Policy risk,strategic decisions and contagion effects: Firm‐specific considerations

Research summary : In this article, we investigate the firm‐specific environment and its impact on firm strategy focusing on adverse changes in the policy environment and their effect on divestitures. We argue that experiencing a negative change in the firm‐specific policy environment causes firms to reassess their exposure to policy risk and their ability to manage their policy environment, making them more likely to divest. Operationalizing negative shifts in the firm‐specific policy environment through formal policy disputes between firms and governments, we find that following a dispute, firms are more likely to divest both in the country where the dispute occurs and in other countries in the same region. However, the impact of disputes on divestitures is firm specific, applying only to firms directly involved in a dispute . Managerial summary : What is the impact of change in the firm‐specific environment on firm strategy? We argue that when firms directly experience a negative change in their policy environment that is specific to them, they negatively reassess their exposure to policy risk and their ability to manage their policy environment, which makes them more likely to undertake a divestiture. We analyze formal disputes between firms and governments that arise from adverse changes in policy and find that, following a dispute, firms are more likely to divest in the country where the dispute occurs and in other countries in the same region. However, the impact of disputes on divestitures is firm specific as it applies only to firms directly involved in a dispute . Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

A behavioral theory of governments’ ability to make credible commitments to firms: The case of the East Asian paradox

An expansive literature exists linking institutional constraints, credible commitments, and economic growth. Yet, this literature runs into difficulty when it tries to explain the East Asian “paradox:” rapid economic growth achieved by countries with low levels of formal constraints on government discretion. We use a behavioral theory of commitment to argue that the characteristics of the salient actors (governments) and their actions (policies) affect the credibility of their behaviors in ways independent of the structural underpinnings of a country’s political institutions. This behavioral theory of commitment provides a distinct but complementary lens through which to view the apparent paradox presented by these East Asian countries, and more generally provides an alternative theoretical mechanism to explain and predict governments’ ability to credibly signal their commitment to a course of action to investing firms. The success of East Asian countries in encouraging investment from both domestic and foreign firms implies that firms interpret governments’ actions as credible signals of their intention to honor their commitments to firms, consistent with the behavioral theory of commitment.     

Resident Bid Preference,Affiliation, and Procurement Competition: Evidence from New Mexico

In public procurement auctions, governments routinely offer preferences to qualified firms in the form of bid discounts. Previous studies on bid discounting do not account for affiliation – a form of cost dependence between bidders that is likely to occur in a public procurement environment. Utilizing data from the New Mexico Department of Transportation’s Resident Preference Program, I develop and estimate an empirical model of firm bidding and entry that allows for affiliation in firms’ project costs. I find evidence of affiliation and show how it changes preference auction outcomes.     

Risk and the strategy of foreign location choice in regulated industries

We argue that firms in regulated industries react to macroeconomic and policy risks in sharply different ways. While they seek to avoid countries with high levels of macroeconomic uncertainty, we predict that they find it more attractive to expand into countries characterized by governments with discretionary policymaking capacities so as to be able to negotiate favorable conditions of entry. We also argue that firms are heterogeneous in their attitudes toward risk. We predict that firms in which the state holds a partial equity stake exhibit a more tolerant attitude. We also expect that as firms accumulate foreign experience, they develop an aversion toward further foreign entries into politically unstable markets. Support for these predictions is provided by an analysis of the Latin American market entries of all listed Spanish firms in regulated industries between 1987 and 2000. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Discrimination in Dynamic Procurement Design with Learning-by-doing

We study the long-run impact of procurement discrimination on market structure and future competition in industries where learning-by-doing makes incumbent firms more efficient over time. We consider a sequential procurement design problem in which local and global firms compete for public good provision. Both firms benefit from learning-by-doing if they provide the public good in the previous period, but global firms only may be able to transfer learning-by-doing from different markets. We show that the optimal procurement has to be biased in favor of the local firm even when all firms are symmetric with respect to their initial cost distribution.     

