US–Brazilian cotton policies

Brazil filed a lawsuit with the WTO against the United States for providing cotton production and export subsidies, and the WTO ruled in favour of Brazil. Brazil threatened to impose retaliatory tariffs if the United States does not comply with the WTO rulings. After a prolonged litigation stretching from 2002 to 2010, both countries agreed to a negotiated settlement wherein the United States paid Brazilian cotton producers to compensate for any adverse effects. This study develops a political economic model to theoretically analyse US cotton policies, Brazil's threat of retaliatory tariffs and the negotiated settlement between the two countries. The theoretical results show that the volume of cotton output, supply price response, politicians' apathy for the public welfare, elasticities of excess supply/demand and the magnitude of US transfers play a crucial role in determining US policies. This study contributes to the literature by being the first to model political economic aspects of the complex system of trade and domestic policies in the cotton industry using a three-country framework, tariff retaliation and transfers between the countries.     

Developing Countries as Plaintiffs and Defendants in GATT/WTO Trade Disputes

Developing countries have been increasing their participation in the formal institutions and proceedings of the multilateral trading system. A prominent example is their more frequent involvement as defendants and plaintiffs in GATT/WTO trade disputes. This paper provides an initial economic appraisal of developing country performance in the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system. We measure the economic resolution of these disputes through trade liberalisation gains, and our results suggest that developing country plaintiffs have had more success under WTO disputes than was the case under the GATT. We also document evidence on potential determinants of this success: the capacity for plaintiffs to make credible retaliatory threats and the guilty determinations by GATT/WTO panels. Finally, there is also some evidence that developing countries have recognised the importance of retaliatory threats and have responded by changing their pattern of dispute initiation under the WTO to better take advantage of the instances in which they have sufficient leverage to threaten retaliation and induce compliance with GATT/WTO obligations.     

WTO棉花争议案中交叉报复的研究

鉴于中国与贸易伙伴贸易摩擦的增多,深入研究WTO争端解决机制及案例对加入世贸不久的中国来说,如何更好地利用WTO争端解决机制具有重要意义。对交叉报复和对报复要求仲裁的理解是对WTO争端解决机制进行深入研究的两个重要方面。     

知识产权国际组织内部争端解决机制述评──基于WIPO和WTO的理论和实践

知识产权国际争端是知识产权国际保护制度和市场交易制度演化的结果。但在20世纪90年代之前,知识产权国际组织争端解决制度实际上是对传统国际公法争端解决机制的交叉援引,争端解决方式缺失国际仲裁和知识产权国际组织内部的争端解决程序。90年代后,国际商事仲裁范围的扩大、WIPO的机构改革和WTO的成立促成WIPO和WTO确立了内部争端解决机制,这是知识产权国际保护制度的重大发展。在国际争端解决实践中,WIPO和WTO的内部争端解决机制得到了成功的运用。     

How do countries respond to anti‐dumping filings? Dispute settlement and retaliatory anti‐dumping

Empirical studies have found that countries may respond strategically to the anti‐dumping petition filed against their exporters through their own retaliatory actions. Although most previous studies have focused on retaliatory anti‐dumping filings, in this paper we explore another potential avenue for strategic response—filing a complaint under the World Trade Organization's (WTO ) dispute settlement understanding. Using a panel of global anti‐dumping filings between 1995 and 2011, we analyse under what conditions countries will choose to retaliate through either an anti‐dumping petition or a WTO dispute, and to what degree these two strategies are complementary or act as substitutes. We find statistical evidence that countries are more likely to file a WTO dispute when they have also filed a retaliatory anti‐dumping petition, suggesting that these two strategies may be complementary.     

