Choosing one’s own informal institutions: on Hayek’s critique of Keynes’s immoralism

In the main, Hayek favored rules that apply equally to all and located such rules in tradition, beyond conscious construction. This led Hayek to attack Keynes’s immoralism, i.e., the position that one should be free to choose how to lead one’s life irrespective of the informal institutions in place. However, it is argued here that immoralism may be compatible with Hayek’s enterprise since Hayek misinterpreted Keynes, who did not advocate the dissolving of all informal rules for everybody. By avoiding this misinterpretation, immoralism can be seen as institutional experimentation at the margin, which Hayek himself favored.

The Austrian roots of the economics of institutions

This paper presents an analysis of the way the Austrian theory of institutions evolved from Menger’s main works. It also tries to advance the idea that the economics of institutions, when it deals with the emergence and evolution of rules and norms from interacting individuals, is inspired by Menger’s work and more generally by the Austrian analysis of the emergence and evolution of institutions. Recent works in the economics of institutions build on this earlier Austrian work to make it more formalized and testable.

Use of borrowed start-up capital and micro enterprises in Mexico: existence of liquidity constraints

Using the National Survey of Micro enterprises (ENAMIN, Encuesta Nacional de Micronegocios) data I test for the presence of liquidity constraints for obtaining start-up capital in Mexico’s credit markets (formal and informal). I use the bivariate probit model with partial observability to recognize two important decisions in the credit allocation process: first, whether an owner of a micro enterprise wants to apply start-up loan and, second, whether financial institutions decide to provide or not to provide the loan. Finally, I compare the results from this model to those of a simple probit model that looks at whether a micro enterprise owner gets funding or not (i.e. the probit model implicitly assumes that no liquidity constraints exist). The findings of this study show that there is substantial heterogeneity in the socioeconomic background of borrowers, as well as in the sources for start-up capital employed by micro enterprises in Mexico. Moreover, there is clear evidence of liquidity constraints in the market for start-up capital that could hinder the creation and growth of small enterprises. Applying the findings of the study, policy makers could fundamentally increase the effectiveness in establishing an economic environment that fosters growth.

The Determinants of Capital Structure Choice: Evidence from Polish Companies

The main objective of this paper is to investigate which of the two competing capital structure theories – the pecking order of financing choices or the traditional static trade-off model – better describes the financing decisions in Polish companies traded on the Warsaw Stock Exchange (WSE). The data come from financial statements of the companies and cover a 5-year period, 2000–2004. First, a correlation is run in order to separate a set of significant factors influencing the capital structure from the list of the following independent variables: assets structure, profitability, growth opportunities, liquidity, firm size, product uniqueness, earnings volatility, non-debt tax shields, dividend policy, and the effective tax rate. Next, in order to test the relationship between capital structure and its potential determinants, multiple regression is run. The evidence generally suggests the relevance of the pecking order hypothesis in explaining the financing choices of Polish firms.

Extending the Learning-By-Exporting Hypothesis: Introducing a Credit Constraint

This paper develops a theoretical framework which can be used to examine policy implications from the learning-by-exporting hypothesis. This work builds on previous theoretical literature by introducing a credit constraint. When credit is available, the analysis suggests that supporting a learning sector via an export subsidy is not necessarily advised to improve social welfare. The learning sector’s goods may be over-produced (relative to another non-tradable sector goods) when consumers can borrow freely for their consumption. If the learning sector’s goods are over-produced, social welfare will be improved via a tax on production.

Transaction tax and stock market behavior: evidence from an emerging market

This study examines the impact of a stamp tax rate increase on market behavior, using data from two stock exchanges in China. We find that when the tax rate increases from 0.3 to 0.5% (which implies that the transaction cost increases by about 1/3) trading volume decreases by 1/3. This implies an elasticity of turnover with respect to a stamp tax of −50% and an elasticity of turnover with respect to transaction cost of −100%. The markets’ volatility significantly increases after the increase in the tax rate. Furthermore, the change in the volatility structure indicates that the markets become less efficient in the sense that shocks are less quickly assimilated in the markets.

