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1.
Nikolai Wenzel 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2010,23(1):55-78
This paper develops the concept of constitutional culture—the attitude, thoughts, and feelings about constitutional constraints
and the nature, scope, and function of constitutionalism. Constitutional culture is approached as a complex emergent phenomenon
bridging Hayekian cognitive and institutional insights. It can be studied as a mental model, a series of expectations and
understandings about the constitutional order, how it is, and how it ought to be. The “map” and “model” approach from Hayek’s
Sensory Order (1952) is employed to understand how individuals and (cautiously) groups of individuals at the national level approach constitutionalism.
This paper goes beyond the more traditional one-size-fits-all approach where all individuals respond uniformly to incentives,
as provided by the constitution qua contract. Instead, constitutionalism is tied up in the individual’s vision of the world,
that is, what Hayek (1948) labels “the facts of the social sciences.” The paper concludes with four areas where constitutional
culture can further the insights of constitutional political economy: comparative political economy, constitutional stickiness,
constitutional maintenance, and the new development economics. 相似文献
2.
Vladislav Valentinov 《Constitutional Political Economy》2008,19(1):19-33
This paper reconsiders the exchange paradigm of constitutional economics from the perspective of the theory of the division
of labor. According to this theory, human wants can be satisfied by two basic mechanisms—exchange and self-sufficiency. The
exchange paradigm of constitutional economics emphasizes the former mechanism while neglecting the latter. Building on major
economic theories of the third sector, it is argued that the latter mechanism is more helpful than the former in explaining
the existence of third sector organizations. The paper concludes by discussing implications of this argument for the further
development of constitutional economics.
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3.
Edward F. McClennen 《Constitutional Political Economy》1993,4(2):173-210
It seems clear that individuals stand to mutually benefit, in a wide variety of situations, from structuring their interactions
in terms of constitutional practices. But a commitment to treat the rules defining such practices as setting real constraints
on choice—a commitment to what could be characterized as an “ethics of rules”—is hard to reconcile with the standard, consequentialist
theory of rational choice, which requires, in effect, that individuals regard any rule as providing no more than a “maxim”
for choice. Such a theory of rational choice, then, constrains individuals to settle for a second best outcome in which choice
is aligned with practice rules by means of strategies of precommitment and threats. The outcome is second best because such
methods yield only partial alignment, and involve the expenditure of scarce resources, as well as a sacrifice of flexibility
and freedom. To say this, however, is to identify the corresponding theory of rational choice as havingconsequentially unacceptable implications. A modified theory of choice is presented, which is still consequentially oriented, but which assesses
consequences in a more holistic manner. It is then argued that this modified theory can provide a rational choice grounding
for the needed “ethics of rules.”
The author would like to thank three anonymous referees for their very helpful comments and suggestions. 相似文献
4.
Cass R. Sunstein 《Constitutional Political Economy》1991,2(3):371-394
Eastern Europe is now undergoing three distinct transitions: to markets, to democracy, and to constitutionalism. Under current
conditions, the transition to constitutionalism is a logical precondition for the transitions to markets and democracy. To
protect both of these, it is especially necessary to develop an “economic bill of rights” for inclusion in the new constitutions.
This bill of rights should include the rule of law, protection of private property, freedom of contract, occupational liberty,
the right to travel within and without the nation, and a prohibition on government monopolies; other similar provisions should
be considered as well. The new constitutions should not include general aspirations, duties, or positive rights. The eventual
development of an economic bill of rights—a precommitment strategy designed to promote prosperity and democracy—could constitute
a new and important contribution to the theory and practice of constitutionalism.
In light of the rapid changes in Eastern European constitutional affairs it should be noted that the final draft of this paper
dates from August 1991.
Karl N. Llewellyn Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department of Political Science, University of Chicago; Co-Director,
Center on Constitutionalism in Eastern Europe, University of Chicago. I am grateful to Jon Elster and Stephen Holmes for valuable
discussion, and to Richard A. Epstein and Stephen Holmes for helpful comments on a previous draft. 相似文献
5.
Alain Marciano 《Constitutional Political Economy》2009,20(1):42-56
This article discusses the methodological foundations of Buchanan’s constitutional political economy. We argue that Buchanan
is a constitutional economist because he is an economist or a political economist. In other words, Buchanan is a constitutional economist—he insists on the necessity
of focusing on constitutions and to analyze the “rules of the social game”—because he defines economics as a science of exchange.
