Does Venture Capital Syndication Spur Employment Growth and Shareholder Value? Evidence from German IPO Data

This study empirically examines the syndication of equity by multiple venture capitalists in Germany. Following the literature, there are mainly two competing views as to why venture capitalists syndicate investments. First, syndication can be viewed as a means of risk-sharing. Second, venture capitalists may provide important productive resources to firms: capital and information. I test hypotheses based on these two aspects. The results show that the syndication of equity and the number of venture capitalists involved cannot be fully explained by firm characteristics like size, age, or industry affiliation. Although syndicated investments do not differ significantly in stock-market performance, they do show significantly higher growth rates.     

Agency costs,institutions, learning,and taxation in venture capital contracting

This paper introduces a data set on forms of finance used in 12,363 Canadian and US venture capital (VC) and private equity financings of Canadian entrepreneurial firms from 1991 to 2003. The data comprise different types of venture capital institutions, including corporate, limited partnership, government, and labour-sponsored funds as well as US funds that invest in Canadian entrepreneurial firms. Unlike prior work with US venture capitalists financing US entrepreneurial firms, the data herein indicate that convertible preferred equity has never been the most frequently used form of finance for either US or Canadian venture capitalists financing Canadian entrepreneurial firms, regardless of the definition of the term ‘venture capital’. A syndication example and a simple theoretical framework are provided to show the nonrobustness of prior theoretical work on optimal financial contracts in venture capital finance. Multivariate empirical analyses herein indicate that (1) security design is a response to expected agency problems, (2) capital gains taxation affects contracts, (3) there are trends in the use of different contracts which can be interpreted as learning, and (4) market conditions affect contracts.     

Social capital of venture capitalists and start-up funding

How does the social capital of venture capitalists (VCs) affect the funding of start-ups? By building on the rich social capital literature, we hypothesize a positive effect of VCs?? social capital, derived from past syndication, on the amount of money that start-ups receive. Specifically, we argue that both structural and relational aspects of VCs?? social networks provide VCs with superior access to information about current investment objects and opportunities to leverage them in the future, increasing their willingness to invest in these firms. Our empirical results, derived from a novel dataset containing more than 1,500 first funding rounds in the Internet and IT sector, strongly confirm our hypotheses. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of venture capital and entrepreneurship, showing that the role and effect of VCs?? social capital on start-up firms may be more complex than previously argued in the literature.     

Offshoring strategy: Motives,functions, locations,and governance modes of small,medium-sized and large firms

How does firm size impact on a firm's offshoring strategy? Are the underlying motives for offshoring, the particular functions considered, the locations to relocate, and the particular governance mode different for small, medium-sized and large firms? In this paper, cost, resource and entrepreneurial drivers are investigated for their relationship with firm size. Moreover, we hypothesize on the relationship between function, location and governance mode choices of offshoring and firm size. Using multi-country data of the Offshoring Research Network (ORN), we present empirical evidence on the three offshoring driver categories and function, location and governance mode choices of small, medium-sized and large firms. The results show offshoring might be used as cost, resource or entrepreneurial strategy. Cost drivers are most important for large and small firms, whereas resource drivers are especially important for medium-sized and large firms. Entrepreneurial drivers are most important for medium-sized firms, just like these firms have a relatively stronger preference for nearshoring. Small firms mostly offshore competence exploring activities, whereas large firms relocate competence exploiting activities.     

Venture capital reputation: a blessing or a curse for entrepreneurial firm innovation—a contingent effect of industrial distance

This study investigates whether venture capital reputation is a blessing or a curse for entrepreneurial firm innovation by using data from 1553 observations of venture capital investments on entrepreneurial firms in China’s New Over-the-Counter (OTC) Market. Advantages that venture capital brings to entrepreneurial firms have been widely acknowledged in extant research. However, our research emphasizes the potential resource outflows rather than inflows when firms are embedded in a shared reputable venture capital, and finds that the curse effect of venture capital reputation on entrepreneurial firms is manifested. Furthermore, we develop the concept of venture capital “intra-industrial reputation” and “extra-industrial reputation” to give a contingent answer to the “blessing or curse” question. The conclusions are drawn indicating that the curse effect is contingent on industrial distance. Venture capital intra-industrial reputation is positively linked to entrepreneurial firm innovation, whereas extra-industrial reputation exerts a strong negative impact, which is responsible for the curse effect.     

