Asymmetric access price regulation in telecommunications markets

In liberalized telecommunications markets, the incumbent typically enjoys several advantages over any entrant. Regulation in such asymmetric markets stimulates competition in the short and the long term if retail prices are low and the entrant's profits are high so that entry is encouraged. I show that asymmetric access price regulation with a cost-based access price for the incumbent and an access markup for the entrant is more successful than cost-based access price regulation applied to incumbent and entrant. This is a robust prediction with respect to the pricing strategies considered. Such asymmetric access price regulation is in accordance with European legislation.     

Access charges under two-tier pricing

This article analyzes the regulation of access charges in a liberalized postal market where operators use two-tier pricing. It develops a model of vertical product differentiation that allows determination of the demand for First and Second Class mail from an incumbent postal operator and a group of entrants. The optimal access charges for First and Second Class letters are determined as well as the optimal quality for these services.      

Competition enhancing regulation and diffusion of innovation: the case of broadband networks

Regulating former telecommunications monopolies has often been legally and technically complex. Among other options, incumbent operators were mandated to share, sell or split their infrastructure thus encouraging market entry. Given the importance of broadband technologies, competitive access has become a policy priority. We use data from 167 broadband markets over a period of 11 years. Firm and intra-platform competition on the incumbent’s legacy network (Digital Subscriber Line) accelerate adoption of broadband, whereas competition over different access technologies does not. The duration of the different regulatory effects shows that simpler network changes have a long-lasting yet delayed effect compared to technically demanding ones.     

Optimal Time-of-use Access Charges

This paper examines the setting of optimal time-of-use access charges in a deregulated network industry environment. Firms, which may include the incumbent, compete in the final retail market. The regulator sets an access fee for use of the essential facility, allowing the incumbent to recover fixed costs. If the retail market is perfectly competitive the optimal access charge varies with time-of-use according to the Ramsey–Boiteux elasticity rule. However, with downstream market power the regulator needs to correct retail price distortion, as well as recover fixed costs efficiently. As a result, the regulators initial impulse to set higher access charges during peak periods may be reinforced, moderated or even reversed — and optimal access charges diverge from a Ramsey–Boiteux pattern.I would like to thank John Panzar and Julian Wright for helpful comments. The helpful and detailed remarks of an anonymous referee have greatly improved this paper and are gratefully acknowledged.     

电信企业的兼并、分拆和接入的规制

电信企业在不同的纵向结构和接入规制制度下表现出不同的行为和效率。在强制接入但接入费率不受规制的情况下,市话长话兼营结构下的长话资费比分离结构下的资费高。但在接入全面规制或完全市场化的情况下,兼营结构的效率较分离结构为高。在三种规制制度下,生产者的利润在分离结构下都比较高,而消费者却在兼营结构下得利较多。这些结论表明接入的规制应该跟产业政策和竞争政策结合起来考虑。本文还发现如果互联费率高于边际成本,那么网络经营者越多,市话资费可能会越高。     

Access regulation with asymmetric termination costs

In many telecommunications markets incumbent providers enjoy a demand-side advantage over any entrant. However, market entrants may enjoy a supply-side advantage over the incumbent, since they are more efficient or operate on innovative technologies. Considering both a supply-side and a demand-side asymmetry, the present model analyzes the effect of two regulatory regimes: an access markup for a low cost network and reciprocal charges below the costs of a high cost network. Both regimes may have adverse effects on subscribers, market shares, and profits. It can be shown that an access markup is not generally beneficial and an access deficit not generally detrimental for the respective networks.     

Access pricing and investment: a real options approach

This paper examines a three-period model of an investment decision in a network industry characterized by demand uncertainty, economies of scale and sunk costs. In the absence of regulation we identify the market conditions under which a monopolist decides to invest early as well as the overall welfare generated by this decision. In a regulated environment, we consider a vertically integrated network provider that is required to provide access to downstream competitors and compare two distinct access pricing methodologies: the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR) and the Option to Delay Pricing Rule (ODPR). We identify the welfare-maximizing access prices using the unregulated market output as a benchmark and show that optimal access regulation depends on market conditions (that is, the nature of demand) with two possible outcomes: (i) access prices that provide a positive payoff to the incumbent, that is, provide a positive compensation to account for the option to delay; and (ii) access prices that yield a zero payoff to the incumbent. Moreover, unlike the earlier literature that argues in favor of an ECPR-type methodology to account for the interaction between irreversibility and demand uncertainty, we find that, except under very specific conditions, an access price that accounts for the option to delay value is welfare-superior to the ECPR.      