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A Knowledge-Based Economy: New Directions of Macromodelling

Development of “new economies” leading to economies mostly based on knowledge implies the construction of new long-term macroeconometric models. They should incorporate the impacts of new technologies being endogenized, as well as human capital. The paper discusses several issues related to the extension of the notion of production function. They cover first of all the measurement and explanation of total factor productivity (TFP), the role of domestic and foreign R&D expenditures, as well as educational expenditures. The discussion is extended to include proposals to construct new submodels explaining the sections of research and education and also the ICT industries.

The politics of constitutional amendment in postcommunist Europe

This paper analyzes the causes and consequences of constitutional amendments in Eastern Europe. Its results challenge the conventional wisdom that constitutional change is a consequence of institutions and that major changes will increase executive powers and limit rights. It finds that the political and social context rather than institutions is the main cause of amendments. These amendments moreover tend to reduce the power of executives and strengthen guarantees of human rights. The paper attributes these results to the particular circumstances of the postcommunist transition.

Population and economic growth with human and physical capital investments

We present a two-sector endogenous growth model with human and physical capital accumulation to analyze the long-run relationship between population growth and real per capita income growth. Formal education and investment in physical capital are assumed to be two separate components of human capital production. Along the balanced growth path equilibrium, population change may have a positive, negative, or else neutral effect on economic growth depending on whether physical and human capital are complementary/substitutes for each other in the formation of new human capital and on their degree of complementarity.

Institutional change from an evolutionary perspective: the Mexican experience

The fall of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in July 2000 marked a milestone in Mexico’s political history. Throughout its 71 years of incumbency, the PRI had incarnated the set of social, political and economic institutions of the country to the extent of becoming synonymous with governance and stability. Using a simple model in which institutional change is the result of the strategic interaction between citizens, an incumbent ruler and a potential new ruler or entrant, we provide a systematic interpretation of this experience emphasizing the role of evolutionary factors such as history, uncertainty, learning and experimentation.

In defence of generalized Darwinism

Darwin himself suggested the idea of generalizing the core Darwinian principles to cover the evolution of social entities. Also in the nineteenth century, influential social scientists proposed their extension to political society and economic institutions. Nevertheless, misunderstanding and misrepresentation have hindered the realization of the powerful potential in this longstanding idea. Some critics confuse generalization with analogy. Others mistakenly presume that generalizing Darwinism necessarily involves biological reductionism. This essay outlines the types of phenomena to which a generalized Darwinism applies, and upholds that there is no reason to exclude social or economic entities.

Quantifying corruption by a human capital earnings equation

This paper uses a human capital earnings equation to quantify administrative corruption in the public sector. Regression analyses are conducted based on information from surveys administered to public officials in Albania. After accounting for officials’ characteristics, e.g., schooling, experience, gender, type of agency, and public and private sectors’ features, we deduce that the administrative corruption was on average 2.6× the officials’ current salary in Albania, which is equivalent to 16.7% of the country’s GDP.

A critique of the new comparative economics

We examine the “new comparative economics” as proposed by Djankov et al. (2003) and their use of the concept of an institutional possibilities frontier. While we agree with their general argument that one must consider a variety of institutions and their respective social costs, including legal systems and cultural characteristics, when comparing the performance of different economic systems, we find various complications and difficulties with the framework they propose. We propose that a broader study of clusters of institutions and such newly emerging forms as the new traditional economy may be better suited as ways to approach the study of comparative economics in the era after the breakdown of the old comparison of market capitalism and command socialism that came to an end with the breakup of the Soviet Union.

Rawls’ Paradox

Rawls’ theory of justice is paradoxical, for it requires a society to aim directly to maximize the basic goods received by the least advantaged even if directly aiming is self-defeating. Rawls’ reasons for rejecting capitalist systems commit him to holding that a society must not merely maximize the goods received by the least advantaged, but must do so via specific institutions. By Rawls’ own premises, in the long run directly aiming to satisfy the difference principle is contrary to the interests of the poor, though it is meant to aid them.

