Linking strategy and human resource practices: How employee and customer contracts are created

Organizations implement their business strategies through the human resource (HR) practices they use. These practices are major determinants of employees' psychological contracts. How employees interpret the terms of their employment impacts motivation, innovation, and customer service. This article describes four common types of psychological contracts in US firms and the HR practices that create them. It develops a framework for understanding how each contract shapes employee performance, retention, cooperation with fellow employees and customer responsiveness. It presents recommendations for more effectively managing the link between business strategy and the psychological contract of employees. © 1994 by John Wiley & Sons, Inc.     

Psychological contracts and change

The concept of psychological contracts is not new, but its popularity among managers is relatively recent. As with most interpersonal structures, we don't know we need it until it is gone. The massive amount of organizational change that took place in the 1980s left damaged relationships in its wake. Implementing changes while discounting human needs played havoc with psychological contracts. Organizations lost something they had taken for granted. As leaders realized they didn't just need more efficient processes and technology in order to compete, but also needed motivated people, psychological contracts became an important topic. Unfortunately the concept was often used as just another technique to try to force people to become what their leaders thought they should be. Psychological contracts aren't very useful for that kind of work. They are much better as a tool for understanding the human needs and problems in an organization—including the needs of the change agents and leaders.     

Limited Liability and Bonus Contracts

This paper studies the nature of incentive contracts between a risk-neutral principal and a risk-neutral agent under the constraint that the agent's liability is limited. A necessary and sufficient condition is derived for the existence of a first-best contract under this constraint, and a bonus-based contract is shown to be the most efficient contractual form. Implications of bonus contracts are also discussed.     

Payer Competition and Cost Shifting in Health Care

This paper studies a model in which two payers contract with one hospital. True costs per patient are not a possible basis for payment, and contracts can only be written on the basis of allocated cost. Payers choose a contract that is fully prospective or fully based on cost allocation, or a payment scheme that would give some weight to each of these two. We characterize the payers'equilibrium contracts arid show how in equilibrium hospital input decisions are distorted by the payers' incentives to engage in cost shifting. Two cost-shifting incentives work in opposite directions, and equilibrium can be characterized by too little or too much care relative to the socially efficient level.     

What effect does uncertainty have on the length of labor contracts?

The literature on duration of explicit labor contracts has suggested that increased uncertainty should be associated with shorter labor contracts. More recently, it has been argued that the effect of uncertainty on contract duration depends on the type of uncertainty involved. Specifically, if the uncertainty pertains to aggregate real shocks, then contract durations should increase as workers seek to insure themselves against the repercussions of such shocks. Using a sample of 1876 labor contracts signed during the period 1977–1988, this paper provides an empirical test of the foregoing hypothesis (known as the efficient risk sharing hypothesis). The paper presents results from estimation of a generalized-probit, simultaneous equation model, in which the dependent variables are contract length, indexation of the contract through a cost-of-living allowance, and the rate of wage change specified in the contract. The empirical findings confirm the efficient risk sharing hypothesis.     

Contract employment policy and research productivity of knowledge workers: an analysis of Spanish universities

Abstract

This article investigates how contract employment practices adopted by universities—fixed-term contracts and permanent contracts—impact research productivity measured in terms of publications in scholarly journals. The empirical application considers the Spanish public higher education system for the period 2002–2008. We report an inverse U-shaped relationship between the rate fixed-term contracts and the research productivity of Spanish universities. That is, contract policies based on fixed-term contracts are conducive to research productivity; however, beyond a critical threshold value increases in the proportion of fixed-term contracts are associated with declining research productivity. These findings reveal that contract employment policies shape research productivity, and that flexible and balanced contract practices are critical for enhancing universities’ research productivity. The results suggest that the excessive use of fixed-term contracts might create an unstable working environment that limits the universities’ capacity to capitalize on their knowledge workers. Policy implications and future research avenues are discussed.     

