to labor being reallocated from production to R&D, and, therefore, to a higher economic growth rate. Moreover, it also reduces corruption and increases welfare if preferences towards a corruption-free environment are strong enough. The results are in line with the data observed for 15 EU countries.     

Bureaucratic corruption and profit tax evasion

Firms may evade taxes on profits and can also avoid fulfilling legal restrictions on production activities by bribing bureaucrats. It is shown that the existence of tax evasion does not affect corruption activities at the firm level, while the budgetary repercussions of tax evasion induce less corruption. Policy measures which alter the gains or losses from corruption have a non-systematic impact on tax evasion behaviour.      

The competitive determinants of a firm's environmental management activities: Evidence from US manufacturing industries

Environmental management (EM) issues have received substantial attention in operations management. While the link between EM practices and firm performance has been well studied, little is known about the competitive drivers of a firm's EM activities. In this research, a Schumpeterian economics perspective is adopted to investigate competitive interactions among leader and challenger firms in the domain of EM, with a particular focus on operational EM activities. Using econometric methods, the empirical analysis of panel data from a broad cross-section of US manufacturing firms reveals that such rivalry does exist and that the effect of a rival's past EM activity on a focal firm's EM activity is greater for more profitable and smaller firms. In addition, firm characteristics such as market leadership, firm size and firm profitability are found to significantly affect the magnitude of a firm's EM activities. This study presents theoretical and empirical evidence of rivalrous behaviors in the domains of EM and OM and, thus, has interesting implications for operations management research and practice.     

Credit bureaus,corruption and banking stability

This study assesses the impact that credit bureaus can have on the occurrence of banking crises, using data for 32 countries over the period 2004–2016 while considering the interference effect of corruption. Different levels of income are considered in order to check for the stability of the relationship. We also test for the existence of a threshold effect driving the credit bureau-banking stability nexus. Estimation outcomes suggest that more credit bureaus are correlated with less banking instability. Moreover, estimation outcomes show that curbing corruption improves the quality of information on delinquent borrowers shared among these institutions and can thus enhance the soundness of the banking system. Our findings also report the existence of a nonlinear relationship in the private and public credit bureaus and banking stability nexus.     

Press freedom and corruption in business-state interactions

We show that press freedom has a role in constraining business corruption. Using firm-level data, we find that countries with greater press freedom have significantly fewer incidences of bribery involving public officials. In particular, we find that a free press is associated with a substantial reduction in the percentage of firms that report corruption during interactions with tax officials and when obtaining construction permits. Furthermore, we find that fewer businesses in these countries report that corruption is the biggest problem that they face. These findings highlight the role of an independent media in combating corruption.     

On the determinants of foreign ownership shares: Evidence from US firms' joint ventures in Japan

It is often argued that firms' foreign expansion is motivated by economies of scale in information-based intangible assets. Since these assets are combined with local factors in real production, their owner often has to deal with local factor owners' opportunistic behavior such as siphoning of skills which reduces the return on intangibles to the original owner. Local factor owners' agency behavior can also reduce a subsidiary's profit. Maintaining ownership mitigates the former type of opportunistic behavior, while ceding ownership reduces the latter type. Hence there is a non-linear relationship between ownership and the cost of control. In this paper we present a model that incorporates these aspects of a joint venture ownership. In our model the share in a joint venture of a foreign parent firm with a superior technology is determined such that its marginal cost of control is set equal to the marginal benefit it derives from a joint venture. We assume that, because of the uniqueness and mobility of its intangible factor, the foreign partner has more bargaining power than its local counterpart regarding the ownership of their joint venture and that the local partner is less concerned than its foreign counterpart about the problems of agency and property rights protection because of its geographic and cultural proximity to the joint venture. As a consequence, the foreign partner is able to exert its preference for its ownership share in the joint venture. Our theoretical results allow a decomposition of ownership share into components explained by the cost of control and by the profitability of a joint venture. Our empirical results using data on technology-based US firms' subsidiaries in Japan are consistent with our model predictions. In particular, the fraction of ownership share explained by the cost of control relative to the fraction explained by intrinsic profitability is higher for industries that rely more heavily on intangible assets, as expected from the model.     

Trade intensity,country size and corruption

Abstract. Several authors claim to provide evidence that governmental corruption is less severe in countries where trade intensity is higher or populations are smaller. We argue that theory is highly ambiguous on these questions, and demonstrate that empirical links between corruption and trade intensity – or country size, strongly related to trade intensity – are sensitive to sample selection bias. Most available corruption indicators provide ratings only for those countries in which multinational investors have the greatest interest: these tend to include almost all large nations, but among small nations only those that are well-governed. We find that the relationship between corruption and trade intensity disappears, using newer corruption indicators with substantially increased country coverage. Similarly, the relationship between corruption and country size weakens or disappears using samples less subject to selection bias. Received: July 2001 / accepted: April 2002 We thank Anand Swamy and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions, Paul Schorosch for able research assistance, and Ray Fisman, Roberta Gatti, Aart Kraay, and Shang-jin Wei for kindly providing data. The conclusions of this paper are not intended to represent the views of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent.     