R&D 'inputs' and 'outputs' of technology-based firms located on and off Science Parks

Science Parks (adjacent to universities) provide an important resource network for technology-based firms. To ascertain the 'added value' of a Science Park location the innovativeness (with regard to a variety of 'input' as well as 'output' measures) of independent technology-based Science Park firms are compared with the levels recorded by a comparable group of firms not located on a Park. Empirical evidence collected in 1992/93 from firms in a 'follow-on' sample (originally interviewed in 1986) as well as a 'new sample' study (independent firms that had located on a Science Park between 1986 and 1992) both revealed no statistically significant differences between the two groups on a variety of innovativeness measures. Results from both samples suggest Science Park firms do not directly invest more in R&D than off-Park firms nor do they record significantly higher levels of technology diffusion. The policy implications of the research findings are discussed.     

VERTICAL CONTRACTING WHEN COMPETITION FOR ORDERS PRECEDES PROCUREMENT*

This paper reverses the standard order between input supply negotiations and downstream competition and assumes that competition for orders takes place prior to procurement of inputs in a vertical chain. It is found that oligopolistically competitive outcomes will result despite the presence of an upstream monopolist. Here, vertical integration is a means by which the monopolist can leverage its market power downstream to the detriment of consumers. However, it does so, not by foreclosing on independent downstream firms, but by softening the competitive behaviour of its own integrated units.     

Benefit or damage? The productivity effects of FDI in the Chinese food industry

We investigate the impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on the total factor productivity of Chinese food firms using firm-level census data between 1998 and 2007 (174,940 sample food firms). We test for within-firm, within-industry, and vertical effects. We find that the effect of FDI on the productivity of Chinese food firms depends significantly on the type of FDI and its countries of origin. FDI from non-HMT (Hong Kong, Macaw and Taiwan) regions can improve the productivity of the invested firm, and also increases the productivity of domestic food firms through vertical industry linkages. However, domestic food firms may be crowded out by non-HMT investment in the same industry. HMT investment can generate positive within-industry productivity spillovers, but negative vertical spillovers. Our findings have immediate implications for policymakers in China, as well as for governments of less developed countries that are formulating foreign investment policies.     

Synergies among Producer Firms,Lead Users,and User Communities: The Case of the LEGO Producer–User Ecosystem

While many firms today proactively involve users in their new product development efforts using a wide variety of methods such as the lead user method, firm‐hosted user communities, or mass customization toolkits, some pioneering firms are experimenting with the creation of sustainable producer–user ecosystems designed for the continuous exploration and exploitation of business opportunities. In this paper, the functioning of such ecosystems is studied with particular emphasis on the synergies they can yield. Based on an explorative and longitudinal multiple case study design, the producer–user ecosystem of the firm LEGO is analyzed, and three main actors in the ecosystem are identified: entrepreneurial lead users who aim to start their own businesses, a vibrant user community, and the LEGO company as the focal producer firm and facilitator for multiple user‐to‐user and user‐to‐producer interactions. Our study reveals three kinds of synergies: (1) reduced risk for entrepreneurial lead users and the focal producer firm, (2) the extension of the design space of the focal producer firm's products, and (3) the creation of buzz within the user community. Finally, the theoretical and managerial implications of our findings for innovation researchers and practitioners are discussed.     

The use of favors by emerging market managers: Facilitator or inhibitor of international expansion?

This article explores the use of favors by emerging market managers, the impact of using favors on their firms’ growth, legitimacy, and reputation in a variety of business environments, and how the use of favors affects firms’ paths to international expansion. We discuss the concept of favors, and to illustrate the process of favors, we look at culturally rooted examples of their use by managers from the BRIC countries of Brazil, Russia, India, and China. Utilizing neo-institutional theory, we create a typology of four types of environments in which managers and firms from emerging markets conduct business with various relational entities (e.g., governments, customers, suppliers, competitors, alliance partners). We posit that the use of favors by managers compensates for the relatively weak legitimacy of formal institutions in emerging market environments, with favors illustrating the resulting reliance upon informal cultural-cognitive institutions. We develop propositions regarding the impact of the use of favors on the organizational outcomes of growth, legitimacy, and reputation of emerging market firms doing business in each of the four environments. This leads to further propositions regarding how the use of favors can influence their firms’ internationalization growth paths. We conclude that the impact of favors on international growth paths results from the fit or non-fit of their use with the level of legitimacy of the formal institutional environment of the focal relational entity in various business transactions.     