Long-Term or Short-Term Managerial Incentive Contracts

This paper deals with the strategic role of the temporal dimension of contracts in a duopoly market. Is it better for a firm to sign long-term incentive contracts with managers or short-term contracts? For the linear case, with strategic substitutes (complements) in the product market, the incentive variables are also strategic substitutes (complements). It is shown that a long-term contract makes a firm a leader in incentives, while a short-term contract makes it a follower. We find that, under Bertrand competition, in equilibrium one firm signs a long-term contract and the other firm short-term incentive contracts; however, under Cournot competition, the dominant strategy is to sign long-term incentive contracts.     

Contract research and high-tech alliances: Vistas for future studies

This research note addresses the governance structure of innovation processes in high-tech alliances, focusing on the content and role of formal contracts. Contract research is strongly heterogeneous, that is, many different paradigms, concepts, definitions and measures exist. We discuss the most important aspects of contract research and primarily argue that future research needs to pay ample attention to the interpretation of contracts, as the written contract might be just a standard form written by lawyers who are not directly involved in the high-tech alliance. We also propose a wide view of contracts and emphasize that contracts might have different functions depending on the role that the contract plays in the relationship. In so doing, we review the most common research methods, i.e., surveys, meta-studies and longitudinal case studies, and suggest that the latter offer the most promissory opportunities for future alliance contract studies.     

IT Contract Flexibility and Negotiator Incentives

Information Technology outsourcing contracts are plagued by inflexibility. We develop an economic model to explain how the contract negotiator's incentives influence contract flexibility. We show that neither wage nor one‐time commission type pay gives any preference for flexibility. However, a promotion incentive, where the bonus is an ongoing bonus, does give the negotiator a preference for less flexible contracts. The preference for less flexible contracts increases as the discount rate increases. The preference for less flexible contracts increases as the number of competitors for the promotion increases. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Interim Information in Long-Term Contracts

We study how long-term contracts condition on a natural flow of information that reduces asymmetric information over time. If such interim information is verifiable, optimal contracts achieve the first best. Under nonverifiability, the optimal contract depends on the signal's accuracy and timing. Introducing signal manipulation as a parameterization of verifiability reveals a trade-off between accuracy and manipulability. Signals that are accurate, received early, or hard to manipulate enable the principal to extract all rents and adjust allocations closer to the first best. Imprecise, late, and manipulable signals affect only future allocations and leave rents to efficient types.     

Inflation forecast contracts

We introduce a new type of incentive contract for central bankers: inflation forecast contracts, which make central bankers׳ remunerations contingent on the precision of their inflation forecasts. We show that such contracts enable central bankers to influence inflation expectations more effectively, thus facilitating more successful stabilization of current inflation. Inflation forecast contracts improve the accuracy of inflation forecasts, but have adverse consequences for output. On balance, paying central bankers according to their forecasting performance improves welfare. Optimal inflation forecast contracts stipulate high rewards for accurate forecasts.     

Subjective performance of patent examiners,implicit contracts,and self‐funded patent offices

Self‐funded patent offices should be concerned with patent quality (patents should be granted to only deserving innovations) and quantity (as revenues come from fees paid by applicants). In this context, we investigate what is the impact of the self‐funded constraint on different bonus contracts and how these contracts affect the examiners' incentive to prosecute patent applications. We consider contracts in which a patent office offers bonuses on quantity quotas (explicit contract) and on quality outcome (either an implicit contract or an explicit contract based on a quality proxy). We find that a self‐funded constrained agency should make different organization choices of incentives. For a low quality proxy precision, an agency facing a tight budget operates well with implicit contracts. However, by only relaxing moderately the budget constraint, the agency might be worse off simply because this will preclude implicit contracts. Only very large patenting fees might allow the agency to compensate for the loss of implicit contracts.     

Debt contracts and cooperative improvements

In this paper, we consider a dynamic game with imperfect information between a borrower and lender who must write a contract to produce a consumption good. In order to analyze the game, we introduce the concept of a coalitional perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium (cPBNE). We prove that equilibria exist and are efficient in a precise sense, and that deterministic contracts that resemble debt are optimal for a general class of economies. The cPBNE solution concept captures both the non-cooperative aspect of firm liquidation and the cooperative aspect of renegotiation.     

