Revisiting the gender gap in CEO compensation: Replication and extension of Hill,Upadhyay, and Beekun's (2015) work on CEO gender pay gap

Research Summary: The increasing number of women chief executives motivates considerable interest in examining possible gender differences in CEO compensation. Recently, Hill, Upadhyay and Beekun reported that female CEOs receive greater compensation than male CEOs, which runs counter to common wisdom that the gender pay gap in the labor market favors men over women. With the goal of contributing to cumulative knowledge development in this area, we seek to reexamine Hill et al.'s finding about gender differences in CEO compensation by extending the analyses further in time, using a larger sample of firms and more rigorous empirical analyses. Our findings, which are robust to different statistical procedures and econometric specifications, do not reveal reliable evidence for differences in compensation paid to male and female CEOs. Managerial Summary : For years, a lively debate has centered on the issue of gender pay gap. The ubiquity of the pay gap between men and women has recently been questioned by Hill et al. who identify the chief executive officer (CEO) role as a workplace position where women receive greater compensation than men. Our investigation examines whether women CEOs are indeed compensated substantively more than male CEOs. We seek to replicate earlier work by Hill and colleagues, using an expanded dataset over a longer period of time and with more rigorous analytical tools. We do not find reliable evidence for a difference in compensation paid to male and female CEOs, suggesting that claims about gender gap in CEO compensation favoring women over men may be premature.     

The effects of CEO equity ownership and firm diversification on risk taking

This research explores the effects of CEO equity ownership and corporate diversification on firms' risk‐taking and risk avoidance behaviors. Hypotheses regarding these effects are tested through econometric analysis of mergers in the U.S. cable television industry. Risk taking and avoidance are measured as horizontal expansion through acquisitions and as the divestiture of assets, respectively, in the face of increasing environmental turbulence. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The role of CEO relative standing in acquisition behavior and CEO pay

In this study, we develop and test a theory of CEO relative pay standing. Specifically, we propose that CEOs with negative relative pay standing status (underpaid relative to comparison CEOs) will engage in acquisition activity, as a self‐interested means of attempting to realign their pay with that of their peers. We further propose that, when CEOs with negative relative pay standing acquire, they will tend to finance those acquisitions more heavily with stock than cash, to mitigate the risk associated with those deals. Finally, we argue that acquisition activity will partially mediate the influence of CEO negative relative pay standing on subsequent CEO compensation increases; however, that pay growth will come primarily in the form of long‐term incentive pay. Our results support our predictions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The effects of ownership structure on conditions at the top: The case of CEO pay raises

We examine how ownership configuration affects the determination of CEO pay raises. Based on a sample of 188 firms over a 5-year period, it was found that pay raises were based on distinctly different factors, depending on the ownership profile of the firm. In management-controlled firms—where no single major owner exists—results suggest an overarching pay philosophy: maximize CEO pay, subject to demonstration of face legitimacy of that pay. In externally-controlled firms—where a major (nonmanager) owner exists—results suggest a very different philosophy: minimize CEO pay, subject to the ability to attract/retain a satisfactory CEO.     

Toward more accurate contextualization of the CEO effect on firm performance

We introduce multiple refinements to the standard method for assessing CEO effects on performance, variance partitioning methodology, more accurately contextualizing CEOs' contributions. Based on a large 20‐year sample, our new ‘CEO in Context’ technique points to a much larger aggregate CEO effect than is obtained from typical approaches. As a validation test, we show that our technique yields estimates of CEO effects more in line with what would be expected from accepted theory about CEO influence on performance. We do this by examining the CEO effects in subsamples of low‐, medium‐, and high‐discretion industries. Finally, we show that our technique generates substantially different—and we argue more logical—estimates of the effects of many individual CEOs than are obtained through customary analyses. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The strategic value of CEO external directorate networks: implications for CEO compensation

This study examines the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and CEO compensation. Drawing on previous research showing a link between executives' external networks, firm strategy, and performance, the study argues that executive external networks are strategically valuable to firms; thus, they should be reflected in executive compensation. The study further examines whether firm diversification, with its elevated demand for strategic resources, moderates the relationship between CEO external directorate networks and pay. Hypotheses are tested using a sample of 460 Fortune 1000 firms. Analyses reveal that the rewards to CEO external directorate networks are contingent upon the firm's level of diversification. Implications for future research and practice are discussed. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Examining CEO succession and the role of heuristics in early‐stage CEO evaluation

This study develops and tests predictions regarding factors that influence early‐stage CEO evaluation. We suggest that contextual elements of the CEO succession process will influence the heuristics that directors employ to aid in their early evaluation of a CEO because traditional performance metrics, such as firm performance, are less diagnostic of CEO quality in the first years of their tenure. Broad empirical support for our theoretical arguments is shown in a sample of Fortune 1000 firms. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Top management team compensation: the missing link between CEO pay and firm performance?

