A market game with symmetric limit orders

We extend the market game with symmetric limit orders studied in Weyers (2003, 2004) to a many-good setup. Our limit orders are symmetric in terms of payment and determine a unique consistent price system for every strategy profile. The limit orders studied in the previous literature—see Dubey (1982), Simon (1984) and Mertens (2003)—share none of these properties. It is shown that three mild market-thickness conditions imply that the set of symmetric Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with the set of price-taking equilibrium outcomes. First, the Dubey and Shubik (1978) refinement is used to eliminate no-trade as an equilibrium. Second, any price-taking equilibrium has trade in each market. Third, there are at least two agents of each type, where a type is determined by preferences and endowments. The last two conditions enable applying the Bertrand argument. This paper thus provides new insights to Bertrand’s (1883) classic critique of Cournot and the associated problem of capacity constraints raised by Edgeworth (1897).     

Convergence in games with continua of equilibria

In game theory, the question of convergence of dynamical systems to the set of Nash equilibria has often been tackled. When the game admits a continuum of Nash equilibria, however, a natural and challenging question is whether convergence to the set of Nash equilibria implies convergence to a Nash equilibrium. In this paper we introduce a technique developed in Bhat and Bernstein (2003) as a useful way to answer this question. We illustrate it with the best-response dynamics in the local public good game played on a network, where continua of Nash equilibria often appear.     

Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games

This paper makes the observation that a finite Bayesian game with diffused and disparate private information can be conceived of as a large game with a non-atomic continuum of players. By using this observation as its methodological point of departure, it shows that (i) a Bayes–Nash equilibrium (BNE) exists in a finite Bayesian game with private information if and only if a Nash equilibrium exists in the induced large game, and (ii) both Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal BNE exist in finite Bayesian games with private information. In particular, it shows these results to be a direct consequence of results for a version of a large game re-modeled for situations where different players may have different action sets.     

Efficiency loss in a Cournot oligopoly with convex market demand

We consider a Cournot oligopoly model where multiple suppliers (oligopolists) compete by choosing quantities. We compare the social welfare achieved at a Cournot equilibrium to the maximum possible, for the case where the inverse market demand function is convex. We establish a lower bound on the efficiency of Cournot equilibria in terms of a scalar parameter derived from the inverse demand function, namely, the ratio of the slope of the inverse demand function at the Cournot equilibrium to the average slope of the inverse demand function between the Cournot equilibrium and a social optimum. Also, for the case of a single, monopolistic, profit maximizing supplier, or of multiple suppliers who collude to maximize their total profit, we establish a similar but tighter lower bound on the efficiency of the resulting output. Our results provide nontrivial quantitative bounds on the loss of social welfare for several convex inverse demand functions that appear in the economics literature.     

Core and competitive equilibria of a coalitional exchange economy with infinite time horizon

The core and competitive equilibria of a large exchange economy on the commodity space ?^∞${?}^{\infty }$ will be discussed. We define the economy as a measure on the space of consumers’ characteristics following Hart and Kohlberg (1974), and prove the existence of competitive equilibria and their equivalence with the core without assuming the convexity of preferences.     

Forecasting stock prices with commodity prices: New evidence from Feasible Quasi Generalized Least Squares (FQGLS) with non-linearities

The complexities in modern stock markets make it imperative to unravel the possible predictors of their future values. This paper thus provides insights into the predictability of stock prices of the BRICS countries with large dependence on commodities either for foreign exchange earnings or industrial while accounting for the role of asymmetries. Essentially, empirical evidence abound for the high volatility in world commodity markets, thus making us to determine if positive and negative changes in commodity prices predict stock prices differently. In addition, unlike the traditional forecast models, our choice of forecast models additionally addresses certain statistical features, including conditional heteroskedasticity, serial dependence, persistence and endogeneity, inherent in the predictors, which have the potential of causing estimation bias. In all, we find evidence in favour of the ability of commodity prices to predict stock prices of Brazil, Russia and South Africa. Also, both the in-sample and out-of-sample forecast performances of the predicted models support asymmetries in a number of commodity prices in each of these three countries. Our results are robust to different data samples and forecast horizons.     

Convergence to symmetry in dynamic strategic models of R&D: The undiscounted case

Will R&D increase or decrease the asymmetry between firms over time? We examine this issue in the context of a dynamic, alternate-move duopoly model of non-cooperative R&D. The asymmetry we consider is with respect to the initial stocks of technological knowledge which provides one firm a greater potential for current and future profits in the product market. Utilizing a value loss process constructed from the Optimality Equation of dynamic programming, we show that for the undiscounted case the asymmetry between the firms disappears over time. We obtain this convergence-to-symmetry result by imparting a temporal character to R&D through the notion that R&D investment cannot be changed instantaneously, by allowing research externalities, complementarity or substitutability between own and appropriated R&D, and either increasing, decreasing or constant returns to scale in the production of technical knowledge from own and rival R&D.     

