国际贸易政策的两难问题与GATT/WTO体制--GATT/WTO的政治经济学

国际贸易是受政治因素影响最大的经济领域之一，GATT／WTO的规则和体系实际上也反映了这种经济与政治交织的复杂性。国家利益的驱动使得各国政府在贸易政策运用方面处于选择偏向自由贸易或贸易保护的“两难境地”。GATT／WTO在倡导贸易自由化、建设开放的多边贸易体制过程中也不得不兼顾保障各国国家利益的要求，从而形成了以务实、折衷以及规则导向为特征的GATT／WTO理念，来支持和推动国际贸易发展中渐进的但又是持续的贸易自由化取向。     

Does International Trade Cause Economic Growth? A Survey

This study surveys the literature on the relationship between international trade and economic growth, and succinctly reviews the role of GATT/WTO in fostering free trade. Most studies support the gains of trade and recognise the substantive contributions of GATT/WTO in fostering free trade; the evidence is, however, not ubiquitously unambiguous. The macroeconomic evidence provides a dominant support for the positive and significant effects of trade on output and growth, while the microeconomic evidence lends larger support to the exogenous effects of productivity on trade, as compared to the effects of trade on productivity. The GATT/WTO remains surrounded by barriers to trade and avowed preferences for preferential trade agreements. The strength of the argument for the gains of trade needs to be evaluated in juxtaposition with several methodological and measurement issues that surround the trade‐growth empirics. Most studies focus on partial equilibrium analysis of trade policy and ignore the general equilibrium aspects of macroeconomic policy. It is difficult to disentangle the effects of trade policies from those of other macroeconomic policies and unequivocally interpret the observed correlations between trade policies and economic growth. Trade is one of the several catalysts of productivity and growth and hence its contribution is contingent on its weight in economic activity.     

Do WTO members have more liberal trade policy?

This paper uses 68 measures of trade policy and liberalization to ask if membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its predecessor the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is associated with more liberal trade policy. Almost no measures of trade policy are significantly correlated with GATT/WTO membership. Trade liberalizations, when they occur, usually lag GATT entry by many years, and the GATT/WTO often admits countries that are closed and remain closed for years. The exception to the rule is that WTO members tend to have slightly more freedom as judged by the Heritage Foundation's index.     

Sanitary and phytosanitary measures in international trade: policy considerations vs. economic reasoning

Sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures are one form of non‐tariff international trade barrier with the objective of requiring consumer and intermediate goods to be safe and to provide information to protect consumers from deceptive practices. However, such barriers could severely restrict trade. The central strategy of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) SPS Agreement is to use science to distinguish between those SPS measures consistent with the Agreement and those in violation of the Agreement. SPS measures belong to what is known as trans‐science questions or questions which can be asked of science and yet which cannot be answered by science. Because of the presence of scientific uncertainty, science policies adopted by members should be identified by the WTO. WTO panels should not, however, establish scientific policies. Prohibitive measures would seem rather incompatible with the role the WTO assumed trying to promote free trade. Rather, facilitating the distribution of available information regarding SPS and food safety risk, or a lack of it, to consumers in importing countries would help them to make better informed decisions according to their own preferences and risk aversion.     

Trade Liberalisation and Economic Performance: Theory and Evidence for Developing Countries

The last five decades have witnessed a profound evolution of economic policy in developing countries, particularly in the case of trade strategies. Both internal, as well as external, factors have prompted the need for more outward‐oriented (or liberalised) trade policy regimes. The creation of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1947 and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 have been important driving forces for free trade. Since then, the major quantitative barriers to trade, i.e. tariffs and non‐tariff barriers (quotas, licences and technical specifications, among other restrictions), have substantially been reduced or dismantled. Also, the progress towards more liberalised trade regimes, mainly in developing countries, has been manifested in the trade and development literature. Major studies suggest that the performance of more outward‐oriented economies is superior to that of those countries pursuing more inward‐looking trade practices (Greenaway and Nam, 1988; Dollar, 1992; Sachs and Warner, 1995; and Rodríguez and Rodrik, 2000). Recent developments in the international trade literature focus on the potential dynamic effects of trade liberalisation, i.e. simplification of tariff structures and elimination of non‐tariff barriers, in reducing the incentives to rent seeking and in accelerating the flow of technical knowledge from the world market. Moreover, there have been important advances regarding the study of trade liberalisation and its impact on exports, imports and the balance of payments, largely neglected in the literature, often driven by supply‐side considerations.     

