知识经济下的进入壁垒与技术创新

一、知识经济下的进入壁垒 　　进入壁垒是指产业内已有企业对准备进入或正在进入该产业的新企业所拥有的优势,换个角度来说,进入壁垒也就是新企业在进入该产业时所遇到的不利因素和限制。进入壁垒大小反映了新企业在进入该产业过程中所遇到困难的大小。形成进入壁垒的因素主要有：规模经济、必要资本、沉没费用、产品差别、技术优势等。由于知识经济有着一系列不同于工业经济的特征,所以在知识经济下,影响和形成进入壁垒的因素也发生了一系列的变化。 　　1.规模经济壁垒。在工业经济中,生产具有大批量、标准化、少品种的特点,因此规…     

我国汽车市场的低效率与进入规制

我国汽车市场的低效率主要表现在较高的利润水平、较低的规模水平和技术水平上.我国汽车市场的低效率是由过度进入造成的.目前我国汽车企业过多,企业难以达到规模经济,因此我国汽车产业迫切需要一个市场集中的过程.政府参与汽车市场的集中过程将有利于我国汽车产业的健康发展.由于汽车产业投资需要巨大的沉淀成本,不受规制的自由进入有可能会导致社会无效率.在我国现阶段,政府对于汽车产业的扶植和进入规制都是必要的.     

进入管制与产品质量

本文分析了政府进入管制对厂商最优质量水平及市场平均质量水平的影响。在模型中 ,消费者对产品质量的主观推断存在误差 ,而产品需求在短期内保持稳定。财政收入最大化政府设置行政性进入壁垒并对非法进入者进行惩罚。因而 ,非法进入者虽然可以以冒牌的方式进入行业或市场 ,但有面临被处罚的可能性。分析结果表明 ,政府一定有动力实施管制 ,且将查处的力度确定如此水平 ,使得冒牌厂商“打而不死” ;此时 ,市场平均质量水平则低于或等于无管制情形。本文的分析还表明 ,在位厂商和非法进入者的均衡质量水平均与管制力度呈负相关关系。     

进入壁垒与石油产业组织效应

进入壁垒是影响产业组织效率的重要因素之一。对于石油产业来说,一定的进入壁垒有利于保护国家利益和社会利益,有利于避免其他企业的盲目进入,提高规模经济效益。但应对石油产业不同性质的业务加以区分,区别实行不同的进入壁垒政策。     

政府审批制度改革与民营企业的市场准入

我国现行的政府审批制度 ,通过两种方式转化为民营企业的产业进入壁垒 :一是为保护产业内国有垄断企业利益而对民营企业实施的“进入阻挠” ;二是政府审批收费和寻租行为阻碍民营企业进入的“逆向选择效应”。这两种进入壁垒阻碍了民营企业的市场准入 ,抑制了民营经济的发展 ,需要通过改革政府审批制度来加以消除     

市场进入壁垒、进入管制与中国产业的行政垄断

本文在对中国产业行政垄断研究的基础上,从产业组织理论的角度对该问题给予了较全面的论述.其基本逻辑过程是:如果不存在市场的进入壁垒,那么,没有外力干预的市场竞争机制将导致最优的社会福利结果.如果存在市场进入壁垒,则可能是技术进入壁垒、企业战略性进入壁垒和政府进入管制,如果这些进入壁垒的效应有利于市场竞争机制的有效发挥及社会福利,那么政府对此就无需进行干预;反之,就应存在着政府干预,而且这种干预的程序和方法都应该具有有效性和公平性.如果我们将这种干预称作政府管制的话,就不应该存在所谓政府对产业的行政垄断.本文从上述分析逻辑给出行政垄断的定义,并对在我国建立完善有效的产业政府管制以及消除产业的行政垄断提出建议.     