The pioneer evidence of contagious corruption

Quality & Quantity - We investigate the corruption contagion phenomenon using both the spatial econometric model as well as the dynamic panel GMM approach, employing data on 109 countries from...     

Does corruption affect income inequality and poverty?

This paper provides evidence that high and rising corruption increases income inequality and poverty. An increase of one standard deviation in corruption increases the Gini coefficient of income inequality by about 11 points and income growth of the poor by about 5 percentage points per year. These findings are robust to use of different instruments for corruption and other sensitivity analyses. The paper discusses several channels through which corruption may affect income inequality and poverty. An important implication of these findings is that policies that reduce corruption will most likely reduce income inequality and poverty as well. Received: March 2, 2000 / Accepted: September 20, 2001     

利剑出鞘惩腐治贪--某教育学院经济责任审计纪实

2001年底至2002年初,山东省菏泽市审计局在对某教育学院主要负责人的经济责任审计中,依靠党委政府的支持,加大审计工作的力度,精心组织,严格实施,以对组织和审计事业高度负责的精神,针对一个个疑点问题,深挖细查,历时3个多月,揭露出包括该学院主要负责人在内的多人经济违纪案件线索,移交司法机关后,有14人被立案,9人被逮捕。其中,该院院长李某以涉嫌贪污受贿数十万元被检察机关起诉,一副院长和原财务科长也分别以涉嫌贪污被起诉,在该市产生强烈反响。     

The incidence and persistence of corruption in economic development

Economic development and bureaucratic corruption are determined jointly in a dynamic general equilibrium model of growth, bribery and tax evasion. Corruption arises from the incentives of public and private agents to conspire in the concealment of information from the government. These incentives depend on aggregate economic activity which, in turn, depends on the incidence of corruption. The model produces multiple development regimes, transition between which may or may not occur. In accordance with recent empirical evidence, the relationship between corruption and development is predicted to be negative.     

The plough,gender roles,and corruption

Cross-country empirical studies of corruption using ordinary least squares commonly find that nations in which women play a greater role in economic and public life suffer less corruption. This has been a controversial finding since measures of women’s participation in the economy and politics are likely endogenous. This study uses an aspect of national ancestral geography as a novel instrumental variable in the estimation of the true causal effects of gender upon corruption. It thereby finds that ordinary least squares estimates of the effects of gender upon corruption are biased. This conclusion is upheld in time-series fixed-effects estimation.     

Public sector corruption and the probability of technological disasters

A growing number of studies have explored the influence of institution on the outcomes of disasters and accidents from the viewpoint of political economy. This paper focuses on the probability of the occurrence of disasters rather than disaster outcomes. Using panel data from 98 countries, this paper examines how public sector corruption is associated with the probability of technological disasters. It was found that public sector corruption raises the probability of technological disasters. This result is robust when endogeneity bias is controlled.     

International corruption and its impacts across entrepreneurship types

Using a large cross‐country sample, this paper examines the impact of corruption on entrepreneurial activities by uniquely addressing two questions: (a) Does the impact of corruption on entrepreneurship vary across entrepreneurship type? (b) How does the effect of corruption differ across nations with varying prevalence of entrepreneurship? Considering three dimensions of entrepreneurship, nascent entrepreneurship, new business owners, and established new business owners, results, accounting for possible two‐way causality, show that entrepreneurship is negatively affected by corruption across entrepreneurship types, with differences in the relative magnitudes of effects. This sanding effect of corruption, however, varies across the prevalence of corruption and switches to greasing for nascent entrepreneurs.     

Exports and cross-national corruption: A disaggregated examination

This paper empirically examines the relation between categories of exports and corruption across countries. Aggregate exports and agricultural exports tend to decrease corruption, while fuel exports increase corruption. The influence of agricultural exports in more pronounced in more corrupt nations, while fuel exports contribute to corruption in least corrupt nations. Manufacturing and ore exports, on the other hand, generally fail to show significant impacts on corruption. Our findings demonstrate that the resource curse is sensitive to prevailing corruption levels, and this finding is novel in the literature. Consistent with the extant literature, corruption decreases with income, and (at some corruption levels) as political freedom increases, and with larger government size. The findings are fairly robust to an alternate corruption measure.     

招行马蔚华首发公务卡 金融创新 遏制腐败

“要把一个好的战略监图有效地转化为全行的经营管理实践,关键在于总行,在于总行的管理能力。我们必须在全行培养一种强有力的执行能力,形成有招商银行自身特色的执行文化”。招行推出公务卡,再一次印证了马蔚华说的话。