Creating Psychological and Legal Contracts Through HRM Practices: A Strength of Signals Perspective

We integrate the concept of signaling theory to propose that organizations create psychological and legal contracts through their human resource management practices (HRM). Focusing on the strength of the signal generated by HRM practices, we develop a framework for contract creation. Specifically, we define and outline how weak signals generate psychological contracts and strong signals develop legally binding contracts. We provide several examples of HRM hiring practices, the weak and strong signals which they emit and the psychological and legal contracts which they create. Our key contribution is to provide a precise model for understanding the distinction between a psychological and legal contract.     

Monthly rent with variable deposit: A new form of rental contract in Korea

In this paper, we describe the structure of the monthly-rent-with-variable-deposit (MRVD) contract, a distinct type of rental contract in Korea. We demonstrate that the Chonsei contract is one variant of the MRVD contract. To explain the MRVD contract, we propose a leverage-effect-seeking hypothesis. Based on this hypothesis, we are able to elucidate a variety of rental market conditions in Korea. Our hypothesis is consistent with the simultaneous existence of several types of rental contracts and various combinations of monthly rent, as well as the up-front deposit in the MRVD contracts. We also focused on the deposit-to-monthly-rent conversion rate, a critical factor in the Korean rental housing market. Our hypothesis indicates that conversion rates vary across local markets depending on local market conditions, such as the expected house price appreciation rate. The results of our data analysis demonstrate that our hypothesis more adequately explains the observed trend in the conversion rate, as well as that in the MRVD contracts.     

需求受定购数量影响的供应链合同设计问题

本文针对一类市场需求受定购影响的问题提出了最佳合同设计问题。现实生活中上网卡或者高档消费品等特殊商品，数量卖的过多，顾客对该商品的评价下降，从而购买量也会相应下降，因此零售商需要考虑如何制定定购数量和合同形式使得自身利益最大。经对目前各种合同形式的研究，发现buy-back合同是最合适的合同形式，它能够达到供应链最佳协调的效果并能实现利润在供应链伙伴间任意分配。     

Efficient venture capital financing combining debt and equity

I present a model of venture capital contracting in which contracts that involve a mixture of both debt and equity are efficient and dominate pure-equity and pure-debt financing. The optimal contract balances the venture capitalist's incentive to intervene in the project and the entrepreneur's desire for control. Received: 9 September 1997 / Accepted: 3 April 1998     

Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion

Regulators often do not regulate all firms competing in a given sector. Due to product substitutability, unregulated competitors have incentives to bribe regulated firms to have them overstate their costs and produce less, thereby softening competition. The best collusion-proof contract entails distortions both for inefficient and efficient regulated firms (distortion ‘at the top’). But a contract inducing active collusion may do better by allowing the regulator to ‘team up’ with the regulated firm to indirectly tax its competitor. The best such contract is characterized. It is such that the unregulated firm pays the regulated one to have it truthfully reveals its inefficiency. We finally compare those contracts.     

Scale development and validation of Transaction Cost Economics typology for contracts: A systems thinking approach

A variety of contract typologies that exist in the literature are helpful in the exploration of different approaches in contractual relations, but only when measured with the right instruments. Although Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) has a distinct, high-level, and abstract typology for contracts, it still lacks a measurement scale. In this paper, a measurement scale for the TCE contract typology (classical, neo-classical, and relational contracts) was developed and validated, using systems thinking approach and experimental design to contribute to the empirical tests of TCE within the contracting realm. First, the antecedents of contract selection within the TCE literature were analyzed using the systemigram technique to visualize and parse out complex relationships that lead to contract selection. The analysis of the TCE Systemigram helped the development of the scale and revealed the need to revisit the risk neutrality assumption embedded in TCE. Second, a measurement scale for the TCE contract typology (classical, neo-classical, and relational contracts) was developed adhering to the original texts of seminal papers and reviews from the TCE literature. Third, the 14-item measurement scale was validated using a series of three vignette-based experimental studies.Key messageThis research explores the antecedents of the TCE contract typology and develops a measurement scale for essential characteristics of classical, neo-classical, and relational contracts, as defined in TCE, using systems thinking approach and a novel vignette-based experimental design.