In this research we discuss the relationship between CEO and top management team (TMT) member compensation, and explore the implications of TMT pay for firm performance. Specifically, we suggest that firm performance may benefit due to agency and group behavioral issues when top management team member pay is aligned—alignment is defined as the degree to which TMT member pay reflects (1) shareholder interests and (2) key political and strategic contingencies within the firm. In support of our theorizing, we found CEO pay to be related to TMT pay; TMT compensation, in turn, predicted performance (i.e., return on assets and Tobin's q) when aligned with shareholder interests and internal contingencies. Moreover, the effect of CEO pay on future firm performance was dependent on top team pay. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Specificity of CEO human capital and compensation

Much research on top management compensation has focused on the relationship between pay and firm performance. Firms, however, may compensate executives for inputs such as skills, as well as for outputs such as firm performance. This study refocuses attention on the links between managerial abilities and compensation by examining pay differences between types of CEO successors who have differential skills—namely, internal and external successors. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

基于CEO变动调节效应的高管团队特征对企业研发投资及技术创新绩效的影响研究

本文以信息技术业上市公司2011～2014年的数据为样本,运用逐步多元回归分析的方法,通过逐步引入高管团队特征变量、CEO变动变量、CEO变动变量与高管团队特征变量交互项对因变量研发投资及技术创新绩效影响进行了回归分析。结果表明：CEO变动对研发投资和技术创新绩效具有显著的正向相关关系;CEO变动可以部分调节高管团队特征对研发投资和技术创新绩效的影响;高管团队持股与年龄异质性与技术创新绩效显著正相关;两职合一与研发投资显著负相关;任期异质性和教育程度异质性与研发投资显著正相关。     

CEO championing of pricing,pricing capabilities and firm performance in industrial firms

CEOs uniquely shape activities within the firm. Among potential activities, pricing is unique: pricing has a direct and substantial effect on firm performance. In what may be the first quantitative study in industrial marketing polling exclusively CEOs globally we examine to which degree CEO championing of pricing influences pricing capabilities and firm performance. Our sample consists of 358 CEOs of industrial firms. Our results suggest that the level of championing of pricing by the CEO positively influences decision-making rationality, pricing capabilities, and collective mindfulness thereby leading to a significantly higher firm performance. This study also documents a relationship between decision making rationality and pricing capabilities (but not firm performance) thus suggesting that intuition in pricing decisions could drive firm performance.     

Performance deviations and acquisition premiums: The impact of CEO celebrity on managerial risk‐taking

Research summary: This article draws on identity control theory and a study of acquisition premiums to explore how CEO celebrity status and financial performance relative to aspirations affect firm risk behavior. The study finds that celebrity CEOs tend to pay smaller premiums for target firms, but these tendencies change when prior firm performance deviates from the industry average returns, thereby leading these CEOs to pay higher premiums. The study also finds that the premiums tend to be even larger when celebrity CEOs have more recently attained celebrity status. Taken together, these findings contribute to identity control theory and CEO celebrity literatures by suggesting that celebrity status is a double‐edged sword and that the internalization of celebrity status by CEOs strongly influences the decision‐making of CEOs. Managerial summary: The purpose of this article is to examine how CEO celebrity status and financial performance relative to aspirations affect the size of acquisition premiums. The study finds that celebrity CEOs tend to pay smaller premiums for target firms. However, when celebrity CEOs' prior firm performance is either better or worse than the industry average, these CEOs pay higher premiums. This situation is exacerbated when the CEO has only recently been crowned a celebrity. In effect, these CEOs feel great pressure to match the inflated performance expectations that come with celebrity status. These findings suggest that being a celebrity is a double‐edged sword. The implication here is that CEOs who have recently been crowned a celebrity should be aware of these pressures and cope accordingly. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stakeholder management as a predictor of CEO compensation: main effects and interactions with financial performance

We test the effects of stakeholder management on CEOs' salaries, bonuses, stock options, and total compensation. We also examine the extent to which the interaction of stakeholder management and financial performance determines compensation. Using a longitudinal database of 406 Fortune 1000 firms, our results suggest that stakeholder management is relevant to boards of directors when setting CEO compensation. Specifically, we found a significant, negative main effect of stakeholder management on CEO salaries. Further, we found that stakeholder management typically reduces the rewards CEOs may get for increasing levels of financial performance. In tandem, these results indicate that CEOs may jeopardize their personal wealth by pursuing stakeholder‐related initiatives. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Throwing caution to the wind: The effect of CEO stock option pay on the incidence of product safety problems

Stock options are thought to align the interests of CEOs and shareholders, but scholars have shown that options sometimes lead to outcomes that run counter to what they are meant to achieve. Building on this research, we argue that options promote a lack of caution in CEOs that manifests in a higher incidence of product safety problems. We also posit that this relationship varies across CEOs, and that the effect of options will depend upon CEO characteristics such as tenure and founder status. Analyzing product recall data for a large sample of FDA‐regulated companies, we find support for our theory. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Settling up in CEO compensation: The impact of divestiture intensity and contextual factors in refocusing firms

We examine the relationship between strategic change and CEO compensation by studying how a firm's refocusing program influences CEO compensation after completing the change. We contribute to the ‘settling up’ literature by arguing that strategic change is often uncertain for both the CEO and the board of directors responsible for executive compensation. As such the firm is likely to settle up with the CEO by paying for compensation risk and effort undertaken during refocusing after the extent and impact of strategic change are better known. We find that refocusing intensity is positively related to post‐refocusing CEO total compensation, suggesting that ‘settling up’ through post hoc compensation is an important factor in strategic change. We also find that prior firm performance, governance structure and industry dynamism are important moderators of this relationship. © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The implementation of special attributes of CEO compensation contracts around M&A transactions

This study investigates how the implementation of special attributes of CEO compensation contracts is determined by both the acquisition and the acquirer features for a set of M&A deals undertaken by Canadian acquiring firms. Our findings reveal that when agency problems are higher, manifested by larger control premiums and poor firm performance, boards of directors tend to implement stronger mechanisms of incentive alignment around M&A transactions. Relying on multiple interdisciplinary logics that are activated to explain directors' ability to effectively perform their monitoring function, we show that boards are reactive rather than proactive in dealing with agency problems. Data are further interpreted in light of the unique aspects of the Canadian institutional context. Based on asymmetric risk properties of two different groups of executive compensation modes examined in this study, testing the substitution effects between alternative governance mechanisms is proposed as an interesting avenue for future research. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.