Simple Monetary Rules under Fiscal Dominance

This paper asks whether interest rate rules that respond aggressively to inflation, following the Taylor principle, are feasible in countries that suffer from fiscal dominance. We find that if interest rates are allowed to also respond to government debt, they can produce unique equilibria. But such equilibria are associated with extremely volatile inflation. The resulting frequent violations of the zero lower bound make such rules infeasible. Even within the set of feasible rules the welfare optimizing response to inflation is highly negative. The welfare gain from responding to government debt is minimal compared to the gain from eliminating fiscal dominance.     

Trend Inflation, Taylor Principle, and Indeterminacy

Positive trend inflation shrinks the determinacy region of a basic New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model when monetary policy is conducted by a contemporaneous interest rate rule. Neither the Taylor principle, which requires the inflation coefficient to be greater than one, nor the generalized Taylor principle, which requires that the nominal interest rate to be raised by more than the increase in inflation in the long run, is a sufficient condition for local determinacy of equilibrium. This finding holds for different types of Taylor rules, inertial policy rules, and price indexation schemes. Therefore, regardless of the theoretical setup, the monetary literature on interest rate rules cannot disregard average inflation in both theoretical and empirical analyses.     

Discretionary monetary policy and the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates

Ignoring the existence of the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates one considerably understates the value of monetary commitment in New Keynesian models. A stochastic forward-looking model with an occasionally binding lower bound, calibrated to the U.S. economy, suggests that low values for the natural rate of interest lead to sizeable output losses and deflation under discretionary monetary policy. The fall in output and deflation are much larger than in the case with policy commitment and do not show up at all if the model abstracts from the existence of the lower bound. The welfare losses of discretionary policy increase even further when inflation is partly determined by lagged inflation in the Phillips curve. These results emerge because private sector expectations and the discretionary policy response to these expectations reinforce each other and cause the lower bound to be reached much earlier than under commitment.     

Identifying the Stance of Monetary Policy at the Zero Lower Bound: A Markov‐Switching Estimation Exploiting Monetary‐Fiscal Policy Interdependence

In this paper, I propose an econometric technique to estimate a Markov‐switching Taylor rule subject to the zero lower bound of interest rates. I show that linking the switching of the Taylor rule coefficients to the switching of the coefficients of an auxiliary uncensored Markov‐switching regression improves the identification of an otherwise unidentifiable prevalent monetary regime because of the presence of the zero lower bound. Using a Markov‐switching fiscal policy rule as the auxiliary regression, I apply the estimation technique to U.S. data. Results show evidence of monetary and fiscal policy comovements, with monetary policy reacting weakly to inflation when fiscal policy is focused on real activity as opposed to debt stabilization, and vice versa.     

Monetary Policy Reaction Functions of the TICKs: A Quantile Regression Approach

This study investigates how Taiwan, India, China, and Korea (TICKs) set interest rates in the context of policy reaction functions using a quantile-based approach. Our results indicate the tendency of a milder response to inflation at low interest rates and greater response at higher quantiles of interest rates, where inflation is presumably higher than desired for China and South Korea. While the response to inflation over the quantiles is significant for India, yet the Taylor principle is less likely to hold. For Taiwan, the results imply that another instrument is employed to deal with its official managed floating currency.     

Fiscal Activism and the Zero Nominal Interest Rate Bound

In an economy where the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates is an occasionally binding constraint and the government lacks a commitment technology, it may be desirable for society to appoint a policymaker who cares less about government spending stabilization relative to inflation and output gap stabilization than the private sector does. A policymaker of this type uses government spending more elastically to stabilize the economy. At the zero lower bound, the anticipation of aggressive fiscal expansions in future liquidity trap situations increases inflation expectations and lowers real interest rates, thereby mitigating the decline in output and inflation.     

Inflation targeting,credibility, and non-linear Taylor rules

In this paper we systematically evaluate how central banks respond to deviations from the inflation target. We present a stylized New Keynesian model in which agents' inflation expectations are sensitive to deviations from the inflation target. To (re-) establish credibility, monetary policy under discretion sets higher interest rates today if average inflation exceeded the target in the past. Moreover, the central bank responds non-linearly to past inflation gaps. This is reflected in an additional term in the central bank's instrument rule, which we refer to as the ”credibility loss.” Augmenting a standard Taylor (1993) rule with the latter term, we provide empirical evidence for the interest rate response for a sample of five inflation targeting (IT) economies. We find, first, that past deviations from IT feed back into the reaction function and that this influence is economically meaningful. Deterioration in credibility (ceteris paribus) forces central bankers to undertake larger interest rate steps. Second, we detect an asymmetric reaction to positive and negative credibility losses, with the latter dominating the former.     

