民间借贷的法律规制

民间借贷在我国历史已久,但是限于我国垄断金融体制的影响,民间借贷一直处于灰色边缘,不被法律所认可与保护,但民间借贷的先天优势的存在让其发展势不可挡,关于民间借贷的合法化阳光化的呼吁声也越来越高,本文就民间借贷的合法发展前景予以展开讨论,并提出一些列对民间借贷合法化的法律规制的建议。     

黑龙江省民间借贷规制效率研究

民间借贷规制的制约因素包括信息不对称、金融风险以及政策和行政约束.黑龙江省民间借贷规制效率主要受借贷资金用途、亲缘关系和居民收入影响,其中亲缘关系的影响较大.提出弱化政治及行政约束,降低信息不对称性;加强民间借贷监管,防范金融风险;深化民间借贷组织与正规金融机构合作等对策建议,以有效提高黑龙江省民间借贷规制效率.     

民间借贷风险的法律规制研究

民间借贷作为一种金融活动,在我国社会经济生活中扮演着相当重要的作用。由于民间借贷特有的隐蔽性、随意性等特征,易于产生多种法律风险。目前我国的法律法规对于企业之间借贷、利率的合法化、借贷民刑衔接等问题的规定与现实生活严重脱节,制约了民间借贷向着规范化、合法化方向发展。应该明确企业借贷的合法性,同时放宽利率的管制,通过制定符合民间借贷发展规律的法律法规,使得民间借贷真正成为助力经济发展的关键。     

互联网背景下民间融资的规范化发展

近年来,民间融资问题一直是金融领域乃至全社会的重点关注问题。互联网与民间融资的结合导致交易主体、交易价格机制和交易工具的变化,对互联网背景下民间融资的监管既不适用对正规金融机构的监管制度,也不适用对传统民间借贷的监管制度,应从性质上对传统民间借贷和互联网金融进行划分,不同性质采取不同的规制和监管方法,严格规制和监管属于正规金融业务的范畴,引导和鼓励纯粹民间金融的发展。     

民间借贷的法律规制研究

民间借贷在我国广泛存在,但是在法律上没有对其进行详细的规定,也没有纳入金融监管体系,所以通过分析民间借贷的法律性质、规制原则,从其问题入手提出法律规制方面的建议,给予民间借贷合法的地位,将有利于降低民间借贷的风险性,促进市场经济的发展。     

规范和引导民间金融健康发展研究

民间金融作为我国信用体系中的一种非正规信用形式,长期以来,由于一直没有合法身份,始终处于地下活动状态.随着我国经济的发展和金融体制的改革,民间金融合法化、阳光化的呼声越来越高.据悉,国家即将通过立法形式确定民间借贷的合法地位,民间借贷合法化已初见曙光.本文运用民间金融的发展机理,分析了民间金融合法化的剁与弊,并对如何规范和引导民间金融的健康发展提出建议.     

民间借贷的激励性法律规制

随着社会经济的快速发展,民间借贷开始越来越活跃,并且呈现出一种组织化、规模化以及跨区域化的特点。民间借贷的存在与活跃必然会对金融行业产生严重的影响,而且还会影响到政府的宏观政策调控,影响市场发展规律以及社会的稳定。所以近些年来政府也采取了很多措施对民间借贷进行法律上的规制,但是整体上来说这些法律规制都是基于打击、禁止等层次,民间借贷给金融、市场以及社会带来的不利影响依旧没有得到削减。文章从激励性法律规制的角度去谈论民间借贷,在分析民间借贷法律规制现状的基础上,重点阐述激励性法律规制的重要作用,以及如何采取激励性法律规制。     

浅析我国民间借贷的法律规制

民间借贷在我国存在已久,已成为许多中小企业发展的重要资金来源,但长期以来国家出于民间借贷风险的担忧和金融安全的考虑,对民间借贷采取严格的管制政策,使得民间借贷始终徘徊在"灰色地带"。本文分析了民间借贷的特征及我国民间借贷法律规制方面所存在的问题,并提出了我国民间借贷法律规制的完善建议。     

