Information‐Hedging Disclosures and Insider Trading

I model the effect of disclosure on the tradeoff between information risk, liquidity risk, and price risk for a well‐informed, risk‐averse insider. Revealing some information before trading decreases the variability of the insider's information advantage and thus reduces his information risk. Disclosure also lowers adverse selection costs for market makers, which reduces the insider's liquidity risk by increasing his trading flexibility. However, disclosure increases price risk for the insider because the price fully reflects the revealed information. The reduction in information and liquidity risks outweigh the rise in price risk when the insider is less risk averse because a less risk‐averse insider's information‐based motive for trading is stronger than his hedging motive. The opposite relation holds when the insider is more risk averse. Therefore, a less (more) risk‐averse insider experiences an increase (decrease) in welfare when he discloses some information before trading. Cost of capital and policy implications are identified.     

Impact of outsiders and disclosed insider trades

We analyze a dynamic market where outsiders share part of the information about a security with a corporate insider and update their incomplete information by learning from disclosed insider trades. Particular focus is on the insider's response to increasing number of learning outsiders.     

THE CHAIRMAN'S STATEMENT AND CORPORATE FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE

Agency theory and signalling theory both suggest that firms are motivated to disclose excellence of financial performance in an unambiguous manner. We might expect, therefore, that good financial performance is associated with a clear and readable Chairman's narrative and poor performance with an obscure or misleading message. Extant work linking corporate performance with clarity of executive narrative fails to distinguish sample cases by industry or financial status. This paper seeks to overcome the consequences of such deficiencies explicitly, by conducting a systematic analysis of the relationship between narrative complexity and alternative measures of financial performance, for a matched sample of failed/non-failed companies across common industries. This study employs separate measures of the readability and the understandability of the chairman's narrative and finds them to be significantly related to overall financial performance and individual measures of performance, most notably liquidity. Poor readability is strongly associated with poor financial performance and ease of readability with relative financial success. The implication is that firms actively signal good news while obscuring, perhaps deliberately, messages which convey bad news.     

Manager wealth concentration,ownership structure,and risk in commercial banks

Of key importance in the governance structure of firms is the role of financial incentives for each major player. The main contribution of this article is an analysis of how an insider's concentration of wealth in his or her bank investment affects incentives to take risk. Major empirical findings are that, first, bank earnings variation falls when bank managers have more of their wealth concentrated in their banks; second, hired-manager banks become less risky when a person who has significant motivation to monitor bank management has his or her wealth highly concentrated in the bank; and third, stock ownership by hired managers can increase total risk of a bank. Further analysis suggests that community banks in our sample control earnings variation by manipulating idiosyncratic risk, credit risk, and leverage but not systematic risk or the loan-to-asset ratio.     

Insiders' hedging in a jump diffusion model

In this paper, we formulate the optimal hedging problem when the underlying stock price has jumps, especially for insiders who have more information than the general public. The jumps in the underlying price process depend on another diffusion process, which models a sequence of firm-specific information. This diffusion process is observed only by insiders. Nevertheless, the market is incomplete to insiders as well as to the general public. We use the local risk minimization method to find an optimal hedging strategy for insiders. We also numerically compare the value of the insider's hedging portfolio with the value of an honest trader's hedging portfolio for a simulated sample path of a stock price.     

An Analysis of Insiders' Use of Prepaid Variable Forward Transactions

This study examines firm performance surrounding insiders' prepaid variable forward (PVF) transactions to infer insiders' information when they enter these off‐market contracts. PVFs allow insiders to hedge downside risk, share performance gains, and obtain immediate large‐sum cash payments for investment or consumption. On average, PVF transactions cover 30% of a sample insider's firm‐specific wealth ($22 million), which is substantially larger than a typical open‐market sale. PVFs systematically follow strong firm performance and precede degraded stock and earnings performance. PVFs also precede periods of negative abnormal returns relative to potential alternative investments. The documented association between PVFs and performance declines does not appear to result from the market's response to transaction disclosure, participant self‐selection, or general price reversals. Thus, evidence suggests that insiders use PVFs to diversify firm‐specific holdings in anticipation of performance declines.     

The Effect of Information Quality on Optimal Portfolio Choice

Three types of agents acting on different information sets are considered: fully informed agents, insiders, and outsiders. Differences in information quality are shown to affect the properties of their optimal portfolios. For an outsider, the share of wealth invested in the stock is decreasing in the variance of the stock. However, for an insider, the effect of an increasing stock variance on the optimal portfolio weight is ambiguous. In a calibration to U.S. data, the confidence intervals of the insider's demand for the stock converge, whereas the outsider's confidence intervals become wider.     