Open access policies, regulated charges and non-price discrimination in telecommunications

Open access policies in telecommunications, including interconnection and unbundling, are implemented by regulators in an effort to increase competition in the sector. Lack of cooperation from incumbents is pervasive, given their incentives to engage in non-price discrimination and the moral hazard resulting from the inability of regulators to monitor the contract. We build a relationship between the access price and non-price discrimination, neither assuming a pre-determined market strategic interdependence or a specific demand function format. When the access charge is liberalized, the incentive for non-price discrimination disappears. It may be optimal for the regulator to set a second-best regulated access price to avoid non-price discrimination.     

Technology investment and alternative regulatory regimes with demand uncertainty

A vertically integrated incumbent and an OLO (Other Licensed Operator) compete in the market for broadband access. The incumbent has the option to invest in building a Next Generation Network that covers all urban areas with similar demand structures. The investment return in terms of demand increase is uncertain. We compare the impact of different access regulation regimes – full regulation, partial regulation (only the copper network is regulated), risk sharing – on investment incentives and social welfare. We find that, when the alternative for the OLO is using the copper network rather than leaving the market entirely, exclusion of the OLO does not necessarily happen in equilibrium even when the incumbent is better in offering value-added services. Risk sharing emerges as the most preferable regime both from a consumer and a social welfare perspective for a large range of parameters.     

Partial Regulation in Vertically Differentiated Industries

We provide theoretical foundations for quality‐adjusted price‐cap regulation in industries where a regulated incumbent and an unregulated entrant offer vertically differentiated products competing in price and quality. We show that, whether or not the incumbent anticipates the reaction of the entrant, the optimal weights in the cap depend upon the market served by the entrant, despite the latter not being directly concerned by regulation. We further show that the cap is robust to small errors in the weights. Our findings point to the conclusion that, in partially regulated industries, regulators should use information about the whole sectors rather than on the sole regulated incumbents.     

Estimation of Price Elasticities for International Telecommunications Demand

This paper examines the effect of price per call minute on international telecommunications demand for calls made from Greece to five destination countries: Australia, the USA, Canada, the UK, and Germany. For this purpose the authors consider two different models, one with constant price elasticity, the log-linear demand function, and another one with time varying price elasticity, log-linear demand where all variables except price are in logarithms. These models were estimated for calls made during peak and off-peak periods, using quarterly data from 1997:I to 2003:IV. The outgoing traffic includes volume of calls in minutes made by the incumbent only and by the incumbent and the mobile providers.     

Universal Service and Entry: The Role of Uniform Pricing and Coverage Constraints

Universal service objectives are pervasive in telecommunications, and have gained new relevance after the introduction of competition in many markets. Despite their policy relevance, little work has been done allowing for a thorough discussion of instruments designed to achieve universal service objectives under competition. We intend to fill this gap, and disaggregate the problem into interacting forms of regulatory intervention such as uniform pricing and coverage constraints. It is shown that these are not competitively neutral and may have far-reaching strategic effects. Under uniform pricing, equilibrium coverage of both incumbent and entrant may be lower than without regulation. These effects depend on which measures are imposed at the same time, thus no single measure can be evaluated in isolation. We also point out that different groups of consumers are affected in different ways, making welfare comparisons difficult.     

Access Regulation and the Timing of Infrastructure Investment

This paper examines infrastructure investment incentives under a system of 'regulation by negotiation'. We demonstrate that an appropriately specified access pricing rule can induce private firms to choose to invest at a socially optimal time. The optimal regulatory regime allocates investment costs to the access provider and seeker based on their relative use-values of the facility. It is superior to an unregulated environment because it commits firms ex ante to an access charge that allows for sunk cost recovery. In addition, we show that when the time that access is sought is flexible both replacement- and historical-cost asset valuation methodologies can lead to optimal investment incentives. However, when seeker timing is restricted, historical cost can give rise to distorted incentives.     