The economic analysis of social norms: A reappraisal of Hayek’s legacy

This paper is organized as follows: first, we show that the reference to the notion of group selection is coherent with the other parts of Hayek’s thought. Second, we develop the idea that recent works in terms of the emergence and evolution of social norms corroborate in part Hayek’s theses in this domain. Finally, we put to the fore some drawbacks in Hayek’s approach and propose means to solve them.

Do authoritarian institutions mobilize economic cooperation?

This paper explores the effect of dictatorial institutions on revenue composition. The higher the degree of institutionalization of the regime, the higher the perceived levels of legitimacy, efficiency and credibility, so taxes that require cooperation and compliance can be more effectively collected from the population. Institutionalized regimes thus make sense if non-tax revenue sources are scarce so limited representation must be granted in exchange of economic support. Our selection-corrected results show that more institutionalized regimes are able to collect more taxes on income, profits and capital gains, taxes on goods and services, taxes on property and payroll taxes.

Addiction,social interactions and gender differences in cigarette consumption

This paper addresses the impact of addiction and social interactions on cigarette demand, controlling for demographic and socioeconomic factors. A Box–Cox double-hurdle model for the simultaneous decisions of how much to smoke and whether to quit smoking is estimated on individual data from the 2000 Italian “Health Status and Use of Health Services” survey. The model incorporates the fixed costs of quitting and allows for the analysis of the effects of addiction and social interactions on smoking participation and cigarette consumption. Estimation results show that the duration of the smoking habit, used as measure of addiction, significantly increases the level of cigarette consumption and lowers the probability of quitting. Social interactions significantly affect individual’s attitude toward smoking. Finally, gender differences are formally tested to verify whether male and female sub-samples can be pooled or should be separately analyzed. The hypothesis of equal consumption parameters is clearly rejected, suggesting the opportunity of distinguishing the consumption patterns of men and women.

A reassessment of the Feldstein-Horioka hypothesis of perfect capital mobility: evidence from historical data

This short paper explores the relationship between investment and saving rates in a sample of 13 OECD countries over the period 1885–1992. To this end, I employ panel cointegration tests based on the maximum likelihood approach developed by Johansen (J Economic Dynamics Control 12:231–254, 1988) instead of conventional panel cointegration residual based tests, in order to draw sharper conclusions. Using estimation techniques appropriate for heterogeneous panels I find a low degree of capital mobility for the sub-periods 1921–1992 and 1950–1992. The findings overwhelmingly support the hypothesis of perfect capital mobility in the short run.

The role of domestic savings in outward-oriented growth strategies

This paper presents a theory of technological catching-up in which local savings plays a key complementary role to international finance and foreign technology. Until now, the literature has primarily emphasized “outward orientation” as the key ingredient of catching-up success. It has indeed been argued that countries which have relied intensively on foreign technologies, either through capital goods imports or foreign direct investment inflows, have been successful while countries which have opted for inward-oriented growth strategy relying on domestic investment and import-substitution strategies have been unsuccessful. In this paper, we develop a sequential model of industrialization in which domestic savings is key to the success of outward-oriented growth strategies. Indeed, internal finance helps to overcome time-to-adjustment constraints which occur in the early phases of the catching-up process when both advanced foreign technologies and backward domestic ones co-exist. In this model, external finance, though international borrowing, and domestic savings are complementary, not substitutable, in the course of technological catching-up.

Deliberation,learning, and institutional change: the evolution of institutions in judicial settings

Institutional change entails institutional design, assessment, and modification, which necessarily take place within the constraints and opportunities afforded by existing institutional arrangements. Viktor Vanberg has made major contributions to our understanding of how institutions evolve. We wish to contribute to this symposium in honor of Vanberg by analyzing how institutions for the management of water institutions in Southern California evolved primarily through the use of the courts as settings for deliberation, learning and institutional change.