Equilibrium binding agreements under diverse behavioral assumptions

Summary. This paper extends the work of Ray and Vohra [3]. It ascertains which partitions of players will emerge and what actions will these players choose under each partition, when they can sign binding agreements and their actions have externalities. The emphasis, however, is placed on situations with multiple outcomes and how agents behave in the presence of such multiplicity. In particular, a deviating coalition considers all the likely outcomes that may prevail upon its deviation, and selects (if possible) a subset of them. Three augmentations of Ray and Vohra's [3] solution concept are defined, capturing three distinct behavioral assumptions. Efficiency of and the relation between the three notions are discussed. Received: October 9, 2001; revised version: April 22, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" I wish to thank Licun Xue, Joseph Greenberg and the participants of PET 2000 for very helpful suggestions. I am indebted to an anonymous referee for his/her valuable comments. The paper has been previously circulated under the title Binding Agreements.     

Renegotiation–Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient

In a two-country model, in which countries differ with respect to the perception of environmental damages and abatement costs, the stability of international environmental agreements is analyzed in a dynamic framework. Three types of agreements are considered: A socially optimal solution, a uniform emission tax (a tax equally applied in both countries) and a uniform emission reduction quota (an equal percentage emission reduction from a base year). Stability is checked for these agreements according to the concept of renegotiation-proofness. It is shown that the stability requirements depend crucially on the parameters defining the interests of the two countries and the type of agreement. Moreover, it is demonstrated that if punishment options are restricted for some reason the stability of an agreement may suffer. One important result of the paper is that if countries exhibit asymmetric interests, stability in the quota regime is higher than in the tax regime and in the social optimum. This might explain why emission reduction quotas have been so popular in international politics despite recommendations of economists to use market-based instruments.     

股份制公司兼并中补偿机制的非完全性问题研究

本文讲座股份公司之间进行兼并的效率问题。提出股份制下,公司兼并过程中,即使允许贿赂,无论是大股东还是经理决策,部分帕累托最优的兼并区域仍不能实现。也就是说,在股份制下,“金降落伞”补偿机制的非完全性是不可避免的。     

Endogenous fertility and modified Pareto-optimality

In a world of endogenous fertility, where the number of descendants is an integral part of the economic allocation, the traditional concept of Pareto-optimality cannot be applied any longer: the number of individuals to be present on earth may vary between any two allocations we wish to compare. Therefore, the concept needs to be modified in order to give new life to the discussion of economic efficiency. This work introduces a straightforward variation of the Pareto-principle and characterizes the optimality of economic allocations according to this concept. It is shown that some of the well-known traditional results on intertemporal optimality do no longer hold. In particular, lump-sum tax instruments (or the rearrangement of initial endowments) are no longer a sufficient tool to achieve efficiency. Received: March 2003, Accepted: September 2005 This work has greatly benefitted from comments by Oded Galor, Karl Shell, Vasco Santos and an excellent anonymous referee. Many thanks to the Editor of this Journal for providing an impeccable refereeing process. Support by the European Union via the Human Capital and Mobility Grant #ERBCHBICT941218 is gratefully acknowledged.     

The role of strategic uncertainty in games: An experimental study of cheap talk and contracts in the Nash demand game

We utilise results from a human-subjects experiment to examine the connection between strategic uncertainty and outcomes in games. Our basic game is a Nash demand game where one player has an outside option available. A “chat” treatment allows bargainers to send cheap-talk messages prior to playing the basic game, and in a “contracts” treatment, they can additionally propose and accept binding contracts. We propose that strategic uncertainty comprises at least two facets: “coordination-type”, which is lower in the chat game than in the basic game, and “rationality-type”, which is lower in the contracts game than in the chat game. We find that both types of strategic uncertainty impact bargaining outcomes: moving from the basic game to the chat game, and thence to contracts, improves several aspects of outcomes, such as higher efficiency, less opting out and less under-demanding. Other results include a treatment effect on the types of agreements that are reached.     