Buchanan’s definition of economics is not only specific, it is also opposed to the definition of economics that other economists
retain and, above all, opposed to the definition of economics that many public choice theorists use. The latter have, in effect,
adopted the Robbins 1932 definition of economics as a science of choice that Buchanan criticizes and rejects. Buchanan’s constitutional
economics can be a branch of public choice only under certain conditions.
相似文献
Alain MarcianoEmail: |
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8.
Abdoul G. Sam 《Journal of Regulatory Economics》2010,37(3):266-286
A two-way fixed effects Poisson model is used to investigate the impact of 43 EPA-sponsored pollution prevention (P2) practices
on compliance and enforcement for a sample of facilities in the US manufacturing sector. I find that P2 adoption reduces environmental
violations in three industries while increasing violations in two others. P2 adoption also spurs fewer enforcement actions
in three industries. I further partition the P2 practices into three categories based on their approach to improve environmental
performance. In doing so, I find that practices that involve changes in operating procedures—about a third of adopted P2 practices—such
as instituting a self-inspection and monitoring program to discover spills or leak sources, improving maintenance scheduling
and/or labeling procedures, are effective in reducing violations while practices that involve equipment or material changes
are not. I also find that adopters of practices that require changes in either procedures or manufacturing equipment—about
half of adopted practices—are rewarded with a more cooperative treatment of environmental infractions with fewer enforcement
actions. 相似文献
9.
Constitutional stability 总被引:7,自引:7,他引:0
Peter C. Ordeshook 《Constitutional Political Economy》1992,3(2):137-175
Political scientists in the pluralist tradition disagree sharply with public and social choice theorists about the importance
of institutions and with William Riker in particular, who argues inLiberalism against Populism that the liberal institutions of indirect democracy ought to be preferred to those of populism. This essay reconsiders this
dispute in light of two ideas unavailable to Riker at the time. The first, offered by Russell Hardin, is that if we conceptualize
constitutions as coordinating devices rather than as social contracts, then we can develop a more satisfying view of the way
in which constitutions become self-enforcing. The second idea derives from the various applications of concepts such as the
uncovered set. Briefly, although institutions such as the direct election of president are subject to the usual instabilities
that concern social choice theorists, those instabilities do not imply that “anything can happen” —instead, final outcomes
will be constrained, where the severity of those constraints depends on institutional details. We maintain that these ideas
strengthen Riker's argument about the importance of such constitutional devices as the separation of powers, bicameralism,
the executive veto, and scheduled elections, as well as the view that federalism is an important component of the institutions
that stabilize the American political system. We conclude with the proposition that the American Civil War should not be regarded
as a constitutional failure, but rather as a success.
I have benefitted from the comments of a number of people on earlier drafts of this essay, especially William Riker, Emerson
Niou, Kenneth Shepsle, Gordon Tullock, Thomas Schwartz, and Matthew Spitzer. 相似文献
10.
Fritz Breuss 《Empirica》2011,38(1):131-152
Inspired by Dornbusch’s model of exchange rate overshooting we develop a theory of stock market behaviour and its impact on
the real economy. The idea is that stock market prices overshoot and undershoot their long-run equilibrium values which are
determined by the development in the real economy. The overshooting is triggered primarily by a loose monetary policy. With
our model we explain the genesis of the global financial crisis (GFC) 2008/2009 primarily as the result of a loose monetary
policy in the USA. Following the overshooting and crash in the stock market the real economy dropped into a recession. After
modelling the interaction of three markets with different speed of adjustment—money, stocks and goods—for a closed economy
we expand it to an open economy and lastly study the spillovers of a financial market crisis between countries (from a large
to a small country) by introducing the transmission channels of external trade or cross-border financial transactions. A long-lasting
monetary easing as exhibiting by the Fed and the ECB since 2007 and 2008, respectively could—according to our model—generate
another boom-bust cycle. 相似文献
11.
Geoffrey Brennan 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2009,22(2):131-143
This paper is an assessment of Besley’s attempt to orchestrate a rapprochement between public choice theory and conventional
public economics—with its characteristic normative orientation towards public policy. In this paper, I first try to set the
Besley enterprise in the context of earlier work—focussing on my own work with Buchanan (The Power to Tax and The Reason of Rules). I then direct attention to three aspects of the Besley enterprise: whether selecting for competence depends on having solved the motivation problem (either by incentive or selection means), how selection mechanisms might be supported institutionally and the possibility
that selection processes might create incentives at the ‘dispositional’ level.
