Technological Progress, Downsizing and Unemployment

This paper presents a model where the form of innovations is endogenous. It is shown that with labour market imperfections, which raise the wage above the shadow price of labour, firms over-invest in innovations cutting labour costs and under-invest in increasing quality. As a result, the market outcome features lower long run growth, higher unemployment and lower welfare than the social optimum. It is further shown that a firm's incentives to cut labour costs are increased as wages rise and as the firm declines. Finally, a rise in competition increases incentives to downsize for firms with below average quality performance.     

Wage Determination in Rural Russia: A Stochastic Frontier Model

This article examines wages in rural Russia after the first decade of economic transition using data from a nationally representative household survey. The stochastic frontier analysis reveals that Russia's rural labour markets place high value on human capital. The overall level of rural wages, however, is very low, with the median wage 10% below the official subsistence level. The gender pay gap severely depresses women's wages. A woman with the same skills as a man is paid only 47% of the man's wage. Rural workers who receive income from their personal plots accept significantly lower wages. Private firms pay considerably higher wages than state or collectively owned firms, but account only for one fifth of rural workers.     

The effects of human resource management on small firms’ productivity and employees’ wages

This paper analyses whether employees and firms differently benefit from particular human resource (HR) practices. The focus is on small firms that may be badly informed on the impact of HR practices on firm performance. In this study on Dutch pharmacies, it is found that firms do not reward employees’ skills according to their contribution to firms’ productivity, as (1) employees are over-rewarded for their sector-specific skills and under-rewarded for the productivity enhancing effect of their computer skills and (2) employees’ work experience positively affects their wages but does not have real productivity effects. Moreover, it is found that training employees in case of vacancy problems seems to be an adequate HR practice, since it increases productivity without affecting the average wage level. The opposite holds for offering higher wages to newly recruited employees. Furthermore, we find that only the employees benefit from performance evaluation interviews, whereas employing many employees by temporary contracts appears to have a negative effect on productivity, without affecting the wage level.     

Employment and wage dynamics in Estonia, 1989-951

This study monitors the effects of economic transition on wages and employment in a former Soviet Republic. Estonia's case is of particular interest because of its early adoption of relatively free labour market policies. Relative wages for the highest educated groups rose for all age groups. There were also rapid increases in returns to job experience, particularly at young ages. Increasing wage dispersion across human capital groups was accompanied by narrowing wage dispersion within human capital groups. Relative wages rose in sectors which gained relative employment, while they fell in shrinking sectors. In addition, there were large flows of labour between shrinking and growing sectors, suggesting that labour market equilibrating mechanisms developed very rapidly in Estonia.     

Training policies and economic growth in an evolutionary world

The role of training and human capital accumulation as a source of innovation and growth is studied within an evolutionary microsimulation model. Firms within the model learn about technology through radical/incremental innovation and imitation. General human capital increases the probability of innovation whereas specific human capital increases technical efficiency. Firms endogenously determine the level of investment in fixed and current assets, R&D activities, and education and training. Human capital accumulation through investment in education and training is shown to be a source of economic growth even though firms tend to under-invest in these activities because they cannot fully recoup training costs when workers quit. The paper investigates the effects of various training policies on macro-performance. The first policy is to subsidise all education and training activities. The second policy requires firms to spend a certain percentage of the wage bill on training activities. In the third case, the government subsidises training activities if the firm hires unemployed people, and pays the social security contributions for 1 year. We experiment with these policies because many European countries adopt similar policies to cure the unemployment problem and to enhance economic growth. By running 101 experiments for each policy, increasing the parameter value step by step, we are able to test the impact of training policies on macro-economic performance (manufacturing growth rates, unemployment, etc.), and to estimate policy elasticities through econometric techniques. The results suggest that some subsidy policies are effective in improving the long-run macro-performance while a minimum requirement to train set upon firms is not.     

Firm ownership and internal labour practices in a transition economy

One feature common to many post‐socialist transition economies is a relatively compressed wage structure in the state‐owned sector. We conjecture that this compressed wage structure creates weak incentives for work effort and worker skill acquisition and thus presents adverse consequences for the entire transition economy if a substantial portion of the labour force works in the state sector. We explore firm wage incentives and worker training, as well as other labour practices and outcomes, in a transition setting with matched firm and worker data collected in one of the largest provinces of Vietnam – Ho Chi Minh City. The Vietnamese state sector exhibits a compressed wage distribution in relation to privately owned firms with foreign ownership. State wage practices stress tenure over worker productivity and their wage policies result in flatter wage–experience profiles and lower returns to education. The state work force is in greater need of formal training, a need that is in part met through direct government financing. In spite of the opportunities for government financed training and at least partly due to inefficient worker incentives, state firms, by certain measures, exhibit lower levels of labour productivity. The private sector comparison group to state firms for all of these findings is foreign owned firms. The internal labour practices of foreign firms are more consistent with a view of profit‐maximizing firms operating with no political constraints. This is not the case for Vietnamese de novo private firms that exhibit much more idiosyncratic behaviour and whose labour practices are often indistinguishable from state firms. The exact reasons for this remain a topic of on‐going research yet we conjecture that various private sector constraints, including limited access to formal capital, play an important role.     

