控制权收益与企业融资方式选择——基于Myers-Majluf模型的分析框架

将控制权收益引入Myers-Majluf模型中,本文建立了一个企业融资方式选择模型。模型预测,由于控股股东和外部投资者的利益冲突,选择股权融资的上市公司存在过度投资行为,而选择负债融资的企业一般不存在过度投资行为;进一步的研究表明,控股股东的控制权收益加剧了企业股权融资偏好和过度投资行为。     

The Effect of CEO Risk Appetite on Firm Volatility: An Empirical Analysis of Financial Firms☆

This paper examines the effect of CEO risk appetite on the return volatility of a sample of large, listed financial firms over the period 2000–2008. After controlling for firm specific characteristics, the results give strong evidence that the CEO risk appetite has an important effect on firm volatility. The biographical measures for CEO risk appetite are significant explanatory variables of all measures of firm volatility employed in this study. The effect of CEO age is significant and positive for all four volatility measures, while CEO education and current job tenure are negative and significant for all four measures. Executive experience with other firm boards has a negative and significant effect on total and idiosyncratic volatility. Interestingly, CEO wealth is complementary to the other biographical variables with a positive effect on all but the default volatility measure. Our results carry implications for shareholders, financial regulators, governments, and managers.     

Evaluating the effects of equity incentives using PSM: Evidence from China

This paper investigates the effects of equity incentives on firm performance in Chinese listed firms. We address the sample selection problem by employing the propensity score matching methodology. Results show that, (1) On the whole, performance is positively related to equity incentives even after controlling for sample selection bias; (2) The final control rights have an important impact on the effects of equity incentives. The execution of equity incentives in privately owned firms can significantly decrease the agency costs between shareholders and managers, but such effects cannot be observed in state-owned firms; (3) Effects of equity incentives depend on the incentive type, that is, comparing to stock-based incentives, option-based incentives can reduce the agency costs significantly, thus are more effective; (4) Ownership structure also has important impacts on the effects of equity incentives. The agency costs decrease in firms with more decentralized ownership after introducing equity incentive, while in concentrated firms the effect is negligible.     

股权分置改革后股东对管理者的激励博弈分析

股权分置改革完成后,中国上市公司的股权结构实现股份全流通和股权分散化,内部人控制问题得到强化,股东和管理层之间发生严重的委托代理问题。从分析管理者效用函数出发寻求其最优努力的内解,通过股东建立的股权激励机制来约束最优努力解,寻求完全信息动态博弈的子博弈精练纳什均衡解,分析结果显示,企业价值最大化由管理层努力产出弹性和努力成本弹性决定,并受企业的资源配置、赢利能力的约束。     

融资约束抑或代理冲突? 上市公司非效率投资动因研究

本文利用投资价值效应的一般原理对我国上市公司的非效率投资产生的原因及其表现形式重新进行了审视和研究。研究发现,无论是国有控股公司还是非国有控股公司,公司经营业绩均与其投资支出呈现出倒U型的曲线关系,且投资支出比例分别在0.47727和0.36971时公司经营业绩达到最高。倒U型曲线关系表明我国上市公司的非效率投资既包含投资不足,又存在过度投资,因而是融资约束和代理问题共同作用的结果。     

A Model of Value Creation: Strategic View

Value creation has long been hailed as the major objective of business firms by many management researchers. Some authors state that a firm must create value for its shareholders; some insist that value must be created not just for shareholders but also for all stakeholders. However, most discussions of value creation do not address an important question: "For whom the value is created?" The purpose of this paper is to take a first step to fill this void and propose a model of value creation along three dimensions: financial, nonfinancial, and time. It is hoped that the model will contribute to a better understanding of how strategic and operational decisions of managers may create value for some stakeholders while destroying it for others.     

Nonfinancial companies as large shareholders alleviate financial constraints of Brazilian firm

We analyze whether financial constraints of Brazilian firms are alleviated by ownership structure. More specifically, we study whether the presence of nonfinancial firms as shareholders of Brazilian firm mitigates financial constraints. We find that the presence of nonfinancial firms as significant shareholders reduces financial constraints, probably because such blockholders are able to reduce asymmetric information problems that are at the origin of financial constraints. This result indicates that the changes in the corporate ownership of the Brazilian firms, achieved within the country's structural changes, have been positive for firm investment and have contributed to the development of Brazil.     

