Efficiency measurement when producers control pollutants: a non-parametric approach

This paper treats efficiency measurement when some outputs are undesirable and producers control pollutants by end-of-pipe or change-in-process abatement. A data envelopment analysis framework that compares producers with similar pollution control efforts is proposed. First, my approach avoids arbitrary disposability assumptions for undesirable outputs. Second, the model is used to evaluate the interplay between pollution control activities and technical efficiency. I compare my approach to the traditional neo-classical production model that does not incorporate undesirable outputs among outputs, and to Färe et al.’s (Rev Econ Stat 71:90–98, 1989, J Econom 126:469–492, 2005) well-known model that incorporates bads. I evaluate the common assumption in the literature on polluting technologies, that inputs are allocatable to pollution control, and apply U.S. electricity data to illustrate my main point: Although my empirical model specifications are in line with the literature on polluting technologies, they rely on inputs that play an insignificant role in controlling nitrogen oxides (NO_x) emissions. Consequentially, there are no reasons to expect the efficiency scores of the traditional model to differ from the efficiency scores of the other two models that account for resources employed to pollution control. Statistical tests show that my model, which explicitly takes pollution control efforts into account, produces efficiency scores that are not statistically different from the traditional model’s scores for all model specifications, while Färe et al.’s model produces significantly different results for some model specifications. I conclude that the popular production models that incorporate undesirable outputs may not be applicable to all cases involving polluting production and that more emphasis on appropriate empirical specifications is needed.     

The weighted average cost of capital is not quite right: Reply to M. Pierru

In this journal [Miller, R. A. (2009). The weighted average cost of capital is not quite right. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49, 128–138], I argued that the standard WACC formula is inadequate in most circumstances to reward stockholders and bondholders where the necessary cash flows are calculated separately to exactly cover the respective costs of capital. Axel Pierru [2009. ‘The weighted average cost of capital is not quite right’: A comment. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49, 1219–1223] observes correctly that my assumed repayment schedules (equal periodic payments to bondholders; similarly for stockholders) imply a temporal drift in the debt (or leverage) ratio; he would recalculate the WACC annually. He proposes an alternative calculation of the repayment schedules under the constraint of a constant debt ratio. Here I suggest three additional possible repayment schedules; in general repayment schedules determine the drift in the debt ratio. However, the expected repayment schedules are established at the time the project is accepted and financed, hence the relevant debt ratio is that which exists at that time. The WACC for a specific project need not (and should not) be recalculated for that project throughout its financial life when that project has already been accepted and financed.     

Experiencing Change in German Controlling – Management Accounting in a Globalized World

Abstract

In this study, I consider the effects of tax risk from tax volatility on the pricing of syndicated debt. Tax volatility is an interesting feature in that managers have some discretion over the risks they take with their tax strategies, which, however, are often harder to monitor for outsiders than risks related to other business activities. Framing my predictions based on the theoretical model developed by Merton [1974], I hypothesize and find that tax volatility is incrementally informative to other priced risks suggesting that tax risks per se are relevant to lenders. Moreover, I find that the results are stronger when the loan contract does not include performance pricing provisions or other restrictions, such as capital expenditure covenants, that protect lenders. This evidence adds to knowledge about the real effects of tax risk.     

On the design and efficiency of a participating growth bill

A Participating Growth Bill (PGB) is an innovative hybrid financial vehicle employed by Western institutions and governments in lieu of short-term debt instruments. This study proposes PGB to be considered as an alternative way of raising funds for open market operations by the governments of Muslim countries constrained by religious regulations against fixed-interest debt (ribawi) financing. The security (PGB) is developed using partial equilibrium analysis under the assumption that the assets backing the financial package do not trade in a secondary market—a situation which invalidates the risk-neutral pricing of the well-known Black and Scholes (1973) model. The study finally demonstrates the efficiency of a PGB over a conventional (ribawi) debt vehicle thereby providing results contrary to assertions of the (i) Capital Structure Irrelevance Theorem (see Modigliani and Miller, 1958) and (ii) Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) (see Sharpe, 1964).     

