Banks’ efficiency and credit risk analysis using by-production approach: the case of Iranian banks

This article uses a by-production approach that integrates credit risk to monitor bank efficiency. The method overcomes the possible misspecification issues of the commonly assumed weak disposability (WDA) of undesirable outputs. In addition, our measure extends the classic by-production approach by including statistical aspects through subsampling techniques. We have also provided an algorithm to correct related infeasibilities. Using this approach, we investigate the performance of Iranian banks and credit risk management in the sector for the period 1998–2012. Non-performing loans (NPLs) have been used as an undesirable output and proxy for credit risk in our models. Based on our empirical results, although the banks generally exhibited efficiency improvements over time, their credit risk performance deteriorated considerably after the regulatory changes introduced in 2005. These findings confirm that credit quality can be monitored more actively across Iranian banks.     

On the assessment of the performance in earnings management for the banking industry: the case of China’s banks

Earnings management is popular in the banking industry. Earnings can be manipulated by discretionary loan loss provisions (DLLP). Analysing the trajectories of banks’ DLLP (i.e. their change in DLLP over time) is an effective way to assess the performance in earnings management for the banking industry, but seems not to have been addressed in the earnings management literature. In this study, we analyse the trajectories of DLLP with the yearly data from 2007 through 2012 for four types of banks in China. The results have indicated that state-owned banks, policy banks and city commercial banks seem to manage earnings well. Cautionary notes about bank risks are provided.     

Firm size,credit scoring accuracy and banks’ production of soft information

Research on SME bank financing generally assumes that smaller firms are more opaque from a lender’s perspective. We propose that the discriminatory power of credit scoring models can be thought of as a proxy for firm opaqueness, given that when these models perform poorly, lenders must invest in the production of ‘soft information’ to supplement the financial data used in these models. Measuring the discriminatory power of probit default models across quintiles of the Irish SME size distribution, we show that our proxy for firm opaqueness increases monotonically as firms get smaller. This finding supports an assumption that is the starting point to a wide strand of literature on SME bank financing. Our findings can also be interpreted as providing an insight to the literature on the determinants of banks’ choice of lending technology. While smaller banks may, as found in a substantial previous literature, produce larger amounts of ‘soft information’ due to their organizational advantages, they may also do so out of necessity: hard-information-based default modelling is less effective among smaller firms, thereby forcing banks that lend to these borrowers to invest more in relationship banking technologies to retain competitiveness.     

China’s competition and the export price strategies of developed countries

This paper analyzes the impact of Chinese competition on developed countries’ export prices. The empirical application is on Italy, one of the main European manufacturing exporters with exports at high risk of competition from China. Our results show that, following China’s entry into the WTO, the price strategies of Italian firms has been affected. While in general the increasing Chinese export competition resulted in an upgrading of products exported, the impact has been different according to the sector and technological level. The incentives to upgrade have been stronger for low technology sectors, where competition is tougher and varieties of products sold lower. To highlight quality differentials, and isolate the effects on the different segments of the distribution of Italy’s export prices, we run quantile regressions. We find that are mainly those products sold at low prices to face a strong pressure to upgrade.     

An experimental study of the impact of competition for Other People’s Money: the portfolio manager market

In this paper we experimentally investigate the impact that competing for funds has on the risk-taking behavior of laboratory portfolio managers compensated through an option-like scheme according to which the manager receives (most of) the compensation only for returns in excess of pre-specified strike price. We find that such a competitive environment and contractual arrangement lead, both in theory and in the lab, to inefficient risk taking behavior on the part of portfolio managers. We then study various policy interventions, obtained by manipulating various aspects of the competitive environment and the contractual arrangement, e.g., the Transparency of the contracts offered, the Risk Sharing component in the contract linking portfolio managers to investors, etc. While all these interventions would induce portfolio managers, at equilibrium, to efficiently invest funds in safe assets, we find that, in the lab, Transparency is most effective in incentivising managers to do so. Finally, we document a behavioral “Other People’s Money” effect in the lab, where portfolio managers tend to invest the funds of their investors in a more risky manner than their Own Money, even when it is not in either the investors’ or the managers’ interest to do so.     