Multilateral stability and efficiency of trade agreements: A network formation approach

We study the endogenous network formation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements by means of hypergraphs and introduce the equilibrium concept of multilateral stability. We consider multicountry settings with a firm in each country that produces a homogeneous good and competes as a Cournot oligopolist in each market. Under endogenous tariffs, we find that a multilateral trade agreement governing the rules and norms of tariff setting, that is the WTO/GATT regime itself, together with a bilateral preferential trade agreement (PTA) is multilaterally stable. We also find that the existence of the WTO is necessary for the stability of the trading system. We further analyse the impact of PTAs on multilateral tariffs within the WTO. We find that the formation of PTAs increases countries' incentives for multilateral tariff reduction.     

Non‐Tariff Measures,Specific Trade Concerns and Tariff Reduction

This paper studies the determinants of the recent proliferation of Specific Trade Concerns raised at the WTO on non‐tariff trade measures (NTMs), with a focus on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBTs). Even though NTMs are imposed de jure to protect consumers from unhealthy products, they increase trade costs de facto. So, when tariff protection lowers, NTMs become effective barriers to trade and the exporting countries can complain at the dedicated committee at the WTO (STCs). Therefore, we study whether STCs are raised by exporting countries as a consequence of tariff reductions in importing countries, that is when non‐tariff measures become barriers to trade. Using a recent database on STCs over the period 1996–2010, we find empirical evidence that SPS and TBT concerns are raised by exporting country as a consequence of importer's tariff cut.     

Labour and Environmental Standards: The ‘Lemons Problem’ in International Trade Policy

Environmental and labour standards have become an important international trade issue. This article examines and ranks alternative trade policy responses available to an importing country with concerns over such standards. While a full import embargo may sometimes be preferable to allowing unrestricted access to unlabeled noconforming imports, a partial embargo that allows imports which demonstrably conform to the standard is always a better policy; and labeling solutions, which separate conforming and non‐conforming imports, are typically better still. Consequently, full import embargoes based on non‐conformity with labour or environmental standards are poor policy choices and should generally remain prohibited by WTO rules.     

Modelling the Extensive Margin of World Trade: New Evidence on GATT and WTO Membership

Recent literature has argued that, contrary to the results of a seminal paper by Rose (2004), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/World Trade Organization (WTO) membership does promote bilateral trade, at least for developed economies and if membership includes non‐formal compliance. We review the literature to identify open issues. We then develop a simple extension of the gravity model that gives rise to an extensive country margin of trade separating positive trade from zero trade country pairs. The model is used to identify WTO membership effects at both the intensive and the extensive margins. Empirical estimation of this model, based on Poisson pseudo‐maximum likelihood methods with exporter and importer fixed effects, allows us to readdress the empirical issue of whether GATT/WTO membership does or does not promote trade. We find that GATT membership was successful on the extensive margin of world trade but not on the intensive margin. For the recent WTO episode (1995–2008), we find consistent and robust evidence for a substantial trade‐creating role of membership which is driven primarily by the intensive margin. WTO membership results in higher bilateral trade of about 40 per cent.     

日本与WTO争端解决机制

在GATT时代,日本在争端解决机制中比较被动,败诉相对较多。到了WTO时代,日本开始积极参与WTO争端解决机制,积极运用这一机制维护日本的国际贸易利益,并取得了较大的成功,出现了胜多败少的局面。日本这一变化的内在动力来自日本以入世为契机成功实现了贸易政策从以往的保护主义向自由贸易转换,可以在WTO争端解决机制舞台上以自由贸易的形象示人,并为此进行了WTO争端解决机构上诉机构大法官的人事布局,一直保持了日本人的上诉机构大法官的席位。日本的这一成果可以为我国所借鉴。     

Anti‐dumping: What are the Numbers to Discuss at Doha?