Host country network,industry experience,and international alliance formation: Evidence from the venture capital industry

Integrating resource dependence and social network theories, we investigate how foreign firms’ position in alliance network in host country influences their further allying with firms from the host and home countries. We introduce network centrality as a factor that influences two competing forces in alliance formation: willingness and attractiveness. Furthermore, we argue that foreign firms suffering from a low network centrality may find it easier to enhance their network position if they have industry experience. Our analysis of data on US venture capital firms’ investment in China supports our theoretical framework. Theoretical and managerial implications of our findings are discussed.     

Venture capital in Western Europe

Western Europe is in the process of an entrepreneurial renaissance. An integral part of this renaissance is the emergence of a venture capital industry in Europe. Although the venture capital institution in Europe is very much modeled along the lines of its American counterpart, it is significantly smaller in size both in absolute terms as well as in relation to the size of the economy. Substantial differences in venture capital activity are also found to exist within Europe,it is most prevaient in the United Kingdom, France, and Netherlands. Surprisingly, it is less developed in West Germany, particularly given the size of this country's economy.Venture capital in Western Europe shares some characteristics with that in the United States. Its investment focus is in high technology, and syndication between funds is common. Unlike the United States, however, banks are a major source of venture capital funds. Surprisingly, in spite of the economic integration to which the European Community aspires, the mobility of venture capital across national boundaries is low.The authors try to explain differences in venture capital activity in several countries of the European Community by examining four aspects of each country's environment. In particular, the size of the technology sector, the cultural influence on entrepreneurial risk-taking, the government's policy to stimulate risk capital and entrepreneurship. and finally, the ability of venture-backed firms to turn to publicly traded markets as a source of future financing. One common factor shared by the three countries with the highest level of venture capital activity is the presence of a secondary stock market geared to the needs of a small, relatively new venture contemplating an initial public offering. The Unlisted Securities Market in the United Kingdom, the Seconde Marché in France, and the Parallel Market in the Netherlands serve these needs and provide the mechanism by which venture capitalists can liquidate their equity position after the venture is quoted on these financial markets. To the venture it provides access to public financing for funding continued growth.In the United Kingdom and Netherlands, the business enterprise has historically been regarded as a tradeable entity and hence the concept of ownership by passive investors is well accepted. In France, where this is a relatively recent phenomenon, the government has played a strong role in stimulating an interest in stock market investing in general. It has also created some extremely attractive fiscal incentives for investors in venture capital funds.     

The tradeoff between firm size and diversity in the pursuit of technological progress