Market Shares and Concentration in the EU Auditing Industry: the Effects of Andersen’s Demise

This paper describes and analyses changes at the concentration level of the audit services markets in 15-EU member-countries. The sample consists of 2,862 clients of auditing firms for the period 1998 to 2004. The findings of the research show that concentration in the aggregate sample increased over time. Concentration in the audit markets of the EU-15 member-countries exhibits substantial variation across countries while average concentration, before and after Arthur Andersen’s dissolution, has increased in 12 and declined in three countries. Results segmented by economic sectors indicate that the concentration increased in all sectors except Energy, which is the sector with the highest concentration. Overall, the empirical results suggest that there are complexities in our understanding of auditing services markets for competition purposes.

Italy’s decline and the balance-of-payments constraint: a multicountry analysis

According to the literature, the decline experienced by the Italian economy in the last two decades depends on a slowdown of its labour productivity, starting in the 1990s. The supply-side explanations of this slowdown are inconsistent with the major stylised facts. In this paper, we verify whether a better explanation is provided by the effect of a negative demand shock, through Italy’s external constraints, in the framework of Kaldor-Dixon-Thirlwall’s cumulative growth model. To this end, we use a multi-country generalisation of Thirlwall’s balance-of-payments-constrained growth model, which allows us to investigate the contribution of Italy’s main trade partners to Italy’s long-run growth from 1970 to 2010. The trade partners are disaggregated into seven groups: Eurozone core, Eurozone periphery, United States, other European countries, OPEC countries, BRIC, and the rest of the world. The results show that Italy’s long-run growth has been consistent with the Bop-constraint, that its decline can be explained by a progressive tightening of this constraint, that the sudden slowdown of labour productivity in the 1990s corresponds to a major shock on Italy’s external constraint, and that the major contributions to this shock came, through different channels of transmission, from the core Eurozone countries and from OPEC countries.     

Political incentives and the effectiveness of monetary policy: evidence from China’s city commercial banks

From the perspective of official-and-director (OAD), this article takes studies of the effect of monetary policy on bank loans to the heterogeneity of bank. We explore how political incentives affect the lending channel of monetary policy transmission, using a sample of China’s city commercial banks during 2006–2014. And we further analyse the role of OAD’s characteristics, including administrative rank and age. The results indicate that although tight monetary policy can reduce bank loans, the OAD can weaken this relationship, and the higher is the administrative rank of OAD, the larger is the effect. And the older is OAD, the larger is the effect. More importantly, the relationship between monetary policy and bank loan is insignificant in banks with OAD, implying that the lending channel of monetary policy is absent when considering the role of OAD.     

Reappraisal of outbound open innovation under the policy of China’s ‘Market for Technology’

China’s ‘Market for Technology’ policy has attracted much interest over the past decade. In light of a relative emphasis on the spillover effects of joint ventures, this study examines the transferring effects of Multinationals’ (MNCs) outbound open innovation in such a context. A survey of 2071 research and development (R&D) contract transactions between Chinese entities and MNCs indicates both internal factors (e.g. organisational capabilities) and external factors (e.g. the role of Intellectual Property protection) affect the transferring effects, which reformulate the focus of the Policy from the relational dimension of ‘Government vs. MNCs’ to the transactional dimension of ‘Domestic entities vs. MNCs’. We thus conclude that MNCs’ active initiative in the involvement of technology transfer and the success of domestic transaction partners combine to contribute to the technology progress within China’s ‘Market for Technology’ policy.     

Men of Steel Meet the Market: Interpreting Firm Behavior in Russia’s Metallurgy Industry

In Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Thomas Piketty (2014) explains growing income inequality via the difference between the rate of return on capital and the growth rate of the economy: the “r > g” inequality. Even if it is true that r > g leads to increasing inequality, nearly every school of economic thought predicts that r will fall as the economy grows. Thus, for Capital (2014) to be a comprehensive theory of inequality, a more adequate theory of r is required. I term this the “Piketty Problem.” I offer a solution to this problem from an institutionalist perspective.     

The effects of foreign strategic investors on business models in China’s commercial banks: does ownership structure matter?

