上市公司盈余管理动因及其治理对策

本通过对盈余管理概念分析，挖掘其形成原因，试图从更深层次理解会计盈余信息的有用性及危害性，并结合我国现状，提出从完善现有的会计准则、公司治理结构及信息披露制度，加强审计及监管功能，提高信息使用的识别力等方面约束不当盈余管理行为，从而促进上市公司持续健康发展。     

基于公司治理结构的会计盈余管理问题研究

公司治理结构与会计盈余管理之间存在着十分紧密的关系,本文重点研究了公司治理结构对会计盈余管理的作用或影响,并就目前中国公司治理结构特点和会计盈余管理特点进行了分析,最后从公司治理结构视角给出了完善会计盈余管理的建议.     

上市公司盈余管理的治理对策

盈余管理是指公司管理当局在会计准则和制度所允许范围内,通过合法的会计方法和非会计方法影响财务报告中有关会计数据,利用职业判断和规划交易等手段对会计盈利进行调节,以达到各种管理当局的目的行为。资本市场的实证研究表明：我国上市公司存在着过度盈余管理行为,使其披露的会计信息缺乏充分性和全面性、甚至缺乏客观性,在一定程度上降低了财务报表的可靠性,导致了会计信息被扭曲,并且会损害投资者、债权人和国家的利益。本文对盈余管理进行了概述,提出了上市公司盈余管理存在的问题,并针对这些问题提出了盈余管理治理对策。     

会计制度改革、盈余稳健性与盈余管理

本文以1994-2007我国会计制度改革为研究背景,分析了盈余稳健性和盈余管理之间的内在关系和相互影响,并以此为基础检验了我国会计准则的执行质量。研究得出,扣除操控性应计利润后,上市公司的盈余稳健性同会计制度中稳健性原则的运用程度仍紧密相关。并且,强化稳健性原则和限制公允价值的运用显著降低了公司高估盈余的水平,而弱化稳健性原则和扩大公允价值的运用,则导致了公司盈余管理水平的显著提高。总体而言,没有证据表明盈余稳健性的提高导致了上市公司的大清洗行为。     

公司治理结构与盈余管理研究

本文采用2008到2011年的样本数据,研究了公司治理结构对盈余管理之间的影响,分别考察了上市公司董事会规模、流通股比例、董事长与总经理两职分离、董事会会议次数以及高管持股比例与盈余管理程度之间的关系。实证结果表明:上市公司流通股比例越高、董事长与总经理两职分离、董事会进行的会议越多,盈余管理水平相对更低;董事会规模、高管持股比例与盈余管理程度呈正相关。     

公司治理结构与盈余管理研究

本文采用2008到2011年的样本数据,研究了公司治理结构对盈余管理之间的影响,分别考察了上市公司董事会规模、流通股比例、董事长与总经理两职分离、董事会会议次数以及高管持股比例与盈余管理程度之间的关系。实证结果表明:上市公司流通股比例越高、董事长与总经理两职分离、董事会进行的会议越多,盈余管理水平相对更低;董事会规模、高管持股比例与盈余管理程度呈正相关。     

降低上市公司盈余管理的对策——基于对“绿大地”过度盈余管理动机的研究

<正>一、"绿大地"过度盈余管理行为云南绿大地生物科技股份有限公司(以下简称"绿大地")成立于1996年,主要经营绿化苗木种植和销售,绿化工程设计和施工的业务。2001年该公司完成股份制改造,2007年12月在深圳证券交易所挂牌上市,成为我国绿化行业的第一家上市公司。然而上市几年内,绿大地多次更换公司高管及会计师事务所,不合常理的补充更正财务季报,变更会计估计     

企业盈余管理及其规范

目前盈余管理已被我国企业特别是上市公司广泛用于操纵利润,应客观认识盈余管理的两面性,采取有效措施规范企业的盈余管理行为.     

盈余管理治理的几点建议

盈余管理与资本市场股票价值估值和价格确定密切相关,因此它一直是西方会计界理论与实证研究的重要课题,自2000年以来,美国证券市场的安然事件、世通丑闻等问题被揭露,使西方会计理论界再一次将目光汇集在盈余管理上来。强化对盈余管理的治理、促进会计信息的真实、保护中小投资者的利益是政府监管部门的责任,也是会计理论研究人员的重要课题。一、完善公司治理结构1、完善公司外部治理结构(1)完善公司产权制度,加强股东和其他财务信息需求者参与监控的动机和能力。可以从两个途径采取相应措施:一是设立专职的国有资产管理机构,以解决国有股产权主体缺失问题,保护所有者权益。该机构不直接参与企业的具体运作,而是以普通股东的身份去实行对公司的监督权、收益权,并对自己的行为失当承担一切责任,法     

论上市公司盈余管理

适度的盈余管理是传递内部信息的一种重要手段,但过度就会引起会计信息的失真,阻碍资本市场的发展。本文从盈余管理的综述谈起,分析了盈余管理与利润操纵的区别、盈余管理的动机、盈余管理的手段,并结合以上的观点,提出了识别盈余管理的一些建议。     

Stock repurchases as an earnings management device

We investigate whether firms use stock repurchases to meet or beat analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) forecasts. We identify conditions under which repurchases increase EPS and document the frequency of accretive repurchases from 1988 to 2001. We find a disproportionately large number of accretive stock repurchases among firms that would have missed analysts’ forecasts without the repurchase. The repurchase-induced component of earnings surprises appears to be discounted by the market, and this discount is larger when the repurchase seems motivated by EPS management, although using the repurchase to avoid missing analyst forecasts appears to mitigate some of the negative stock price response.     