Unions and Efficient Training

The paper examines the optimal level of training investment when trained workers are mobile, wage contracts are time-consistent, and training comprises both specific and general skills. The firm has ex post monopsonistic power that drives trained workers' wages below the social optimum. The emergence of a trade union bargaining at the firm-level can increase social welfare, by counterbalancing the firm's ex post monopsonistic power in wage determination. Local union-firm wage bargaining ensures that the post-training wage is set sufficiently high to deter at least some quits, so that the number of workers the firm trains is nearer the social optimum     

Labour Demand and Wage-induced Innovations: Evidence from the OECD countries

This paper shows that increasing real wages steepens or reverses the slope of the labour demand schedule because increasing wages give firms incentives to innovate and to invest in newer and more efficient vintages of capital. Using macroeconomic data for the OECD countries it is shown that the efficiency inducement of higher real wages steepens the traditional neoclassical labour demand function substantially. Taking into account the adverse demand effects of wage reductions it is doubtful that real wage reductions are a cure for the unemployment problem in the OECD countries.     

Changes in Wages,Wage Inequality and the Return to Human Capital Skills in Kenya: 1977–2005

The conventional literature on wage inequality in Kenya has two drawbacks: first, by focusing on manufacturing sector wages, overlooking wages in other sectors, the results may be biased. Second, previous studies emphasize wage determination solely at the conditional mean rather than resort to wage determination across the entire earnings distribution. We remedy these weaknesses and add a new layer of research previously unexamined. Particularly, we consider wage changes during periods of wide GDP fluctuations from 1977 to 1986, 1986 to 1999, and 1999 to 2005 and explore if prices of measured human capital skills moved in tandem with changes in the dispersion of unmeasured human capital skills as is postulated by human capital theory. Our results support human capital theory: we find higher wages and higher residual wage dispersion during periods of rising GDP (1999–2005) but find lower wages and lower residual wage dispersion during periods of falling GDP (1977–86 and 1986–99).     

General training and oligopsony

I consider a duopsony model of a general skilled labour market. The source of the market power of the firms is the mobility cost of the workers. In the model general training is inefficient and the firms bear a share of the general training cost. If capital market imperfections prevent workers from investing in human capital, the imperfect competition in the skilled labour market compared with the perfect competition promotes general training. In order to remove the inefficiency of personnel training it is necessary to link together a minimum wage for skilled workers and loans to apprentices.     

Intergenerational externalities,sustainability and welfare—The ambiguous effect of optimal policies on resource depletion

This paper studies an endogenous growth model with exhaustible resources, overlapping generations and human capital externalities. In the competitive equilibrium, selfish behavior and inefficient skills accumulation may prevent sustained growth. Implementing the utilitarian optimum likely induces sustainability via increased knowledge formation, but resource depletion may be faster or slower than under laissez-faire depending on the social discount rate. Heavy (modest) social discounting delays (anticipates) the achievement of net welfare gains for newborn agents and successors. The reason is that human capital accumulation magnifies the positive growth effects of policies that lower the rate of resource destruction, preserving the welfare of newborn agents. Resource-depleting policies, instead, hamper growth and reduce lifetime welfare of early-in-time generations—the first loser being the currently young.     

Statistical Discrimination with Peer Effects: Can Integration Eliminate Negative Stereotypes?

We introduce peer effects in the costs of human capital acquisition into a model of statistical discrimination in labour markets. This creates a link between the level of segregation in social networks and racial disparities in job assignment and wages. We show that this relationship is characterized by discontinuities: there is a threshold level of segregation below which negative stereotypes become unsustainable, and steady-state skill levels can change dramatically. This change can work in either direction: skill levels may either rise or fall in both groups. Which of these outcomes arises depends on the population share of the disadvantaged group and on the distribution of the costs of human capital investments. We also examine the effects of affirmative action policies in the presence of peer effects and provide conditions under which such policies eliminate negative stereotypes.     

Skill Formation,Immigration and European Integration: The Politics of the UK Growth Model

ABSTRACT

While a reluctant European player now heading for the Exit, the UK was also an enthusiastic adopter of several key EU economic policies – namely, the skills and technology policies of Agenda 2020 and labour mobility. These initiatives worked with existing British policy, and structural biases, to exacerbate the already bifurcated structure of UK capitalism – between the high-paid technology and financial services sector on the one hand, and low-cost, low-wage sectors on the other hand. In particular, and central to the argument of this paper, immigration from Eastern and Central Europe after 2004 helped to sustain low-cost manufacturing and services industries by undermining firms’ incentives to invest in training. This combined with endemic failures in the UK’s skills system, which is heavily geared towards producing graduates with general skills but neglects the needs of mid and lower segments of the labour market. EU integration, therefore, exacerbated cleavages over skills between high- and low-productivity sectors and may have contributed to social divisions that led to Brexit.     

