Harassment, corruption and tax policy: a comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee [Eur. J. Political Economy 16 (2000) 75–94]

This comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee [Eur. J. Political Economy 16 (2000) 75–94] shows that their basic model can be simplified by an alternative formulation. A corrupt auditor gives two choices to a taxpayer: pay bribe and evade tax or be overtaxed. Although harassment can be redressed through court, the taxpayer chooses to pay bribe. However, as this note discovers, the bribe–income ratio will critically depend on whether the taxpayer can afford the court fees. This may lead different income groups to have different preferences for corruption.     

Property Taxation, Capitalization, and the Economic Implications of Raising Property Taxes

This study applies a hedonic pricing model to provide further empirical evidence whether, in the spirit of Tiebout (Journal of Political Economy 64(1):416?C424, 1956), Oates (Journal of Political Economy 77(6):957?C971, 1969), and Tullock (Journal of Political Economy 79(5):913?C918, 1971), property taxes in particular have been capitalized into housing prices in the city of Savannah, Georgia housing market. There were sufficient data in this context to study a total of 2,888 single-family houses for the six-year period 2000?C2005; 591 of these houses were located in the Savannah Historic Landmark District. Estimating the model in semi-log form reveals (after allowing for a variety of factors, including 12 spatial variables, four of which are de facto Tiebout type variables) that the natural log of the real sales price of a single-family house in the city of Savannah environment was in fact negatively affected by the city and county property tax level. This study is prompted by the fact that city and county governments are facing serious financial challenges and are searching for viable revenue sources. Increasing property taxes is one of the potential revenue sources being considered by elected officials. In providing current evidence on the effects of property tax in particular and on the Tiebout hypothesis in general, we seek to alert city and state governments of the potential consequences and perils of property tax hikes.     

Contests with size effects through costs

Eggert and Kolmar [Eggert, W., Kolmar, M., in press. Contests with size effects. European Journal of Political Economy.] examine the effects of group size on individual and aggregate payoffs in contests where prizes increase in the number of players. In a reconsideration of their paper, this note examines contests in which the unit cost of effort decreases in the number of players. In contests for fixed prizes, an increase in the number of players decreases individual and aggregate payoffs. In contests in which players face a trade-off between appropriative and productive investments, an increase in the number of players decreases individual payoffs while increasing aggregate payoffs.     

Are regional asymmetries detrimental to tax coordination in a repeated game setting?

This paper reexamines the main findings of Cardarelli et al. [Cardarelli, R., Taugourdeau, E., Vidal, J.-P., 2002. A repeated interactions model of tax competition, Journal of Public Economic Theory 4, 19-38], and Catenaro and Vidal [Catenaro, M., Vidal, J.-P., 2006. Implicit tax co-ordination under repeated policy interactions, Recherches Economiques de Louvain 72, 1-17], who show that regional asymmetries undermine the implicit collusion of tax coordination in a repeated game model of capital tax competition. In particular, this paper investigates how increased regional differences in per capita capital endowments and/or production technologies affect the willingness of each region to cooperate in achieving tax coordination. It is shown that there may exist cases where as regional asymmetries in net capital exporting positions increase, regions are more likely to cooperate on capital taxes and thereby achieve tax coordination.     

Agglomeration, innovation and international research mobility

This paper discusses a model of the New Economic Geography, in which the seminal core-periphery model of Krugman [Krugman, P., 1991, Increasing returns and economic geography, Journal of Political Economy 99, 483–499.] is extended by endogenous research activities. Beyond the common ‘anonymous’ consideration of R&D expenditures within fixed costs, this model introduces in an analytically tractable approach vertical product differentiation in combination with a de-integrated R&D sector. In the context of international factor mobility, the destabilizing effects of a mobile scientific workforce are analyzed. Based upon a simple welfare analysis, a consideration of R&D promoting policy instruments and their spatial implications, this paper makes a contribution to the brain-drain debate.     

How well does a small structural model with sticky prices and wages fit postwar U.S. data?

In this paper, we ask whether a small structural model with sticky prices and wages, embedding various modelling devices designed to increase the degree of strategic complementarity between price-setters, can fit postwar U.S. data. To answer this question, we resort to a two-step empirical evaluation of our model. In a first step, we estimate the model by minimizing the distance between theoretical autocovariances of key macroeconomic variables and their VAR-based empirical counterparts. In a second step, we resort to Watson's [Watson, M.W., 1993. Measures of fit for calibrated models. Journal of Political Economy 101, 1011–1041.] procedure [Measures of fit for calibrated models. Journal of Political Economy 101 (6), 1011.1041] to quantify the model's goodness-of-fit. Our main result is that the combination of sticky prices and sticky wages is central in order to obtain a good empirical fit. Our analysis also reveals that a model with only sticky wages does not perform well according to Watson's criterion [Watson, M.W., 1993. Measures of fit for calibrated models. Journal of Political Economy 101, 1011–1041.].     