“The weighted average cost of capital is not quite right”: A rejoinder

Richard Miller's reply (2008) to my comment (2008) on his claim (2007) that the standard WACC formula fails to correctly remunerate shareholders and bondholders raises crucial questions on the nature of the project's debt that he considers in his calculations. To clarify this point, I here introduce several possible definitions of a loan associated with a project, and discuss their respective relevance for a WACC calculation. In addition, Mr. Miller's suggestion that the standard WACC formula is not quite right remains unsubstantiated.     

Limited arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for the existence of an equilibrium

In Chichilnisky (Working Paper No. 586, 1991), Chichilnisky (Working Paper No. 650, 1992) and Chichilnisky (Economic Theory, 1995, 5, 79–108), I introduced the concept of a global cone and used it to define a condition on endowments and preferences, ‘limited arbitrage’, which I showed to be necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium. In response to a comment (Monteiro et al., Journal of Mathematical Economics, 1997, 26, 000-000), I show here that the authors misunderstood my results by focussing on brief announcements which cover other areas, social choice (Chichilnisky, American Economic Review, 1994, 427–434 and algebraic topology (Chichilnisky, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society, 1993, 29, 189–207), rather than on the publication which contains may proofs on equilibrium. The comment's example is irrelevant to my results in Chichilnisky (Economic Theory, 1995, 5, 79–108) because it starts from different conditions. Limited arbitrae is always necessary and sufficient for the existence of a competitive equilibrium, with or without short sales, with the global cones as I defined them, and exactly as proved in Chichilnisky (Economic Theory, 1995, 5, 79–108).     

The US debt–growth nexus along the business cycle

We use the US data gathered by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) to assess whether debt affects economic growth differently at different phases of the business cycle. In order to do that, we extend the threshold regression model of Chudik et al. (2017) and propose a new threshold quantile ARDL regression model. Our results show that to stimulate growth policy makers can manage the debt/GDP percentage according to how well the economy is doing. The estimated quantile thresholds (range 31–53 per cent) are larger than the one found by Lee et al. (2017) using median regressions, but still (much) smaller than the 90 per cent of Reinhart and Rogoff. In particular, when the US economy observes growth rates above their median value, that is when a smaller debt-to-GDP threshold affects the performance of the economy. In a steady-state situation, in general, regardless of the position of the business cycle and whether the debt-to-GDP ratio is below or above its threshold effect, less debt as a percentage of GDP boosts the US growth. Remarkably, this effect was always greater before than after World War II. Moreover, the most recent decades have witnessed the negative (positive) effect of more (less) debt when the economy had growth rates at their first quartile (median and third quartile). That is, the US policy makers are advised to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio during expansions to promote growth.     

Determinants of financial distress and bankruptcy in highly levered transactions

Prior literature on highly levered transactions (levered buyouts or levered recapitalizations) has emphasized either changes in governance or the structuring of their financing in helping these firms avoid financial distress or bankruptcy. Observing a sample of HLTs over time, we observe that debt composition is a more critical influence than proposed changes in governance for the likelihood of an HLT avoiding financial distress or bankruptcy. Such evidence is consistent with the [Chemmanur, T. & Fulghieri, P. (1994). Reputation, renegotiation, and the choice between bank loans and publicly traded debt. Review of Financial Studies 7, 475–506] model and suggests that the critical factor is the ability to informally renegotiate debt terms with a few lenders.     

The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: A defense

It is shown that the Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering appears as a very natural solution to the problem of defining social preferences over distributions of divisible goods. The paper analyses various ways of deriving this social ordering from minimally egalitarian conditions and informational parsimony requirements.Received: 10 October 2003, Accepted: 4 April 2005, JEL Classification: D63, D71This paper was written while I was a research fellow at the ZiF (Bielefeld), for the project “Procedural Approaches to Conflict Resolution”, and the last version was prepared during my sabbatical year at Nuffield College, Oxford. I thank my hosts for their hospitality. D. Dimitrov and F. Maniquet have provided valuable comments on an earlier draft. I also thank the audience of a seminar at the U. of Montreal. Finally, the comments of three anonymous referees and the Associate Editor have been very helpful.     