让民间借贷阳光化

随着温州老板纷纷跑路,＂吴英案＂一审再审等事件纷纷进入公众视线,民间借贷成为公众和国家的重要关注对象,同时也引人深思,为何中国的民间借贷总是难以与非法集资划清界限？本文试图通过解析民间借贷混乱的原因,探寻一条让民间借贷阳光化、合法化地道路。     

有关民间借贷法律法规之现状及立法建议

随着金融自由化的深入,民间借贷作为正规金融的补充正以不可比拟的优势迅速促进中小企业的发展。但由于民间借贷法律体系的不完善,民间资本所有者的正当权利得不到全面的保护,为社会主义市场经济的平稳运行带来了潜在的危险。解决我国民间借贷问题离不开法律的引导,对民间借贷的立法提出如下对策:选择重点规制的路径;对民间借贷主体进行规制;对民间借贷利率进行管制;对民间借贷资金来源进行限制;对民间借贷活动的监管。     

Government Lending and Monetary Policy

The financial dimension of the current contraction has brought a historic expansion in government lending to financial market participants, mostly through an expanding array of Federal Reserve (Fed) initiatives. This contrasts with the Fed's typical response to recent recessions that has been limited to adjustments of the target Fed funds rate. Restrictions on credit supply and declines of creditworthiness have both contributed to the contraction in lending, although the latter cause has probably been underestimated relative to the former. Fed and other government lending programs have targeted particular sectors, altering the allocation of credit across markets. Also, targeted credit programs contribute to the moral hazard problem inherent in the provision of government-funded credit or guarantees. An alternative approach to monetary policy where the Fed funds target is essentially zero is purchasing Treasuries, which is likely to have little effect on the relative credit spreads on different financial instruments. However, given that targeted lending has taken place, it is critical that regulatory mechanisms be installed so that government regulation matches the scope of government support. Also, targeted lending by the Fed is in effect fiscal policy. Is this a legitimate role for a central bank, or should such lending be subject to legislative approval, with the Fed's role limited to monetary stability?     

环境管制、产品质量与企业收益——兼论污染罚金政策的使用效率

本文引入消费者效用函数、政府环境管制成本函数、企业生产成本函数,研究了环境管制对企业产品质量和利润的影响。研究表明:(1)在政府财政收入最大化的条件下,政府对企业征收污染罚金是不会让污染生产的企业退出市场的;(2)在政府财政收入最大化、消费者效用最大化和企业利润最大化的均衡条件下,政府征收污染罚金时,会降低产品环境质量;(3)政府加大罚金力度会提高生产清洁产品企业的净收益,而降低生产污染产品企业的净收益,并且清洁生产企业的利润比污染生产企业的利润高;(4)政府如果放弃财政收入最大化目标,对清洁生产的企业予以激励,对污染的企业在说服教育的基础上采用创新弃权书的管制方式,否则即对其征收罚金,这样会使两类企业都进行清洁生产。这些结论表明政府对污染生产企业征收罚金时,重在引导教育并建立激励型生态补偿制度,注重政策的使用效率。     

民间借贷的制度缺失与法律规制

民间借贷作为正规金融的补充,对解决中小微企业的资金短缺起到了积极作用。由于立法滞后,法律依据不足,逐利、欺诈、违约、无序充斥着本不成熟的民间借贷市场,给金融稳定和经济安全带来了一系列负面效应,亟需法律规范和引导。当务之急是要构建法律体系,净化营业环境,完善准入标准,建立预警机制,尽快将民间借贷导入法制化轨道。     

Official bailouts,moral hazard and the ‘speciality’ of the international interbank market

We analyse the evolution of emerging market loan spreads at a more disaggregated level than other studies on the subject, providing statistical support to the assumption of the ‘speciality’ of the international interbank market, to the extent that the pricing of interbank credit is insensitive to the nature (public or private) of the borrower. In sharp contrast, the public or private nature of other borrowers, such as corporates or financial firms, causes significant differences in spreads. These results could be interpreted as evidence of the possible role played by implicit government guarantees in the international interbank market, which lower the incentives for participants to monitor counterpart risk very closely. Furthermore, the specificity of banks is witnessed by the fact that only spreads on loans to emerging market banks have clearly declined following the 1995 Mexican bailout, whereas evidence on the pricing of lending to corporates and financial firms is more ambiguous. Although, on the one hand, this might support the view that financial assistance from the IMF gives rise to moral hazard, on the other hand, contrary to expectations, spreads on loans to Asian banks, among the major candidates in the current policy debate on moral hazard, have been unaffected by the IMF's response to Mexico's crisis.     

