审计收费影响因素的实证分析

本文从客户特征出发提出三个假设研究审计收费影响因素,发现公司规模对审计收费有显著影响,代表风险因素和盈余管理动机的变量对审计收费影响不显著,说明审计师对审计风险因素重视不足。     

企业诉讼风险与审计收费——基于关键审计事项披露视角

以2016年年报披露关键审计事项的A+H股以及2017—2018年年报披露关键审计事项的A股上市公司为研究对象,运用中介效应检验方法,发现当企业诉讼风险较高时,审计师会选择披露更多的关键审计事项,进而导致审计收费的增加。进一步检验发现,仅仅在风险承担水平高、盈余管理水平高、股权集中度高的组别中,关键审计事项披露在诉讼风险与审计收费之间的发挥着中介效应。从关键审计事项这一新的视角检验了企业诉讼风险与审计收费之间的关系,明晰了企业诉讼风险对审计收费产生影响的机制,即关键审计事项披露作为企业诉讼风险影响审计收费的中介变量在风险披露方面发挥的作用。     

债务违约风险、关键审计事项与审计收费

以2016—2019年披露关键审计事项的上市公司为样本,检验债务违约风险影响审计收费的作用路径。研究发现:债务违约风险与关键审计事项披露均与审计收费显著相关;债务违约风险与关键审计事项披露数量显著相关;关键审计事项披露在债务违约风险与审计收费之间发挥中介作用。进一步分类研究表明:(1)关键审计事项披露的中介效应仅存在于被出具标准审计意见和非“四大”审计的企业;(2)随时间推移,关键审计事项披露在提高审计报告沟通价值上呈现逐渐增强趋势。     

法律风险、政治联系与风险导向审计定价——基于中国证券审计市场的经验证据

中国转型期的公司法律风险和政治联系对于新兴的审计市场均衡定价至关重要。以2007年、2009年和2010年三年间96家上市公司作为样本,采用多元线性回归的分析方法,对上市公司法律风险、政治联系与审计收费的关系进行实证研究,结果显示:现代风险导向审计模式下,上市公司法律风险越高则审计收费越高,上市公司政治联系越强则审计收费越低,而且国内"十大"事务所对政治联系较弱的上市公司收取了更高的风险溢价。这一结果表明现代风险导向审计定价具有风险含量。     

国家审计对社会审计收费的影响研究

文章利用国家审计全覆盖这一外生冲击所形成的准自然实验,以2011—2019年A股上市公司为样本,考察国家审计如何影响社会审计收费.双重差分检验结果显示,相比非国有企业,国家审计全覆盖政策提出后,国有企业的社会审计收费下降了12.35％.研究发现,治理效应提升所导致审计师感知的审计风险下降是国家审计全覆盖降低社会审计收费的重要渠道.进一步研究表明,当审计师议价能力较强、公司诉讼风险较高时,国家审计全覆盖对社会审计收费的负向影响更大.文章从社会审计收费的角度为国家审计全覆盖的经济效应提供了经验证据,对理解宏观政策的执行与后续改革提供一定的参考.     

企业规模、审计风险与注册会计师审计责任

本文从企业规模对审计风险及审计责任的影响分析得出结论：考虑到审计成本和审计失败所担负责任的不同,注册会计师具有减少小型企业审计程序的动机,不能获取足够的审计证据以发表恰当的审计意见,打破了企业规模与审计收费、审计风险、审计责任之间的均衡关系。为了解决这一问题,本文提出了小型企业审计的总体原则和具体审计措施。     

我国审计收费影响因素的经验分析

本文基于2001～2006年我国8786家上市公司的审计收费数据,运用调整后的Simunie回归模型,分析了审计收费及其影响因素之间的关系。研究发现：公司规模、审计意见类型、存货占总资产比重以及是否为T类公司是影响审计收费的重要因素,而反映经营风险、财务风险和监管风险的因素——应收账款占总资产比重、净资产收益率、资产负债率、流动比率和受到监管部门的处罚或谴责与否等对审计收费有一定影响。     

交易所年报问询函如何影响审计收费?——基于风险揭示效应和风险传导效应的检验

作为新兴一线监管方式,交易所问询函能否发挥证券交易所“风险预警”的职能要求?以2015—2019年沪深A股上市公司为样本,从审计风险视角出发,探究交易所年报问询函对审计收费的影响机制。研究结果显示,收到年报问询函的公司有更高的审计收费。高质量的内部控制和高媒体关注度削弱了问询函对审计收费的影响,表明“风险揭示效应”的存在;同时,收到年报问询函的公司有更大的概率进行财务重述、卷入诉讼案件和受到行政处罚,进而提高了审计收费,表明“风险传导效应”的存在。结论从审计视角肯定了交易所年报问询函的风险预警作用,对于推动证券市场监管模式创新具有一定的启示意义。     