Government debt,learning and the term structure

Does a change in the public׳s holdings of government debt affect the term structure of interest rates? Empirical analysis using a VAR model indicates that a rise in these holdings of the real debt-to-GDP ratio increases both the three-month and ten-year U.S. nominal yields in a statistically significant manner. The maturity composition of debt is also found to matter: innovations in holdings of long-term debt affect the term structure, while increases in short-term debt affect inflation expectations. These effects of changes in holdings of debt on the yield curve can be derived in a general equilibrium model in which the government issues exponentially-maturing riskless debt, financed by lump-sum taxes, and the optimizing agents are adaptive learners. On calibrating the average maturity of debt in the model to match that of U.S. Treasury debt since the 1980s, I find that positive innovations in government debt lead to increases in asset yields. This is because agents do not learn the principle of Ricardian equivalence exactly, and perceive increases in holdings of government bonds as a rise in their net wealth. Imposing rational expectations on the agents eliminates this channel, and changes in holdings of government debt have no effect on yields. The learning model also implies that as the real debt-to-GDP ratio increases, and the average maturity of debt becomes longer, the agents become less likely to learn that Ricardian equivalence holds.     

Risky allocations from a risk-neutral informed principal

We study a model of informed principal with private values where the principal is risk neutral and the agent is risk averse. We show that the principal, regardless of her type, gains by not revealing her type to the agent through the contract offer. The equilibrium allocation transfers some ex-ante risk from one type of agent to the other. Despite the increase in the principal's surplus, allocative efficiency does not necessarily improve. Received: 26 January 2004, Accepted: 5 May 2005 JEL Classification: C72, D23, D82 I would like to thank my supervisor Leonardo Felli for suggestions and Leo Ferraris for helpful discussions. All remainig errors are my own.     

Growth, control and tensions in an open socialist economy

Persistent contradictions among growth, efficiency and equilibrium in East European countries are analysed in our theoretical model. Internal and external tensions are distinguished. Both types of tension diminish the efficiency of investment and of foreign trade, moreover, they modify macrodistributional shares. Competing growth strategies are compared achieving constant internal and/or external tensions. A simple numberical macromodel is constructed to be used in computer simulations.Special thanks are due to J. Kornai for introducing me to the topic through joint research. I am in great debt to J. Burkett for his contribution to the econometric analysis of a related model and for his penetrating comments on the present paper. My colleagues Zs. Kapitány, L. Halpern, J. Király, G. Körösi, M. Lackó, B. Martos and J. Vincze, have never tired of helping me with their comments. Finally, I acknowledge the help of an anonymous referee. Of course, any remaining error is exclusively mine.     

Discussion

I thoroughly enjoyed reading the article by Bhadra et. al. (2020) and convey my congratulations to the authors for providing a comprehensive and coherent review of horseshoe-based regularization approaches for machine learning models. I am thankful to the editors for providing this opportunity to write a discussion on this useful article, which I expect will turn out to be a good guide in the future for statisticians and practitioners alike. It is quite amazing to see the rapid progress and the magnitude of work advancing the horseshoe regularization approach since the seminal paper by Carvalho et al. (2010). The current review article is a testimony for this. While I have been primarily working with continuous spike and slab priors for high-dimensional Bayesian modeling, I have been following the literature on horseshoe regularization with a keen interest. For my comments on this article, I will focus on some comparisons between these two approaches particularly in terms of model building and methodology and some computational considerations. I would like to first provide some comments on performing valid inference based on the horsheshoe prior framework.     

Managerial succession and organizational performance—evidence from the German Soccer League

It has been widely studied how organizational performance changes after the replacement of managers. However, there is little evidence whether environmental changes moderate the efficiency of management replacements. In this paper, I explicitly consider the effect of a change in the environment of organizations on post‐replacement effects. Analyzing the performance effect of coach replacements in the German Soccer League before and after the introduction of the 3‐points‐rule theoretically and empirically I find that the magnitude of the performance effect of coach replacements differs under alternative regimes. The empirical analysis confirms predictions from my theoretical model and identifies moderating effects. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Debt and Development

This paper examines incentive and valuation effects of debt financing on land investment. When land is debt financed, the landowner holds both a development option on the land and a default option on the debt. Because development typically devalues the default option, investment may be delayed past the point at which efficient investment would otherwise proceed. The incentive to underinvest is shown to be more pronounced as debt level increases, i.e., as the debt becomes riskier. This agency problem provides an explanation as to why land is generally difficult to debt finance and may also explain why debt levels are relatively low for “land-intensive” real estate firms. Novel comparative statics show that debt value may increase for a given increase in asset volatility as well as for a given increase in interest rate. Renegotiation and restrictive contract provisions are considered as mechanisms to promote efficient investment policy in the presence of debt financing.     