US–Brazil Cotton Dispute and the World Cotton Market

US policies for its cotton producers depress world cotton prices, adversely affecting exporters such as Brazil, which filed a complaint to the WTO. Despite WTO rulings in Brazil's favour, meting out the right to enact retaliatory countermeasures, the United States continues to subsidise its cotton farmers. After prolonged negotiations, Brazil and the United States reached an agreement which allowed the United States to pay Brazil to refrain from enforcing the countermeasures. To capture the adverse effects of US policies, theoretical analyses are conducted. The theoretical model is extended by constructing an empirical model of the world cotton market. The adverse effects of US policies on Brazil are estimated and compared to the compensation the United States pays Brazil.     

美国禁止通过互联网提供赌博服务的贸易争端评述

安提瓜诉美国“赌博案”是世贸组织争端解决机制新近审理结案的一个涉及以互联网方式跨境提供服务的典型案例。文章介绍了这一案件的背景,论述了本案所涉及的实体法律问题,简要分析了本案所带来的启示并预测了其前景。本案的审理及其结果,展现了国际服务贸易中的市场准入规则的重要影响,更凸现了服务贸易的市场开放和国内社会安全之间的潜在矛盾。同时,也将对世贸组织体制内的电子商务、自由贸易与公共道德之关系等问题的走向产生重要影响。     

我国现行贸易报复机制及其适用性分析

我国作为世界贸易组织成员被赋予对采取歧视性贸易保护措施的国家(地区)实施贸易报复的权利.在"和平崛起"战略下,我国现行贸易报复机制的适用是以符合世贸组织争端解决机制为前提的,其适用的措施及其适用的范围都有其独特性.     

上诉机构“停摆”之后的WTO争端解决机制何去何从

WTO争端解决机制自生效以来,以其高效的纠纷解决和具有约束力的裁决一直被认为是维护多边贸易体制的重要力量。尤其是争端解决中设立上诉机制,开创了国际争端解决两审终审的先例,这使得WTO体制下的争端解决与其他国际体制下的争端解决相比,更加凸显其公正性与有效性。然而,由于个别成员的阻挠,上诉机构于2019年12月10日因到期离任的成员不能够及时得到增补而陷于"停摆",无法继续受理上诉案件。上诉机构停止运作会给WTO的争端解决机制走向带来很大的不确定性,但是世贸组织争端解决机构不会停止工作,多边贸易体制也不会因此陷入崩溃。     

The North American–European Union Dispute Over Beef Produced Using Growth Hormones: A Major Test for the New International Trade Regime

At the time, the negotiation of the SPS agreement was seen as a major accomplishment of the Uruguay Round. One of the first major tests of both the SPS and the WTO’s new dispute settlement system was the long standing and acrimonious dispute between the EU and the US and Canada over trade in beef produced using hormones. Both the SPS and the disputes system performed as expected but the EU, the loser in the case, has chosen to ignore the WTO Panel’s ruling and accept retaliation. As a result, the credibility of the WTO is threatened and the outcome suggests that new negotiations may be required. The issues in the case are outlined and implications for trade in biological products drawn.     

试析WTO争端解决机制

WTO自建立以来,其争端解决机制为多边贸易体制的有效运转提供了重要保障,对国际贸易争端的顺利解决起到了积极的作用。WTO争端解决机制是在GATT争端解决机制的基础上产生和发展起来,有着诸多不可比拟的优点,但同时不可避免地继承和包含GATT争端解决机制"先天性"的不足,其在实践中也暴露出不少问题,从具体的规则程序到实际运行的效果和作用都还存在不足之处。     

Antidumping and retaliation threats

We propose and test two ways in which retaliation threats may dampen the antidumping (AD) activity we observe. First, the threat of retaliatory AD actions may make a domestic industry less likely to name a foreign import source in an AD petition. Second, the prospect of a GATT/WTO trade dispute may make government agencies less likely to rule positive in their AD decision. Using a nested logit framework, we find evidence that both retaliation threats substantially affect US AD activity from 1980 through 1998.     

