Public good,collective action and financial regulation

The economy‐wide liberalization reforms implemented from the 1980s onwards in major capitalist economies had deep impact on financial markets. Public financial regulation has been replaced by self‐regulation, financial innovations proliferated and gave rise to many diversified and complex speculative operations that financialized most economic decisions and actions. Recurrent instabilities and crises became common ground in advanced as well as in emerging market economies and converged on the global systemic crisis in 2007–08, notwithstanding the efficient market doctrine that kept supporting financial liberalization. This crisis raised concerns about the relevance of market‐based financial regulation with regard to the systemic viability of capitalist economies and brought forward the central role of financial regulatory framework in the sustainable working of open societies. This article considers financial stability as a collective action problem through the lens of the literature on the commons and public goods. It seeks to contribute to the development of a relevant paradigm of collective action in the provision of a particular public good, financial stability, through a particular public action, financial regulation. After recalling the broad outlines of the evolution of financial markets and the institutional environment in the last decades, the monetary and financial characteristics of a capitalist economy are presented. The monetary and financial structure turns out to be a public infrastructure. The criticalness of financial transactions for the whole economic society together with the non‐rivalrousness and non‐excludability of financial stability determine the very publicness of the latter. The continuity of financial relations fundamentally needs a viable financial system. However, this is a complex issue as it falls into the classical opposition “private vs public” and calls for a collective action framework consistent with the characteristics of a financialized economy. This article argues that financial stability cannot be ensured through individual‐decision‐based market relations because of the endogenous limits of individual actions and the systemic nature of instabilities they can provoke. A specific treatment of finance as a public utility and of financial stability as a public good is then required. The study on the organization and management of financial markets, namely financial governance issue, ultimately leads to consider financial regulation as a collective action problem that calls for a public supervision framework through an extra‐market macroregulation, apt to allow economy to work in a viable way.     

Dissertation abstract: A status theory of collective action

The “collective action problem” describes situations where each person in a group can individually profit more by withholding contributions to group goals. However, if all act in their material self-interest no public good is produced and all are worse off. I present a new solution to the collective action problem based on status. I argue that contributions to collective action increase an individual’s status in the group because contributions create perceptions of high group motivation, defined as the relative value an individual places on group versus individual welfare. Individuals are predicted to receive a variety of social and material benefits for their contributions to the group. These rewards can help explain why individuals contribute to collective action. Four laboratory studies tested the theory. In Study 1, following interaction in a 6-person public goods game, participants reported viewing higher contributors as more group motivated and higher status. Higher contributors also wielded more interpersonal influence in task interactions with participants. Participants also cooperated with higher contributors more, and allocated greater altruism to them in a Dictator game. Study 2 addressed an exchange-theoretic alternative explanation for the findings of Study 1, showing that observers of collective action who did not benefit from higher contributors’ contributions to the public good, nonetheless rated them as higher status, cooperated with them more, and gave them greater altruistic gifts. These results show that collective action contributors can earn social and material benefits even outside the group. Study 3 more directly tested the mediating role of group motivation. Contributors who sacrificed a greater proportion of resources for the collective action were rated as more group motivated and higher status than a moderate proportional contributor, even though the amounts they contributed were the same. These findings support the theory, and underscore the significance of self-sacrifice in the acquisition of status in collective action. Study 4 investigated the effects of status rewards on contributors’ behavior towards and perceptions of the group. Participants who received positive status feedback for their contributions subsequently contributed more than those who did not. Rewarded participants also identified more with the group and saw it as having greater solidarity and cohesion. I conclude by discussing theoretical implications and future research. JEL Classification C71     

Can second-order punishment deter perverse punishment?

Recent experiments have shown that voluntary punishment of free riders can increase contributions, mitigating the free-rider problem. But frequently punishers punish high contributors, creating “perverse” incentives which can undermine the benefits of voluntary punishment. In our experiment, allowing punishment of punishing behaviors reduces punishment of high contributors, but gives rise to efficiency-reducing second-order “perverse” punishment. On balance, efficiency and contributions are slightly but not significantly enhanced. JEL Classification C91 · C73 · C41 · D71     

An exploration of the positive effect of inequality on common property forests

This paper analyzes the household level forces driving the positive impact of inequality on common property forest cover in Mexico. A game theoretic model demonstrates that when common property goods are complementary to private inputs in production, an increase in wealth inequality can lead to a decrease in exploitation of the commons. Data from 350 Mexican common properties show that as inequality increases, those on the lower end of the land distribution are less likely to use the commons. The data also show a negative correlation between inequality and poverty. Alternative hypotheses for these results are considered.     

