The Political Economy of Social Security under Differential Longevity and Voluntary Retirement

This paper studies a model where the existence of a pension system is decided by majority voting. We assume that individuals have the same income but different longevity. Retirement is voluntary and the pension system is characterised by a payroll tax on earnings and a flat pension benefit. Individuals vote only on the tax level. We show that a pension system emerges when there is a majority of long-lived individuals and that voluntary retirement enables to lower the size of the transfers received by the long-lived. A rise in average longevity will also increase the size of the pension system.     

Myopia, redistribution and pensions

This paper reviews a number of recent contributions that study pension design with myopic individuals. Its objective is to explore how the presence of more or less myopic individuals affects pension design when individuals differ also in productivity. This double heterogeneity gives rise to an interesting interplay between paternalistic and redistributive considerations, which is at the heart of most of the results that are presented. The main part of the paper is devoted to the issue of pension design when myopic individual do not save “enough” for their retirement because their “myopic self” (with a high discount rate) emerges when labor supply and savings decisions are made. Some extensions and variations are considered in the second part. In particular we deal with situations where labor disutility or preferences for consumption are subject to “habit formation” and where sin goods have a detrimental effect on second period health. Myopic individuals tend to underestimate the effects of both habit formation and sinful consumption, which complicates public policy.     

Do tax subsidies for retirement saving affect total private saving? New evidence on middle-income workers*

We exploit exogenous variation from a pension reform in Denmark to estimate the effect of tax subsidies on total private saving. We present new evidence on individuals in the middle of the income distribution and show that a reduction in tax subsidies for retirement saving reduces total private saving. The reform changed the tax incentives for saving in the pension scheme that holds the highest tax advantage for middle-income workers in Denmark. We find that for each unit of reduced saving in this pension scheme, only 64 percent is substituted to other types of saving.     

On myopia as rationale for social security

It has been argued that “paternalistically motivated forced savings constitutes an important, and to some the most important, rationale for social security retirement systems.” This paper revisits the role played by myopia in generating a theoretical rationale for pay-as-you-go (PAYG) social security in dynamically efficient economies. If the competing asset is linear storage and myopic agents are allowed to borrow against future pension benefits, there is no welfare-rationale for PAYG pensions. Sufficiently strong myopia may justify such pensions only if agents cannot borrow against their future pension, but then they are at a zero-saving corner. With enough myopia, co-existence of positive optimal pensions and positive private saving is possible if the return to saving declines with saving, as in a model with a neoclassical technology.     

The political economy of contributive pensions in developing countries

This paper sheds light on the role of public institutions as a way to reduce tax evasion through a close link between payroll taxation and pension benefits. We use a political economy model in which agents have the possibility to hide part of their earnings in order to avoid taxation and, where the public system is more efficient in providing annuitized pension benefits than the private sector. We show that in the absence of evasion costs, agents are indifferent to the tax rate level as they can always perfectly adapt compliance so as to face their preferred effective tax rate. There is unanimity in favour of the maximum tax rate and, the public pension system is found to be partially contributive in order to increase tax compliance and thus the resources collected. This, in turn, enables higher redistribution toward the worst-off agents. When evasion costs are introduced, perfect substitutability between compliance and taxation breaks down. At the majority-voting equilibrium, individuals at the bottom of the income distribution who are in favour of more redistribution, and those at the top who want to transfer more resources to the old age, form a coalition against middle-income agents, in favour of high tax rates. In addition to the previous tax base argument, the optimal level of the Bismarkian pillar is now chosen so as to account for political support.     

Who is saving privately for retirement and how much? New evidence for Germany

Due to demographic change, the replacement rates of the German statutory pension scheme will decrease over the next decades. Voluntary savings for retirement will therefore increase in relevance as a method of maintaining one’s standard of living during retirement. This article examines the savings behavior for retirement on an individual level in Germany at the extensive as well as the intensive margin. First, the decision to save in general is analyzed, showing that the main determinants for saving are personal income and disposable household income. Furthermore, it is shown that migrants and individuals living in the Eastern part of Germany turn out to be less likely to have additional private savings. Second, the chosen gross saving rates are analyzed using a Tobit model, a log-normal hurdle model and a Type II Tobit model. The results suggest that the decision to save in general, as well as the saving rate, are independent of each other, leading to a loss of information if only a standard Tobit model is used. For example, higher personal income increases the probability to save for retirement, but decreases the resulting saving rate. Modeling both decisions separately thus, leads to a better understanding of the determinants of saving for old-age.     