While tariff barriers have decreased worldwide through various GATT rounds, anti‐dumping has surged to play a crucial role as the most important non‐tariff barrier. After much debate and opposition, anti‐dumping is on the agenda of the Doha round of multilateral trade negotiations and it is one of the most important issues, especially for developing countries as they are the main targets of this policy instrument. With this prospect, it is important to assess the relevance of anti‐dumping not only by focusing on traditional users but by analysing the experience of new users, which are now major players in the field. This paper improves upon existing studies by providing a comprehensive assessment on the use of anti‐dumping. First, data on the time pattern of worldwide implementations of anti‐dumping laws are presented. This time profile shows interesting relationships with legal developments in GATT and WTO dispositions. Second, usual sources of data are complemented with various other sources. This allows the inclusion of recent heavy users like China, Russia, Taiwan and Ukraine, which are ignored in similar studies but important for their trade volumes. This enlarged and updated dataset shows that new users are even more important than previously thought, with implications for the Doha negotiations.     

Electronic Commerce,Trade and Tariff Revenue: A Quantitative Assessment

This paper assesses the quantitative importance of electronic commerce in trade and tariff revenue, in light of the WTO decision on ‘duty‐free cyberspace’. Electronic commerce is likely to boost international trade in software, digitizable media products (music, books) and many services sectors significantly. However, despite the growing importance of electronic commerce for trade, tariff revenue loss from duty‐free electronic commerce is unlikely to be significant.     

Dumping in a Global World: Why Product Quality Matters

Anti‐dumping actions are now the trade policy of choice of developing and transition economies. To understand why these economies have increasingly applied anti‐dumping laws, we build a simple theoretical model of vertical intra‐industry trade and investigate the strategic incentives of exporting firms to undertake dumping. We show that the definition of dumping matters. Based on a comparison of low‐quality and high‐quality prices, only unilateral dumping by the low‐quality firm obtains. By contrast, the standard WTO definition leads to either reciprocal or unilateral dumping by the high‐quality firm, depending on cross‐country differences in incomes, the height of tariff protection and on exchange rate changes.     

What's the Point of Reciprocal Trade Negotiations? Exports,Imports, and Gains from Trade

This paper explains why trade‐policy makers may prefer reciprocal trade negotiations (RTN) to unilateral tariff reductions (UTR) for economic reasons. It answers puzzles like ‘Why WTO reciprocity?’ and strengthens the unnecessarily weak case made for the WTO by those who downplay or dismiss benefits from foreign tariff reductions (FTR). RTN is superior to UTR because it provides economic benefits that UTR cannot – namely, FTR benefits which are clearer than potentially important UTR benefits: Whereas each policy offers efficiency gains, any terms‐of‐trade effect of UTR generally detracts from these gains, while any terms‐of‐trade effect of FTR is typically beneficial (especially for a small price‐taking country) with this benefit augmenting FTR's efficiency gains. Moreover, benefits from reductions in foreign barriers may come from several sources; they are not solely the result of terms‐of‐trade improvement – or economies of scale (the two benefits already noted in the literature, though often dismissed). For example, with foreign NTB elimination, possible home benefits are shown even with rising costs and terms‐of‐trade deterioration. RTN is also superior to UTR because, by eliminating protection in either NTB or tariff form, RTN provides an escape from not only a terms‐of‐trade prisoners’ dilemma, but many other previously unrecognised prisoners’ dilemmas, including one in international rent transfers, and several others with no economies‐of‐scale or terms‐of‐trade motivation. Of course, if superior RTN is not an option, UTR may well be desirable. If reciprocity is an option, but only in a narrower CU or FTA form, such reciprocity may still be superior to UTR, or it may be inferior; theory cannot unambiguously rank these.     

Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes

Developing countries have been increasing their participation in the formal institutions and proceedings of the multilateral trading system. A prominent example is their more frequent involvement as defendants and plaintiffs in GATT/WTO trade disputes. This paper provides an initial economic appraisal of developing country performance in the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system. We measure the economic resolution of these disputes through trade liberalisation gains, and our results suggest that developing country plaintiffs have had more success under WTO disputes than was the case under the GATT. We also document evidence on potential determinants of this success: the capacity for plaintiffs to make credible retaliatory threats and the guilty determinations by GATT/WTO panels. Finally, there is also some evidence that developing countries have recognised the importance of retaliatory threats and have responded by changing their pattern of dispute initiation under the WTO to better take advantage of the instances in which they have sufficient leverage to threaten retaliation and induce compliance with GATT/WTO obligations.     