Determinacy under Inflation Targeting Interest Rate Policy in a Sticky Price Model with Investment (and Labor Bargaining)

In a sticky price model with investment spending, recent research shows that inflation-forecast targeting interest rate policy makes determinacy of equilibrium essentially impossible. We examine a necessary and sufficient condition for determinacy under interest rate policy that responds to a weighted average of an inflation forecast and current inflation. This condition demonstrates that the average-inflation targeting policy ensures determinacy as long as both the response to average inflation and the relative weight of current inflation are large enough. We also find that interest rate policy that responds solely to past inflation guarantees determinacy when its response satisfies the Taylor principle and is not large. These results still hold even when wages and hours worked are determined by Nash bargaining.     

Taylor rules and the term structure

The expectations model of the term structure has been subjected to numerous empirical tests and almost invariably rejected, with the failure generally attributed to systematic expectations errors or to shifts in risk premia. Rules for monetary policy designed along the lines of Taylor [1993. Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy 39, 195-214] specify that the central bank adjusts short-term yields in response to deviations of inflation and output gaps from target level. Such rules give a good empirical account of the behavior of the short-term interest rate. Combining the Taylor rule and expectations theory, it is possible to generate—along lines pioneered by Campbell and Shiller [1987. Cointegration and tests of present value models. Journal of Political Economy 95, 1062-1088]—a series of theoretical long-term interest rates. When such theoretical rates are calculated for the US over 1980-2004, considerable support for the expectations theory emerges.     

Monetary Policy Estimation in Real Time: Forward‐Looking Taylor Rules without Forward‐Looking Data

I propose a methodology for estimating forward‐looking Taylor rules in real time when forward‐looking real‐time central bank data are unavailable. The methodology consists of choosing appropriate models to closely replicate U.S. Greenbook forecasts and then applying these models to Canada, Germany, and the U.K. The results show that German and U.S. Taylor rules are characterized by inflation coefficients increasing with the forecast horizon and a positive output gap response. The U.K. and Canada interest rate reaction functions achieve maximum inflation response at middle‐term horizons of about 1/2 years and the output gap coefficient is insignificant.     

Taxation and the Taylor principle

A nominal tax system is added to a sticky-price monetary business cycle model. When nominal interest income is taxed, the coefficient on inflation in a Taylor-type monetary policy rule must be significantly larger than one in order for the model economy to have a determinate rational-expectations equilibrium. When effective tax rates are raised by inflation, the stability of the economy's equilibrium can be adversely affected. Finally, when depreciation is treated as a charge against taxable income, an even larger weight on inflation is required in the Taylor rule in order to obtain a determinate and stable equilibrium.     

The high-frequency impact of news on long-term yields and forward rates: Is it real?

Macroeconomic news announcements move yields and forward rates on nominal and index-linked bonds and inflation compensation. This paper estimates the reactions using high-frequency data on nominal and index-linked bond yields, allowing the effects of news announcements on real rates and inflation compensation to be parsed far more precisely than is possible using daily data. Long-term nominal yields and forward rates are very sensitive to macroeconomic news announcements. Inflation compensation is sensitive to announcements about price indices and monetary policy. However, for news announcements about real economic activity, such as nonfarm payrolls, the vast majority of the sensitivity is concentrated in real rates. Accordingly, most of the sizeable impact of news about real economic activity on the nominal term structure of interest rates represents changes in expected future real short-term interest rates and/or real risk premia rather than changes in expected future inflation and/or inflation risk premia. Such sensitivity of real rates to macroeconomics news is hard to rationalize within the framework of existing macroeconomic models.     

Monetary Policy and Financial Markets at the Effective Lower Bound

I discuss what determines the effective lower bound (ELB) for the policy rate and argue that the ELB is not hard, but rather soft, and that it is probably slightly negative. I argue that, at the ELB, current output can be increased by (i) monetary policy that extends the period of credibly low policy rates and generates inflation expectations, (ii) financial‐stability policy—which is distinct from monetary policy—that reduces the spreads between market interest rates and the policy rate, and (iii) fiscal policy that increases the neutral real rate by reducing expected growth of government expenditure and increases potential output by increasing current government expenditure.     

基于前瞻性泰勒规则对中国通货膨胀目标值估计的实证研究

基于状态空间形式的前瞻性泰勒规则,采用卡尔曼滤波估计方法对中国1992～2008年动态通货膨胀目标值进行估计,结果显示中国的通货膨胀预期目标值较实际水平平滑,1998年之后的通货膨胀目标估计值能够较准确反映中国这一时期真实通货膨胀率预期值;中国历年通货膨胀和产出水平的变化随着利率的变化而顺向变动。结论提示今后中国货币政策可采取把灵活而又规范的通货膨胀目标制与泰勒规则结合的操作框架。     

Optimal monetary policy in an economy with incomplete markets and idiosyncratic risk

This study investigates an incomplete markets economy in which the saving behavior of a continuum of infinitely lived agents is influenced by precautionary saving motives and borrowing constraints. Agents can use two types of assets (interest bearing IOUS and money) to smooth consumption. Money is valued because of a timing friction in the bond market. In particular, the bond market closes before agents observe their idiosyncratic productivity shock. I find that the Friedman rule is not optimal for this economy. The results indicate that the optimal allocation has a rate of inflation of 10%, and a positive amount of private credit held by the government. A positive inflation rate transfers resources from agents with big endowments to those holding bonds which improves risk sharing, and therefore, welfare. However, for higher rates of inflation, agents economize on money holdings, offsetting the insurance effects, and causing a reduction in welfare. Furthermore, higher rates of inflation discourage agents from borrowing, and the endogenous lower bound on bond holdings is higher than the exogenous borrowing limit. High rates of inflation, therefore, exacerbate frictions in the bond market.     