Basic analytics of multilateral lending and surveillance

I analyse the role of multilateral financial institutions in a world of global capital markets assuming that they have an informational advantage over private lenders in the market for sovereign debt. I show that the adverse selection problem in this market may be solved through certification if the multilateral agency does not care too much about borrower country welfare. However, with lending the private information of the agency will be revealed whatever its weighting of borrower welfare vs. private lenders' profits. Multilateral lending on concessional terms also alleviates the moral hazard problem — that investment in creditworthy borrowers is reduced as private lenders seek to avoid ex post default by constraining credit.     

The Moderating Influence of Financial Market Development on the Relationship between Loan Guarantees for SMEs and Local Market Employment Rates

We empirically examine whether a major government intervention in the small firm credit market yields significantly better results in markets that are less financially developed. The government intervention that we investigate is Small Business Administration (SBA) guaranteed lending. After controlling for the appropriate cross‐sectional market characteristics, we find that SBA guaranteed lending has a significantly more positive impact on the average annual level of employment when the local market is relatively less financially developed. This result has important implications for public policy directives concerning where SBA guaranteed lending should be directed.     

Private capital flows, capital controls, and default risk

What has been the effect of the shift in emerging market capital flows toward private sector borrowers? Are emerging market capital flows more efficient? If not, can controls on capital flows improve welfare? This paper shows that the answers depend on the form of default risk. When private loans are enforceable, but there is the risk that the government will default on behalf of all residents, private lending is inefficient and capital controls are potentially Pareto-improving. However, when private agents may individually default, capital flow subsidies are potentially Pareto-improving.     

激励规制、市场势力与接入定价——以电信业为例

政府规制的目标是矫正市场失灵,不当的规制方案会限制市场竞争活力,阻碍技术创新.本文将规制机构、厂商和消费者纳入到激励相容框架下,通过考察信息约束条件下的接入定价问题,解释了产品的需求价格弹性、政府转移支付、税收政策、技术创新和网络外部性与接入定价的关系,引申出主导性厂商市场势力的来源及激励性接入定价政策,得出电信监管部门实施对网间结算费的直接规制,没有减弱市场势力,反而抑制了主导性厂商提高接入质量和研发创新.     

中国房地产市场过热与风险预警

从消费与投资两方面来说，1998年以来中国房地产市场的快速发展仅是以往“存量需求”的释放，而不是潜在需求真正地转化为有效需求。这一过程又主要依赖于银行信贷的支撑和代际收益的转移，这自然导致了中国房地产市场的虚假繁荣和价值的严重高估，造成房地产市场资产价格与价值的严重背离和房地产泡沫的出现。面对中国房地产价格快速飚升的威胁，为了避免房地产价格波动影响金融稳定以及国内经济的未来发展，首先要从金融体系的稳定性入手，建立房地产价格失衡预警指标体系、建立金融体系与宏观经济失衡的预警指标并提高金融机构风险测量能力。同时政府要在土地政策、信贷政策、税收政策和住房政策等方面采取积极的应对措施。     

Financial sector development and access to finance. Does size say it all?

This paper analyzes what features of financial systems can strengthen the linkages between banks and economic development. We investigate whether a set of banking and capital market characteristics can improve the ability of banks to provide increased credit flows to the private sector, while simultaneously improving financial inclusion for the poor. We analyze the determinants of both macro-level lending conditions and micro-level access to finance using a set of Panel Vector Error Correction Models and GMM estimations in a panel of 138 countries for the 2002–2009 time periods. Results converge to suggest that rather than focusing solely on banking sector size, financial policy should seek to foster inter banks competition, develop appropriate macro-prudential safeguards, promote capital market development. In addition, improved access to finance requires adequate civil rights and support to entrepreneurship.