The Union Response to International Corporations

The purpose of this paper has been to examine, on a pre-liminary basis, some of the implications of the international corporationunion interface for individual countries. It has been suggested that the impact of this interface will depend on the production strategy of the international corporation, the solidarity of the coalition of the unions in different countries, and the economic and political conditions prevailing in the individual countries. In order to gain a deeper understanding of the bargaining relationship between unions and international corporations, it is suggested that research will have to be conducted on the following topics: the industrial relations decision-making process of international firms, in particular the ways in which these firms react to international collective bargaining; the alternative strategies open to unions in international collective bargaining; the impact of international unionism and international firms on the industrial relations system of individual countries; the problems associated with international collective bargaining involving unions with different political ideologies; and the impact of international unionism on economic and political integration and the perception of national governments.     

Innovation and Product Development Strategies in the Italian Motorcycle Industry

The motorcycle industry in Italy offers fertile ground for anyone interested in developing a better understanding of the role innovation plays in enhancing a firm's competitive position. This industry includes both domestic and Japanese firms, with companies ranging from high-volume manufacturers to specialty or niche producers. Firms trying to gain a competitive edge in this crowded field must contend with not only advances in product and process technology, but also the whims of fashion. In a survey of top-level marketing and product development managers from eight leading firms in the Italian motorcycle industry, Moreno Muffatto and Roberto Panizzolo explore the innovation models these firms employ to enhance their competitive position. Their study has the following objectives: categorizing the various competitors in terms of their product and market strategies and their product development and innovation strategies; highlighting differences between the methods of Italian and Japanese firms competing in this market; analyzing the relationships between firms, as well as the roles suppliers play in the various innovation strategies; and identifying the various organizational models employed by the firms in this industry. Different product and market strategies are identified on the basis of three variables: total production volume, the number of different products offered, and the number of different engine capacities offered. Using these variables, the companies in the study are categorized as volume producers, specialists, or niche specialists. The firms are further differentiated on the basis of the relative emphasis each places on product technology and design, product innovation, product variety, and time-based competition. In the firms studied, partnerships play a key role in new product development. Nearly every firm participates in joint projects, most often involving development of either an entire vehicle or an engine. Other partnerships involve firms in countries that offer emerging markets for the motorcycle industry. Organizational structures and strategies employed by the volume producers in this study include: the large product leader, who oversees concept definition and product planning; the project leaders group, which coordinates all phases of development, including activities assigned to external groups; the project managers matrix, a matrix organizational structure with a strong product orientation; and the business unit program manager, who oversees all projects within an independent business unit.     

On the duality of political and economic stakeholder influence on firm innovation performance: Theory and evidence from Chinese firms

Research Summary

In this study, we propose and test a multi‐stakeholder perspective to address variation in innovation performance across firms. Specifically, we analyze how a focal firm's innovation performance is shaped by its political stakeholders (local and central governments) and economic stakeholders (suppliers, buyers, and competitors). Using a data set consisting of over 26,400 Chinese firms, we first find support for our predictions that a focal firm's innovation performance will be enhanced by both its government connections and the innovativeness of its economic stakeholders. We then analyze whether the interdependent effect of these political and economic stakeholders is more likely to be synergistic versus antagonistic, and find evidence consistent with the antagonistic view.

Managerial Summary

We show how a firm's innovativeness is influenced strongly by its relationships to external stakeholders. Specifically, we examine the potentially dual‐edged role of political stakeholders (local and central governments) and economic stakeholders (suppliers, buyers, and competitors). Using extensive data on Chinese firms, we find: (a) that the higher the level of government connections, the greater a firm's innovativeness; (b) that firms located in proximity with more innovative economic stakeholders also tend to have higher innovation performance. We also look beyond these independent positive effects to examine the joint effect of these two forms of stakeholder influence, and here we see that more influence is not always better. Specifically, we find that the innovation benefit that typically accrues to firms in proximity to more innovative economic stakeholders is weakened when those firms also have higher‐level government connections.     