基于报复角度的国际反倾销分析

国内外学者通过研究发现一国(地区)遭受反倾销后,有可能对别国(地区)进行报复性反倾销,这样会导致国际反倾销的日益增加。我们通过整理WTO公布的1995-2010年间的反倾销数据,从反倾销的国别或地区、行业和年份等方面进行了研究,认为:印度、美国、欧盟和阿根廷的反倾销报复能力比较强,已经成为全球反倾销的主要国家(地区),中国和韩国的反倾销报复能力比较弱,已经成为全球被反倾销的主要国家(地区)。进一步地,我们将主要反倾销国家(地区)与主要被反倾销国家(地区)之间的反倾销案件进行比较后,认为一国(地区)遭受反倾销特别是来自于主要反倾销国家(地区)的反倾销时,若没有进行有效的反倾销报复,其他国家(地区)也会加入对该国(地区)的反倾销队伍中来,使其面临更多的反倾销。     

Multilateral,Regional and Bilateral Trade‐Policy Options for the United States and Japan

We have used the Michigan Model of World Production and Trade to simulate the economic effects on the United States, Japan, and other major trading countries/regions of the Doha Round of WTO multilateral trade negotiations and a variety of regional/bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) involving the United States and Japan. We estimate that an assumed reduction of post‐Uruguay Round tariffs and other barriers on agricultural and industrial products and services by 33 per cent in the Doha Round would increase world welfare by $686.4 billion, with gains of $164.0 billion for the United States, $132.6 billion for Japan, and significant gains for all other industrialised and developing countries/regions. If there were global free trade with all post‐Uruguay Round trade barriers completely removed, world welfare would increase by $2.1 trillion, with gains of $497.0 billion (5.5 per cent of GNP) for the United States and $401.9 billion (6.2 per cent of GNP) for Japan. Regional agreements such as an APEC FTA, an ASEAN Plus 3 FTA, and a Western Hemisphere FTA would increase global and member country welfare but much less so than the Doha multilateral trade round would. Separate bilateral FTAs involving Japan with Singapore, Mexico, Chile and Korea, and the United States with Chile, Singapore and Korea would have positive, though generally small, welfare effects on the partner countries, but potentially disruptive sectoral employment shifts in some countries. There would be trade diversion and detrimental welfare effects on some non‐member countries for both the regional and bilateral FTAs analysed. The welfare gains from multilateral trade liberalisation are therefore considerably greater than the gains from preferential trading arrangements and more uniformly positive for all countries.     

Comment on Fritz Breuss “WTO Dispute Settlement: An Economic Analysis of Four EU–US Mini Trade Wars”

In his excellent empirical analysis of the WTO dispute settlement process, Fritz Breuss has amply demonstrated the undesirability of trade retaliation by applying the CGE model to the transatlantic mini trade wars in the Hormones, Bananas, Foreign Sales Corporations and Steel Safeguards cases. The author's conclusion that tariffs are very bad instruments for countermeasures is uncontested. However, the practicability of a mechanism of direct transfers as proposed by the author may be questionable. The comments also discuss the purpose of retaliation (countermeasures) in the WTO dispute settlement system and summarize Japan's experience with the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.     

日本与WTO争端解决机制

在GATT时代,日本在争端解决机制中比较被动,败诉相对较多。到了WTO时代,日本开始积极参与WTO争端解决机制,积极运用这一机制维护日本的国际贸易利益,并取得了较大的成功,出现了胜多败少的局面。日本这一变化的内在动力来自日本以入世为契机成功实现了贸易政策从以往的保护主义向自由贸易转换,可以在WTO争端解决机制舞台上以自由贸易的形象示人,并为此进行了WTO争端解决机构上诉机构大法官的人事布局,一直保持了日本人的上诉机构大法官的席位。日本的这一成果可以为我国所借鉴。     

WTO Dispute Settlement and the EU–US Mini Trade Wars: A Commentary on Fritz Breuss