Changing Monetary Policy Rules, Learning, and Real Exchange Rate Dynamics

When the exchange rate is priced by uncovered interest parity and central banks set nominal interest rates according to a reaction function such as the Taylor rule, the real exchange rate will be determined by expected inflation and the output gap or the unemployment gap of the home and foreign countries. This paper examines the implications of these Taylor rule fundamentals for real exchange rate determination. Because the true parameters in central bank policy rules are unknown to the public and change over time, the model is presented in the context of a least squares learning environment. This simple learning model captures the volatility and the major swings in the real deutschemark/euro–dollar exchange rate from 1976 to 2007.     

中国化泰勒规则的构建与规则利率的估算——基于考虑金融周期信息的潜在产出与自然利率的再估算

我国货币政策正在向价格型调控方式转型,有必要探索符合我国实际的泰勒规则以确定政策利率目标水平,而如何科学合理地估算潜在产出和自然利率是关键。本文对构建多目标下的中国化泰勒规则时应考虑的因素作了深入探讨,并将金融周期信息纳入我国潜在产出的测算,同时采用基于潜在产出的方法对自然利率进行估算,进而分不同情形尝试估算我国的规则利率水平。结果表明,考虑金融周期信息后的潜在产出在金融扩张期将低于传统方法的估计结果,可为政策制定者有效应对经济运行的过热现象或泡沫化状态提供参考;无论是基于何种潜在产出和自然利率的测算组合,将国内外利差、房价涨幅偏离经济增长程度纳入中国化泰勒规则的构建均是合理的;不同情形下估算的规则利率走势,自2004年以来与货币市场利率走势均较为相近,且2013年后随着利率市场化改革的快速推进,差距呈明显缩小态势,但2017年下半年至2018年期间,受国际宏观形势和国内因素影响,估算的规则利率均快速上扬,与货币市场利率走低形成反差。     

中国化泰勒规则的构建与规则利率的估算——基于考虑金融周期信息的潜在产出与自然利率的再估算

我国货币政策正在向价格型调控方式转型,有必要探索符合我国实际的泰勒规则以确定政策利率目标水平,而如何科学合理地估算潜在产出和自然利率是关键。本文对构建多目标下的中国化泰勒规则时应考虑的因素作了深入探讨,并将金融周期信息纳入我国潜在产出的测算,同时采用基于潜在产出的方法对自然利率进行估算,进而分不同情形尝试估算我国的规则利率水平。结果表明,考虑金融周期信息后的潜在产出在金融扩张期将低于传统方法的估计结果,可为政策制定者有效应对经济运行的过热现象或泡沫化状态提供参考;无论是基于何种潜在产出和自然利率的测算组合,将国内外利差、房价涨幅偏离经济增长程度纳入中国化泰勒规则的构建均是合理的;不同情形下估算的规则利率走势,自2004年以来与货币市场利率走势均较为相近,且2013年后随着利率市场化改革的快速推进,差距呈明显缩小态势,但2017年下半年至2018年期间,受国际宏观形势和国内因素影响,估算的规则利率均快速上扬,与货币市场利率走低形成反差。     

Monetary policy transparency and pass-through of retail interest rates

This paper examines the degree of pass-through and adjustment speed of retail interest rates in response to changes in benchmark market rates in New Zealand during the period 1994–2004. We consider the effects of policy transparency and financial structure of the monetary transmission mechanism. New Zealand is the first OECD country to adopt a full-fledged inflation targeting regime with specific accountability and transparency provisions. Policy transparency was further enhanced by a shift from quantity (settlement cash) to price (interest rate) operating targets in 1999. Using Phillips–Loretan estimates of cointegrating regressions we find complete long-term pass-through for some but not all retail rates. Our results also show that the introduction of the Official Cash Rate (OCR) increased the pass-through of floating and deposit rates but not fixed mortgage rates. In line with previous studies we find the immediate pass-through of market interest rates to bank retail rates to be incomplete. Although we find no statistical evidence for asymmetric response of retail rates to changes in market rates other than for business lending rates in the pre OCR period, differences in the magnitude of mean adjustment lags indicate that banks appear to pass on decreases to fixed mortgage rates faster. Overall, our results confirm that monetary policy rate has more influence on short-term interest rates and that increased transparency has lowered instrument volatility and enhanced the efficacy of policy.