Leading-by-example and signaling in voluntary contribution games: an experimental study

We report experimental results on the effect of leadership in a voluntary contribution game. Consistent with recent theories we find that leading-by-example increases contributions and earnings in an environment where a leader has private information about the returns from contributing (Hermalin in Am Econ Rev 88:1188–1206, 1998; Vesterlund in J Public Econ 87:627–657, 2003). In contrast the ability to lead-by-example has no effect on total contributions and earnings when such returns are commonly known. In our environment the success of leadership therefore appears to be driven by signaling rather than by nonpecuniary factors such as reciprocity. This paper was started while the authors were visiting the Harvard Business School during the fall of 2000. We are grateful for their hospitality and financial support. Vesterlund acknowledges support from the National Science Foundation and Potters from the Royal Netherlands’ Academy of Arts and Sciences. We thank Henrik Orzen for assistance in conducting the experiment. We also thank David Cooper and an anonymous referee who helped us improve the paper. Finally we thank Chris Anderson, Jim Andreoni, John Duffy, Simon Gaechter, Ernan Haruvy, Muriel Niederle, Jack Ochs, Elke Renner, Al Roth, participants at ESA-meetings (Barcelona, 2001), the Leadership and Social Interactions Workshop (Lyon, 2003), SITE (Stanford, 2004) and seminar participants at Alabama, CMU, Duke, Keele, Maryland, Nottingham, NYU, Pittsburgh, OSU, and York for valuable comments.     

Country size and the voluntary provision of international public goods

Standard studies on voluntary contributions to an international public good treat national economies as if they were single agents. This masks the fact that nations are comprised of populations of citizens, whose collective benefits a national government takes account of when deciding on the amount of the contributions. This paper constructs a model which explicitly allows for the effect of population differences and explores their consequences. We can then present the so-called exploitation of the great by the small by Olson and Zeckhauser [Olson, M., Zeckhauser, R., 1966. An economic theory of alliances. Review of Economics and Statistics 48 (1966) 266–279] and explore how residents of larger countries fare relative to those in smaller countries. We also elaborate on the effects of changing populations and show that growing into a large country is not necessarily beneficial for the country's residents.     

Is There a Bias Toward Contributing to Local Public Goods? Cultural Effects

A series of experiments was designed and implemented to investigate cross-cultural differences in preferences for contributing to local public goods. The research investigates differences between contributions made by participants from the United States, Russia and Kazakhstan. In these experiments each participant has three options: keep money for herself, contribute to a public good that benefits a small group (the local good), or contribute to a public good that benefits the entire group (the global good). The researchers find significant differences in contribution patterns across the three cultures, and find that all participants contribute significantly more to the small group public good than to the large group public good.     

New hope for the voluntary contributions mechanism: The effects of context

This research examines how three common contextual factors can affect contributions in the linear voluntary contributions mechanism (VCM). Using business student subjects and a low marginal per capita rate of return, the results show that contributions in the last of ten rounds range from 18% for the traditional VCM with no initial cheap talk, no voting, and a status quo of not giving to 94% in a VCM with initial cheap talk, voting, and a status quo of giving. The results demonstrate that context can make the VCM produce sustained efficiencies similar to incentive-compatible public-good mechanisms.     

利益相关者视角下校园公共产品困境研究──以某高校“小黄车”为例

公共产品的非排他和非竞争性使得其自身具有成为“公地悲剧”的较大可能性。校园公共产品具有公共品的特性,具有多方的利益主体,但相互间利益的不对等容易引发校园公共产品的提供与使用的混乱。从“某高校‘小黄车’损坏严重”的困境出发,以其涉及的相关利益者为视角,分析校园公共产品供求机制运行中存在的问题,构建多方利益主体间的博弈模型,探讨学校与学生之间管理与使用中出现“囚徒困境”的原因以及解决方法,从而试图为校园公共产品的有效管理提供对策。     

Linear Public Goods Experiments: A Meta-Analysis

Objective: To use meta-analysis techniques to assess the impact of various factors on the extent of cooperation in standard linear public goods experiments using the voluntary contributions mechanism. Data Sources: Potentially relevant experiments were identified through searches of EconLit, the Internet Documents in Economics Access Service (IDEAS), and a survey article. Review Methods: A total of 349 potentially relevant studies were identified. Of these, 27 (representing a total of 711 groups of participants) met the inclusion criteria. Data were abstracted from these studies using a standardized protocol. Results were analyzed using weighted ordinary least squares. Average group efficiency was the dependent variable. Results: The marginal per capita return, communication, constant group composition over the session (partners), positive framing, and the use of children as subjects had a positive and significant effect (p < 0.05) on the average level of contribution to the public good. Heterogeneous endowments to subjects, experienced participants, and soliciting subjects' beliefs regarding other participants' behaviour prior to the start of the session/period had a negative and significant effect. A number of other factors were not identified as significant. Conclusion: The meta-analysis results parallel several key findings from previous literature reviews. In addition, they offer parameter estimates and an analysis of significance based on the totality of the available research evidence. More consistent reporting of the results of experiments would greatly improve the ability to conduct this type of research.     

Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game

We study the voluntary provision of a discrete public good via the contribution game. Players independently and simultaneously make nonrefundable contributions to fund a discrete public good, which is provided if and only if contributions cover the cost of production. We characterize nonconstant continuous symmetric equilibria, giving sufficient conditions for their existence. We show the common normalization by which players’ values are distributed over [0, 1] is not without loss of generality: if the distribution over this interval has continuous density f with f(0) >  0, then no (nonconstant) continuous symmetric equilibrium exists. We study in detail the case in which players’ private values are uniformly distributed, showing that, generically, when one continuous equilibrium exists, a continuum of continuous equilibria exists. For any given cost of the good, multiple continuous equilibria cannot be Pareto ranked. Nevertheless, not all continuous equilibria are interim incentive efficient. The set of interim incentive efficient equilibria is exactly determined. The authors thank Manfred Dix, George Mailath, Andrew Postlewaite, and an anonymous referee for their comments.     

Facebook-to-Facebook: online communication and economic cooperation

Direct face-to-face communication has traditionally been found to be more effective for fostering economic cooperation than any form of indirect, mediated communication. We inquire whether this is still the case since most young adults routinely use texting and online social media to communicate with each other. We find that young adults in our laboratory public goods experiment are just as adept at finding and sustaining cooperative agreements when communicating within a Facebook group and through online chat as they are in person.