Random Advertising and Monopolistic Price Dispersion

We investigate the role of price advertising in a market where consumers are imperfectly informed about prices. We consider a monopolist whose demand depends on price and advertising expenditure. This demand function is derived from optimizing behavior of consumers. Uninformed consumers may pay a cost to visit the seller and obtain price information. Advertising enables the monopolist to increase the number of informed consumers. In equilibrium the uninformed consumers form rational price expectations, and the seller necessarily adopts a random pricing and advertising strategy.     

When (not) to indulge in ‘puffery’: the role of consumer expectations and brand goodwill in determining advertised and actual product quality

We analyze why some firms advertise product quality at a level different from the actual quality of a product. By considering the interacting effects of product quality and advertising, we develop a dynamic model of consumer expectations about product quality and the development of brand goodwill to determine the optimal values for the decision variables. The model parameters are determined based on prior literature and we use numerical techniques to arrive at the solution. We then derive conditions under which a firm will find it optimal to overstate or understate product quality. The results suggest that quality may be overstated in markets characterized by high price sensitivity, low quality sensitivity, low brand loyalty, and high source credibility, suggesting the need for vigilance on the part of consumers, upper level managers and regulatory authorities in such market conditions. This is important because current regulatory resources are insufficient to reduce deceptive advertising practices (Davis JJ. 1994. Ethics in advertising decision‐making: implications for reducing the incidence of deceptive advertising. Journal of Consumer Affairs 28 : 380–402). Further, the law of deceptive advertising prohibits some advertising claims on the ground that they are likely to harm consumers or competitors (Preston IL, Richards JI. 1993. A role for consumer belief in FTC and Lanham Act deceptive advertising cases. American Business Law Journal 31 : 1–29). Also, Nagler (1993. Rather bait than switch: deceptive advertising with bounded consumer rationality. Journal of Public Economics 51 : 359–378) shows that deceptive advertising causes a net social welfare loss and a public policy effectively preventing deception will improve social welfare. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Equilibrium price and advertisement distributions

We consider an economy where many sellers sell identical goods to many buyers. Each seller has a unit supply and each buyer has a unit demand. The only possible information flow about prices is through costly advertising. We show that in equilibrium the sellers use mixed strategies in pricing which leads to price and advertisement distributions. With convex advertising costs each seller sends only one advertisement in the market. We also delineate a class of advertising costs which ensures that sellers may send multiple advertisements in equilibrium. Higher prices are advertised more than lower prices.     

Advertising Media Planning,Optimal Pricing,and Welfare

This paper analyzes optimal media planning strategies in a pricing‐advertising competition model where firms can use mass and specialized advertising. We find that although targeted advertising avoids the wasting of ads, firms might find it optimal to mix specialized advertising with the mass media. We also show that the characteristics of the specialized media available crucially affect the outcome of price competition between firms, which can range from a full fragmentation of the market into local monopolies to lower average prices (compared to the case where firms had only mass advertising available). Regarding welfare, we prove that although the use of specialized advertising can lower consumer surplus and drive a fragment of consumers out of the market, this advertising technology is welfare‐improving, and can be Pareto superior.     

Strategic Buying to Prevent Seller Exit

We consider a dynamic oligopoly model in which a seller may drop out of the market when demand for its product is insufficient in the first period. Buyers suffer some disutility if a seller exits the market and so their first‐period purchase decision not only depends on current period preferences and prices, but also on the potential effect that their behavior has on the probability of seller survival. Specifically, some buyers may choose to purchase from the seller with the lower survival probability even though they like the other seller's product better, a behavior that we call “strategic buying.” We analyze how the incidence of strategic buying depends on parameters and also the implications of the strategic buying motive for sellers' first‐period pricing decisions.     

When Is Advertising a Signal of Product Quality?

A model of advertising is presented in which consumption experience is an imperfect indicator of product quality. In equilibrium, neither price nor advertising signal the quality of newly introduced goods. Advertising of established products can be a signal of quality, but if it is, it must be an imperfect signal leaving residual uncertainty that influences consumers' repurchase decision. A set of observable implications follow.     

Advertising a second-price auction

This study examines a symmetric private-value second-price auction model in which the seller solicits bidders at a cost, sets a reserve price, and receives a payoff which is a convex combination of revenue and welfare. The bidder’s valuations are drawn from a distribution with a decreasing hazard rate and non-decreasing virtual valuations. We find that at equilibrium the seller adopts an advertising policy which minimizes the uncertainty over the number of participants, and sets a reserve price which only depends on the distribution of valuations and the weight on revenue in the objective function. A welfare-maximizing seller is shown to advertise more than a revenue-maximizing seller, and a ceteris paribus increase in the advertising level is proved to increase the expected winner’s rent.     

