Regime change in Australian capitalism: towards an historical political economy of regulation

Regulatory regimes of political economy have a high degree of stability. The old Australian regime of labourist–protectionism survived more or less unchanged since before the Great War. The key feature was the historic compromise between the classes and leaders of capital and labour, mediated via the state and the institutions created to implement it. In the 1980s the regime was radically and rapidly transformed into the neoliberal globalizing regime. Explaining such large–scale shifts in systems of political economy, the history of which follows a pattern of punctuated equilibrium, is a difficult task for historical enquiry. This paper seeks to articulate an appropriate theoretical framework, derived from the structurist (that is, historical and realist) tradition that emphasizes historicity, multidimensionality, a form of institutionalism, human agency, and neo–Darwinian evolutionary theory.     

The political economy of gambling in a neocolonial economy

Conclusion This study has attempted to show the entrenched character of parasitic capitalism in the form of gambling in the Jamaican economy on a scale that massively but painlessly redistributes income from the working class to the petite bourgeoisie. It speaks to a dimension of class exploitation that is often ignored in the focus on large multinational corporations and has parallels in the parasitic forms of capitalism that exploit the black community in the United States. Parasitic capitalism is seen as promoting a form of false class consciousness that seeks outlets to class frustrations in precapitalist illusions of luck and chance that feed the coffers of the grasping petite bourgeoisie with hard-earned working class wage incomes. The data and findings point clearly to the need to either eliminate parasitic capitalist activities such as gambling or alternatively remove it from the control of the petite bourgeoisie and convert the capital accumulated to community and mass-oriented development and social projects.     

Stabilization: The political economy of overkill

This paper considers whether national and international aspects of the IMF's stabilization programmes during the 1970s and early 1980s have resulted in a process of ‘overkill’ — or, in other words, a process of economic retrenchment which went much further than was strictly necessary in terms of what could have been regarded as reasonable objectives. In the international context, the author describes how the attack on inflation has become an end in itself, at the expense of other stated objectives of the IMF, thus creating a distortion of its priorities. The paper discusses errors of diagnosis which have led to this disorientation and explains why deflationary policies should not be regarded as a panacea. The paper then considers the nead for equity and efficiency in the distribution of the political and economic costs of adjustment.The next section of this paper discusses the assumptions underlying the IMF's treatment of Fund members and to what extent ‘even-handedness’ in the application of stabilization measures may result in inequality of burden-sharing among borrowers. Problems related to monetarist theories and the consequent policies are examined, followed by a consideration of the dangers involved in devising ‘straightforward’ performance criteria in the form of precise monetary targets that can readily be monitored by the IMF. This means of evaluating the national adjustment policies' success is seen to be unsatisfactory, viz. the frequency of stand-by arrangement breakdowns and mistakes in forecasting.The paper concludes that the concept of unilateral adjustment is not an acceptable basis for IMF supervision of the international monetary system. In addition, care should be taken to avoid overkill in determining the degree and character of adjustment needed in stabilization programmes. One possible solution to the extra burden imposed on the LDCs might be a liberalization of the compensatory financing facility with the objective of applying the same kind of regime to imports as to exports.     

The political economy of transformation

This article gives an analysis of the political economy of transformationwhich stresses the major achievements of some countries, thefact that the transformation is not yet over, the existenceof both winners and losers, and the limitations of transitionorthodoxy. Attention is paid to the implications of transformationup till now for social philosophy and the Washington Consensus.It is argued that among the surprises of transformation werethe importance of a sound banking system, of a strong, but limited,state, and the fact that transformation is a long and difficultprocess. In addition, the initial stress on the need for rapidprivatization turned out to be one-sided. More important forthe resumption of economic growth is the development of newprivate firms. There are political dangers on the road aheadwhich, for the successful applicants, will be reduced by EUmembership.     