Central bank instruments, fiscal policy regimes, and the requirements for equilibrium determinacy

This paper examines the role of the monetary instrument choice for local equilibrium determinacy under sticky prices and different fiscal policy regimes. Corresponding to Benhabib et al.'s results for interest rate feedback rules [Benhabib, J., Schmitt-Grohé, S., Uribe, M., 2001. Monetary policy and multiple equilibria. American Economic Review 91, 167–185], the money growth rate should not rise by more than one for one with inflation when the primary surplus is raised with public debt. Under an exogenous primary surplus, money supply should be accommodating—such that real balances grow with inflation—to ensure local equilibrium determinacy. When the central bank links the supply of money to government bonds by controlling the bond-to-money ratio, an inflation stabilizing policy can be implemented for both fiscal policy regimes. Local determinacy is then ensured when the bond-to-money ratio is not extremely sensitive to inflation, or when interest payments on public debt are entirely tax financed, i.e., the budget is balanced.     

The hump-shaped behavior of inflation and a dynamic externality

We propose a general equilibrium model that explains the empirical evidence of the hump-shaped response of inflation to a monetary policy shock. The model replaces backward-looking indexation à la Christiano et al. [2005. Nominal rigidities and the dynamic effect of a shock to monetary policy. Journal of Political Economy 113(1), 1-45] with a dynamic externality into the production function of firms. The model, armed with sticky wages and variable capital utilization, has two offsetting effects on real marginal cost over the business cycle. First, increasing factor prices raise real marginal cost in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock in the intermediate run. Second, a dynamic externality reduces real marginal cost in the short run because it raises productivity in response to an increase in output following the shock. Overall, the resulting short-run decrease and intermediate-run increase in marginal cost replicate the hump-shaped behavior of inflation under purely forward-looking price and wage Phillips curves.     

Estimating elasticities of residential energy demand from panel county data using dynamic random variables models with heteroskedastic and correlated error terms

A dynamic random variables model correcting for heteroskedastic and correlated error terms over time and space and dynamic demand and using panel county data offers consistent and efficient elasticity estimates of residential electricity and natural gas demands. The model developed by Swamy [Swamy, P.A.V.B., 1974. Linear models with random coefficients. In: P. Zarembka (Eds.), Frontiers in Econometrics, Academic Press, London, pp. 143–168.] with a modification suggested by Maddala et al. [Maddala, G.S., Trost, R.P., Li, H., Joutz, F., 1997. Estimation of short-run and long-run elasticities of energy demand from panel data using shrinkage estimators. Journal of Business and Economic Statistics 15, 90–100.] uses a panel of selected California counties for the years 1983–1997 to yield elasticity estimates that differ from those obtained from more standard panel data procedures.     

Uncertainty of voters' preferences and differentiation in a runoff system

Haan and Volkerink (Haan, M., Volkerink, B., 2001. A runoff system restores the principle of minimum differentiation. European Journal of Political Economy 17, 157-162, this journal) show that the principle of minimum differentiation holds in two-round elections for any number of candidates. We show that the principle of minimum differentiation may not hold, when uncertainty of the position of the median voter is introduced.     

Audited reputation

We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 854–882].     

Taxation,corruption, and growth

We build an endogenous growth model to analyze the relationships between taxation, corruption, and economic growth. Entrepreneurs lie at the center of the model and face disincentive effects from taxation but acquire positive benefits from public infrastructure. Political corruption governs the efficiency with which tax revenues are translated into infrastructure. The model predicts an inverted-U relationship between taxation and growth, with corruption reducing the optimal taxation level. We find evidence consistent with these predictions and the entrepreneurial channel using data from the Longitudinal Business Database of the US Census Bureau. The marginal effect of taxation for growth for a state at the 10th or 25th percentile of corruption is significantly positive; on the other hand, the marginal effects of taxation for growth for a state at the 90th percentile of corruption are much lower across the board. We make progress towards causality through Granger-style tests and by considering periphery counties where effective tax policy is largely driven by bordering states. Finally, we calibrate our model and find that the calibrated taxation rate of 37% is fairly close to the model׳s estimated welfare maximizing taxation rate of 42%. Reducing corruption provides the largest potential impact for welfare gain through its impact on the uses of tax revenues.     