The contingent effects of political strategies on firm performance: A political network perspective

Research Summary: We examine the performance impact of corporate political strategies by analyzing the relationships among firms and various government institutions. While a firm's political connections to a focal government with decision‐making authority enhance performance, connections to a rival government competing with the focal government harm performance, particularly when the rivalry is intense. Firms can neutralize the negative effect from this political rivalry by using direct or indirect connections to a constraining government with power over the focal government. We find support for our conjectures based on an analysis of interactions among Chinese steel firms and the central and provincial governments in acquisition decisions during the industry's consolidation period of 1999–2010. Managerial Summary: Firms invest in political capital in order to influence public policies in their favor. However, the government is a not a monolithic entity and the relationships among various government institutions can alter and even reverse the effects of a firm's political strategy. This research shows that a firm's political connections can be both an asset and a liability. That is, although firms benefit from their connections to governments with decision‐making authority, they can be caught in the crossfire when there is a rivalry between governments. Furthermore, our research suggests that firms can cope with the negative impact from political rivalry by taking advantage of the structural relationships within the political system and influencing governments that have constraining power.     

The ineffectiveness of R&D subsidies—An oligopoly theoretic insight

In several European countries, governments subsidise private firms in their product development. Existing empirical literature indicates that these subsidies do not have much impact on firms' R&D efforts. It is suggested that this inefficiency may reflect strategic, oligopolistic behaviour: not to apply for subsidies is a strategic commitment to non-aggressive behaviour. Firms may be willing to apply for subsidies mainly when they know they are not going to affect their R&D efforts significantly.     

生产性服务进口对制造业自主创新效率的影响——基于跨国面板数据的实证分析

本文运用2000～2014年40个国家或地区的跨国面板数据，实证分析了生产性服务进口对制造业自主创新效率提升的促进作用。研究结果显示：生产性服务进口对各国制造业自主创新效率的提升均具有显著的正向影响，其中，生产性服务进口对发达国家制造业自主创新效率的促进作用大于对发展中国家，发达国家制造业技术创新较多依靠运输通讯、金融保险服务进口，发展中国家制造业技术创新较多依赖商务服务、建筑服务进口。     

Auction Reforms for Effective Official Development Assistance

Auctions, which are applicable to aid-related procurement systems, have been recently recognized as an important tool for improving economic efficiency. Using data on procurement auctions for Japanese official development assistance projects, the equilibrium bid function is estimated. The data reveals that a 1% increase in the number of bidders decreases the equilibrium bid by about 0.2%. This implies that strengthening competition at procurement auctions lowers contract prices and mitigates the heavy indebtedness of developing countries. Auctions are also instrumental in fostering local business environment and governance. For intensifying bidding competition, it is useful to introduce an electronic bidding system, encourage local firms to jointly bid, and relax excessive qualification requirements.     

Firm non‐market capabilities and the effect of supranational institutional safeguards on the location choice of international investments

Research Summary : We investigate the extent to which firms rely on supranational institutional safeguards versus their non‐market capabilities to offset the risks of investing abroad. We argue that firms with non‐market capabilities are insensitive to supranational institutional safeguards when choosing the location of their international investments. We show that supranational agreements between an investor's home and host nation, operationalized as bilateral investment treaties (BITs), increase the likelihood of investment, but there is substantial firm heterogeneity with respect to this relationship. Firms with various forms of non‐market capabilities are not sensitive to BITs, whereas other firms are more likely to invest under BITs. We advance the understanding of how firm non‐market capabilities can substitute for supranational institutional arrangements in addressing risks associated with host country institutional weaknesses. Managerial Summary : The risk of expropriation is one of the main concerns companies have when investing abroad. Because of this, many countries implement bilateral investment treaties (BITs) to safeguard foreign investments, alleviate foreign investor concerns, and promote investments. We show that only those companies without political competence or political connections favor countries with BITs when choosing where to invest. Companies with political competence or political connections, on the other hand, ignore BITs and apparently rely on their ability to influence governments whenever their foreign investments face expropriation threats. As a result, politically connected or competent companies can enter markets most of their competitors lacking these capabilities shy away from. They can, therefore, do business in environments in which they face less competition.     

The impact of firm cost and market size asymmetries on national mergers in a three-country model

This paper studies the impact of firm cost and market size asymmetries on merger decisions. I consider a model where a small and a large country compete in a third (world) market. Each of the two countries has two firms (with potentially different costs) that supply the domestic market and export to the third market. Merger decisions in the two countries are modeled as a simultaneously move game. The paper finds that firms in the large country have more incentives to merge than firms in the small country. In contrast, the government of the large country has more incentives to block a merger than the government of the small country. Thus, the model predicts that conflicts of interest between governments and firms concerning national mergers are more likely in large countries than in small ones.