Insider Investment Horizon

We examine the relation between insiders’ investment horizon and the information content of their trades with respect to future stock returns. We conjecture that an insider's investment horizon establishes a benchmark for expected patterns of continued trading behavior and thus helps identify unexpected insider trades, which should be more informative in efficient markets. Consistent with this conjecture, the trades of short-horizon insiders are both more unexpected and more informed, on average, than those of long-horizon insiders. Short-horizon insiders and their firms also tend to display characteristics that are associated with a greater focus on short-termism.     

The spillover effects of target interest rate news from the U.S. Fed and the European Central Bank on the Asia-Pacific stock markets

This paper provides comprehensive evidence on the spillover effects of the U.S. Fed's and the European Central Bank (ECB)’s target interest rate news on the market returns and return volatilities of 12 stock markets in the Asia-Pacific over the period 1999–2006. The news spillover effects on the returns are generally consistent with the literature where a majority of stock markets shows significant negative returns in response to unexpected rate rises. While the results of the speed of adjustment for the Fed's news are mixed across the markets, the ECB news was absorbed slowly, in general. The return volatilities were higher in response to the interest rate news from both sources. In addition, both the Fed and the ECB news elicited tardy or persisting volatility responses. These findings have important implications for all levels of market participants in the Asia-Pacific stock markets.     

Does insider trading have information content for the bond market?

This study documents that there is significant information content in stock trading by registered corporate insiders for the bond market. We report significant positive price reactions for convertible and straight bonds in response to the Wall Street Journal's Insider Trading Spotlight publication of insider buy transactions and significant negative reactions for insider sell transactions. The stock market response to the publication of the insider transactions, although weaker than the bond market reaction, is also found to be significant. Cross-sectional results suggest that bond market participants extract the quality of the insider-trading signal by observing factors such as the dollar volume of the trade, the percentage change in the holding of the insider, and the insider's position in the firm. Lower-rated (riskier) bonds are found to be more sensitive to the information than higher-rated issues. The empirical evidence presented in this paper suggests that the absence of any reporting requirement for insider bond transactions may create aan enhanced opportunity for the insiders to exploit private information to expropriate wealth from uninformed bond traders.     

Audit firm's Confucianism and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

This study examines the association between audit firm's Confucianism and stock price crash risk. We postulate that Confucian moral standards predict a mixed relationship between audit firm's Confucianism and stock price crash risk. Using a large sample of listed firms in China during 2006–2018, we find that audit firm's Confucianism is positively related with client's future stock price crash risk, implying that Confucianism of audit firm aggravates client's bad news hoarding behavior. The effect is more pronounced for client without female auditors and/or with closer personal relationship with auditors. Mechanism analysis shows that audit firm's Confucianism exacerbates crash risk by worsening audit quality and information transparency. Political discipline and external monitoring help to alleviate the negative influence of audit firm's Confucianism on stock price crash risk.     

Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation

We present evidence that reassigning tasks among agents can alleviate moral hazard in communication. A rotation policy that routinely reassigns loan officers to borrowers of a commercial bank affects the officers' reporting behavior. When an officer anticipates rotation, reports are more accurate and contain more bad news about the borrower's repayment prospects. As a result, the rotation policy makes bank lending decisions more sensitive to officer reports. The threat of rotation improves communication because self‐reporting bad news has a smaller negative effect on an officer's career prospects than bad news exposed by a successor.     

News release and the role of different types of investors

We examine how investors react to positive and negative news in the Chinese stock market. We show that positive news is followed by a reversal in stock price, while negative news reports are accompanied by a drift. Using a unique account-level dataset, we find that institutional investors' attention bias contributes to the market's absorption process for different types of news, which is different from the conclusion that the phenomenon is driven by retail investors in the U.S. market. We explain the differences between the two markets as the short-sale constraints induce the attention bias of institutional investors in China. Individual investors are not able to correctly judge the content of news reports, and act as a liquidity provider. We highlight the market regulation plays an important role in the process of investors analyzing information.     

Internal control effectiveness,textual risk disclosure,and their usefulness: U.S. evidence

This paper investigates the impact of internal control effectiveness (ICE) on the level of textual risk disclosure (TRD; including aggregate risk disclosure and its tone of good news and bad news about risk). Our findings suggest that firms with an ineffective internal control system exhibit significantly lower levels of TRD than firms with effective internal controls. Besides, we show a significant change in TRD behavior provided by managers of firms with recurrent ineffective internal controls. Pursuant to agency theory, this behavior change is prompted to reduce the expected public uncertainty and agency problems. We also investigate the usefulness of ICE reporting and TRD to the market. Results suggest that firms reporting ineffective internal controls are likely to have higher investor-perceived risk than firms reporting effective internal controls. Furthermore, TRD improves firms' market liquidity, and such improvement is principally driven by good news rather than bad news about risk. Collectively, our results fill an apparent gap in the literature on the importance of ICE, as well as the usefulness of the external auditor's attestation on a firm's internal controls and management TRD.     