Strategic trade and delegated competition

Strategic trade theory has been criticized on the grounds that its predictions are overly sensitive to modeling assumptions. Applying recent results in duopoly theory, this paper considers three-stage games in which governments choose subsidies, firms' owners choose incentive schemes for their managers, and then the managers compete in the product market. We show that if firms' owners have sufficient control over their managers' behavior, then the optimal strategic trade policy does not depend on the mode of product-market competition, i.e., whether firms compete by setting prices or quantities.     

Dynamic Agency and Large‐Risk Taking

I propose a dynamic investment model with moral hazard under which greater exposure to future uncertainties about losses could enhance incentive provisions and improve firm value. The model provides an explanation for why many financial companies and investment banks choose to improve their short‐run performance by putting themselves at greater risk of catastrophic losses in the future, as what happened prior to the 2007 financial crisis.     

公司治理赏罚博弈分析

公司治理的核心问题就是督促经营管理者努力工作 ,以实现股东利益最大化 ,为此必须设计出合理的激励机制 ,而激励机制实质上是一种关于赏罚的制度安排。建立一个赏罚支付博弈模型 ,在经营管理者和股东的策略选择上 ,既赏又罚策略是一个纯策略纳什均衡     

风险企业股票期权类型选择机制研究

在风险企业的创业过程中,风险企业家和员工的人力资本在很大程度上决定着创业的成败,然而人力资本具有非共生性,需要用一定的激励机制来共化人力资本于风险企业的价值之中。定量分析体现股票期权激励效果的因素,以边际激励效果因子大小为选择股票期权类型的标准,来比较标准的股票期权计划和基于业绩要求的股票期权计划所产生的激励效果,为风险企业采用高激励效果的基于业绩要求的股票期权计划提供依据。     

Do Auditors Applaud Corporate Environmental Performance? Evidence from China

This paper examines the relationship between turnover among chief executive officers (CEOs) and corporate sustainability performance (CSP) by identifying the influence of two major types of succession to the top job (internal or external promotion) and the reasons for change. Our model also integrates the firm’s past prioritization of CSP and the impact of a company’s participation in the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI). Upper echelons theory and agency theory frameworks are adopted to understand CSP. Using an analysis of panel data for 88 public companies across 13 years in France, we find that a change of chief executive has a positive and significant effect on CSP 5 years after the change. This positive effect is stronger when the new CEO is recruited from outside the firm. The impact on CSP is invariably positive and significant, except for voluntary departures. The arrival of a new CEO affects CSP less when the firm has already achieved a high standard of CSP and participates in the GRI. These results are obtained after controlling CSP determinants already validated in the literature (financial performance, size, profitability, etc.). The findings show that expectations of CEOs are not solely economic and financial but also concern CSP. In terms of governance, they should prompt shareholders looking to strengthen CSP to choose new CEOs from outside the firm and to encourage the firm to participate in the GRI.     

公司财务治理模式机制创新若干问题初探

传统的财务治理模式忽略了债权人和股东的冲突以及经营管理者和股东的冲突,从而导致传统财务治理模式不能涵盖"债权人——股东——经营管理者"这一委托代理关系的全部,更不能达到有效治理的目的。为了保证企业治理程序的完善,应进一步加强和优化企业财务治理,建立相应的财务信号系统和财务评价体系,制定合理的相机治理程序,建立一个由有债权人参与的共同治理和有经营管理者参与的相机治理相结合的机制。     