中国轿车市场差异化进入壁垒探析

对于在位企业而言,进入壁垒对于保持其竞争优势至关重要。产品差异化是在位企业构建进入壁垒的重要手段之一。本文通过一个两阶段动态博弈模型,分析了在位企业通过合理的产品差异化程度设置进入壁垒的问题,进而从产品差异化的角度解释了轿车市场的进入壁垒问题。轿车产品通常具有较大的差异。产品的差异性一方面使得在位企业拥有竞争优势,另一方面有使得进入者可能在产品空间中找到理想的位置进入。为了达到遏制进入的目的,在位企业应当合理地设置自己的产品线,使得自己的产品保持合理的差异程度。合理的差异化程度将使得进入者在进入之后面对相近的替代产品的竞争无法达到规模经济的产量。而且,通过对中国轿车市场销量排行榜的分析,找到了支持理论模型的经验证据。     

开放条件下中国轿车产业的外资进入与市场结构研究

外资进入提高了国内轿车市场的竞争程度,降低了市场集中度,促进了市场规模的扩张和产品的差异化,同时也降低了产品价格,带来了消费者福利的提高;改善了我国轿车产业的组织结构,很多企业已经达到了工厂最小最优规模经济水平,生产成本大幅下降;外资进入从资本规模、技术、产品差异、规模经济等几个方面提高了国内资本的进入壁垒;政府与跨国公司共同主导的产业发展模式亟待改变.     

品牌作为进入壁垒的经济学分析

进入壁垒是新厂商进入特定产业（市场）所面临的一系列障碍,它是影响市场结构的重要因素。传统产业经济学研究的进入壁垒一般基于厂商的非对称优势壁垒（如规模经济、产品差异化等）或制度性壁垒（如政策、法律等）。但是,在高度市场化和宏观产业政策一定的条件下,非对称优势和制度性因素都无法真正成为阻碍厂商进入的壁垒。在消费者选择条件下,由品牌构筑起的进入壁垒将成为厂商竞争最重要的壁垒形式之一。     

异质性视角的产业进入壁垒与流动壁垒——兼论我国产业管制的政策取向

企业只有具备核心能力才不会被替代,因此分析潜在企业进入产业的壁垒必须考虑对企业的能力要求。据此可将产业进入壁垒分为两类:同质性进入壁垒是阻碍潜在企业形成基本能力的因素;异质性壁垒是指阻碍行业内企业积累核心知识和能力、形成企业间异质性的共性因素,同时也是流动壁垒。政府产业管制的取向是同时消除同质性和异质性进入壁垒,尤其是后者,这将有利于避免因产业过度进入而面临的限制进入和鼓励竞争的两难冲突。     

INSUFFICIENT ENTRY OF EMPLOYEE‐CONTROLLED FIRMS IN A FREE‐ENTRY OLIGOPOLY

This study is a theoretical examination of whether employee‐controlled firms (ECFs) enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market excessively or insufficiently, from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. The excess entry theorem is well known in oligopoly theory. According to this theorem, a greater number of profit‐maximizing firms enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market than is optimal for welfare maximization. We demonstrate the possibility that insufficient entry arises when ECFs compete in a free‐entry market. In particular, we show that if both the demand and cost functions are convex, insufficient ECF entry necessarily occurs. Our results suggest that competition among firms seeking purposes other than profit might lead to insufficient entry because differences in competing firms’ objectives affect the intensity of market competition.     

Excess Entry in the Absence of Scale Economies

It is well-known that with free entry, more firms than is socially optimal typically enter provided there are economies of scale. This paper investigates the possibility of excess entry in the absence of scale economies We thank Simon Anderson, Tom Holmes, the late Arijit Mukherji, and Xavier Vives for helpful comments. We also thank the participants at the July 2001 Australasian Meetings of the Econometric Society in Auckland, June 2002 University of Melbourne-National University of Singapore Symposium and seminar participants at the University of Sydney and University of New South Wales for useful suggestions. We are especially thankful to an anonymous referee whose meticulous comments have helped us to improve the paper     

企业社会责任标准国际化背景下企业进入策略研究*

本文通过构建博弈模型，对企业社会责任（CSR）标准国际化背景下企业进入策略进行研究。本文发现，企业最优进入策略受到进入成本影响，当进入成本较低时所有企业都适合选择进入高CSR标准市场，当进入成本较高时所有企业都不适合选择进入，当成本介于两者之间时适合部分企业选择进入。在对社会福利的分析中还发现，当进入是企业最优策略时，无论是部分进入还是全部进入，企业承担更高的社会责任能同时提升企业利润和社会福利水平。     