Conclusion Our analysis lends support to both sides of the debate concerning the optimal firm size for achieving technical advance. It provides a basis for why industries composed of many small firms will tend to exhibit greater diversity in the approaches to innovation pursued, and why greater diversity will contribute to more rapid technological change. It also provides a basis for why industries populated by larger firms will achieve a more rapid rate of technical advance on the approaches to innovation that are pursued. These arguments together suggest that a tradeoff exists between the appropriability advantage of large size and the advantages of diversity that accrue from numerous small firms. Our analysis has been more appreciative than rigorous and, indeed, often explicity speculative. While we attempted to raise important questions, our framework requires more structuring before we can be confident about any of our conclusions. Even in its inchoate form, however, our analysis demonstrates that much needs to be done before the current debate about firm size can seriously inform policy. If we accept the plausibility of our basic framework, it focuses attention on a range of issues and questions. The fundamental premise of our analysis is that firm capabilities and perceptions differ within industries. This premise is not, however, widely reflected in analyses of industry behavior and performance, which typically take some representative firm as their starting point. Indeed, the analytic utility of our particular premise deserves scrutiny. Are differences in firm capabilities and perceptions as critical to explaining the industry patterns in innovative activity and performance as we suggest? Do these differences persist? Is our abstract characterization of these differences and their effects on innovative activity up to the task of providing a basis for policy?These intraindustry differences in capabilities and perceptions underpin the hypothesized relationship in our framework between the number of firms within an industry and the number of distinct technological activities pursued by the industry as a whole. Surely this hypothesis should be tested. To establish the relationship between numbers of firms and technological diversity, we also made two important assumptions, which themselves should be examined. First, we assumed that firms independently decide upon which approaches to innovation to pursue.This assumption precludes the clustering of firms around innovative activities due to imitation, a phenomenon highlighted by Nelson (1981) and Scott (1991). To the degree that innovative activities yield relatively fast, public results, the assumption may be suspect. While our evidence indirectly suggests that such clustering may not be critical for explaining innovative activity in a wide range of industries, more research would be helpful. Second, we assumed that the number of approaches to innovation pursued by firms is independent of their size, implying large and small firms will tend to pursue the same number of approaches. This assumption probably does not apply to the smallest firms within an industry, particularly to the extent that such firms are often not full line manufacturing firms. Does it apply, however, to the medium to large firms that account for the preponderance of R&D and economic activity inthe manufacturing sector? While our evidence again provides indirect support for this claim, more empirical and theoretical research is indicated.We also made other claims and assumptions that deserve further attention. For example, we argued that greater technological diversity stimulates technical advance and provides gross increments to social welfare. Assuming it exists, the mechanism linking diversity and technical advance has never been examined empirically and is not obvious. Our assumption that expected firm growth due to innovation is increamental played an important role in permitting usto hypothesize an appropriability advantage of large size. Again, both the assumption and its alleged effect on innovative activity are worth examining. Finally, we also need to test whether the relationship between R&D and firm size within industries depends upon appropriability conditions, particularly upon the extent to which firms can sell their innovations or grow rapidly due to innovation. In conclusion, this litany of reasonable but unsubstantiated assumptions and arguments should make clear that this paper is only a modest beginning of a daunting research agenda.

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Does acquiring venture capital pay off for the funded firms? A meta-analysis on the relationship between venture capital investment and funded firm financial performance

Researchers and practitioners frequently propose that venture capital (VC) is an important resource to increase the performance of funded firms, especially in environments of uncertainty. In this paper we scrutinize these theoretical propositions, following an evidence-based research approach. We synthesize 76 empirical samples on 36,567 firms. We find a small positive performance effect of VC investment on funded firm performance; however, the effect vanishes if researchers control for industry selection effects. Furthermore, we find that the performance effect mainly relates to firm growth while profitability is unaffected. We also uncover that performance effects are reduced when the funded firms are very young or very mature. In addition, studies focusing on IPO events, which constitute the majority of studies, determine a substantially smaller performance effect. We discuss theoretical implications and offer suggestions for future research on VC.     

Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: A networking perspective

The networking of 464 venture capital firms is analyzed by examining their joint investments in a sample of 1501 portfolio companies for the period 1966–1982. Some of the factors that influence the amount of networking are the innovativeness, technology, stage, and industry of the portfolio company. Using the resource exchange model, we reason that the relative amount of networking is explained primarily by the degree of uncertainty associated with an investment rather than by the sum of money invested.Among the findings of our study about venture capitalists are the following:The top 61 venture capital firms that managed 57% of the pool of venture capital in 1982 had an extensive network. Three out of four portfolio companies had at least one of the top 61 venture capital firms as an investor. Those top 61 firms network among themselves and with other venture capital firms. Hence they have considerable influence.Sharing of information seems to be more important than spreading of financial risk as a reason for networking. There is no difference in the degree of co-investing of large venture capital firms—those with the deep pockets—and small firms. Furthermore, where there is more uncertainty, there is more co-investing, even though the average amount invested per portfolio company is less. That, we argue, is evidence that the primary reason for co-investing is sharing of knowledge rather than spreading of financial risk. Venture capital firms gain access to the network by having knowledge that other firms need.It is likely that there will be increasing specialization by venture capital firms. Knowledge is an important distinctive competence of venture capital firms. That knowledge includes information such as innovations, technology, and people in specific industry segments. Among the portfolios of the top 61 venture capital firms are ones with a concentration of low innovative companies, others with a concentration of high innovative technology companies, and others with a no particular concentration. As technology changes rapidly and grows more and more complex, we expect that venture capitalists will increasingly specialize according to type of companies in which they invest. Only the largest firms with many venture capitalists will be like “department stores,” which invest in all types of companies. The smaller firms with only a few venture capitalists will tend to be more like “boutiques” which invest in specific types of companies, or in specific geographical regions around the world.We think that the networking of venture capital firms has the following implications for entrepreneurs:Entrepreneurs should seek funds from venture firms that are known to invest in their type of product. It speeds the screening process. If the venture capital firm decides to invest, it can syndicate the investment through its network of similar firms. And after the investment has been made, the venture capital firms can bring substantial expertise to the entrepreneur's company.Entrepreneurs should not hawk their business plans indiscriminately. Through their networks, venture firms become aware of plans that have been rejected by other firms. A plan that gets turned down several times is unlikely to be funded. Thus it is better to approach venture capital firms selectively.The extensive network of the leading venture capital firms probably facilitates the setting of a “market rate” for the funds they invest. The going rate for venture capital is not posted daily. Nevertheless, details of the most recent deals are rapidly disseminated through venture capitalists' networks. Hence, that helps to set an industry-wide rate for the funds being sought by entrepreneurs.Lastly, we give the following advice to strategic planners:Venture capital firms share strategic information that is valuable to others outside their network. Since they often invest in companies with emerging products and services, venture capitalists gather valuable strategic information about future innovations and technological trends. Thus, strategic planners should tap into venture capitalists' networks, and thereby gain access to that information. It is sometimes information of the sort that can revolutionize an industry.     

Governance and resource interaction in networks. The role of venture capital in a biotech start-up

This paper examines venture capital (VC) governance in innovation processes. The VC literature often presents the relationship between a VC firm and a start-up as dyadic and analyzes it with agency theory. In contrast, this paper deploys the resource interaction framework presented in Håkansson and Waluszewski (2002) to governance and innovation in networks. The paper reports an in-depth case study of Pyrosequencing, a Swedish biotech firm financed with VC. The results from this study reveal how the relationship between a VC and a start-up company is embedded in a wider network and how the governance of the VC spreads in the surrounding network and influences a start-up's possibilities to develop organizational and technical resource interfaces to critical counterparts such as suppliers and customers.     

Strategic alliances by venture capital backed firms: an empirical examination

A growing body of literature examines the formation of strategic alliances as an important value-added role provided by venture capital firms. This paper contributes to this literature by examining two related questions: whether venture capital firms use strategic alliances as a substitute or compliment to capital infusion, and how venture capital firms use alliances to mitigate different types of risk. Results from 2505 venture-backed startups reveal that venture capital firms treat alliance formation as a substitute for capital infusion and that the breadth of the network of syndication partners investing in the startup increases the number of its strategic alliances. We also find intentionality in alliance formation. Specifically, firms operating in industry environments characterized by technical risk are more likely to form alliances with partners capable of mitigating technical risks, and firms operating in environments characterized by market risk are more likely to form alliances with partners capable of mitigating market risk. Our findings lend additional support to the perspective that alliances represent an important mechanism through which venture capital firms add value to their portfolio companies.     