Retirement planning in the light of changing demographics

With increasing longevity and decreasing fertility rates, governments and policy makers are increasingly engaged in the question of long term retirement planning. In many cases this has included emphasising the need for individuals to take more responsibility for their own retirement planning through tax incentives, compulsion and changes to the age at which state retirement benefits become available. In the case of Australia, as is considered here, long term retirement planning has been focused around the development of a compulsory defined contribution (DC) superannuation system. Here we investigate the interaction between population ageing and the sustainability of the superannuation system by modelling a general superannuation scheme to compare the adequacy of retirement funds under a number of alternative scenarios. The model incorporates stochastic longevity forecasts and provides insight into the sufficiency of compulsory retirement saving both now and future. We find that the current pension scheme is more robust to longevity improvements for mid-class individuals however significant gaps arise for low-income individuals as longevity improves. Without addressing these issues, government expenditure is expected to increase substantially.     

Risk-return preferences in the pension domain: Are people able to choose?

This paper presents new evidence for the Netherlands on pension preferences and investor autonomy in the pension domain using a representative survey of about 1000 Dutch citizens. Our main conclusions are the following. Risk aversion is domain dependent and highest in the pension domain. The vast majority of respondents favours the currently dominant defined benefit pension system. If offered a combined defined benefit/defined contribution system, the majority would like to have a guaranteed pension income of at least 70% of their net labour income. Self-assessed risk tolerance and financial expertise are important individual explanatory variables of pension attitudes. The average respondent considers himself financially unsophisticated and is reluctant to take control of retirement savings investment, even when offered the possibility to increase expertise. Respondents who have chosen a relatively safe portfolio tend to switch to the riskier median portfolio when they are shown future income streams. This again suggests that many respondents currently lack the skills to have investor autonomy over investment for retirement.     

Endogenous retirement and public pension system reform in Spain

Population aging has spurred developed countries around the world to reform their PAYG pension systems. In particular, delaying legal retirement ages and reducing the generosity of pension benefits have been widely implemented changes. This paper assesses the potential success of these policies in the case of the Spanish economy, and compares them with the results obtained by the (rather modest) reforms already implemented in 1997 and 2001. This evaluation is accomplished in a heterogeneous-agent dynamic general equilibrium model where individuals can adjust their retirement ages in response to changes to the pension rules. We check the ability of the model to reproduce the basic stylized facts of retirement behavior (particularly the pattern of early retirement induced by minimum pensions). The model is then used to explore the impact of pension reforms. We find that already implemented changes actually increase the implicit liabilities of the system. In contrast, delaying the legal retirement age and extending the averaging period in the pension formula to cover most of the individual's life-cycle can reduce the implicit liabilities substantially. These findings reveal the failure of the Spanish political system to distribute the costs of population aging more evenly across the generations.     

Precautionary retirement and precautionary saving

The paper analyzes the lifetime utility maximization problem of an agent who chooses her saving and timing of retirement in the presence of labor income risk in a simple setting where a pure redistributive pension scheme is in place. In this context, a precautionary motive for retirement, which pushes old workers to replace an uncertain labor income with certain pension payments, and to retire early is identified. The conditions for precautionary retirement and saving to arise are then characterized and interpreted in two settings. In the first setting, utility only depends on income, and a sufficiently low level of absolute prudence is necessary for precautionary retirement. A sufficiently high level is necessary however for precautionary saving, which can coexist with precautionary retirement only for intermediate values of absolute prudence. In the second setting, agent utility also depends on leisure, and three conditions allow the precautionary motive for retirement and saving to jointly operate: prudence, an index of absolute prudence sufficiently low and cross-prudence in leisure.     

Social Desirability of Earnings Tests

Abstract. In many countries, pension systems involve some form of earnings test; i.e. an individual's benefits are reduced if he has labor income. This paper examines whether or not such earnings tests emerge when pension system and income tax are optimally designed. We use a simple model with individuals differing both in productivity and in their health status. The working life of an individual has two 'endings': an official retirement age at which he starts drawing pension benefits (while possibly supplementing them with some labor income) and an effective age of retirement at which professional activity is completely given up. Weekly work time is endogenous, but constant in the period before official retirement and again constant (but possibly at a different level), after official retirement. Earnings tests mean that earnings are subject to a higher tax after official retirement than before. We show under which conditions earnings tests emerge both under a linear and under a non-linear tax scheme. In particular, we show that earnings tests will occur if heterogeneities in health or productivity are more significant after official retirement than before.     