The U.S./EU Beef Controversy and a Proposed Framework for Resolving Standards Disputes in International Trade

While world trading institutions such as GATT and its successor, the WTO, have made significant progress in addressing tariff barriers as well as some non‐tariff barriers, trade disputes over product standards appear to be increasing in number and intensity. Product standards refer to measures governments take to ensure that products sold in their home market meet health, safety, and quality requirements consistent with the public interest. The longstanding controversy between the European Union and the United States over the export of hormone treated beef is used as a case study to illustrate the difficulty of resolving product standards disputes.     

Quality standards for used durables: An indirect subsidy?

We construct a theoretical framework to study the impact of quality standards for used durable goods on trade ?ows, pro?ts and consumer welfare. We show that asymmetric quality standards generate trade in used goods from high- to low-standard countries while at the same time reducing trade in new goods. Producers in the exporting country bene?t from this change while consumers lose. In the importing country consumers are better off but domestic industry is hurt. These ?ndings suggest that quality standards on used goods may be a powerful policy tool whose use should be monitored by the WTO.     

The internationalization of competition policy: implications for international business

In the post–Uruguay Round World Trading System and with the creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO), a new set of agendas on the governance of the world economy has emerged. Among them are the relationship between trade and social policy, trade and the environment, and trade and competition policy. These issues are new in the sense that policymakers have, until now, avoided drawing direct‐policy linkages between them. The main reason for this is that traditionally social and competition policies have been domestic policy domains that international policymakers were prevented from influencing. While environmental policy has been subject to several international negotiations, the link between trade and the environment has been relatively under‐discussed in the GATT. Moreover, there have been few international agreements that have drawn a direct link between trade and the environment.¹ The focus of this paper is the relationship between trade and competition policy. In particular, this paper seeks to address the issues related to international competition policy and the concerns and problems faced by international business in this context. ¹ An exception being the agreement on trade in endangered species (CITES). © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

GATT第24条关于关税同盟和自由贸易区的实体外部标准解读

GATT/WTO多边贸易体制关于关税同盟和自由贸易区的纪律规定于GATT第24条。该条确立了自由贸易区、关税同盟和旨在建立关税同盟或自由贸易区的过渡性协议三种区域贸易安排的具体表现形式。根据WTO秘书处的研究报告,GATT第24条关于自由贸易区和关税同盟多边纪律,可以概括为三个条件:一是深度区域自由化的义务(内部标准);二是对区域外成员贸易保持中立的义务(外部标准);三是透明度义务。其中前两项为实体标准,第三项为程序性标准。纵观GATT第24条诸款,其第5款普遍被认为规定了自由贸易区和关税同盟的实体外部标准。实体外部标准所关注的是:虽然GATT的缔约方乃至WTO成员有权缔结自由贸易区和关税同盟,这种权利是有限度的,即,关税同盟和自由贸易区要对第三国的贸易保持中立,即不得以建立关税同盟和自由贸易区为名而使第三国的利益陷入不利。本文旨在系统而细致地研究GATT第24条规定的自由贸易区和关税同盟的实体外部标准。     

Production uncertainty and trade policy commitment

Agricultural markets are characterized by production and marketing lags. Uncertainty is also an inherent feature of agricultural markets. This paper investigates if two policy active importers will choose to commit to their import levels or keep the flexibility to revise their ex-ante import levels once production decisions are made and the uncertainty is resolved. This is the constant dilemma faced by prospective WTO members. We assume production in both importing countries is subject to an asymmetric random shock. We show that a government will not want to commit to its import level when there is a high degree of uncertainty in production. However, an importing country is likely to commit to a trade policy in equilibrium although the equilibrium may be Pareto dominated. Under certain conditions, an equilibrium in which one country commits to its ex-ante import level while the other chooses the flexibility option can emerge. In this setting, international trade agreements play an important role.