Network Interconnection in Telecommunications

This paper discusses industries such as telecommunications where firms each have their own customers and must interconnect with other firms to provide a comprehensive service. Two scenarios are considered: (i) the case of a symmetric, unregulated industry, and (ii) the case of an industry with a dominant, regulated incumbent. In the first, provided there is sufficient product differentiation, it is shown that firms agree to set interconnection charges above associated costs in order to obtain the joint profit-maximising outcome. In the second a formula for the welfare-maximizing interconnection charge is derived. Relations with the 'efficient component pricing rule' are discussed     

An Efficient Avoided Cost Pricing Rule for Resale of Local Exchange Telephone Services

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires incumbent local exchange telephone companies to make their retail telecommunications services available to resellers at a discount that reflects the costs that will be avoided by providing the services at wholesale rather than at retail. In this article, we develop a pricing methodology to apply to such wholesale services. The methodology, which we label the Avoided Cost Pricing Rule, is designed to generate an economically efficient discount that may be applied to the incumbent local exchange carriers' services that are offered to resellers.     

An empirical analysis of incentive regulation and the allocation of inputs in the US telecommunications industry

A translog cost function is estimated to examine whether carriers use an efficient combination of inputs in the telecommunications industry. Special attention is given to the role of rate regulation reform in an increasingly competitive business environment. Findings suggest that telecommunications carriers facing price-cap regulation do use an efficient mix of labor and capital. In contrast, the condition for cost minimizing use of inputs is not met for telecommunications carriers facing rate-of-return. The superior factor input use allocation by carriers facing price-cap regulation compared to carriers facing rate-of-return regulation is interpreted as suggesting that incentive regulation plays an important role in promoting efficient use of inputs even in a competitive business environment.     

Forecasting VoWLAN technology for the Taiwan mobile telecommunication industry

Disruptive innovation is always a great challenge to the management of incumbent firms, especially in fast-changing industries. In this study, scenarios were developed to facilitate strategic decision-making by incumbent mobile telecommunications firms that confront the threats of disruptive technology of voice over wireless local area network (VoWLAN). Combining various possible outcomes of uncertain conditions and strategic alternatives available to the incumbent firms, six scenarios were developed: incremental evolution, disruptive evolution, cost deterrence, fierce competition, market pre-emption and market convergence. The results show that a passive ‘do-nothing’ strategy by incumbent firms leads to failure if the disruptive technology is inevitable. However, firms can slow the pace of disruptive technology by applying a price-cut strategy and enjoy several years of profits in the process. Industrial insights and strategic implications obtained from all the scenarios are discussed.     

Price competition in the market for business telecommunications services

We estimate a two-step control-function model that relates incumbent prices for small-business telecommunications services to the number of facilities-based entrants, cost, demand, regulatory conditions, and a correction for endogenous market structure. Results show that the price effects from entry are understated in ordinary least squares regressions. When controlling for endogeneity, prices are negatively related to the number of entrants, indicating that markets without a competitive presence could exhibit market power. These findings should prove helpful to the Federal Communications Commission and other State regulators determining the conditions under which price and other forms of regulation may be relaxed.     

Level of access and infrastructure investment in network industries

In this paper, we study how the terms of access to an incumbent’s infrastructure (i.e., the level of access and price) affect an entrant’s incentives to build its own infrastructure. Setting a high level of access (e.g., a resale arrangement), which requires relatively small up-front investment for entry, accelerates market entry, but at the same time delays the deployment of the entrant’s infrastructure. This is also true for a lower access price. We show that the socially optimal access price can vary non-monotonically with the level of access. We also study the case where access is provided at two different levels, and show that access provision at multiple levels can delay infrastructure building. Finally, we modify our baseline model to allow for experience and/or market share acquisition via access-based entry, and show that high levels of access may accelerate facility-based entry.     

Incentive Regulation and The Cost Structure of The Local Telephone Exchange Network

This paper combines an engineering process model of the cost of local exchange telecommunications firms with an analytical model of optimal incentive regulation (with ex post cost observability), to study empirically the properties of the optimal regulatory mechanism. Relying on detailed properties of the cost function, we examine three issues: (i) the extent of natural monopoly when informational rents associated with regulation are taken into account; (ii) the extent of incentive correction, which expresses the divergence of pricing under the optimal mechanism from optimal pricing under complete information; (iii) the implementation of optimal regulation through a menu of linear contracts. Our findings are that, for fixed territory, strong economies of scale allow local exchange telecommunications to retain monopoly characteristics even when the (informational) costs of regulation are properly accounted for, the incentive correction term is small in magnitude, and that optimal regulation can be well approximated through relatively simple linear contracts.