Short-term earnings guidance and accrual-based earnings management

Motivated by recent practitioners’ concerns that short-term earnings guidance leads to managerial myopia, we investigate the impact of short-term earnings guidance on earnings management. Using a propensity-score matched control sample, we find strong and consistent evidence that the issuance of short-term quarterly earnings guidance is associated with less, rather than more, earnings management. We also find that regular guiders exhibit less earnings management than do less regular guiders. Our findings hold using both abnormal accruals and discretionary revenues to measure earnings management and after controlling for potential reverse causality concerns. Furthermore, in a setting where managers have particularly strong capital market incentives to manage earnings, we corroborate these findings by documenting that earnings guidance either has no impact on or mitigates earnings management. Overall, our evidence does not support the criticism from practitioners that short-term earnings guidance leads to more earnings management.     

Quarterly earnings guidance and real earnings management

We examine if quarterly earnings guidance induces real earnings management. Quarterly guidance may cause myopia and inefficient decision-making, if managers become overly concerned with setting and beating short-term earnings targets. We test these associations on a large sample of US firms. Our evidence suggests that quarterly guidance is informative and lowers myopic incentives. However, our analyses also reveal endogenous associations exist between guidance and real earnings management. In contrast with existing concerns over frequent guiders, we find that guidance appears problematic in infrequent guiders, and in firms that issue good news earnings guidance and that operate in settings where earnings pressures are high.     

Overvaluation and earnings management

Consistent with Jensen’s [Jensen, M., 2005. Agency costs of overvalued equity. Financial Management 34, 5–19] agency-costs-of-overvalued-equity prediction, we find that overvaluation is statistically and economically related to subsequent income-increasing earnings management. This relation is robust to a series of tests that address potential endogeneity concerns, including omitted variable bias and reverse causality. The agency costs of overvalued equity are substantial. Overvaluation-induced income-increasing earnings management is negatively related to future abnormal stock returns and operating performance, and this negative relation becomes more pronounced as prior overvaluation intensifies. Among the most overvalued firms, those with high discretionary accruals underperform those with low discretionary accruals during the following year by 11.88% as measured by the three-factor alphas, and by 12.87% points as measured by industry-adjusted unmanaged EBITDA-to-assets ratio.     

The real earnings management of cross-listing firms

We examine the existence of real and accrual-based earnings management before and after cross-listings on the U.S. market. The results indicate that firms actively manage their earnings around cross-listing events, using both accrual and real earnings management, but real earnings management is dominant. American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) cross-listed at Level 1 and sponsored ADRs show the largest increase in real earnings management from before to after the listing. Firms that have adopted International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) display lower increases than firms under domestic GAAP. Finally, our results confirm a significant negative relationship between long-run performance and real earnings management before and after major corporate events.     

Stock repurchases as an earnings management mechanism: The impact of financing constraints

Our paper provides evidence regarding the use of share repurchases as an earnings management mechanism in the presence of debt-financing constraints as well as the impact of these constraints on the use of accruals and other real earnings management techniques. We document that share repurchases are prevalent as a mechanism to increase earnings per share. Next, we show that the presence of debt-financing constraints discourages the use of repurchase-based earnings management. We also find that for firms more likely to be engaged in earnings management, high financing constraints appear to increase the use of accruals based earnings management and decrease the use of other real earnings management techniques.     

Employee effort and earnings management

In this study, we examine the relationship between employee effort within the firm and earnings management, using data on working hours and discretionary accruals. With higher employee effort, we find less earnings management among U.S. firms. This result is stronger when earnings are more predictable and persists after we control for endogeneity. We also find smaller earnings discontinuities with higher employee effort. Our domestic results remain the same with a global sample. Our results suggest that earnings management enables benchmark beating with greater precision than can high employee effort alone, but also that high-effort firms may be misclassified as earnings manipulators.     

Multiple blockholders and earnings management

This paper examines the impact of multiple blockholders on earnings management when the main conflict of interest is between controlling shareholder and other shareholders. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2000 to 2017 and controlling for potential sample selection and endogeneity, we find that firms with multiple blockholders tend to have higher earnings management than firms with a single controlling shareholder. The positive impact of multiple blockholders on earnings management is more pronounced when those blockholders are the same type – state or private. Earnings management is also enhanced with more large shareholders and higher relative ownership of other large shareholders to the controlling shareholder. The results are consistent with the cost-sharing hypothesis, where the other large shareholders shoulder the costs of earnings management with the controlling shareholder proportionally, but not the private benefits of control. Further tests show that the positive relation between multiple large shareholders and earnings management is less pronounced in firms with stronger internal or external governance. Overall, our paper demonstrates a potential dark side of multiple blockholders from the angle of financial reporting quality.