A game theoretic approach to optimize multi-stakeholder utilities for land acquisition negotiations with informality

To combat the critical stresses of rising urbanization, the government acquires land from private owners using the power of eminent domain. This land assembly causes negative externalities such as increasing social tension and injustice that may impose a long-term threat to stability and sustainable development. Therefore, there is a need to make the land acquisition process more transparent and just. Considering the unique Indian context where informality has a strong presence, we propose an approach based on game theory that models the bargain through a three-stage Nash equilibrium game. Four agents – the government, the private developer, the landowner, and the free rider – are considered. We provide conditional solutions for the generalizable Case and proceed to model different stakeholder behavior patterns through two utility functional forms – linear and exponential. In the linear case, we find that the free rider obtains half of the revenue of the project, whereas the landowner gains between one-fourth and one-half of the revenue. Thus, we highlight the undeniably crucial role free riders play in land acquisition negotiations. However, closed form solutions cannot be obtained for the exponential form, due to which we use simulations to demonstrate a solution procedure. We conclude by stating that the proposed model can be useful in formulating future land policies in a sustainable and inclusive manner, with optimal utility derivations for all concerned stakeholders. Our model can also be extended to other spatial contexts where informality features heavily in the land market, especially in the Global South.     

Pseudocontinuous functions and existence of Nash equilibria

In topological spaces, we introduce a new class of functions (pseudocontinuous functions) and we present some characterizations and properties. In particular, we show that any preference relation endowed of utility functions is continuous if and only if any utility is pseudocontinuous. A maximum theorem is proved for such a class of functions and connections with similar results are investigated. Finally, the existence of Nash equilibria for games with pseudocontinuous payoffs is obtained.     

On the robustness of the competitive equilibrium: Utility-improvements and equilibrium points

We show that the set of competitive equilibrium points of a pure exchange economy are the equilibrium points of a broader class of better-response demands than the usual utility-maximizing demand functions. The better-response demands are derived from assigning weights to all commodity bundles with higher utility than the current commodity bundle, with the greatest weights being placed on the commodity bundles with the highest utility gain. The usual utility-maximizing demand functions are then those in which the weight on the utility-maximizing bundle is one. We also show that these better-response demands belong to a large class of response maps that are generated by monotonic transformations of the utility functions and/or monotonic transformations of the weights assigned to the commodity bundles.     

Role of credit and monetary policy in determining asset prices: Evidence from emerging market economies

We examine the relative dominance of credit and monetary policy shocks in influencing asset prices in emerging markets. Estimates from panel VAR models for 22 EMEs provide evidence of a significant impact of bank credit on house prices in contrast to trivial impact on stock prices, possibly due to prudential regulations on banks’ exposure to stock markets. Contractionary monetary policy triggers sizeable and persistent decline in stock than housing prices as higher interest rates may render the funding of leverage costlier. Global shocks play an important role in explaining fluctuations in domestic stock prices rather than house prices since the latter class of asset is largely non-tradable across countries.     

Measuring a boom and bust: The Sydney housing market 2001–2006

The Sydney housing market peaked in 2003. The period 2001–2006 is, therefore, of particular interest since it captures a boom and bust in the housing market. We compute hedonic, repeat-sales and median price indexes for five regions in Sydney over this period. While the three approaches are in broad agreement regarding the timing of the turning point in the housing market, some important differences also emerge. In particular, we find evidence of sample selection bias in our hedonic and repeat-sales data sets (with the former focusing more on better quality dwellings and the latter more on lower quality dwellings). These sample selection biases could in turn cause bias (in opposite directions) in our hedonic and repeat-sales indexes. Median indexes may likewise be biased as a result of an apparent decline in the average quality of dwellings sold in the latter part of the sample. We also find evidence of convergence in prices across regions during the boom and divergence in the subsequent bust.     

Ramsey policies in a small open economy with sticky prices and capital

This paper analyzes jointly optimal fiscal and monetary policies in a small open economy with capital and sticky prices. We allow for trade in consumption goods under perfect international risk-sharing. We consider balanced-budget fiscal policies where authorities use distortionary taxes on labor and capital together with monetary policy using the nominal interest rate. First, as long as a symmetric equilibrium is considered, the steady state in an open economy is isomorphic to that of a closed economy. Second, sticky prices’ allocations are almost indistinguishable from flexible prices allocations both in open and closed economies. Third, the open economy dimension delivers results that are qualitatively similar to those of a closed economy but with significant quantitative changes. Tax rates are both more volatile and more persistent to undo the distortions implied by terms of trade fluctuations.     