相似文献
Geoffrey BrennanEmail: |
12.
Randall G. Holcombe 《Constitutional Political Economy》1996,7(4):281-291
Frank Vibert's book, Europe: A Constitution for the Millennium, draws on constitutional economics to describe how a European constitution should be developed to govern a European political union. Vibert's theoretical constitutional framework is solid, but his analysis has two shortcomings. First, he discusses constitutional theory but never presents any specific constitutional provisions that would be based on that theory. This makes the feasibility of drawing up an acceptable constitution appear more straightforward than it actually is. Second, he assumes that Europe will eventually be politically unified in much the same manner as the United States, and does not consider alternatives. Rather than having a single European government, as Vibert suggests, a better alternative would be to have European nations united through a variety of treaties, agreements, and multinational organizations. 相似文献
13.
Kurt Dopfer 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2012,22(1):133-160
The paper starts from Schumpeter’s proposition that entrepreneurs carry out innovations (the micro level), that swarms of
followers imitate them (meso) and that, as a consequence, ‘creative destruction’ leads to economic development ‘from within’
(macro). It is argued that Schumpeter’s approach can be developed into a new—more general—micro-meso-macro framework in economics. Center stage is meso. Its essential characteristic is bimodality, meaning that one idea (the generic rule) can be physically actualized by many
agents (a population). Ideas can relate to others, and, in this way, meso constitutes a structure component of a ‘deep’ invisible macro structure. Equally, the rule actualization process unfolds over time—modelled in the paper as
a meso trajectory with three phases of rule origination, selective adoption and retention—and here meso represents a process component of a visible ‘surface’ structure. The macro measure with a view to the appropriateness of meso components is generic correspondence.
At the level of ideas, its measure is order; at that of actual relative adoption frequencies, it is generic equilibrium. Economic
development occurs at the deep level as transition from one generic rule to another, inducing a change of order, and, at the
surface level, as the new rule is adopted, destroying an old equilibrium and establishing a new one. 相似文献
14.
E. C. Pasour Jr. 《Constitutional Political Economy》1994,5(1):81-98
Economists since Pareto have sought to demonstrate that governmental redistribution to assist the poor increases overall welfare
in society. This paper addresses the general issue of redistribution but focuses on two recent efforts to justify redistribution
in the context of constitutional political economy. It is argued below that income insurance and other proposed rationale
for redistribution overlook or minimize information and incentive problems endemic in all governmental programs to assist
the poor. Two reasons for opposing legislated redistribution are discussed—the first rooted in pragmatic considerations, the
other based on principle. The conclusions are twofold: (1) purported justifications for redistributive policies are inconsistent
with methodological individualism, and (2) it is problematic as to whether imposing such an obligation on the public-at-large
even at the constitutional level will improve the welfare of the poor and the non-poor. 相似文献
15.
We assess monetary equilibrium theory by focusing on its foundation—price stickiness—and answer several ancillary questions.
Prices are sticky at times. Contra monetary equilibrium theorists, this is not a reason to advocate an issuance of fiduciary
media to counteract the effects of a sluggish price adjustment process. Issuances of fiduciary media will breed negative effects,
primarily via wealth redistributions, faulty interest rate signals and exacerbated business cycles. Allowing the price level
to adjust to maintain monetary equilibrium provides for fewer detrimental effects than adjusting the supply of credit. 相似文献
16.
"强化市场型"政府理论、"瘦身国家"理论和宪政理论从不同的学科视角共同探讨政府权力应该如何配置和行使,才能实现规范和高效运行,以保护个体合法权益,最终促进经济的繁荣发展,三种理论为政府证券监管权的制度设计提供了指导和研究思路。 相似文献
17.
This paper considers the impact of the Constitutional Court on legislative output in Italy. Following Tsebelis’ ((2002) Veto Players: Foundations of Institutional Analysis. Princeton: Princeton University Press) veto players model and the stylised facts as regards the Italian Constitutional Court’s activity, this paper presents a multi-stage game in the spirit of Gely and Spiller ((1990). A rational choice theory of supreme court statutory decisions with applications to the state farm and grove city cases. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6, 263–300). In the first stage, the legislative veto players, namely the parties in government, choose whether to change or not the policy status quo by enacting new legislation. In the second stage, the Court makes a constitutional interpretation: it decides whether to alter or not the outcome of the first stage through a sentence of constitutional illegitimacy. The Court has both the power of annulling laws and a limited power of creating new legally binding norms. Moreover, in the third stage, a constitutional law voted by a parliamentary qualified majority can overturn the Court’s decisions. The model predicts that the presence of the Court lowers legislative policy change and tests this prediction with 1956–2001 annual time series data for Italy.
