交易操纵型盈余管理研究述评

由于会计准则的弹性空间日趋收紧,交易操纵型盈余管理逐渐引起主流学术界的重视。本文首先从交易操纵型盈余管理的性质、动机和手段三个方面来系统梳理相关研究,然后分析相关实证研究中的计量问题,并探讨交易操纵型盈余管理的经济后果及其约束机制,最后在梳理相关文献的基础上展望未来研究方向,以期推动交易操纵型盈余管理研究。     

交易操纵型盈余管理研究述评

由于会计准则的弹性空间日趋收紧,交易操纵型盈余管理逐渐引起主流学术界的重视。本文首先从交易操纵型盈余管理的性质、动机和手段三个方面来系统梳理相关研究,然后分析相关实证研究中的计量问题,并探讨交易操纵型盈余管理的经济后果及其约束机制,最后在梳理相关文献的基础上展望未来研究方向,以期推动交易操纵型盈余管理研究。     

会计准则的经济后果与盈余管理

会计准则的经济后果与盈余管理存在着密切的关系。由于会计准则具有经济后果，因而会计准则制定与执行中出现了大量的盈余管理行为。要遏制盈余管理，就要完善会计准则的制定机制，尽可能地保证会计准则的公平与有效执行。     

浅析会计准则与盈余管理的关系

本文主要讨论会计准则与盈余管理的关系,来说明会计准则与盈余管理是相互矛盾,也是相互影响的。     

浅析企业盈余管理动机及盈余管理方式

本文较系统地分析了盈余管理的动机、盈余管理方式,为解决盈余管理问题提供对策.     

盈余管理与上市公司所得税税负关系的文献综述

本文系统的回顾了盈余管理与上市公司所得税税负关系的文章，并进行了相关的评论，希望能够为后续的研究提供参考。     

浅析影响管理者运用真实盈余管理与应计盈余管理两种方式的因素

盈余管理是管理当局在遵循会计准则的基础上,通过对企业对外报告的会计收益信息进行控制或调整,以达到主体自身利益最大化的行为。而盈余管理又有真实盈余管理与应计盈余管理之分。本文将重点讨论管理者如何在这两种方式中进行抉择,在什么情况下管理者会更倾向于使用真实盈余管理而何时又会较多的使用应计盈余管理。     

上市公司盈余管理动机研究介绍

上市公司的盈余管理动机十分复杂，以往的献普遍地将盈余管理视为机会主义行为，近期的研究发现了盈余管理的其他一些动机，比较典型的有降低的交易成本的动机、获得比较业绩优势的动机以及对市场预期做出理性反应的动机等。也就是说，上市公司即使不存在委托一代理问题，仍然可能存在基于其他动机的盈余管理行为。这意味着，这些非机会主义动机会加剧上高龄的盈余管理。     

上市公司盈余管理研究

上市公司盈余管理不仅是一个会计问题还是一个复杂的社会问题。它需要社会各相关部门联合起来进行系统的研究和治理，以保证我国证券市场和国民经济的健康发展。本文通过研究与盈余管理相关的理论，追寻它背后的动机，分析新会计准则实施后的盈余管理行为，探讨现状和存在的问题，进一步探求解决对策。     

库存管理模型文献综述

库存管理是物流活动的重要组成部分,如果库存管理不当,企业将负担巨大的库存成本。文章主要根据需求性质,从需求的确定性和随机性角度来分析前人关于库存管理的研究成果,得出现在库存管理存在的问题及其将来可能的发展方向。     

管理控制和绩效管理关系的文献综述

管理控制是绩效管理的理论基础，而绩效管理则是企业实施管理控制的一种手段，从管理控制的角度分析绩效管理的设计思想和方法是研究上的一种创新，也将给实际工作带来一定的借鉴意义。随着组织工作方式以及对人性假设认识的变化．管理控制的基本思想经历了从简单控制、结构控制到协和控制的演变，绩效管理体系的设计也随之发生变化。     

数字化转型对上市公司真实盈余管理的影响研究

基于 2013-2019 年的中国 A 股上市公司年度数据,研究了数字化转型对上市公司真实盈余管理的影响,研究发现：（1）数字化转型提高了上市公司真实盈余管理水平。（2）从公司内部治理角度,在管理持股比例较高、机构持股比例较低的情况下,公司数字化转型对真实盈余管理的影响显著。（3）外部监督中,审计机构为非国际四大事务所的上市公司进行真实盈余管理的动机更强,而媒体关注和分析师关注对上市公司在数字化转型中的真实盈余管理没有约束作用。（4）从公司性质的角度,非国有企业和制造类企业在数字化转型中进行真实盈余管理的动机更强。结论在使用双重差分法和滞后期解释变量控制内生性及进行稳健性检验后依然成立。研究丰富了研究数字化转型过程的相关文献,同时为资本市场监管机构提供了一定的建议。     

