Group-Affiliated Analysts’ Strategic Forecasts During a Year: Evidence from Korea

In examining the family-controlled business groups in Korea, prior literature shows that group-affiliated analysts’ forecasts are optimistically biased. This article investigates whether the group-affiliated analysts strategically time the level of accuracy and bias in their forecasts for the same group-affiliated firms due to the change in information asymmetry in the market. The results show that the group-affiliated analysts issue more accurate and less optimistic earnings forecasts for the affiliated firms when the level of information asymmetry is low; particularly, in April, which is right after annual earnings announcements.     

年报可读性对分析师盈余预测的影响

利用2010—2017年上市公司A股相关数据,本文研究了企业年报文本信息可读性对分析师盈余预测的影响。研究发现,企业年报文本信息可读性越低,分析师关注水平、预测质量也越低。进一步研究发现,较高的机构投资者持股水平能够显著缓解年报可读性对分析师关注的影响,但是没有发现机构投资者持股改善分析师预测质量的证据。高质量的审计以及高水平的信息披露质量评级可以改善企业的信息环境,从而有效缓解年报文本信息可读性对分析师盈余预测的影响。研究结论为企业年报文本信息可读性影响资本市场信息解读和传播效率提供了证据,有助于监管部门重视企业年报文本信息披露监管法律法规的制定和完善。     

Sell-side analysts’ career concerns during banking stresses

We propose a new approach to examine sell-side analysts’ career concerns by relating their forecast boldness to their employers’ news flows. Specifically, we use banking sector news to proxy for the severity of career concerns. Analysts follow more closely the consensus forecast when the prospects of the banking sector are negative (and vice versa). The effect is both economically and statistically significant after controlling for various firm, analyst, brokerage house, and forecasting characteristics, as well as sector and economy wide effects. The more established analysts, in terms of reputation and experience, are generally unaffected by banking sector news. In contrast, their less established peers tend to cluster their forecasts near the consensus after a sequence of negative news flows for banks. Collectively, our results support the notion that during banking stresses when job security is low analysts’ tendency to imitate others increases.     

国外证券分析师盈利预测实证研究综述

在对投资决策、资本成本、公司评估、盈余与股价的关系等进行探讨的文献中，分析师的盈利预测被广泛地用作盈利预期的代理变量，成为理论研究的一项基础。本文对国外证券分析师盈利预测的实证研究文献进行了综述，分析、比较了盈利预测业绩衡量标准、各衡量模型的优劣、乐观偏差、预测修正、意见分歧以及分析师跟进等理论。     

Financial Analysts' Forecast Accuracy and Dispersion: High-Tech versus Low-Tech Stocks

This study focuses on systematic differences in security analysts' forecast accuracy and dispersion between high- and low-tech firms. In line with the recent development in theoretical models and empirical findings, it posits that security analysts' unsigned forecast error and forecast dispersion are expected to differ between high-tech and low-tech firms. The results of this study provide evidence of lower unsigned error and dispersion for high-tech firms vis-à-vis low-tech firms. The higher forecast accuracy and forecast convergence for high-tech firms relative to low-tech firms in financial analysts' forecasts of earnings can be attributed to the information effect prevailing over the noise effect. Given the lack of empirical studies that compare analysts' forecast accuracy and dispersion between high-tech and low-tech sectors, the results of this paper provide a fresh basis for assessing how market participants vary in their treatment of New Economy stocks and factors that affect such decisions. In the light of the fact that the 1990s is a period characterized by the start of the Information Revolution through the Internet, the results of this study shed light on the usefulness of examining factors that differentiate between high-tech firms (New Economy stocks) and low-tech firms (Old Economy stocks) in financial analysts' forecasting earnings.     

The association between quarter length,forecast errors,and firms’ voluntary disclosures

Approximately 60 percent of adjacent fiscal quarters contain a different number of calendar days. In preliminary analyses, we find the change in quarter length is significantly associated with the changes in sales and earnings and that analysts condition on the prior quarter's results when making their forecasts. These results indicate that it is important for analysts to adjust for changes in quarter length when making forecasts. However, we find the quarterly change in days is positively associated with analysts’ sales and earnings forecasts errors, where forecast error equals the actual earnings minus the forecasted earnings. These results indicate that analysts systematically underestimate (overestimate) performance when quarter length increases (decreases). We find evidence indicating investors make similar errors as returns around earnings announcements are positively associated with the change in quarter length, but only when changes in firm performance is more sensitive to changes in quarter length. Corroborating these findings, managers are more (less) likely to discuss quarter length during conference calls when quarter length decreases (increases). These results are consistent with managers’ strategic disclosure incentives. In summary, our evidence suggests analysts and investors fail to fully take account of the quasi-mechanical effect that quarter length has on firm performance and managers strategically alter their voluntary disclosures to take advantage of these failures.     

The determinants of analyst-firm pairings

This paper explores the determinants of observed analyst-firm pairings. We adopt an analyst/brokerage house perspective that allows us to examine not only firm-level characteristics as in prior research, but also attributes of the analyst and the analyst’s brokerage house that may drive these pairings. Our empirical analyses provide two primary insights. First, analyst characteristics such as industry expertise and relative experience, and brokerage house characteristics such as continuity of coverage, are associated with the decision to follow a firm. Second, there is substantial variation in the association between firm, analyst, and brokerage house characteristics and the decision to follow a firm; this occurs across individual analysts as well as across different types of brokerage houses. Overall, our results provide further insights into the factors leading to observed analyst-firm pairings, and indicate that these factors vary across analysts and their brokerage houses – suggesting richer associations than the average firm-level relationships documented by prior research.     

