Taxing multi-nationals under union wage bargaining

This paper investigates corporate taxation under separate accounting (SA) and formula apportionment (FA) in a model with union wage bargaining and multi-national firms. Under SA, we find that increases in the corporate tax rate raise the wage level of domestic workers, while they lower the remuneration of foreign workers. The main insight emerging from a tax competition game is that the endogenous wage level gives rise to an ambiguous fiscal externality, which may dampen the race-to-the-bottom in corporate tax rates. A switch to a tax system with FA principles reverses the impact of corporate taxes on negotiated wages. While increases in the corporate tax rate reduce domestic wages, they raise the wage level of foreign workers. In a tax competition game, the endogenous wage level gives rise to a positive fiscal externality that enforces the race-to-the-bottom in corporate tax rates.     

Why Capital Income Taxes Survive in Open Economies: The Role of Multinational Firms

This paper discusses the role of multinational firms and double taxation treaties for corporate income taxation in open economies. We show that it is optimal for a small open economy to levy positive corporate income taxes if multinational firms are taxed according to the full taxation after deduction system or the foreign tax credit system. Positive corporate taxes also occur in the asymmetric case where some countries apply the exemption system and others apply the tax credit system. If all countries apply the exemption system, the optimal corporate income tax is zero. We also show that, under tax competition, corporate income taxes are not necessarily too low from the perspective of the economy as a whole. While the undertaxation result is confirmed for the case of the exemption system, tax rates may also be inefficiently high if the deduction or the credit systems are applied.     

Redistribution as Social Insurance and Capital Market Integration

In this paper we claim that enhanced economic integration can call for an increase in redistribution among workers. When individuals are risk averse and no human capital insurance is available, the share of workers who choose to invest in specific human capital will be inefficiently low. Redistribution among workers plays the role of the missing insurance market by making the investment in the specific skills more attractive. Capital market integration has two different effects. On the one hand it makes labour income taxation more distortionary, therefore reducing the optimal tax rate on labour. On the other hand, it increases the variance of specific labour wage and widens the scope for risk protection of specific human capital through the redistribution implemented by a labour income tax. We show that the insurance effect of redistribution can be stronger than the distortionary effect, so that the optimal tax rate on labour income can increase when capital markets become more integrated.     

Capital Structure,Corporate Taxation and Firm Age*

This paper analyses the relationship between corporate taxation, firm age and debt. We adapt a standard model of capital structure choice under corporate taxation, focusing on the financing and investment decisions typically faced by a firm. Our model suggests that the debt ratio is associated positively with the corporate tax rate and negatively with firm age. Further, we predict that the tax-induced advantage of debt is more important for older firms than for younger ones. To test these hypotheses empirically, we use a cross-section of around 405,000 firms from 35 European countries and 127 NACE three-digit industries. In line with previous research, we find that a firm's debt ratio increases with the corporate tax rate. Further, we observe that older firms exhibit smaller debt ratios than their younger counterparts. Finally, consistent with our theoretical model, we find a positive interaction between corporate taxation and firm age, indicating that the impact of corporate taxation on debt increases over a firm's lifetime.     

Neutral Taxation of Shareholder Income

A Norwegian tax reform committee recently proposed a personal tax on the realized income from shares after deduction for an imputed risk-free rate of return. This paper describes the design of the proposed shareholder income tax and shows that it will be neutral with respect to investment and financing decisions and decisions to realize capital gains, provided that full loss offsets are granted. Thus the tax allows some non-distortionary double taxation of corporate equity income. With an appropriate choice of tax rates, it also solves the problem of income shifting under a dual income tax. JEL Code: H24, H25     

Made in the U.S.A.? A Study of Firm Responses to Domestic Production Incentives

How do U.S. companies respond to incentives intended to encourage domestic manufacturing? I study the Domestic Production Activities Deduction (DPAD), which was enacted in the American Jobs Creation Act (AJCA) of 2004 and was the third largest U.S. corporate tax expenditure as of 2017. Using confidential data from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, I find greater average domestic investment spending of $95.5–$143.6 million, but only within the sample of domestic‐only firms and not until 2010, when the greatest statutory DPAD benefits were available. Additional evidence suggests that U.S. multinational claimants invest abroad rather than in the United States and that the increased investment by DPAD firms is accompanied by a reduction in the domestic workforce, consistent with a substitution of capital for labor. I also show that the delayed investment response is due to firms engaging in other responses first, such as changing corporate reporting to shift income across time and borders. Quantifying the extent of these effects contributes to the literature that studies this tax deduction and informs policy makers as to the effectiveness of both manufacturing incentives and U.S. corporate income tax rate reductions in stimulating real domestic activity.     