Worker flows, job flows and firm wage policies

Like many transition economies, Slovenia is undergoing profound changes in the workings of the labour market with potentially greater flexibility in terms of both wage and employment adjustment. To investigate the impact of these changes, we use unique longitudinal matched employer‐employee data that permits measurement of employment transitions and wages for workers and enables links of the workers to the firms in which they are employed. We can thus measure worker flows and job flows in a comprehensive and integrated manner. We find a high pace of job flows in Slovenia especially for young, small, private and foreign‐owned firms and for young, less educated workers. While job flows have approached the rates observed in developed market economies, the excess of worker flows above job flows is lower than that observed in market economies. A key factor in the patterns of the worker and job flows is the determination of wages in Slovenia. A base wage schedule provides strict guidelines for minimum wages for different skill categories. However, firms are permitted to offer higher wages to an individual based upon the success of the worker and/or the firm. Our analysis shows that firms deviate from the base wage schedule significantly and that the idiosyncratic wage policies of firms are closely related to the observed pattern of worker and job flows at the firm. Firms with more flexible wages (measured as less compression of wages within the firm) have less employment instability and are also able to improve the match quality of their workers. JEL Classifications: J23, J31, J41, J61, P23, P31.     

Corporate Tournaments, Human Capital Acquisition, and the Firm Size–Wage Relation

This paper provides a possible explanation for the empirically observed size–wage effect and inter-industry wage differences. It develops a model in which incentives for workers to accumulate general human capital are provided by corporate tournaments, where workers with the highest level of general human capital win promotions. Given that the prizes in such tournaments are determined by outside market conditions, the investment and the equilibrium wages depend on firm and industry characteristics. The model implies that workers in bigger firms and in more technology intensive and profitable firms and industries acquire more human capital and receive higher wages and benefits.     

Foreign ownership wage premia in emerging economies

In this article we examine the relationship between wages, labour productivity and ownership using a linked employer–employee dataset covering a large fraction of the Czech labour market in 2006. We distinguish between different origins of ownership and study wage and productivity differences. The raw wage differential between foreign and domestically‐owned firms is about 23 percent. The empirical analysis is carried out on both firm‐ and individual‐level data. A key finding is that industry, region and notably human capital explain only a small part of the foreign–domestic ownership wage differential. Both white and blue collar workers as well as skilled and unskilled employees obtain a foreign ownership wage premium. Foreign ownership premia are more prevalent in older and less technologically advanced firms. Joint estimation of productivity and wage equations show that, controlling for human capital, the difference in productivity is about twice as large as the wage differential. Overall, results indicate that the international firms share their rents with their employees.     

Training and worker effort: a signalling perspective

Abstract This paper analyzes the interaction between firms’ investment in general skills training and workers’ incentives. It shows that when a firm has an informational advantage over its workers, its provision of free general skills training can serve as a signal that there will be a long‐term relationship between the firm and its workers. This signal induces the workers to exert more effort in learning firm‐specific skills, which enhances the firm's profits. In contrast with most of the existing literature, the model implies that firms may provide free general skills training even if there is no labour market friction.     

Education, Work and Wages in the UK

Abstract. This paper is concerned with the relationship between education, wages and working behaviour. The work is partly motivated by the sharp distinction in the literature between the returns to education and the effect of wages on labour supply. Education is the investment that cumulates in the form of human capital while labour supply is the utilization rate of that stock. Yet, variation in education is usually the basis for identifying labour supply models – education is assumed to determine wages but not affect labour supply. Moreover, it is commonly assumed that the private rate of return to education can be found from the schooling coefficient in a log-wage equation. Yet, the costs of education are largely independent of its subsequent utilization but the benefits will be higher the greater the utilization rate. Thus the returns will depend on how intensively that capital is utilized and we would expect that those who intend to work least to also invest least in human capital. Indeed, the net (of tax liabilities and welfare entitlements) return to education will be a complex function of labour supply and budget constraint considerations.
Here we attempt to model the relationship between wages, work, education and the tax/welfare system allowing for the endogeneity of education as well for the correlations between the unobservable components of wages and working behaviour. We use the estimates to simulate the effect of a new UK policy designed to increase education for children from low-income households.     

Income Taxes,Subsidies to Education,and Investments in Human Capital

We study a two‐sector economy with investments in human and physical capital and imperfect labor markets. Investments are irreversible and noncontractible, due to random matching between firms and workers. Income is allocated according to the Nash bargaining mechanism. At equilibrium, given the distribution of the agents across sectors, there is underinvestment in both human and physical capital, due to the holdup problem generated by bargaining and noncontractibility. Self‐selection of the agents into the two sectors typically induces too many workers to invest in high skills. Compared to the constrained efficient allocation, at each equilibrium, there are too many people investing too little effort in the high‐skill sector. We also study the effects of several tax policies on total expected surplus.     

Does Poaching Distort Training?

We analyse the efficiency of the labour market outcome in a competitive search equilibrium model with endogenous turnover and endogenous general human capital formation. We show that search frictions do not distort training decisions if firms and their employees are able to coordinate efficiently, for instance, by using long-term contracts. In the absence of efficient coordination devices there is too much turnover and too little investment in general training. Nonetheless, the number of training firms and the amount of training provided are constrained optimal, and training subsidies therefore reduce welfare.