Economic theory suggests that some of the trade remedies allowed by the WTO may lead away from liberal trade and impose costs on those that apply them. Breuss has provided evidence in the case of four EU-US mini-wars that the policy that created the trade conflict was not clearly in the economic interest of the offending country and that the sanctions imposed exacerbated rather than alleviated the problem. Breuss builds a case for compensation payments rather than trade sanctions for rule violations and for targeting of the recipients of those payments.If trade policy were a matter of economic rationality then this approach would be convincing. For better or worse, the trade rules are an unruly mix of economic, political and legal constructs. The commentary expands on this to explore the role of the dispute settlement process itself and the sanctions designed to give it teeth. The conclusion is that the economic calculations, while a good measure of the costs of legal or political decisions, are not central to the dispute settlement and sanctions processes. The dispute settlement process is also about preserving the balance of political advantage from negotiated rules and schedules, and the sanctions process is as much to do with preventing abuse as correcting it. So a full economic analysis would have to compare politically balanced alternative scenarios and the incorporate the effect of the threat of sanctions on government behavior.     

WTO贸易救济措施争端解决的绩效分析——基于动态非平衡面板数据模型系统GMM检验

文章在回顾相关研究的基础上考虑四阶段WTO争端解决程序,根据WTO争端案例结案时长不等的特点和多阶段策略选择难以量化的性质,建立WTO贸易救济措施争端解决绩效动态非平衡面板数据模型,运用系统GMM检验,对WTO贸易救济措施争端解决绩效进行了实证分析。结果表明：积极援引WTO争端解决机制是能够在一定程度上挽回贸易损失的,尤其是双方在争端解决过程中达成的磋商解决、请求专家组中止工作、相互满意解决或者败诉方执行WTO决定等均对申诉方出口贸易具有促进作用;尽快结案将有利于申诉方,而WTO争端解决案件的持续时间越长,越不利于申诉方。     

Curbing Agricultural Exceptionalism: The EU's Response to External Challenge

From 1948 to 1994, the agricultural sector was afforded special treatment in the GATT. We analyse the extent to which this agricultural exceptionalism was curbed as a result of the GATT Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, discuss why it was curbed and finally explore the implication of this for EU policy making. We argue that, in particular, two major changes in GATT institutions brought about restrictions on agricultural exceptionalism. First, the Uruguay Round was a ‘single undertaking’ in which progress on other dossiers was contingent upon an outcome on agriculture. The EU had keenly supported this new decision rule in the GATT. Within the EU this led to the MacSharry reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1992, paving the way for a trade agreement on agriculture within the GATT. Second, under the new quasi‐judicial dispute settlement procedure, countries are expected to bring their policies into conformity with WTO rules or face retaliatory trade sanctions. This has brought about a greater willingness on the part of the EU to submit its farm policy to WTO disciplines.     

The Evolution of Japan's Aggressive Legalism

Japan's recent trade policy is sometimes characterised as ‘aggressive legalism’ in the sense that it aggressively utilises the multilateral trade rules embodied in the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation in dealing with disputes with its trade partners. This policy may appear to be a marked departure from Japan's past practice of favouring bilateral, non‐legal settlement of trade disputes. Upon closer examination, however, while Japan has been moderately active in using the WTO dispute settlement process for resolving its trade disputes, it behaves more like a country that resorts to surgical strikes on selected targets (usually the United States) under a powerful cover of the European Community. Compared to Japan, Korea's attitude in the WTO is more aggressive. While the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) is not content with the status quo and is seeking to expand its aggressiveness in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, it faces an uphill battle. One of the difficulties facing trade officials in Japan may be the lack of a national system for lodging WTO complaints, open to any citizens or firms, like Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974 or the European Trade Barriers Regulation. Nonetheless, in the historical context, Japan is far more aggressive than in the past in utilising the rules of the GATT/WTO to advance its national interests. It will never revert to the infamous practice of bilateralism and grey area measures.