Democracy, collective action and intra-elite conflict

We analyze a model where there is uncertainty about the future power of two ex-ante symmetric elites to appropriate surplus, and ex-ante surplus sharing agreements are not binding. We show that in an oligarchy, the stronger elite appropriates the entire available surplus, whereas a democracy results in a more balanced surplus allocation between the two elites. In a democracy, the newly enfranchised non-elite organize to act collectively, so that the weaker elite can credibly threaten to form a coalition with the organized non-elite against the stronger elite. Such a threat ensures that the more balanced surplus sharing proposal chosen by majority voting is renegotiation-proof. Therefore, sufficiently risk-averse elites unanimously choose democracy as a form of insurance against future imbalances in relative power. We emphasize that franchise extension to, and low cost of organizing collective political activity for, the non-elite are both necessary features of a democracy. Our formal analysis can account for the stylized facts that emerge from a comparative analysis of Indian and Western European democracies.     

Cooperation in collective action*

The ability to cooperate in collective action problems – such as those relating to the use of common property resources or the provision of local public goods – is a key determinant of economic performance. In this paper we discuss two aspects of collective action problems in developing countries. First, which institutions discourage opportunistic behaviour and promote cooperation? Second, what are the characteristics of the individuals involved that determine the degree to which they cooperate? We first review the evidence from field studies, laboratory experiments, and cross community studies. We then present new results from an individual level panel dataset of rural workers.     

社区参与、集体行动与新农村建设

在发展中国家,社区参与治理已经成为农村经济发展的关键.传统理论强调个人理性行为导致集体行动困境.本文通过将参与意识纳入博弈论分析框架演绎出社区参与发生的外部条件,外部通过降低个体参与的成本收益比率,促使社区参与规模产生临界值效应而形成高水平集体行动均衡,社区参与形成的集体行动促使公用地悲剧为公用地繁荣.我国新农村建设过程中,需构建政府、市场和社区参与的综合发展框架.     

Conceptualising environmental collective action: why gender matters

This paper demonstrates how institutions for natural resourcemanagement (such as community forestry groups), which appearto be participative, equitable and efficient, can be found lackingon all three counts from a gender perspective. It also examinespossible gender differences in social networks, values and motivations.Although there is little to suggest that women are inherentlymore conservationist than men, the distinctness of women's socialnetworks embodying prior experience of successful cooperation,their higher dependence on these networks (as also on the commonsin general), and their potentially greater group homogeneityrelative to men, could provide an important (and largely ignored)basis for organising sustainable environmental collective action.The paper also outlines the factors that can constrain or facilitatewomen's participation in formal environmental management groups.Illustrative examples are drawn from rural South Asia.     

The participation decision versus the level of participation in an environmental treaty: a spatial probit analysis

This paper represents treaty participation as a two-stage game, for which nations first decide whether or not to participate and then they choose their level of participation. The resulting subgame perfect equilibrium is used to derive a reduced-form equation for estimating and separating the influences of the variables at the two decision stages. This spatial probit equation forms the basis for a full-information maximum likelihood estimator that accounts for the simultaneity bias associated with public good spillins at both stages. When the procedure is applied to the Helsinki Protocol, we find that the strategic influence of a variable may drastically differ depending upon which stage is scrutinized.     

Can good projects succeed in bad communities?

The lack of “social capital” is frequently given as an explanation for why communities perform poorly. Yet to what extent can project design compensate for these community-specific constraints? I address this question by examining determinants of collective success in a costly problem for developing economies — the upkeep of local public goods. It is often difficult to obtain reliable outcome measures for comparable collective tasks across well-defined communities. In order to address this I conducted detailed surveys of community-maintained infrastructure projects in Northern Pakistan. The findings show that while community-specific constraints do matter, their impact can be mitigated by better project design. Inequality, social fragmentation, and lack of leadership in the community do have adverse consequences but these can be overcome by changes in project complexity, community participation, and return distribution. Moreover, the evidence suggests that better design matters even more for communities with poorer attributes. The use of community fixed effects and instrumental variables offers a significant improvement in empirical identification over previous studies. These results provide evidence that appropriate design can enable projects to succeed even in “bad” communities.     

Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

We consider collective choice problems where a set of agents have to choose an alternative from a finite set and agents may or may not become users of the chosen alternative. An allocation is a pair given by the chosen alternative and the set of its users. Agents have gregarious preferences over allocations: given an allocation, they prefer that the set of users becomes larger. We require that the final allocation be efficient and stable (no agent can be forced to be a user and no agent who wants to be a user can be excluded). We propose a two-stage sequential mechanism whose unique subgame perfect equilibrium outcome is an efficient and stable allocation which also satisfies a maximal participation property.     

集体行动的理论综述

集体行动是人们历来关注的焦点之一。特别是在社会学领域,结构主义、功利主义和构建主义都对集体行动做出了理论上的解释;在经济学界,对于集体行动的研究还刚刚开始,特别是还缺少针对具体经济现象中的集体行动的研究。从社会学和经济学两方面对研究集体行动的理论做一个梳理,以期对研究具体的经济现象有所指导意义。     

Wealth inequality and employment fluctuations

This paper is concerned with the business cycle dynamics in search and matching models of the labor market when agents are ex-post heterogeneous. We focus on heterogeneity caused by different labor market histories and the resulting wealth inequality they generate. We show that this inequality implies wage rigidity relative to a complete insurance economy. The fraction of wealth poor agents prevents real wages from falling too much in recessions, since small decreases in income imply large losses in utility. Analogously, wages rise less during expansions than in models with homogeneous workers as small increases are enough for poor workers to accept job offers. This mechanism reduces the volatility of wages but generates more volatile employment levels.     