相似文献
Michele SantoniEmail: |
18.
Mikhail Filippov 《Constitutional Political Economy》2005,16(2):93-111
Forty years since its publication, William Riker’s Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (1964) remains one of the most
influential volumes on the politics of federalism. However, in assessing Riker’s federal theory, scholars tend to focus on
the specific hypotheses, the famous claim that the “military threat” constitutes a necessary condition for federal success,
and upon rejecting the validity of that claim, by association, quickly dismiss the general theoretical argument. But Riker’s
federal theory does much more for our understanding of federalism as a form of government than simply connect, rightly or
not, federal success with the presence of a military threat. In the paper I argue that the most innovative feature of Riker’s
analysis, defining for his contribution to the field and accountable for the emergence of new and original insights was the
successful application for the first time of the principle of methodological individualism to institutional and constitutional
analysis. Riker’s theory of federalism, when viewed in the context of his intellectual contribution to the studies of democratic
institutions, is, indeed, the original point of departure. In the paper, I review Riker’s theory of federalism as embedded
in and an integral part of his broader theory of democratic institutions, in order to highlight some of its merits that remained
underappreciated until current research has generated the conceptual framework consistent with Riker’s insights. Second, I
draw some implications from Riker’s theory for the contemporary challenges of federal constitutional design.
For correspondence: filippov@artsci.wustl.edu
JEL classification: H77, K1 相似文献
19.
Jason Potts 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2007,20(2-3):123-135
This paper offers an extension of the distinction of [Kohn, Cato Journal, 24:303–339 (2004)] between the two paradigms of modern economic theory—value and exchange—as derived from the generic–operant framework
of [Dopfer and Potts, The general theory of economic evolution, Routledge, London, (2007)]. I argue that Austrian and evolutionary economics can be analytically unified about a general framework of rule coordination
and change that I shall call the generic value paradigm. This is an analytic generalization of Kohn’s “exchange paradigm” that will allow us to redefine his conception of the “value
paradigm” as the operational value paradigm in terms of the economics of known and fully exploited opportunities. The generic value paradigm, in turn, underpins the
economics of the growth of knowledge and the evolution of the economic order as an open-system process due to the origination,
adoption, and retention of novel generic rules. Austrian economics is then circumscribed as a special case of the more general
“generic” analysis of the coordination and evolution of economic rules.
相似文献
20.
This paper studies the long-run relationship between consumption, asset wealth and income—the consumption–wealth ratio—based
on German data from 1980 to 2003. We find that departures from this long-run relationship mainly predict adjustments in income.
The German consumption–wealth ratio also contains considerable forecasting power for a range of business cycle indicators,
including the unemployment rate. This finding is in contrast to earlier studies for some of the Anglo-Saxon economies that
have shown that the consumption–wealth ratio reverts to its long-run mean mainly through subsequent adjustments in asset prices.
While the German consumption wealth ratio contains little information about future changes in German asset prices, we report
that the U.S. consumption–wealth ratio has considerable forecasting power for the German stock market. One explanation of
these findings is that in Germany—due to structural differences in the financial and pension systems—the share of publicly
traded equity in aggregate household wealth is much smaller than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. We discuss the implications
of our results for the measurement of a potential wealth effect on consumption.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not reflect the position of the Deutsche Bundesbank. We
gratefully acknowledge comments and suggestions from an anonymous referee as well as from Heinz Herrmann, Helmut Lütkepohl,
the editor, Baldev Raj, Burkhard Raunig, Monika Schnitzer, Harald Uhlig and Christian Upper. We also benefitted from comments
by seminar participants at the ECB, the Deutsche Bundesbank, the CESifo Macro, Money and International Finance Area Conference
2005, the EEA 2005 annual congress and at the 2005 IAEA Meetings. Last but not least, we would like to thank Mark Weth for
very useful information concerning the construction of the financial wealth data. Hoffmann’s work on this paper is also part
of the project The International Allocation of Risk funded by Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft in the framework of SFB 475. Responsibility for any remaining errors and shortcomings
is entirely our own. 相似文献