区域产业生态系统组织成员间的竞合协同进化研究

从生态学视角来看,在同一区域内相互关联的组织成员构成了区域产业生态系统,对其研究主要是分析该系统内产业组织的演化,即关联成员之间的竞争与合作协同进化。构建了成员竞合协同进化模型,并以两个成员竞合协同进化为例,运用微分方程定性知识以及数值仿真对该模型的稳定性进行分析,所得到的一些结果为模拟以及预测区域产业生态系统的组织结构演化提供了理论依据,有利于进一步揭示在区域产业生态系统中组织成员之间竞争与合作协同进化发展的内在机理。     

Social and solidarity economy and social and solidarity commons: Towards the (re)discovery of an ethic of the common good?

This research poses the ethic of the common good and the institutions of the social and solidarity economy (SSE) as the foundation of commoning practices. Specifically, it illustrates how the latter may contribute to regenerating the commons, fostering open and shared access to key productive resources and essential goods and services. The analysis focuses on social and solidarity commons (SSC), defined as all those relational practices that contribute to the accumulation and regeneration of human and social (as well as other types of) critical capital. To achieve this research goal, this study collected new and old issues debated in the academic literature concerning the geographic nature of commons and their juridical and economic treatment within socioeconomic disciplines. Then, a historical overview of the commons highlights their dynamic and multifaceted nature and illustrates how they have often been co‐owned and co‐governed according to shared rules and norms. Within this general framework, SSC are introduced, and a role for the institutions of the SSE is proposed to foster an ethic of the common good as a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for expanding and enforcing people's participation in commoning practices.     

Self-enforcing International Environmental Agreements with Costly Monitoring for Compliance

Theoretical analyses of international environmental agreements (IEAs) have often employed the concept of self-enforcing agreements to predict the number of parties to such an agreement. The term self-enforcing, however, is a bit misleading. The concept refers to the stability of cooperative agreements, not to enforcing compliance with these agreements once they are in place. In this paper we analyze an IEA game in which parties to an agreement finance an independent monitor who audits the compliance performance of the members of an agreement. These audits reveal instances of noncompliance so they can be sanctioned. We find that costly monitoring of compliance limits the circumstances under which international cooperation to protect the environment is worthwhile, but when IEAs do form they will often involve greater participation than IEAs that do not require costly monitoring. Consequently, costly monitoring of IEAs can produce higher international environmental quality. Moreover, under certain conditions, aggregate welfare is higher when IEAs require costly monitoring.      

共性技术下异质企业对学研方合作行为的演化博弈仿真分析

共性技术因其在技术创新链条中的基础性地位和对相关产业集群创新的巨大拉动效应,受到各国政府的广泛重视,而产业共性技术创新必须依靠政府指导下、不同产业共同参与的“产学研”合作模式,运用两群体模仿者动态微分方程,分析了在不同情景下分别来自新兴产业和成熟产业的两类异质企业间与学研机构合作研发共性技术的演化博弈过程和稳定策略,并运用数值模拟对理论命题逐一进行仿真验证,最后得出结论与启示。     

合作研发的影响因素——来自中国企业的经验研究

本文重点检验了技术溢出、研发目标对合作研发的影响。研究发现：合作研发与输入溢出具有显著的正相关关系;就输出溢出而言,水平溢出会抑制企业问的合作（包括水平合作和垂直合作）,而垂直溢出却会促进企业间的垂直合作,且这种积极作用不会受到水平溢出的影响;研发目标对企业问合作研发模式选择也具有显著影响,当企业旨在提高研发成果的成功率和利用率时,更倾向于选择垂直合作;当企业进行重大技术开发或重大创新时,更倾向于选择水平合作。     

Model uncertainty and the rationality of economic policy

This paper examines the process of economic policy-making under conditions of model uncertainty. A median voter model is introduced in which the electorate is uncertain of the policy measures available as well as their respective outcomes and opinion formation is a social process of communication and contagion. Learning from experience is also considered. It is shown that economic policy-making under uncertainty produces novel policy routines, but that a mechanism of efficiently utilising the generated knowledge is missing.JEL Classification: D78, D83, H73     

产业技术创新战略联盟稳定性影响机制研究 ——一个合作机制视角的多案例探索性分析

以3个产业技术创新战略联盟案例为样本,运用扎根理论的三阶段编码方法,从联盟合作机制视角,构建产业技术创新战略联盟稳定性影响机制模型,对联盟稳定性进行多案例探索性研究,得出以下命题：运行机制、控制机制、激励机制和整合机制共同构成产业技术创新战略联盟的长效合作机制,该四维机制作为联盟运行的机制保障,有助于提升产业技术创新战略联盟稳定性;政府政策能强化联盟合作机制对联盟稳定性的促进作用。结论可为战略联盟长效合作机制构建以及政府政策制定提供理论依据和参考。     