The political economy of protectionism : The bureaucratic case

Zusammenfassung Die politische ?konomie des Protektionismus: Die Rolle der Bürokratie. — Dieser Aufsatz versucht zu analysieren, welche Rolle die Bürokratie auf dem politischen Markt der Protektion spielt. Bisher wurden in der Literatur ausschlieΒlich Politiker und W?hler als bestimmende Kr?fte behandelt. Alle Argumente, die in diesem Aufsatz vorgebracht werden, unterstützen die Ansicht, daΒ Bürokraten die Protektion st?rker befürworten als Politiker. Wenn man eine Beh?rde als einen partiellen Diktator ansieht, der eine bestimmte Industrie überwacht, dann wird sie notwendigerweise einen h?heren Protektionsgrad als den theoretisch optimalen w?hlen. Wenn die Bürokraten weniger als die Politiker Gelegenheit haben, einen Gewinn (Reichtum) aus den protektionistischen Aktivit?ten zu ziehen — und das kann erwartet werden-, dann werden sie für eine h?here Protektion sein als die Politiker. Diese Neigung zugunsten der Protektion wird noch verst?rkt, wenn man die Informationskosten in die Betrachtung einbezieht. Ein anderes Ergebnis dieses Aufsatzes ist, daΒ jede Rangordnung protektionistischer MaΒnahmen, welche die Angebotsseite des Marktes für Protektion nicht in vollem Umfang berücksichtigt, v?llig irreführend sein kann.

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Résumé L’économie politique du protectionnisme: Le cas bureaucratique. — Cet article essaie d’analyser le róle joué par les bureaucrates sur le marché politique de protectionnisme. Jusqu’à présent les agents publiques considérés dans la littérature étaient exclusivement des politiciens et des votants. Tous les arguments élaborés dans cet article supportent l’idée que les bureaucrates soutiennent le protectionnisme plus fortement que les politiciens. Si nous regardons un bureau comme dictateur partiel supervisant une industrie spécifique’un tel bureau nécessairement choisira un niveau de protection qui est plus haut que l’optimum de la théorie. Si les bureaucrates ont moins souvent l’opportunité de tirer des gains (richesse) des activités protectrices que les politiciens — comme on pourrait l’attendre — ils soutiendront une protection plus haute que les politiciens. Le biais en faveur de la protection augmente si nous considérons aussi les co?ts d’information. Un autre résultat de cet article est que chaque essai de classifier les mesures protectrices qui ne considère pas l’offre sur le marché de protection toute entière peut tromper totalement.

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Resumen La politica econ?mica del proteccionismo: El caso burocrático. — Este articulo trata de analizar el roi jugado por los bur?eratas en el mercado politico de la protection. Hasta aqui, los agentes püblicos considerados en lu literatura fueron exclusivamente politicos y votantes. Todos los argumentes propuestos en este trabajo dan fuerte apoyo a la idea que los bur?eratas están más a favor de la proteeei?n que los polfticos. Si se mira una oficina püblica como un dictador parcial que supervisa una industria determinada, esta elegirá necesariamente un nivel de proteeei?n más alto que el te?ricamente Optimo. Si los bur?eratas tienen menos oportunidades para captura ganancias (riqueza) de las actividades protegidas que los politicos, como es de esperar, entonces ellos van a favorecer una proteeei?n más alta que los politicos. Este sesgo hacia la proteeei?n se incrementará si, además, se consideran los costos de information. Otro resultado de este articulo es que cualquier clasificaei?n entre dispositivos protectivos que no toma completamente en cuenta el lado de la oferta del mercado por proteeei?n puede ser bastante enga?oso.

     

The political economy of immigration quotas

It is argued, using a single-sector general equilibrium model, that the economic interests of citizens of a host country in relation to immigration depend on their factor ownership. Using the median voter model, it is argued that whether a country admits further immigration depends on the country's factor ownership distributions, the generosity of its transfer programs, as well as on the prejudices about immigrants that its citizens hold.on leave from Moorhead State University.     

The political economy of China's future

The Chinese economy and political system have evolved, perhaps even matured, to a point whereby researchers within and without academia deem it appropriate to shift their attention from the immediate past, and of course the present, to the long‐term future. Institutional changes, particularly WTO accession, and the challenges posed by modern technology are reinforcing this trend. The more policy sensitive of the two most ambitious exercises in crystal ball gazing, it is argued here, has yielded fascinating insights but, inevitably so given the nature of the undertaking, the questions to which it gives rise match both quantitatively and qualitatively the answers provided.     

The political economy of American monetary policy

Conclusion This thought-provoking volume should be read by any monetary economist who cares about trying to understand Fed policy. In light of the continuing trend toward constructing economic theories that tell more and more about less and less, cynics may have come to believe that the economics profession does not value research about real-world issues such as monetary policymaking. The contributions to this volume provide hard evidence that a sizable part of the profession continues to pursue policy-related questions.