Corporate flat tax reforms and businesses’ investment decisions: evidence from Switzerland

This paper focuses on the effects of a corporate income flat tax reform on businesses’ investment decisions. Since 1990, several Swiss states (cantons) have been switching from a graduated to a flat tax rate scheme on profits. The paper assesses the effects of such a reform both on the number of establishments (i.e. extensive margin of investment) and on the number of employees (i.e. intensive margin) in a given jurisdiction by computing a difference-in-differences estimation. Our results suggest that the introduction of a flat tax reform on corporate income taxes has a negative and statistically significant impact on both margins of investment. Moreover, the effect is considerably larger for riskier firms, suggesting that progressive taxation acts as an insurance effect for risk-averse entrepreneurs.     

The Responsiveness of Corporate Investments to Changes in Corporate Income Taxation During the Financial Crisis: Empirical Evidence from Slovenian Firms

I examine the responsiveness of corporate investments to changes in corporate income taxation during the financial crisis. When investigating tax effects in financially constrained firms, the model of investment demand needs to be extended to include an additional channel through which taxes could affect investments. I model the tax effects via two transmission channels, the traditional user cost of capital channel and the cash flow channel, which is crucial for financially constrained firms. The empirical results show that corporate investments in financially constrained firms do not respond to changes in corporate income taxation through the user cost of capital channel, but there is strong evidence of the effect that materializes through the cash flow channel.     

Do corporate taxes affect employee welfare? Evidence from workplace safety

We examine the impact of tax policy on worker safety that exploits spatial discontinuity in treatment and control establishments stemming from state-level corporate tax changes. The granularity of our data and econometric approach allows us to exploit within-firm, across-establishment variation in worker safety shedding light on the real effects of headquarter versus plant-level decisions. Plant-level injury rates increase with tax hikes in establishment states, but not with those in headquarter states, highlighting the importance of plant-level decisions. We explore three plausible non-mutually exclusive mechanisms to help explain these findings ─ safety investment, leverage, and labor stress channels. We find that in the presence of a tax hike, firms reduce safety-related investments, and the tax effect on injury rates is exacerbated for firms that increase leverage and for firms where employees work longer hours and seasonal workers are used. Overall, our findings suggest that tax increases lead to negative welfare outcomes for employees, with no similar benefit accruing for tax cuts.     

Optimal taxation and redistribution in an OLG model with unemployment

This paper concerns redistribution via nonlinear income taxation in an overlapping generations model with two ability-types. We assume that the wage rates are determined by bargaining between unions and firms, meaning that the equilibrium is characterized by involuntary unemployment. We show that the policy instruments that are used to calculate the marginal labor income tax rate for each ability-type give rise to intertemporal tax base effects. In addition, since the relationship between the employment and the capital stock implies intertemporal production inefficiency at the second best optimum, imperfect competition in the labor market may itself justify capital income taxation.      

Beyond the labour income tax wedge: the unemployment-reducing effect of tax progressivity

In this paper, we argue that, for a given overall level of labour income taxation, a more progressive tax schedule increases employment. From a theoretical point of view, higher progressivity increases overall employment through a wage moderating effect and also because employment of low-paid workers is more elastic to wages. We test these theoretical predictions on a panel of 21 OECD countries over 1998–2008. Controlling for the burden of taxation at the average wage, our estimates suggest that a more progressive tax schedule reduces the unemployment rate and increases the employment rate. These findings are confirmed when we account for the potential endogeneity of both average taxation and progressivity. Overall, our results suggest that policy-makers should not only focus on the detrimental effects of tax progressivity on in-work effort, but also consider the employment-enhancing effects.     

How Much Do Taxes Discourage Incorporation?

The double taxation of corporate income should discourage firms from incorporating. We investigate the extent to which the aggregate allocation of assets and taxable income in the United States between corporate and noncorporate firms responds to the size of this tax distortion during the period 1959–1986. In theory, profitable firms should shift out of the corporate sector when the tax distortion is large, and conversely for firms with tax losses. Our empirical results provide strong support for these forecasts, and imply that the resulting excess burden equals 16 percent of business tax revenue.     

Leverage and Taxes: Evidence from the Real Estate Industry

Finance theory has long viewed corporate income taxes as a potentially important determinant of corporate financing decisions and capital structures. But finance academics have been unable to provide convincing empirical evidence of a material effect of taxes on corporate leverage, in part because of difficulties in constructing an effective proxy for marginal corporate tax rates, and hence for the tax benefits of debt, for large samples of individual companies. The authors address this by analyzing leverage decisions in an industry whose publicly traded entities are organized either as taxable corporations, or as real estate investment trusts (REITs) that effectively avoid entity level taxation. This enables them to measure the relative tax benefits of debt with greater precision while controlling for important nontax characteristics that affect debt usage. The tax hypothesis predicts that for real estate firms with similar asset portfolios, taxable firms should have more debt than their nontaxable counterparts. Both the nontaxable and the taxable real estate firms in our sample routinely have more than twice the leverage of industrial firms, which suggests that factors other than taxes are contributing to their use of debt. But among real estate firms, tax status appears to play a much weaker role. Taxable firms have significantly more leverage only after 2000, when restrictions on REITs were removed through new regulations that made their operations much more like those of taxable real estate firms. Our findings also depend on real estate characteristics—most notably, only residential real estate firms demonstrated differences that are consistent with the tax hypothesis. Taken together, the authors’ findings suggest that although taxes do seem to matter, their role is clearly secondary relative to factors such as the nature of the firm’s assets. A generous interpretation of our evidence puts the effect of taxes between one‐third and one‐half of that implied by prior research.     