Competition, cooperation, and the neighboring farmer effect

In this paper we propose a model that explains how cooperation can emerge spontaneously between firms in a highly competitive market environment. The basic idea is that the more competitive is the market, the less costly it is for firms to help each other like good neighbors. Cooperation takes the form of sharing technical know-how, which speeds up the adoption of new technologies (normally developed elsewhere) that spur industrial development. The model comports with the development history of Japan's first example of successful industrial development – its cotton spinning industry – whose conditions match those of firms in small open economies today.     

近15年国家科技进步奖获奖成果科研合作分析

以2000-2014年国家科技进步奖获奖成果为数据源,对获奖成果完成人员之间以及完成机构之间的科研合作状况进行了分析。结果表明,96%的获奖成果是通过人员间合作完成的,并以10人合作完成的成果最多; 76%的获奖成果是通过机构间合作完成的,且合作机构数量越多,获奖成果数越少;随着年代的推移,跨机构科研合作的趋势日益明显;以清华大学和浙江大学为代表的一流高校,是高水平科研合作网络的核心节点。     

An assessment of the Europe agreements’ effects on bilateral trade, GDP, and welfare

The so-called Europe Agreements had been enacted in the 1990s to initiate the integration of goods markets between the 15 EU incumbent economies as of 1995 and 10 potential entrants located in Central and Eastern Europe. This paper evaluates the trade, GDP, and welfare effects of these agreements by means of structural analysis of a bilateral trade flow model. The results support three conclusions. First, the agreements exerted significant positive effects on goods trade between the EU15 incumbents and the CEEC and, at the same time, they induced trade redirection from other countries. Second, EU15 GDP responded by an increase of much less than 1% while that in the 10 CEEC increased by several percent in response to the agreements. Third, the effects on welfare were moderate in the EU15 but amounted to more double-digit percentage changes in the involved CEEC.     

On the Theory and Diplomacy of Environmental Treaty-Making

International cooperation can be looked at in two ways: as a process and as an outcome. This paper shows how the process of treaty-making can affect treaty outcomes and how treaty design can change the rules of the game of international cooperation.     

产学研合作网络均衡性与有效性问题研究

在产学研合作中,由于合作网络拓扑结构的不同,产学研合作的各主体收益和总体收益也不一样。采用纳什均衡博弈和图论相结合的方法,构建网络拓扑图,图形中圆圈为各参与主体、边为各主体与其它主体的合作关系、收益函数为其效用函数,展开合作网络的均衡性和有效性分析。研究发现：均衡性方面,在线性收益函数条件下,纳什均衡网络或者是完全不连通网络,或者是最小连通网络,并分析得到了产学研合作网络符合严格纳什均衡网络所需满足的参数条件;有效性方面,在线性收益函数条件下,有效性网络也或者是完全不连通网络,或者是最小连通网络,并满足有效性网络所需的参数条件;通过比较纳什均衡网络和有效性网络的参数条件,归纳出3种不同情况。     

不同产学研合作模式的利益分配研究

针对3种不同类型的产学研合作模式,建立基于分成因子的利益分配模型。通过模型的求解,揭示不同产学研合作模式的利益分配机制,并对不同产学研合作模式的利益分配进行比较,得出结论:在3种不同类型的产学研合作模式下,学研方的利益分成均在合作整体利益的三分之二及以上。从社会整体福利最大化的角度,产学研合作双方采取紧密型合作模式,通过共同组建经济实体可以实现最终产品市场的Pareto均衡。但由于共同经济实体的组建、运营与管理比其它合作方式更为复杂、困难更多、难度更大,因此产学研合作双方对是否采用这种合作模式都非常慎重。与松散型的技术转让方式相比,尽管企业在较紧密型产学研合作方式下的利益分成有所减少,但可以实现更为重要的战略目标。所以委托开发、合作开发、技术许可等较紧密型的产学研合作方式成为学研方与企业进行合作的主体模式。