Strategic policies and growth: an applied model of R&D-driven endogenous growth

We introduce and explore a general equilibrium model with R&D-driven endogenous growth, whose antecedents are the models of Romer (1990) [Romer, P.M., 1990. Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98, S71-102] and Grossman and Helpman (1991) [Grossman, G.M., Helpman E., 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, The MIT Press, Cambridge]. Utilizing evidence from recent econometric studies on sources of growth, the model also accounts explicitly for cross-border technological spillovers. The model is specified and calibrated to data from Japan, and is solved to obtain both the transitional and the steady-state equilibria. We explore the effects of selective trade and R&D promotion policies on long-run growth and social welfare. The model results suggest that while a strategic trade policy has little effect on re-allocating resources into domestic R&D activities, it can significantly affect the cross-border spillovers of technological knowledge, which, in turn, stimulates growth. We find that trade liberalization may cause the growth rate to fall and lead to a loss of social welfare in the long-run, although it improves welfare in the short-run. R&D promotion policies stimulate growth by inducing private agents to allocate more resources to domestic R&D, as well as to take greater advantage of global R&D spillovers. Here, we find significantly high growth effects together with sizable gains in social welfare at low incidence to tax payers.     

Earmarked taxation and political competition

Although tax earmarking constitutes a voluntary constraint for government's policymaking, it is widely used in the real world. This paper investigates the electoral dimension of earmarking in a model of political competition with ideological parties. Its main contribution is to derive new insights on the relationship between earmarking and parties' probability of winning the elections. We find that the electoral pressure may favor the existence of tax-earmarking equilibria, but that it sometimes creates a tendency against earmarked taxation even when, as shown by Brett and Keen (2000) [Brett, C., Keen, M., 2000. Political uncertainty and the earmarking of environmental taxes. Journal of Public Econonomics 75, 315–340], incumbent governments have strong incentives to use earmarking rules to constrain future policymakers.     

Taking,giving, and impure altruism in dictator games

We show that, if giving is equivalent to not taking, impure altruism could account for List’s (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007) finding that the payoff to recipients in a dictator game decreases when the dictator has the option to take. We examine behavior in dictator games with different taking options but equivalent final payoff possibilities. We find that recipients tend to earn more as the amount the dictator must take to achieve a given final payoff increases, a result consistent with the hypothesis that the cold prickle of taking is stronger than the warm glow of giving. We conclude that not taking is not equivalent to giving and agree with List (in Journal of Political Economy 115(3):482–493, 2007) that the current social preference models fail to rationalize the observed data.     

Variety of products,public capital,and endogenous growth

This paper develops an extension of the endogenous growth model with variety expansion presented in Romer [Romer, P.M., 1990. Endogenous technical change, Journal of Political Economy 98, part 2, S71–S102] by considering public capital accumulation. Characterizing the transitional dynamics, the growth rate of consumption traces (and available number of intermediate goods also might trace) an S-shaped converging path to the equilibrium growth rate, similar to a logistic growth curve, if the intensity of public capital is sufficiently high. We also show that public investment enhances economic growth because it stimulates demand for intermediate goods and raises the market interest rate.     

Intergenerational Politics, Fiscal Policy and Productivity

A political–economic theory of fiscal policy is presented in which tax policy preferences are derived from a conflict of interest between individuals of different ages. Policy formation is fully rational in that an individual's beliefs regarding future policies are consistent with state-contingent policy outcomes. The overlapping generations friction that prevents the young from transacting with future members of society implies that young policymakers strategically manipulate the policy preferences of the yet unborn to lower their own expected old-age tax burden. A comparison of the original equilibrium to one induced by the “constitutional commitment” of fiscal policy isolates the strategic component of tax rates and demonstrates that aggregate labor productivity is biased as a result of the conflict.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: E62, H30, O40.     

Book Reviews

Book reviewed in this article:
Kornai, János, The Socialist System: the Political Economy of Communism
Dallago, Bruno; Ajani, Gianmaria; Grancelli, Bruno, eds., Privatisation and entrepreneurship in post-socialist countries
Dallago, Bruno; Brezinski, Horst; Andreff, Wladimir, eds., Convergence and system change: the convergence hypothesis in the light of transition in Eastern Europe
Frydman, Roman; Andrzej Rapaczynski; John S. Earle, et al., The Privatisation Process in Central Europe     

A spatial tax harmonization model

Policies to harmonize value-added tax rates are controversial in the European Union. This paper formulates a multi-country model over a one-dimensional space as a non-cooperative Nash game, in which each country aims at maximizing its tax revenue, subject to the constraint that its tax rate lies within a given common band. Then we examine the effects of changes in the common band on tax rates, tax revenues and the number of cross-border shoppers at Nash equilibrium. We also analyze the effects of geographical variation in country size and location.     

Anticorruption reforms,tax evasion,and the role of harassment

We examine the impact of anticorruption reforms on tax evasion when corruption and potentially harassment are endemic among tax auditors. We find that the threat of harassment may counterintuitively boost the impact of such anticorruption reforms on tax evasion and also eliminate corruption. Specifically, a moderate anticorruption policy can discontinuously reduce tax evasion to a level even below that under no corruption. Further strengthening of such policy can nonetheless prove counterproductive and increase tax evasion. On the contrary, in the absence of harassment, a moderate anticorruption reform induces higher tax evasion and sustenance of bribery. In this case, only a large reform can reduce tax evasion and eliminate corruption.