Auditor Sensitivity to Earnings Management*

Abstract. Generally accepted auditing standards, auditing textbooks, and firm audit manuals indicate that, other things equal, the presence of significant monetary incentives based on financial results increases the inherent risk of material misstatement, and higher inherent risk should ordinarily cause the auditor to exercise a heightened degree of professional skepticism in conducting the audit. This article addresses the following basic research question: Are auditors sensitive to management's incentives to manage earnings? Research that examines whether auditors distinguish between explanations provided by managers with different incentives is important because audit standards indicate that inquiry of management can assist the auditor in evaluating significant unexpected differences. Two experiments were conducted. The first experiment explored whether management-buyout-induced incentives to make income-decreasing accruals affect auditors' judgments of the probability that a material misstatement exists. As predicted, auditors were sensitive to these incentives. The second experiment explored whether bonus-induced incentives affect auditors' judgments of the probability that a material misstatement exists. The auditors agreed that bonus plans such as the one in the experiment create incentives for management to make income-increasing or income-decreasing accruals depending on the terms of the plan. However, the auditors' judgments were unaffected by whether the unexpected difference and management's incentives were congruent. The auditors opted for potential audit effectiveness rather than potential audit efficiency by assuming that—on balance—management had incentives congruent with the unexpected overstatement. Résumé. Selon les normes de vérification généralement reconnues, les manuels de vérification et les guides de vérification des cabinets comptables, toutes choses égales par ailleurs, la présence d'encouragements monétaires substantiels basés sur les résultats financiers accroît le risque inhérent d'inexactitudes importantes, et un risque inhérent supérieur doit normalement amener le vérificateur à exercer davantage de vigilance dans la réalisation de sa mission de vérification. L'auteur s'intéresse à la question fondamentale suivante: les vérificateurs sont-ils sensibles aux motivations de la direction à user d'astuces comptables aux fins de l'établissement des bénéfices? Les recherches visant à déterminer si les vérificateurs établissent une distinction entre les explications fournies par les gestionnaires dont les motivations sont différentes revêtent beaucoup d'importance, compte tenu du fait que les normes de vérification indiquent que les demandes de renseignements de la direction peuvent aider le vérificateur à évaluer les écarts inattendus appréciables. Deux expériences ont été menées. La première avait pour but de déterminer si les motivations à agir sur les comptes de régularisation de manière à réduire les bénéfices, induites par un rachat de l'entreprise par les cadres, ont une incidence sur les jugements des vérificateurs relatifs à la probabilité d'inexactitudes importantes dans les déclarations. Conformément aux prévisions, les vérificateurs se montrent sensibles à ces motivations. La seconde expérience visait à déterminer si les motivations induites par les primes ont une incidence sur les jugements des vérificateurs en ce qui a trait à la probabilité de l'existence d'inexactitudes importantes. Les vérificateurs conviennent que les systèmes de primes, comme celui de la seconde expérience, motivent la direction à agir sur les comptes de régularisation de façon à augmenter ou réduire les bénéfices, selon les conditions du système. Toutefois, les jugements des vérificateurs ne sont pas influencés par le fait que l'écart inattendu dans les bénéfices et la motivation de la direction sont reliés. Les vérificateurs optent pour l'efficacité potentielle de la vérification plutôt que pour son efficience potentielle, en supposant que, dans l'ensemble, la direction présente des motivations qui vont dans le sens des surestimations inattendues en matière de bénéfices.     

Career Concerns and Management Earnings Guidance

This study provides evidence that managers' career concerns affect their earnings guidance decisions. We hypothesize that CEOs who are relatively more concerned about assessments of their abilities have stronger incentives to guide the market expectations of earnings downwards to increase the likelihood of meeting or beating the expectations. Consistent with this hypothesis, we find that (i) short‐tenured CEOs, CEOs promoted from inside the firm, and nonfounder CEOs are more likely to provide downward earnings guidance when they have bad news, and (ii) their downward guidance tends to be more conservative. In response, analysts revise earnings forecasts less for the downward guidance provided by more career‐concerned CEOs. This indicates that analysts rationally incorporate these CEOs' stronger incentives to be conservative in their earnings guidance. Consequently, we find that CEOs with greater career concerns are not more likely to beat the market expectations, even when they provide more conservative downward guidance.     

Earnings Management under Price Regulation*

Price controls¹ have a major impact on firms' earnings and cash flows. Because price control regulation is costly to firms, it is a type of regulatory intervention that can impact a firm's accounting decisions (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978). Thus, regulatory changes that give firms relief from price controls provide incentives for earnings management. This paper examines discretionary accruals made by New Zealand manufacturing firms in response to two sets of regulations issued in 1971 and 1972. These regulations allowed manufacturing firms to apply for price increases to gain relief from financial hardship caused by the 1970 Price Freeze Regulation. Using a modified accruals mode! that adjusts for price-level movements, the paper tests discretionary accruals of two samples of manufacturing firms and one control sample of nonmanufacturing firms. The results provide evidence of income decreasing discretionary accruals by manufacturing firms for the years during which they could apply for price increases. The control firms do not exhibit significant discretionary accruals in 1971 or 1972. Also, this paper provides evidence that failing to adjust for price-level movements in high inflationary periods could result in inferences of income decreasing discretionary accruals where none may exist.     

Earnings Management to Avoid Losses and Earnings Decreases: Are Analysts Fooled?*

This paper explores whether analyst forecasts impound the earnings management to avoid losses and small earnings decreases documented in Burgstahler and Dichev 1997, whether analysts are able to identify which specific firms engage in such earnings management, and the implications for significant forecast error anomalies at zero earnings and zero forecast earnings. We use data from Zacks Investment Research 1999 and find that analysts anticipate earnings management to avoid small losses and small earnings decreases. Further, analysts are much more likely to forecast zero earnings than firms are to realize zero earnings, and analysts are unable to consistently identify the specific firms that engage in earnings management to avoid small losses. This latter inability contributes to significant forecast pessimism associated with zero reported earnings and significant forecast optimism associated with zero earnings forecasts.     

Ex Ante Severance Agreements and Earnings Management

This research studies whether severance agreements may reduce fraudulent earnings management, and whether severance pay mitigates executives’ career concerns. In a sample of large U.S. firms, those with higher severance pay are less likely to be subject to accounting and auditing enforcement releases (AAERs) by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Among S&P 500 firms in the post‐SOX period with premanaged earnings below analyst forecasts, firms with higher severance pay are less likely to meet/beat the analyst forecast using abnormal accruals. Overall, these results suggest that fear of losing a lucrative severance package, and/or the insurance offered by such a package curbs earnings management.