Wealth inequality and dynamic stability

We explore the link between wealth inequality and stability in a two-sector neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous agents. We show that when the inverse of absolute risk aversion (or risk tolerance) is a strictly convex function, wealth inequality is a factor that favors instability. In the opposite case, inequality favors stability. Our characterization also shows that whenever absolute risk tolerance is linear, as when preferences exhibit hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA), wealth heterogeneity is neutral.     

The price of education and inequality

Constructing a simple model that includes the price of education, this paper shows that the educational expenditure of rich households could prevent poor households from escaping poverty. The paper offers an explanation for persistent inequality.     

Wealth inequality, entrepreneurship and industrialization

The paper shows that in a two-good economy with a basic and a luxury good sector inequality is indeed a hindrance to provide sufficient incentive for entrepreneurship to low-wealth economic agents. In contrast to the literature it uses both demand and supply-side explanations for the analysis. An entrepreneurial subsidy policy to encourage entrepreneurship in autarky financed by a lump sum tax on the rich is not very effective in unequal economies since it hardly impacts the welfare. When trade is opened up in the luxury good sector of such an economy the sector might cease to exist. In such a scenario, the rich people being the sole consumers would reap the entire benefits of globalization via low price of the imported luxury good. The paper highlights that the crucial question is: ‘how to globalize’ rather than ‘whether to globalize’ and suggests policy measures to make globalization inclusive.     

The enfranchisement of women and the welfare state

We offer a rationale for the decision to extend the franchise to women within a politico-economic model where men are richer than women, women display a higher preference for public goods, and women's disenfranchisement carries a societal cost. Men and women are matched within households which are the center of the decision process. We derive the optimal tax rate under two alternative regimes: a males-only enfranchisement regime and a universal enfranchisement regime. The latter is associated with a higher tax rate but, as industrialization raises the reward to intellectual labor relative to physical labor, women's relative wage increases, thus decreasing the difference between the tax rates. When the cost of disenfranchisement becomes higher than the cost of the higher tax rate which applies under universal enfranchisement, the male median voter is better off extending the franchise to women. A consequent expansion of the size of government is only to be expected in societies with a relatively high cost of disenfranchisement.We empirically test the implications of the model over the 1870–1930 period. We proxy the gender wage gap with the level of per capita income and the cost of disenfranchisement with the presence of catholicism, which is associated with a more traditional view of women's role and thus a lower cost. The gender gap in the preferences for public goods is proxied by the availability of divorce, which implies marital instability and a more vulnerable economic position for women. Consistently with the model's predictions, women's suffrage is correlated positively with per capita income and negatively with the presence of catholicism and the availability of divorce, while women's suffrage increases the size of government only in non-catholic countries.     

Market volatility and inequality in earnings: experimental evidence

We analyze the volatility of actions in experimental oligopoly markets. Can the volatility, measured as the total variation in actions, be predicted by inequality in earnings of the previous period? We examine two types of differentiated markets, Cournot and Bertrand, and two informational conditions. We find for both types of markets and regardless of the information available to firms that inequality in earnings is a major factor for explaining volatility. The more equal profits are distributed, the less volatility is observed.     

Wealth inequality,governance and economic growth

Links between economic growth and inequality are of growing interest for researchers and policy makers. Previous studies of this relationship have focused mainly on inequalities in income rather than in wealth. Yet from many perspectives wealth inequality is arguably more important. Using a new panel data set from Credit Suisse for 45 sample countries over the period 2000–2012, this study investigates the effects of wealth inequality on economic growth. Empirical results from system GMM estimation suggest that the wealth inequality is negatively associated with cross-country economic growth. This result is robust to alternative estimators and measures of wealth inequality, as well as the econometric specification. Further empirical investigation reveals that impact of wealth inequality on growth is mitigated by better governance.     

Inter-provincial migration and inequality during Vietnam's transition

Vietnam's economic boom during the transition to a market economy has centered on very rapid growth in some sectors and provinces, yet poverty has diminished across the entire country. With capital investments highly concentrated by province and sector, geographic labor mobility may be critical in spreading the gains from growth. Conversely, rising income inequality may be attributable in part to impediments to migration. We first use census data to investigate migration patterns and determinants. We then examine the role of migration as an influence on income ratios between pairs of provinces. The former analysis robustly confirms economic motives for migration but also suggests the existence of poverty-related labor immobility at the provincial level. Examination of income ratios between pairs of provinces reveals that the impact of migration on inequality can be either negative or positive. A robust inequality-reducing impact of migration is found for migration flows into provinces where most of Vietnam's trade-oriented industrial investments are located.