Stock Option Repricing: Heads I Win, Tails You Lose

Recent scandals at Enron, WorldCom and Global Crossing have put the ethical spotlight on corporate malfeasance as never before. However, these are the situations in which management knew that they made the wrong choice. As professor Joseph Badaracco of Harvard Business School points out, the real ethical dilemmas arise when people must choose between right and right — where both choices can be justified, yet one must be chosen over the other. Whether or not to reprice stock options represents one such ethical dilemma. Repricing can help exodus of talented employees and motivate them to improve firm performance. However, it alienates shareholders and other workers of the company who are left unprotected from the adverse economic consequences of a stock price decline.In this paper we examine the ethics and the economics of stock option repricing. We find that repricing runs counter to two key tenets of business ethics — distributive justice and ordinary decency. To examine the economics of repricing, we draw upon agency theory to identify situations where repricing has the potential to benefit shareholders. However, a survey of empirical research reveals that these benefits do not translate into reality. Repricing does not improve employee retention or firm performance. In addition, managers benefit by opportunistically timing the repricing. Due to weaknesses in corporate governance such as lack of independence and conflicts of interest, the current repricing practice seems to be at odds with the objective of shareholder wealth maximization, and at a more fundamental level, a violation of board's fiduciary duty to shareholders. We offer suggestions that mitigate the ethically undesirable effects of repricing in the wider context of prevailing corporate governance and regulatory environment. We believe that these suggestions, if properly implemented, can transform repricing from a greed-inspired evil to a valuable compensation tool to retain employees, boost their morale, and enhance stockholder wealth.     

家族控股、终极所有权与企业绩效——来自我国上市公司的经验证据

借鉴Driffield等(2007)的研究方法,运用终极产权论追踪上市公司的终极控股股东,分析我国家族企业金字塔结构下的控股股东和终极所有权对企业绩效的影响。研究发现:第一大股东持股比例与企业绩效呈倒U型关系,第二至五大股东持股比例之和与企业绩效呈U型关系;家族上市公司的企业绩效与家族控股股东的控制权负相关,与现金流权正相关,与超控制权负相关;另外,家族上市公司的企业绩效与是否委派管理层负相关,与董事长与总经理是否合一负相关。同时,按家族控股股东的控制权大小分组检验也得到了类似的结论。     

政府最终控制、控股股东行为与财务报告透明度——中国A股市场上市公司的经验证据

以中国沪深两市A股上市公司2004—2006年间的2940个公司年度为样本,以财政部发布的《企业会计准则———基本准则》和FASB发布的第2号公告中的会计信息质量特征为基础,对财务报告透明度进行度量,分析政府最终控制、控股股东行为对财务报告透明度的影响。研究发现:控股股东掏空行为显著降低了财务报告透明度;国家最终控制的上市公司的财务报告更不透明,并且政府干预动机越强,财务报告透明度越低;财务报告透明度与最终控股股东的所有权比例呈U型变化,与其他股东的制衡能力呈同向变化。     

Do founders matter? A study of executive compensation,governance structure and firm performance

This study compares founder-CEOs and professional CEOs in newly public firms in terms of executive compensation, governance structure, and firm performance. The paper applies a series of decomposition methods to separate founders' extrinsic characteristics from their intrinsic endowments. The paper finds that founder CEOs tend to earn smaller incentive compensation and smaller total compensation than professional CEOs. Founder-managed firms are associated with higher financial performance and are more likely to survive than professional managed firms. Firms with founder-CEOs are associated with even higher financial performance when the position of CEO and chairperson of the board is combined.     

Competitive edge: A strategic management model

To assess a firm's strategic position, its managers must collect and interpret data regarding the firm itself, its competitors, its stakeholders, and the industry. Having implement a strategy based on that information, the managers further must measure that strategy's effect. The “competitive-edge model” presented in this article provides a series of questions to guide the strategic decision-making and data-collection process so that managers gain an explicit picture of what is happening with their firm, their competitors, and the industry. Equipped with the requisite information, managers can develop marker and non-marker strategies by matching internal resources with external opportunities. Market-based strategies seek to provide an advantage for the firm over its competitors by appealing to specific customer attributes. Non-market strategies take into account aspects of the environment not directly related to customers, including the actions of government, shareholders, and special interest groups.     

Institutional investors, shareholder activism, and earnings management

The widespread practice of earnings management adversely impacts the quality of financial reports and increases information asymmetries between owners and managers. The present study investigates the effect of shareholder activism (as expressed by the proxy proposals sponsored by shareholders), and monitoring by the largest institutional owner on earnings management. Our longitudinal analyses indicate that the number of shareholder proposals received by firms is positively related to subsequent earnings management, yet concurrently, monitoring by the largest institutional owners is negatively related to earnings management. Our findings shed light on the equivocal results reported by prior research regarding the impact of shareholder activism on firm performance, on one hand, and ownership monitoring and performance, on the other.