Delaying retirement in Spain

We study the reform of the Spanish public pension system in a multiperiod, general equilibrium, overlapping generations model economy populated by heterogeneous households. Our households differ in their place of birth, in their age, in their education and, endogenously, in their employment status, in their wealth, and in their pension entitlements. They receive a stochastic endowment of efficiency labor units each period. And they face a disability risk and a survival risk. They understand the link between the payroll taxes that they pay and the public pensions that they receive. And they decide how much to consume and to work, and when to retire from the labor force. We calibrate this economy to Spanish data, and we use it to study the consequences of delaying three years the statutory retirement ages in 2010. We find this reform is sufficient to solve the sustainability problems that plague the current Spanish public pension system. Our model economy predicts that under the current rules, the pension system fund will run out in 2028 and in the reformed economy it will last until 2050. We also find that it is moderately expansionary, and that it improves social welfare from the year 2015 onwards. We conclude that policymakers should seriously consider delaying the statutory retirement ages in Spain sometime in the near future.     

Reinforcing the Link Between Contributions and Pensions: The Effect of the Population Aging

In this paper, we analyze a majority voting process on the earnings-related part of pension benefits in a Social Security system with flexible retirement. We show that the aging of the population may make it easier to implement one of the proposed reforms to achieve a delay in the average retirement age of workers, to reinforce the link between contributions and pensions.     

Time inconsistency and delayed retirement decision: the French pension bonus

With the increase in life expectancy and demographic shocks, several public policies in the last decades aim to encourage individuals to postpone retirement. One of them, the pension bonus, gives an increased pension if individuals retire beyond their Full Retirement Age. Previous ex post analyses found that the responsiveness to this type of financial incentives, which encourage to postpone retirement, is heterogeneous among agents and that the global effect is rather limited. Deriving from previous research in Behavioural Economics, this article analyses the impact of time inconsistency in the decision to delay retirement to get the bonus. Using public national survey data, short-term and long-term impatience are measured with questions on retiring motivations. After controlling for the endogeneity of the bonus knowledge, econometric results show that time-inconsistent agents are less likely to retire with the bonus.     

Pension funds saving individuation

This paper considers a pension insurance problem using an intertemporal framework. We assume a deterministic framework in order to obtain tractable and yet revealing results regarding the propensity to save for retirement. The essential conclusions of this paper include a condition for a single switch, that is, when the saver will decide the switching time, prior to retirement, to start saving. Because of the linear objective used in this paper, saving rates were found to be of the bang-bang type. In addition, we show that the tax effects are important. The richer the saver, the greater the tax advantages for pension savings.     

Market wages,reservation wages,and retirement decisions

The paper is an empirical cross-section study of the retirement decisions of American white men between the ages of 58 and 67, predicated on the theoretical notion that an individual retires when his reservation wage exceeds his market wage. Reservation wages are derived from an explicit utility function in which the most critical taste parameter is assumed to vary both systematically and randomly across individuals. Market wages are derived from a standard wage equation adjusted to the special circumstances of older workers. The two equations are estimated jointly by maximum likelihood, which takes into account the potential selectivity bias inherent in the model (low-wage individuals tend to retire and cease reporting their market wage). The model is reasonably successful in predicting retirement decisions, and casts serious doubt on previous claims that the social security system induces many workers to retire earlier than they otherwise would. The normal effects of aging (on both market and reservation wages) and the incentives set up by private pension plans are estimated to be major causes of retirement.     

The effect on the Italian private pension market of increased uncertainty concerning public pension provision

This paper examines the effect on the demand for private pensions in Italy of the recent strong increase in uncertainty concernin future public pension provision. Theory suggests that such increase uncertainty will increase the demand for all forms of private sector saving, and, in particular, the demand for private pensions — despite the present generosity of the Italian public pension arrangement. This theoretical proposition is confirmed by an empirical test. The implications are important.     

The Austrian Severance Pay Reform: Toward a Funded Pension Pillar

With the beginning of 2003 a new severance pay scheme was introduced in Austria. The reform extends the coverage of the scheme to all employees, and moves it to full and enterprise external funding, but average payments will be lower than previously. This paper provides some evidence on two explicit aims of the reform, namely to generate more fairness in the distribution of severance payments among employees and the creation of a basis of the underdeveloped second pillar of the Austrian pension system. The empirical analysis based on a cross section of completed job spells of different durations indicates that differences in payments among groups will be stronger in the new scheme compared to the old system. Based on retirement income projections and simulations of a multi-pillar pension reform for the blue and white collar workers’ pension system, we conclude that, an increase of the contribution rate would be necessary to achieve a sufficient second pillar retirement income. Helpful comments by Milan Vodopivec and an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged.     

Social Security and Family Support

This paper shows how the role of the market, the state and the family in providing old‐age support has evolved over time with changes in factors such as the reliability and the effectiveness of family support, the interest rate, the cost of public funds, and earning inequality. Agents with different productivity vote over the size of a Beveridgian pension system. When children assistance is certain, agents may rely exclusively on family and prefer no pension. However, when the size and the probability of family generosity decrease, social security is more likely to emerge.