The real effects of bank taxation: Evidence for corporate financing and investment

This paper examines how bank taxation affects the financing decisions and investment activities of corporates. Exploiting exogenous tax variation at the bank level, we show that taxing banks' gross profits leads to higher bank leverage, and results in lower risk and credit supply. The contraction in credit supply has implications for corporate debt financing and investment activity. Corporates more exposed to banks subject to gross profit tax exhibit lower leverage and rely less on bank debt. Corporates partly offset lower bank financing by switching to bond financing. The cost of bond financing increases with corporate exposure to the tax. A greater exposure also impacts negatively on corporate investment activity. Overall, our results highlight the importance of bank taxation for corporate financing and investment decisions.     

Taxes and production: The case of Pakistan

This paper investigates the effectiveness of investment incentives and corporate income taxes in influencing production and investment decisions in the Pakistani wearing apparel and leather products industries. Three tax instruments are considered: the corporate income tax (CIT), the investment tax credit (ITC), and the capital cost allowance (CCA).The results show that since there are significant capital adjustment costs, it is important to distinguish between the short, intermediate, and long-run effects associated with the tax instruments. Production decisions are relatively more responsive to changes in the ITC rate compared to changes in either CCA or CIT rates in each run. However, only in the long run for the apparel industry are the ITC and CCA rates cost effective in stimulating investment. The CIT is never cost effective. Thus targeted instruments outperform the general CIT instrument. In addition, although the incentive to invest is enhanced, there is little effect on output. Therefore, tax incentives essentially make production techniques more capital intensive.     

Sickness absence and health care in an economic federation

This paper addresses vertical fiscal externalities in a model where the state governments provide health care and the federal government provides a sickness benefit. Both levels of government tax labor income and policy decisions affect labor income as well as participation in the labor market. The results show that the vertical externality affecting the state governments’ policy decisions can be either positive or negative depending on, among other things, the wage elasticity of labor supply and the marginal product of expenditure on health care. Moreover, it is proved that the vertical fiscal externality will not vanish by assigning all powers of taxation to the states.      

Tax credit rating and corporate innovation decisions

The tax credit rating mechanism was formally implemented in 2014. As an important tax collection and management innovation, it has attracted the attention of regulatory authorities and scholars. Different from the literature that directly examines corporate tax compliance, we focus on the impact of tax credit rating implementation on corporate research and development (R&D) investment decisions. Using listed companies’ data from 2014 to 2019, we find that companies with higher tax credit ratings invest more in innovation, because the system helps managers identify R&D opportunities, alleviates corporate financing constraints and reduces agency costs. We confirm that tax credit ratings have manifold impacts on corporate information environments and business decisions, with better ratings positively affecting firms’ business decisions. This discovery can inform tax policy reform, encourage corporate innovation and construct social credit systems.     

Intangible investment and Ramsey capital taxation

The standard analysis of optimal fiscal policy aggregates different types of assets into a unique capital good and all types of capital taxes into a unique capital tax. This paper considers a disaggregated framework: an economy with corporate and dividend taxes, where firms invest in both tangible and intangible assets (which can be expensed or sweat). In our setup, firms can always respond to changes in the timing of taxation. We find that the optimal long-run policy features zero corporate taxes and positive dividend taxes, with labor and dividend taxes being identical. Moreover, the initial capital levy is relatively small.     

A growth oriented dual income tax

This paper proposes a growth oriented dual income tax by combining an allowance for corporate equity with a broadly defined flat tax on personal capital income. Revenue losses are compensated by an increase in the value added tax. The paper demonstrates the neutrality properties of the reform with respect to investment, firm financial decisions and organizational choice. Tax rates are chosen to prevent income shifting from labor to capital income. The reform decisively strengthens investment of domestically owned firms as well as home and foreign based multinationals and boosts savings. Simulations with a calibrated growth model for Switzerland indicate that the reform could add between 4 to 5 percent of GNP in the long-run, depending on the specific scenario. Given the slow nature of capital accumulation, it imposes considerable costs in the short-run. We consider a tax smoothing scenario to offset the intergenerationally redistributive effects. JEL Classification: D58, D92, E62, G32, H25