Information provision and consumer search behavior for products with asymmetric uncertainty

When selling multiple products with asymmetric uncertainty, should the seller disclose product information so that customers do not have to incur any cost to resolve their uncertainties; if so, which product should the seller choose? To address these questions, we consider a monopolist selling two substitutable products to a group of consumers. Each consumer has asymmetric uncertainty regarding the two products. A total of four different information provision structures are considered based on whether the seller discloses information about each product with the aim of determining which strategy provides the seller with the greatest revenue. We derive several interesting results. First, the optimal information provision strategy depends on the magnitude of uncertainty in relation to the product with lower uncertainty. Specifically, if the uncertainty regarding the product with lower uncertainty is sufficiently small, it is optimal for the seller to provide information about the product with higher uncertainty, otherwise, the seller should provide information about both products. Second, when only one product's information should be revealed, it is optimal for the seller to choose the product with higher uncertainty and charge a higher price. Third, withholding information on both products is never optimal for the seller. Finally, our main model is extended by examining the Mean-Preserving Spread setting, and the robustness of our main results is confirmed. Furthermore, we examine the situation in which a monopolist sells a single product with two main attributes. We find that each of the four information provision strategies can be optimal under various scenarios.     

Production quality and pricing strategy for substitutable products under comparison effects

Comparison effects have been studied extensively in many fields. In particular, existing operations management articles have discussed the impact of comparison effects on enterprises' production and pricing decisions. Research has also shown that consumers' purchasing decisions are primarily determined by three factors: product quality, selling price, and comparison effects. The current study introduces the concepts of social and temporal comparison effects to examine how comparison effects influence a monopolist’s production quality and pricing strategy for substitutable products. Results reveal the following: (1) Setting different prices for even two types of substitutable products with negligible quality differences can divide customers into three groups under the influence of social comparison effects in a single-stage model. (2) The monopolist should avoid using a price discrimination strategy in which products with a short market life cycle have the same quality but different prices. (3) When the market life cycle of products is sufficiently long in the single-product market and the market with two substitutable products, the monopolist’s optimal choice in the second stage is to keep production quality constant and increase the selling price. Consequently, the number of buyers does not decrease because of temporal comparison effects. Therefore, the firm increases its revenue. (4) For the market with two substitutable products with quality differences, one approximate optimal strategy for the enterprise in the second stage is to keep the selling price constant with the assumption that product quality cannot be adjusted after the first period. At this point, the consumption situation in the market is the same as that in the first stage. Therefore, when no external constraints exist, the monopolist firm can obtain more benefits in the second stage than in the first stage by exploiting the temporal comparison effects of consumers in the second stage. (5) When consumer identity information can be confirmed in the market, social comparison effects, similar to temporal comparison effects, could help the enterprise increase its price and profit while maintaining product quality. These social and temporal comparison effects constrain consumers. Thus, the number of people who continue to buy products does not decrease.     

First price package auction with many traders

This paper studies a first price package auction in which multiple sellers participate in addition to multiple buyers. We generalize the notion of the profit-target strategy which is first introduced as a truthful strategy in a first price package auction with a single seller by Bernheim and Whinston (1986b). We then show that the set of equilibrium payoffs in profit-target strategies is equal to the bidder-optimal core, and is also equal to the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria. Using this result, we find that any equilibrium payoff vector is weakly Pareto-dominated by the VCG payoff vector for buyers, and that the Walrasian competitive equilibrium payoff vector is weakly Pareto-dominated by some equilibrium payoff vector for buyers, even if goods are substitutes. This contrasts with the first price package auction with a single seller, in which it is shown that if goods are substitutes, then those three outcomes are payoff-equivalent.     

With a Little Help from My Enemy: Comparative Advertising as a Signal of Quality

We extend the theory of advertising as a quality signal   using a model where an entrant can choose to advertise by comparing its product to that of an established incumbent. Comparative advertising, comparing quality of one's own product to that of a rival's, empowers the latter to file for court intervention if it believes the comparison to be false or misleading. We show that comparative advertising can be a signal in instances where generic advertising is not viable.     

Optimal auctions and information disclosure

We characterise properties of optimal auctions if the seller may disclose information about the quality of the object for sale. We show that the seller maximizes his expected revenue by revelation of all information to all bidders and implementing a second price auction with appropriate reservation price.     

Price and Money-Back Guarantees as Signals of Product Quality

Why is it so common for the seller to provide guarantees that say “Satisfaction guaranteed or your money back” along with the sale of a product? Newly introduced goods and mail-ordered products are usually sold with such guarantees. In honoring money-back guarantees, why is it a common business practice to pay back exactly the purchase price rather than a portion of it? In this paper we study the informational role and optimality of the common business practice of money-back guarantees in a signaling model with quality uncertainty and risk-neutral buyers. We find that money-back guarantees and price together completely reveal a monopoly firm's private information about product quality, Moreover, the private information is revealed at no signaling cost. Furthermore, we show that in terms of the level of monetary compensation specified by a guarantee, price is the profit-maximizing level of monetary payback in case of product failure.     