Emerging strategies in the venture capital industry

This article reports a study of the future direction of the venture capital industry by examining the basic strategies and strategic assumptions of a broad sample of venture capital firms. There are three main sets of results:First, the once homogeneous venture capital industry is rapidly dividing into several different “strategic groups.” Members of these “groups” are increasingly distinguishing themselves from other groups on four basic dimensions followed by member firms: 1. Financial Resources—Equity capital comes from a greater variety of sources (five major sources) resulting in fundamentally different demands on the mission of the receiving venture capital firm. 2. Staff Resources—The way venture capital firms use staff resources, particularly regarding investee management assistance, is becoming increasingly varied across different groups. Some firms provide fewer than 2-days per year, while others provide up to 450 man-days per year per client. 3. Venture Stages—While the overall industry retains a primary interest in stage 1,2, and 3 investment, specific firms vary considerably in the distribution of investment emphasis across these three stages. 4. Use of Financial Resources-Firms in the industry are becoming increasingly differentiated in the size of minimum investments they make ($100 M to $1000 M) and in their role as a direct investor versus a “broker” for institutional funds. Practicing venture capitalists should make use of this first set of findings in two ways. First, they may find it useful to compare their firm's orientation along these four strategic dimensions with those of the firm's that comprised this study. Second, they may seek to use these four strategic dimensions as a basis on which they might examine, clarify, and/or redefine the marketing strategy pursued by their firm.A second set of results identified three goals and priorities of venture capital firms that have neither changed over time nor across increasingly different strategic groups. Annualized, after-tax return on investments of between 25% and 40% remain the most common objective across all firms. A 5-to-6 year investment time horizon and a major emphasis on the quality of the management team in evaluating new deals were universal priorities across diverse venture capital firms.A third finding in this study was that venture capital firms profess greater “certainty” about the future direction of the venture capital industry than the direction of their firm. The most notable example of this is a strong sense that industry-wide rates of return are headed downward yet few senior partners expect their firm to experience this decline.Practicing venture capitalists may be interested to peruse these results to see what trends are predicted within the venture capital industry by this subsample of that industry. Second, they should consider the finding that industry-wide rates of return are headed downward in light of the first two sets of findings to develop their own opinion about the future performance of different strategic groups within the industry.It is important to note that the sample of venture capital firms on which this study was based did not include most of the larger, older funds. Some of these funds would be characterized as “industry leaders, pace-setters, and innovators.” The sample provides a solid representation of the “broad middle” of the venture capital industry and newer entrants into the industry. While larger, older funds are under represented, their impact on future trends and strategies in the industry is captured to some extent in the set of questions about “future direction of the venture capital industry.“Finally, the emerging strategic groups in the venture capital industry that were identified by this study may be useful information for investors as well as users of venture capital. For investors, the opportunity to participate in venture capital activity should become more clearly understood and varied. Basically, this study should help investors differentiate the strategic posture of different venture capital firms and funds on four factors rather than simply industry/geographic considerations.For users of venture capital, the results of this study suggest a possibility for multiple options that are both more accessible and more catered to specific needs. Users of venture capital should find a clearer basis on which to differentiate venture capital firms in terms of venture stage priorities, staff utilization orientations, sources and uses of financial resources. This should make for more informed “shopping” among different venture capital sources and provide a basis on which to “shop” for the most compatible firm.     

The interplay of need and opportunity in venture capital investment syndication

This study examines the syndication of investments novel to a VC firm as a function of the firm's need and opportunity to do so. We distinguish two types of uncertainty that firms face when considering novel investments: egocentric, pertaining to making the right decisions, and altercentric, pertaining to being evaluated as a potential partner on the investment. Whereas the former increases the firm's need to syndicate the investment, the latter reduces the firm's opportunity to do so, making it contingent upon the firm's status and reputation for attracting potential partners. Using data on first-round venture capital investments, we find that novel investments are more likely to be syndicated. Moreover, this relationship is stronger for firms with higher status and weaker for firms with higher reputation. These results highlight a relational aspect of uncertainty, inherent in a particular VC firm — investment dyad, and suggest that status and reputation play different roles in aligning the need and opportunity to syndicate novel investments.     