Ethnic Minority Analysts’ Participation in Public Earnings Conference Calls

We investigate ethnic minority and nonminority sell-side analysts’ participation in public earnings conference calls. We find that minority analysts are underrepresented in conference call Q&A sessions, and minority analysts who do participate on the calls experience lower levels of prioritization than do nonminority analysts. Minority analysts’ lower participation rates are partially but not fully mediated by characteristics such as experience, work environment, and stock rating favorability. Additionally, firm and conference call fixed effects mediate approximately half the magnitude of lower minority participation rates. Extroverted minority analysts participate at higher rates, but the negative association between minority status and conference call participation is exacerbated when calls are more time constrained, when executive teams are less diverse, and when analysts are from less prestigious brokerage houses. Overall, we document the underrepresentation of minority analysts on earnings conference calls and provide evidence suggesting both analysts’ and managers’ choices influence minority analysts’ participation rates.     

证券分析师利益冲突影响投资者利益吗——一个经验研究评述(1995—2007)

近年来,公众对证券分析师利益冲突的广泛关注促使政府及相关部门采取了组织隔离与业务分立等一系列监管措施以保护投资者利益。然而,近期的实证研究却对证券分析师利益冲突损害投资者利益这一监管前提提出了质疑。本文在对1995—2007年间相关文献进行综述的基础上,分析了实证结果与监管当局观点之间存在差异的原因,并据此提出了若干利益冲突监管政策调整思路,以期为我国证券市场监管效率的提高提供启示和借鉴。     

Monitoring and corporate disclosure: Evidence from a natural experiment

Using an experimental design that exploits exogenous reductions in coverage resulting from brokerage house mergers, we find that a reduction in coverage causes a deterioration in financial reporting quality. The effect of coverage on disclosure is more pronounced for firms with weak shareholder rights, consistent with a substitution effect between analyst monitoring and other corporate governance mechanisms. The effects we uncover using our experimental design are an order of magnitude larger than estimates from ordinary least squares regressions that do not account for the endogeneity of coverage. Overall, our results suggest that security analysts monitor managers and entrenched managers adopt less informative disclosure policies in the absence of such scrutiny.     

Who was informative? Performance of foreign and local analysts’ stock recommendations during the Asian financial crisis

This paper examines the performance of foreign and local analysts’ stock recommendations in Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and South Korea during the financial crisis of 1997–1998. Unlike most of the prior studies, our results provide strong evidence that neither of the two groups held a complete information advantage over the other during the period of crisis. Using a large dataset of analysts’ recommendations, we show that foreign analysts’ buy recommendations were more informative than local analysts’ buy recommendations, while the opposite held for sell recommendations, i.e. local analysts’ sell recommendations were more informative than foreign analysts’ sell recommendations. Our results provide evidence that neither of the frequently advanced explanations regarding relative performance of foreign and local analysts hold during the period of extreme uncertainty.     

分析师意见分歧与银行信贷决策——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

作为金融市场重要信息中介,分析师通过发布专业意见向市场传递私有信息,但不同分析师发布的意见可能存在严重分歧。本文从银行信贷决策角度研究了分析师意见分歧的经济后果,结果表明,严重的分析师意见分歧会降低银行信贷规模,提高信贷成本,并缩短信贷期限;进一步研究发现,分析师意见分歧对银行信贷决策的影响在不同内部控制水平、产品市场竞争和媒体报道程度的企业之间存在显著差异,并且是通过缓解信息不对称这一作用机制实现的。本文结论不仅拓展了理论界和实务界对分析师作用的认识,而且为完善银行信贷决策提供了新思路。     

Do Publicly Signalled Earnings Management Incentives Affect Analyst Forecast Accuracy?

Using a panel of listed Australian firms for the years 1999–2007, this paper investigates whether analysts' forecast efficiency is improved by the occurrence of a publicly observable event, such as a CEO appointment, which signals a firm's earnings management incentives. Two supporting hypotheses are also tested: first, that CEO appointments are associated with income‐decreasing earnings management; and second, that analyst forecast errors increase with the level of earnings management present in current period financial statements. Consistent with prior literature, we find income‐decreasing earnings management in the year of CEO appointment. Earnings management, as a general phenomenon, is found to be significantly related to analyst forecast errors in the period in which the earnings management occurs. However, we present evidence that analyst forecasts for current year earnings are significantly more accurate with respect to earnings management in cases where a CEO is appointed during the current financial period.     

Compensation Design and Career Concerns of Fund Manager

We develop an optimal incentive contract for the fund manager with career concerns. Drawing upon the framework of Gibbons and Murphy (1992), we restructure the performance of fund manager with emphasis on the multiplicative effect of previous effort on the latter period, and derive the positive cross-period linkage of fund managers efforts. In particular, our study derives that a greater first-periods effort by the fund manager will induce more second-period effort and greater compensation in either fixed or variable (performance-related) portion of the payment. Though the total performance related pay might increase as the result of greater effort in the previous period, we show that the pay-performance sensitivity in the second period will decline. Moreover, the initial wealth increase will motivate the fund manager to exert more effort and induce better performance, but decrease the pay-performance sensitivity in the second period.JEL Classification: G2, J33, J41