存在消费者搜寻的双寡头企业广告竞争模型

针对泰勒尔（1997）广告竞争模型中不允许消费者搜寻这一问题，应用两阶段博弈模型，建立了一个存在消费者搜寻的双寡头广告竞争模型，模型中的消费者具有偏好异质性，且搜寻成本企影响企业产品价格和广告水平。结果表明，在发现成本高的情况下，均衡是两企业定价水平相同，广告水平则随消费者保留值的增大先增大再减小。     

Product Rivalry with multiple Strategic weapons: an Analysis of price and advertising Competition

A dynamic model of product rivalry is developed for a market in which firms choose price and advertising intensity. The model, a state-space game, is implemented using data that consist of weekly price, sales, and promotional activity for four brands of saltine crackers sold by four chains of grocery stores in a small town. A number of questions can be asked of this data. First, is advertising predatory (merely changing market shares) or cooperative (shifting out market demand)? Second, are price and advertising own and cross-strategic complements or substitutes? And finally, do investments in stocks of goodwill and in price reductions make firms tough and aggressive or soft and accommodating?     

Group Buying Commitment and Sellers’ Competitive Advantages

This paper examines a model of duopoly firms selling to an exogenously formed buyer group consisting of members with heterogeneous preferences. Two research questions are addressed: (1) when is it optimal for a buyer group to commit to exclusive purchase from a single seller, and (2) how does the presence of group buying and the exclusive purchase commitment associated with it affect firms’ incentives to invest in quality improvement? We find that, even though exclusive purchase commitment benefits buyers when the competing products provide similar quality, it may lower buyer surplus if one product is significantly advantaged and/or the competing products are not highly differentiated horizontally. This result is robust even if the buyer group is formed endogenously. In addition, contingent on the similarity between the competing sellers’ investment costs, the sellers’ incentives to improve quality may be positively or negatively affected by the presence of group buying.     

Depreciation,adverse selection and housing markets

Implications of incomplete buyer and seller information on product quality are considered for the durable goods market. Hypotheses on price paths over a working life for durables of a given vintage are formulated. Some empirical results for single-family dwellings are used to test the hypotheses.     

Advertising and Coordination in Markets with Consumption Scale Effects

Many advertised products are established and have little quality variation. For these products advertising signaling explanations are unconvincing. We develop a coordination model of advertising with consumers observing ads probabilistically and never observing advertising levels. Consumers who fail to see an ad for a product believe it will likely have low sales and so be of low value. Firms advertise to avoid these beliefs. The model's predictions on advertising, market share, and profitability are consistent with observed outcomes. The model produces the time series behavior for prices and market share observed in the data and not available from existing coordination models.     

Equilibrium pricing and advertising strategies for nondurable experience products in a dynamic duopoly

The quality of many consumer nondurable goods or services is sufficiently complex or obscure that consumers cannot completely verify the true quality in a single usage. For such ‘experience’ products or services, the accumulated consumer consumption experience of a brand is an important determinant of its sales or market share. The market share of a brand is in turn directly influenced by its own and the competitive price and advertising strategies, given the different levels of quality (among other factors). In this paper, we investigate the impact of the aggregate consumption experience on the firm's dynamic pricing and advertising strategies by developing a formal game-theoretic model of a dynamic duopoly. The model of competition does not yield explicit closed-form expressions for the dynamic price and advertising paths of the two firms. Hence, we simulate the equilibrium paths using a discrete-time algorithm. Our simulation results provide interesting insights into the dynamic equilibrium price and advertising paths, under a variety of realistic competitive scenarios.     

Common-value auction versus posted-price selling: an agent-based model approach

Previous theoretical work has compared a private-value auction and posted-price market, and an affiliated-value auction and a posted-price market to determine the selling method preferred by sellers. Much less, however, is known about the seller’s preferred selling method when the buyers have a common value of the item. Our objective is to determine if a first-price auction or a posted-price market provides a seller with the larger expected revenue when buyers have a common value of the item being sold. An agent-based posted-price market and an agent-based first-price common-value auction with a reserve price are developed to compare these selling methods. Holding the buyers’ uncertainty about the value of the item constant, the seller prefers the posted-price market when the seller has no uncertainty about the item’s value. When the seller has an equal level of uncertainty as the buyers, the seller’s expected revenue for each market is similar. As the seller’s uncertainty increases beyond the level of the buyers’ uncertainty, the auction with a reserve price eventually becomes the preferred choice.