The CEO,venture capitalists,and the board

An element in the never-ending debate about the process of funding highpotential businesses is the extent to which venture capitalists add value besides money to their portfolio companies. At one end of the spectrum, venture capitalists incubate start-ups and nurture hatchlings, while at the other extreme, so-called “vulture” capitalists feed on fledgling companies. A very important way in which venture capitalists add value other than money to their portfolio companies is by serving on boards of directors. Hence, by studying the role of outside directors, especially those representing venture capital firms, we were able to shed light on the issue of value-added.In the first phase of the research, we studied 162 venture-capital-backed high-tech firms located in California, Massachusetts, and Texas. In the second phase (with data from 98 of the 162 firms), the lead venture capitalists on the boards were classified according to whether or not they were a “top-20” firm.Board Size The average board size was 5.6 members, which was somewhat less than half the size of the board of a typical large company. Board size increased from 3 to 4.8 members with the first investment of venture capital.Board Composition and Control The typical board comprised 1.7 inside members, 2.3 venture capital principals, .3 venture capital staff, and 1.3 other outsiders. Insiders constituted 40% or less of the members of 82% of the boards, while venture capitalists made up over 40% of members of 55% of the boards. When a top-20 venture capital firm was the lead investor, then 55% of the board members were venture capitalists; in contrast, when the lead was not a top-20 firm, only 23% of board were venture capitalists.Value-Added Overall, our sample of CEOs did not rate the value of the advice of venture capitalists any higher than that of other board members. However, those CEOs with a top20 venture capital firm as the lead investor, on average, did rate the value of the advice from their venture capital board members significantly higher—but not outstandingly higher—than the advice from other outside board members. On the other hand, CEOs with no top-20 as the lead investor found no significant difference between the value of the advice from venture capitalists and other outside board members. Hence, in our sample, we could not say that there was a noticeable difference in the value of valueadded by top-20 boards and non-top-20 boards.The areas where CEOs rated outside board members (both venture capitalists and others) most helpful were as a sounding board, interfacing with the investor group, monitoring operating performance, monitoring financial performance, recruiting/replacing the CEO, and assistance with short term crisis. That help was rated higher for early-stage than later-stage companies.Our findings have the following implications for venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and researchers.Venture Capitalist The main product of a venture capital firm is money, which is a commodity. It's impossible to differentiate a commodity in a martetplace where the customers have perfect information. As venture capitalists learned since the mid-1980s, their customers (entrepreneurs) now have an abundance of information that, while it may not be perfect, is certainly good enough to make a well-informed decision when selecting a venture capital firm. Hence, value-added may be the most important distinctive competence with which a venture capital firm—especially one specializing in early-stage investments—can differentiate itself from its competitors. If that is the case, then venture capital firms need to pay more attention to their value-added, because CEOs, overall, do not perceive that it has a great deal of value to their companies. The top-20 appear to be doing a somewhat better job in that area than other venture capital firms.Entrepreneurs If an entrepreneur wants outside board members who bring valueadded other than money, it appears that they can do as well with non-venture capitalists as with venture capitalists. The entrepreneurs we talked to in our survey gave the impression that board members with significant operating experience are more valued than “pure” financial types with no operating experience. If venture capital is an entrepreneur's only source offunding, then the entrepreneur should seek out firms that put venture capitalists with operating experience on boards. It also appears that an entrepreneur, will, on average, get more value-added when the lead investor is a top-20 firm, but there is a drawback: when a top-20 is the lead investor, it is more likely that venture capitalists will control the board. No entrepreneur should seek venture capital solely to get value-added from a venture capitalist on the board, because outside board members who are not venture capitalists give advice that is every bit as good as that given by venture capitalists.Researchers Value-added is a fruitful avenue of research. From a practical perspective, if valueadded exists it should be measurable. So far the jury has not decided that issue. Some finance studies of the performance of venture-capital-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) claim to have found valueadded, some claim to have found none, and at least one study claims to have found negative value- added. From a theoretical perspective, value-added is relevant to agency theory, transaction cost economics, and the capital asset pricing model. It also is relevant to strategic analysis from the viewpoint of distinctive competencies.     

Organizational Virtue and Stakeholder Interdependence: An Empirical Examination of Financial Intermediaries and IPO Firms

Organizational virtue orientation (OVO), an organizational-level construct, refers to the integrated set of beliefs and values that support ethical character traits and virtuous behaviors. To advance the study of organizational virtue, we examine OVO in firms making their initial public offerings (IPOs), with respect to key external stakeholders that serve as financial intermediaries (i.e., venture capital firms and underwriting banks). Drawing on stakeholder and resource dependence theories, we argue that mutual interdependencies occur between financial intermediaries and IPO firms such that venture capital firms’ ownership levels and underwriter reputation are positively associated with the selection of more virtuous IPO firms. We also argue for the moderating relationship of IPO firm age on these main relationships; since IPO firms have more history and information availability, less importance will be placed on OVO in the selection process. In support of our hypotheses, the results of this study suggest the organizational virtue of IPO firms influences the selection decisions of financial intermediaries by reflecting positively on these key stakeholders to improve legitimacy and reputation.     