Introducing foreign strategic investors (FSIs) is a vital step in the ownership reforms of China’s banking industry. Using China’s data from 1995 to 2014, we employ propensity score matching and difference-in-differences approaches to investigate the effects of FSIs on the business models of Chinese banks, including income structure and funding structure. We find that FSIs significantly influence income structure. The bank’s non-interest income (NII) share significantly rises after introducing FSIs. The higher ownership shares of FSIs are associated with the higher NII share. And the NII share has been increased when FSIs assign directors or senior managers to Chinese banks. We also report that the effects of FSIs on income structure are weaker in state-owned banks than those in other banks, and ownership concentration weakens the links between FSIs and income structure. Finally, this article shows that FSIs have no significant influence on funding structure. These findings will be informative and relevant to both policymakers and practitioners.     

International Experience,China’s Development and Prospect of Carbon Market Construction

Carbon market, which is capable of scientific quantifying and marked-based pricing of carbon emission, is an important way for countries to achieve the target of carbon emission reduction. The global carbon market, after more than ten years of development, has developed a mature mechanism. China started the trial of carbon market in 2011. After ten years of exploration, the national carbon trading market was officially launched in mid-July 2021. Against the backdrop of carbon neutrality, the national carbon market will shoulder a greater mission of carbon emission reduction and speed up its financialization and internationalization. However, it should take a dialectical attitude toward the opportunities and risks of carbon market financialization. In the future, China can promote the development of carbon market through efforts to develop market participants, clarify the attributes of carbon finance, prevent potential risks of carbon finance, improve the connection mechanism with the international carbon market, and innovate carbon finance services.     

Trade liberalization,intra-industry trade and the environment: competition mode and the order of firms’ moves

This paper explores the implications of trade liberalization by extending the intra-industry trade framework à la Fung and Maechler (J Int Trade Econ Dev 16(1):53–69, 2007) to the case of sequential move and taking the mode of firms’ competition into consideration as well. It is shown that the existing results obtained for the case of simultaneous price competition are robust in quantity competition and sequential move cases. Moreover, it studies the likelihood that the environmental effects of trade liberalization occur.

Monopoly power and the firm’s valuation: a dynamic analysis of short versus long-term policies

Summary. Recent anti-trust cases exacerbated the concerns of investors regarding the effects of a firms monopoly power on its production choice, shareholder value, and the overall economy. We address this issue within a dynamic equilibrium model featuring a large monopolistic firm whose actions not only affect the price of its output, but also effectively influence the valuation of its stock. The latter renders time-inconsistency to the firms dynamic production choice. When the firm is required to pre-commit to its strategy, the ensuing equilibrium is largely in line with the predictions of the textbook monopoly model. When the firm behaves in a time-consistent manner, however, the predictions are strikingly at odds. The trade-off between current profits and the valuation of future profits induces the firm to increase production beyond the competitive benchmark and cut prices. This policy may result in destroying shareholder value, and does indeed fully wipe out the firms profit in the limit of the decision-making interval shrinking to zero, in line with the Coase conjecture.Received: 23 December 2003, Revised: 1 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D42, D51, D92, E20, G12.Correspondence to: Anna PavlovaWe thank Steve Spear and the anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. We are also grateful to Franklin Allen, Dave Cass, Peter DeMarzo, Bernard Dumas, Ron Giammarino, Rich Kihlstrom, Leonid Kogan, Branko Urosevic, Dimitri Vayanos, seminar participants at Boston University, University of Colorado at Boulder, Columbia University, MIT, University of Pennsylvania, Princeton University, American Finance Association Meetings, and European Finance Association Meetings for valuable comments. All errors are solely our responsibility.     

Fixed versus flexible election terms: explaining innovation in the timing of Canada’s election cycle

This paper argues that there is an efficiency gain underlying the recent adoption of legislation calling for a fixed 4-year governing term by the federal and most provincial governments in Canada. The efficiency gain arises from foreclosing an externality produced by the Canadian constitutional provision that sets a maximum length for a legislative term (5 years) while allowing the governing party (through the Governor General) to dissolve the House early. Because the opportunistic use of surprise can improve the governing party’s probability of winning, strategic choice can lead to elections being held at times that most disadvantage the incumbent’s rivals. Evidence from Canada is introduced suggesting that federal elections became less predictable through successive reductions in the campaign time given to competitors, thus raising the cost of this externality. The same reasoning suggests that the party most likely to propose this legislative innovation will be the party in opposition rather than in power and/or the new leader of an established party facing loss in the upcoming election. By fulfilling the fixed term even when it could benefit by calling the election early, the party establishes a precedent that raises the political cost to others of cancelling the fixed term legislation.     