Precise computation of a competitive equilibrium of the discrete land market model

This paper provides a finite algorithm to compute a competitive equilibrium of the Alonso-type discrete land market model (known as bid-rent equilibrium) without assuming any condition on the spatial configuration such as monocentricity. The existence of the finite algorithm implies that the discrete land market model is sufficiently tractable for computer simulation analysis (sensitivity analysis) even if the spatial configuration is variable. Specifically, we can evaluate numerically the effects of new routes in a transportation network upon equilibrium rents and commuting mode.     

Convergence of optimal harvesting policies to a normal forest

This paper extends the forestry maximum principle of Heaps (1984) to allow the benefits of harvesting to be the utility of the volume of the wood harvested as in Mitra and Wan, 1985, Mitra and Wan, 1986. Unlike those authors, however, time is treated as a continuous rather than as a discrete variable. Existence of an optimal harvesting policy is established. Then necessary conditions are derived for the extended model which are also sufficient. The conditions are used to show that under certain boundedness conditions, sequences of optimal harvesting policies contain subsequences which converge pointwise a.e. and in net present value to an optimal harvesting policy. This result is then used to show that any optimal logging policy must converge in harvesting age to a constant rotation period given by modified Faustmann formula. The associated age class distribution converges to a normal forest.     

Nowcasting food inflation with a massive amount of online prices

The consensus in the literature on providing accurate inflation forecasts underlines the importance of precise nowcasts. In this paper, we focus on this issue by employing a unique, extensive dataset of online food and non-alcoholic beverages prices gathered automatically from the webpages of major online retailers in Poland since 2009. We perform a real-time nowcasting experiment by using a highly disaggregated framework among popular, simple univariate approaches. We demonstrate that pure estimates of online price changes are already effective in nowcasting food inflation, but accounting for online food prices in a simple, recursively optimized model delivers further gains in the nowcast accuracy. Our framework outperforms various other approaches, including judgmental methods, traditional benchmarks, and model combinations. After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, its nowcasting quality has improved compared to other approaches and remained comparable with judgmental nowcasts. We also show that nowcast accuracy increases with the volume of online data, but their quality and relevance are essential for providing accurate in-sample fit and out-of-sample nowcasts. We conclude that online prices can markedly aid the decision-making process at central banks.     

Residential investment and house prices in a multi-sector monetary business cycle model

This paper develops a three-sector quantitative dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model to account for some of the salient business cycle properties concerning residential investment and house prices. We depart from the traditional Real Business Cycle setup by incorporating monetary frictions and credit market activities into the model economy. The model generates the high volatility of residential investment and hours worked in the house investment goods producing sector, as well as the procyclicality of house prices. The lead-lag pattern of house investment also roughly conforms with the data. We find that monetary policy and nominal interest rates play a special role in the determination of house prices. Money shocks generate remarkably volatile residential investment and house prices.     

Spatial externalities and agglomeration in a competitive industry

We introduce spatial spillovers as an externality in the production function of competitive firms operating within a finite spatial domain under adjustment costs. Spillovers may attenuate with distance and the overall externality could contain positive and negative components with the overall effect being positive. We show that when the spatial externality is not internalized by firms, spatial agglomerations may emerge endogenously in a competitive equilibrium. The result does not require increasing returns at the private or the social level, increasing marginal productivity of private capital with respect to the externality, or location advantages. In fact agglomerations may emerge with decreasing returns to scale, declining marginal productivity of private capital with respect to the externality, and no location advantage. The result depends on the interactions between the structures of production technology and spatial effects as shown in the paper. No agglomerations emerge at the social optimum when spillovers are internalized and diminishing returns both from the private and the social point of view prevail. Numerical experiments with Cobb–Douglas and CES technologies and an isoelastic demand confirm our theoretical predictions.     

Towards a theory of the labor market with a public sector

The object is to specify and analyze equilibrium in a labor market with frictions when there is a significant public sector. In the vast majority of equilibrium studies on labor markets, a public sector has been ruled out by assumption. This seems a strange oversight as about 17% of workers in the US are public sector workers, whereas in western Europe, approximately 22% of workers work in the public sector. The goal in this study is to provide answers to such questions as: what happens to private sector wages if the public sector is increased? If the Government increases the number of public sector jobs, does this crowd out private sector jobs? When will private sector wages be greater (less) than the public sector wage? Reasonably complete answers to these questions (and others) are provided within the context of the model developed.