Rejoinders to the comments on my paper “Performance measurement and joint production of intended and unintended outputs”

I will comment on the comments by the groups of three reviewers separately. First of all, I will thank all three groups providing a first round of reports in order for me to get rid of obvious mistakes. In the second round the reviewers were free to comment on the qualities of my revised version. I am not to change my revised paper when giving my comments on what would be honest reports on the quality of my final version. However, the reviewers will not have a go at my rejoinders to comments according to the symposium rules. I keep the section numbering of the authors in order to make it easier to identify the arguments.

     

A channel model of investment decision: An intertemporal planning approach

The paper considers some theoretical implications of the Oslo-Cairo intertemporal planning model (the channel model). A version of the channel model with private and public investment projects is developed. The optimality properties of the model are derived. It is shown that: (i) Pareto solution can be supported by competitive prices and (ii) a ranking criterion can be constructed in the spirit of cost-and-benefit analysis. The results brings the channel model theoretically in line with the classical resource allocation models.This paper is a revised and abridged version of Chapter Two of my doctoral dissertation at the University of Kansas. I wish to thank Professor Mohamed El-Hodiri, Chairman of my thesis committee, for his guidance and support and for introducing me to the theory of optimal control with delays. I would also like to thank Professors Van Vleck, Paul Comolli, David Burress and Tom Weiss for their helpful suggestions. The paper has benefited substantially from the comments provided by anonymous referees. I remain responsible for all errors and inaccuracies.     

On the possibility of efficient bilateral trade

I study a sequential process in which different pairs of traders bargain over the terms of trade of an indivisible good. I consider bothone-sided andtwo-sided offers based bargaining at the stage-game level. The sequential process is modelled as an infinite stage-game of incomplete information and the paper studies the efficiency properties of its equilibria. It is shown: With one-sided offers, all equilibria are long-run ex post efficient; with two-sided offers, examples of equilibria are constructed with widely varying efficiency properties. This paper is based on Chapter 1 of my Ph.D thesis.     

Recombination in digital innovation: Challenges,opportunities, and the importance of a theoretical framework

In this article I argue that the quest to establish digital innovation as a research domain is hindered by three challenges. As digital innovation research we are too often: a) reifying the agency of digital innovation actors; b) developing explanations of digital innovation detached from the specifics of digital technology, and c) developing overly specific explanations of digital innovation. I begin by providing a brief overview of the recombination perspective and considering why this perspective holds great appeal in the digital age. I then engage with Henfridsson et al.'s (2018) value spaces framework as a platform for framing value creation and value capture in relation to recombination in digital innovation. Next, I push Henfridsson et al.'s arguments one step further to discuss them in relation to what I consider to be the key challenges for digital innovation research. Illustrating with some of my own recent projects, I suggest that in order to fully address these challenges we need to (1) develop explanations of digital innovation acknowledging the complexity of sociomaterial interaction in digital innovation; (2) develop explanations of digital innovation building on the specifics of digital technology, and (3) develop explanations of digital innovation based on an oscillation between the specific and the general. The article concludes by pointing to future challenges and developments for digital innovation research.     

A Two‐Stage Double Bootstrap DEA: The Case of the Top 25 European Football Clubs' Efficiency Levels

This paper analyzes how European football clubs' current value and debt levels influence their performance. The Simar and Wilson (J Econometrics, 136: 31–64, 2007) procedure is used to bootstrap the data envelopment analysis scores in order to establish the effect of football clubs' current value and debt levels on their obtained efficiency scores. The results reveal that football clubs' current value levels have a negative influence on their performances, indicating that football clubs' high value does not ensure higher performance. At the same time, the empirical evidence suggests that football clubs' debt levels do not influence their efficiency levels. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.