On the origin of money,or Menger’s one-sided reading of Genovesi’s Lezioni

Abstract

By examining Menger’s interpretation of Genovesi’s arguments on the origin of money, this note shows that Genovesi is a subtle theorist managing to blend the Cartalist with the Mengerian approaches to the origins of money. Far from resting exclusively on the Mengerian unattended consequences of the uncoordinated behaviours of rational agents trying to minimise their transaction costs, Genovesi shows how governments can and do create fiat money with a positive value in connexion with their ability to raise taxes. For Genvesi both trust (à la Menger) and authority (à la Cartalist) are necessary to explain the positive value of money.     

Usury,Market Power and Poverty Traps: A Study of Rural Credit in 1930s’ China

This paper studies the cross-regional variation of interest rates in China in the 1930s. Based on county-level data from the Buck (1941) rural surveys, we examine factors that may have influenced rural interest rates in pre-1949 China. Since the quality of institutions that define property rights and facilitate contract enforcement is important for such transactions as land tenancy arrangements, we treat land tenancy rate (or percentage of owner-farmers) as a proxy for institutional quality. Contrary to the popular belief among historians and economists that usury or high interest rates caused persistent poverty, we find that while the monopoly-exploitation hypothesis has little explanatory power, a region’s institutional quality and income level are persistent and significant determinants of interest rates. Thus, poverty is a key driver of high rates of interest. Economic growth and the development of market institutions are crucial for lowering high interest rates and combating usury.     

The linkages,persistence, asymmetry in the volatility,the price discovery and efficiency,and the effect of the US subprime mortgage financial crisis on the spot and the futures market’s returns: the case of India

This article examines the effects of persistence, asymmetry and the US subprime mortgage crisis on the volatility of the returns and also the price discovery, efficiency and the linkages and causality between the spot and futures volatility by using various classes of the ARCH and GARCH models, and through the Granger’s causality. We have used two indices: one for spot and the other for futures, for the daily data from 12 June 2000 to 30 September 2013 from Nifty stock indices. We have then tested for ARCH effects, and subsequently employed various models of the ARCH and GARCH conditional volatility. The GARCH(1,1) model is found to be significant, and it implies that the returns are not autocorrelated and have ‘short memory’. It supports the hypothesis of the efficiency of the markets. The negative ‘news’ has more significant effect on volatility, corroborating the ‘leverage impact’ in finance on market volatility. We have also tested the volatility spillover effects. The two methods we employed support the spillover effects and the causality is bidirectional. We also have used the dummy variable for the US subprime mortgage financial crisis and found that they are statistically significant. Indian stock market is thus integrated to the world stock markets.     

Austrian economics and development: The case of Sudha Shenoy’s analysis

The aim of this paper is to describe Sudha Shenoy’s use of Menger, Mises, and Hayek (she explicitly called them ‘the older Austrians’) to explain development and growth. Her aim was to show that the application of Austrian economics, based on the notions of capital structure and division of labor, embedded in a specific legal framework (common law), historically promoted development and growth (as in early modern England); and can promote development and growth in underdeveloped countries (her specific focus was India). Shenoy also claimed that any policymaking as well as government’s intervention are either useless or dangerous, having two main dysfunctional effects, which are often interrelated; namely, make development slower (or even stop it), and increase corruption.     

On the evolutionary edge of altruism: a game-theoretic proof of Hamilton’s rule for a simple case of siblings

We offer a game-theoretic proof of Hamiltons rule for the spread of altruism. For a simple case of siblings, we show that the rule can be derived as the outcome of a one-shot prisoners dilemma game between siblings.JEL Classification: A13, C70, D64Correspondence to: Oded Stark, ZEF, University of Bonn, Walter-Flex-Strasse 3, 53113 Bonn, GermanyWe are indebted to an anonymous referee and to Uwe Cantner for helpful comments and suggestions. Partial financial support from the National Institute on Aging (grant RO1-AG13037) and from the Humboldt Foundation is gratefully acknowledged.