Strategic pricing and entry deterrence under price-cap regulation

This paper shows that dynamic price-cap regulation allows the regulated firm to deter entry. Under dynamic price-cap regulation, the allowed prices in each period are an increasing function of the prices set in the previous period. By setting a low price before entry, the regulated firm can commit itself to charge a low price in the event of entry. If this price is sufficiently low with respect to the potential entrant's fixed cost, entry does not occur. Whether the regulated firm prefers to deter or accommodate entry depends on the level of the entry cost for the prospective entrant, on the tightness of the price-cap and on the degree of market power of the competing firms in case of entry.     

Middle-ground players in dynamic imitative markets: global entry strategies of Korean firms in the biosimilars market

ABSTRACT

This study examines the strategies used to enter the biosimilars market – the emerging biogeneric market – by five Korean biopharmaceutical firms. The analysis is based on a conceptual framework that characterises the use of imitative innovation by middle-ground firms. These middle-ground firms are positioned between globally innovative firms from major developed economies and latecomer firms from large emerging economies. The study finds that the five Korean firms used three entry modes that resemble the typology of strategies commonly used in the previous catch-up stage: exploiting scale economies and specialisation. The study also reveals the risk and potential of each entry mode.     

Technical efficiency, market share and profitability of manufacturing firms in Cote d'Ivoire: the technology trap

This paper investigates the sources of inefficiency of firmsin Côte d'Ivoire and examines to what extent these effectstranslate into poor performance. A large majority of firms istechnically inefficient, producing far below the maximum attainableoutput level. Major cost savings can also be realised throughenlarging the scale of activities of firms. Efficiency gainsand scale advantages translate into a better competitive positionand via their impact on market share into higher profitability.However, severe growth barriers and imperfect markets keep firmsfrom realising these gains and prevent firms from catching upin technology with respect to their larger, older and oftenforeign-owned competitors.     

Uber and the Persistence of Market Power

Entry into the taxi industry involves few risks. Entrants have lower costs than the incumbents, sunk costs are small, and modern technology makes it easy to hail a cab using the Internet. Despite large scale entry and low barriers to entry, monopoly power persists. The persistence of monopoly power illustrates that new technologies may not quickly eviscerate monopoly power.     

Entry,growth, and survival: The new learning on firm selection and industry evolution

This paper tries to shed some light on the seeming paradox posed by the findings in the industrial organization literature that (1) the bulk of firms in an industry are not only very small, but also sufficiently small so that they are operating at a sub-optimal scale of output, and (2) entrepreneurs are apparently not deterred from starting new firms even in industries where scale economies play an important role. A dynamic view of the process of firm selection and industry evolution is that new firms typically start at a very smal scale of output. Because this level of output may be sub-optimal, the firm must grow in order to survive. The empirical evidence supports such a dynamic view of the evolutionary nature of industries. Viewed through a dynamic lens, the often-observed asymmetric size distribution of firms becomes more understandable. The persistence of an asymmetric firm-size distribution skewed towards small enterprises presumably reflects a continuing process of entry into industries and not necessarily the survival of such small and suboptimal enterprises over a long period of time.     

THE WELFARE EFFECTS OF UPSTREAM MERGERS IN THE PRESENCE OF DOWNSTREAM ENTRY BARRIERS*

We examine the incentives for upstream firms to consolidate horizontally and the impact of this process on industry performance, when there are downstream entry barriers and firms negotiate bilaterally. In the short run, consumers are not worse off with upstream mergers, since consolidation only results in a redistribution of industry rents. In the long run, consumers are better off after upstream mergers, since they induce more entry into that segment. When social welfare is evaluated, a limit on upstream consolidation may prevent excessive entry; but upstream entry can be sometimes insufficient, if the retailers' intrinsic bargaining power is excessive.