Stock price reaction to public and private information

I use Easley and O’Hara's [1992, Journal of Finance 47, 577–604] private information-based trading variable, PIN, together with a comprehensive public news database to empirically measure the effect of private and public information on the post-announcement drift. I show that stocks associated with high PIN, consensus public news surprises, and low media coverage experience low or insignificant drift. Thus not all information acquisition variables have the same effect on the market's efficiency. Whether information is public or private is irrelevant; what matters is whether information is associated with the arrival rate of informed or uninformed traders.     

Too Good to be True? An Analysis of the Options Market's Reactions to Earnings Releases

Using option implied risk neutral return distributions before and after earnings announcements, we study the option market's reaction to extreme events over earnings announcements. While earnings announcements generally reduce short‐term uncertainty about the stock price, very good news does not reduce uncertainty and slightly bad news actually increases uncertainty. We also find that left tail probabilities decrease over earnings releases while right tail probabilities increase. We interpret these findings as evidence of maintained investor expectations that very good news is generally not released during earnings announcements, combined with skepticism in the form of lingering uncertainty at the release of such very good news.     

Insider Trading, News Releases, and Ownership Concentration

This paper investigates the market's reaction to U.K. insider transactions and analyzes whether the reaction depends on the firm's ownership. We present three major findings. First, differences in regulation between the U.K. and United States, in particular the speedier reporting of trades in the U.K., may explain the observed larger abnormal returns in the U.K. Second, ownership by directors and outside shareholders has an impact on the abnormal returns. Third, it is important to adjust for news released before directors' trades. In particular, trades preceded by news on mergers and acquisitions and CEO replacements contain significantly less information.     

Identifying and Attracting the "right" Investors: Evidence on the Behavior of Institutional Investors

This article summarizes the findings of research the author has conducted over the past seven years that aims to answer a number of questions about institutional investors: Are there significant differences among institutional investors in time horizon and other trading practices that would enable such investors to be classified into types on the basis of their observable behavior? Assuming the answer to the first is yes, do corporate managers respond differently to the pressures created by different types of investors– and, by implication, are certain kinds of investors more desirable from corporate management's point of view? What kinds of companies tend to attract each type of investor, and how does a company's disclosure policy affect that process? The author's approach identifies three categories of institutional investors: (1) “transient” institutions, which exhibit high portfolio turnover and own small stakes in portfolio companies; (2) “dedicated” holders, which provide stable ownership and take large positions in individual firms; and (3) “quasi‐indexers,” which also trade infrequently but own small stakes (similar to an index strategy). As might be expected, the disproportionate presence of transient institutions in a company's investor base appears to intensify pressure for short‐term performance while also resulting in excess volatility in the stock price. Also not surprising, transient investors are attracted to companies with investor relations activities geared toward forward‐looking information and “news events,” like management earnings forecasts, that constitute trading opportunities for such investors. By contrast, quasi‐indexers and dedicated institutions are largely insensitive to shortterm performance and their presence is associated with lower stock price volatility. The research also suggests that companies that focus their disclosure activities on historical information as opposed to earnings forecasts tend to attract quasi‐indexers instead of transient investors. In sum, the author's research suggests that changes in disclosure practices have the potential to shift the composition of a firm's investor base away from transient investors and toward more patient capital. By removing some of the external pressures for short‐term performance, such a shift could encourage managers to establish a culture based on long‐run value maximization.     

The rising risks of fossil fuel lobbying

For 2009 to 2018, we find that fossil fuel firms are more likely to lobby and that lobbying expenditures are greater with increases in a firm's vulnerability to climate change news risk. The industry's resistance to a timely low-carbon transition has spawned a divestment movement that accelerated in 2014. Estimates of fossil fuel firm vulnerability to climate change news risk increase after 2013, strengthening firms' inclination to lobby just when this activity becomes less valued by shareholders. We consider the financial implications of continued climate policy obstruction for financial system stability and the success of the clean energy transition.     

Does Silence Speak? An Empirical Analysis of Disclosure Choices During Conference Calls

In this paper, we exploit the open nature of conference calls to explore whether managers withhold information from the investing public. Our evidence suggests that managers regularly leave participants on the conference call in the dark by not answering their questions. We find that the best predictors of such an event are firm size, a CEO's stock price–based incentives, company age, firm performance, litigation risk, and whether analysts are actively involved during the call's Q&A section. Finally, we document strong support for the assumption maintained in the literature that investors interpret silence negatively. That is, investors seem to interpret no news as bad news.