How do new ventures grow? Firm capabilities, growth strategies and performance

While new venture growth performance has been studied extensively, little work has been done to examine the complex strategic choices through which growth is pursued and attained. Building on the resource-based view and social capital perspective, this study develops a conceptual framework that links combinations of ventures' (1) technological, (2) financial, and (3) networking capabilities to different growth strategies in terms of organic growth, partnership, and acquisition. We further assess the mechanisms through which a new venture's growth choices affect firm performance. Using data from 238 new high-tech ventures in China, we find that new ventures with different resource combinations follow different growth strategies. While partnership growth leads to greater product diversity, and acquisition is more effective in realizing firm internationalization, both lead to a better chance of survival of new ventures. In addition, the study explicates the role of technological capability in moderating the relationship between growth strategies and new venture performance.     

Exploring the innovation strategies of young firms: Corporate venture capital and venture capital impact on alliance innovation strategy

We investigate how governance structure and power influence alliance exploration strategy. Adopting a real options perspective and the agency view, we suggest that innovation strategies differ based on the firm's governance authority. We find that the motivations of corporate venture capitalist firms, venture capitalists, and firm founders may have an impact on the formation of exploratory alliances among adolescent firms. Using a sample of 122 adolescent firms, we examine the influence that governance structure has on the firm's alliance portfolio and innovation potential. While the influence of corporate venture capitalist firms alone do affect alliance formation strategy, corporate venture-backed firms with founders having high influence (knowledge or ownership in the firm) are more likely to form innovation-focused alliances. In contrast, venture capitalist-backed firms tend to avoid innovation-focused alliances, preferring more exploitive ones, even when founders have high influence within the firm.     

The impact of firmspecific capabilities on the amount of capital raised in an initial public offering: Evidence from the biotechnology industry

Going “public” has a magical sound to most entrepreneurial managers. By going public the firm increases its legitimacy in the business community, improves access to debt financing, and creates a means of exit for major shareholders. However, by far the most important reason for going public is to infuse a significant amount of investment capital into the firm. It is well documented that small businesses frequently fail because of insufficient funding and heavy debt loads. Issuing an initial public offering (IPO) allows entrepreneurial firms to overcome these pitfalls. Clearly, if access to capital is the major goal of going public, then the success of an offering is measured by the amount of capital raised by the firm. This study presents a model of the total amount of capital raised by a firm through an IPO. The explanatory variables include several indicators of the scientific capabilities of the firm including the location of the firm, the quality of the research staff, the number of products under development, the number of patents held by the firm, and the firm's prior spending on research and development (R&D). The model is empirically tested on a sample of 92 biotechnology IPOs. The results provide strong support for the hypothesized positive relationship between the total amount of capital raised by a firm's IPO and the scientific capabilities of the firm.Our results have important implications for entrepreneurs. First, an entrepreneur needs to develop and send credible signals indicating the value of the firm's intangible assets to the market. Second, the market values as deep a product pipeline as possible given a firm's resource constraints. Third, choice of location is a key strategic decision that should not be overlooked. Fourth, the market values firm-specific capabilities and will increase the capital it is willing to invest in a firm accordingly. Finally, the amount of capital a firm raises in its IPO can be influenced by entrepreneurial managers' strategic decisions.     

Structuring deals and governance after the IPO: Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in high tech start-ups

In an effort to better understand the effects of venture capital investment on selected firm governance and financing structures, we examined the post-IPO experiences of 190 biotechnology and healthcare firms (see appendix). Our study revealed that in virtually all cases, the involvement of venture capitalists reduced the role of the founder-entrepreneur in strategic decision making. This was illustrated by the larger proportion of outside directors when venture capitalists invested and the smaller proportion of entrepreneurs who remained officers or in board positions after the IPO. We also found that venture capitalists rarely invested alone, and preferred to structure deals in which venture capital partners share both risks and rewards.