富豪榜会影响审计收费吗？——基于上市公司的经验证据

利用上市公司实际控制人登上“胡润百富榜”这一外生事件,实证研究了上榜影响审计收费的两条路径：（1）盈余管理路径。公司上榜后,为规避政治成本进行了向下的盈余管理,使得其会计信息质量下降,审计风险提高,最终导致审计收费增加。（2）媒体关注路径。公司上榜后,媒体关注度增加,公司风险增加,审计风险随之提高,审计收费增加。从登上富豪榜这一外部因素研究了对审计收费的影响,为审计收费的研究提供了新的视角,同时使我们进一步理解了上市公司实际控制人登上富豪榜的经济后果。     

会计师事务所法律责任与审计收费溢价

目前,我国的会计师事务所正从有限责任制转变为合伙制,组织形式的变化意味着事务所法律责任的增强,事务所的收费行为也发生了相应变化。在给定的法律体制下,大规模事务所应比小规模事务所收取更高的审计费用。当事务所法律责任增强时,一方面需要审计师加大审计投入并增加审计程序;另一方面为了补偿更高的审计风险带来的损失,审计师需要提高审计收费;大规模事务所相比小规模事务所,其提高审计收费的比例较低,从而大规模事务所的审计溢价幅度应降低。     

审计收费与审计质量关系研究

审计收费是影响审计质量的重要因素,本文通过理论和实证检验等方法进行分析得出审计收费和审计质量在一定程度上是正相关关系,结合我国审计收费现状,提出了一些可行性建议。     

Audit committee effectiveness and the audit fee

The UK is the only major country within the European Union the majority of whose listed companies have formed audit committees composed of non-executive directors to monitor financial reporting, the external auditors, and internal control strength. The adoption of audit committees in contrast to the approach in Europe has arisen despite the lack of evidence on their effectiveness even in the USA and Canada, where they have been mandatory since the 1970s. This paper seeks to establish whether audit committees are effective in ensuring audit quality by protecting the auditors from fee cuts which might affect audit quality, and signal tighter internal controls which help to reduce audit time and hence audit fees. The problem is that the audit committee may be expected to exert a two-way pressure on audit fees. To the extent that audit committees should enhance audit quality, partly by ensuring that audit hours are not reduced, an audit committee may be expected to increase total audit fees. At the same time, an audit committee may reasonably be thought to be a proxy for internal control strength. Ceteris paribus, companies with strong internal controls may be expected to pay lower audit fees than those with weak internal controls. Our paper argues that the ‘quality’ aspect of the audit can be captured through a dummy firm size variable, whilst the internal control aspects can be captured through dummy risk and complexity variables. The hypotheses examined are that size related audit fees are higher in companies with an audit committee; and that risk- and complexity-related audit fees are lower in companies with audit committees. The hypotheses are tested by developing a regression model for audit fees of a sample of the companies which comprise the FT-SE 500, with variables being included for the presence or absence of an audit committee. The results show that the relationship between size-related audit fees and the presence of an audit committee is positive and statistically significant, but that although there is a negative relationship between risk- and complexity-related audit fees and the presence of an audit committee, the relationships are not conclusively significant. The findings provide support for the contention that audit committees are at least partially effective in preventing reductions in the audit fee to levels where the quality of the audit may be compromised.     

基于审计主客体特征的审计收费的影响因素分析

本文在以往研究成果的基础之上,从会计师事务所和被审计单位主客体的角度研究审计收费的影响因素。基于会计师事务所角度,影响审计收费的因素有:审计成本、事务所的规模、事务所的品牌效应;基于被审计单位角度,影响审计收费的因素分别是:资产规模和子公司个数、盈余管理、所有权集中程度和股东的制衡度、风险水平、区域位置。     

中小企业板块上市公司审计费用决定因素分析

本文根据现有的理论及文献,对我国中小企业板块上市公司审计费用决定因素进行了分析。着重探讨了审计公司规模,初次审计合约,审计任期,审计风险以及审计客户规模和复杂程度对中小企业板块上市公司审计费用产生的影响。     

再融资资格、异常审计收费与审计意见变通

增加审计收费是上市公司改善审计意见的重要手段,但能在多大程度上改善审计意见需要进一步研究.以2008-2010年间被出具非标审计意见的上市公司为研究对象,进一步将非标审计意见细分,考察这些公司在随后会计年度审计意见的改善程度与审计收费的关系,结果显示:变更审计师不能改善审计意见,上市公司审计收费水平异常增加,可以引起审计意见的改善,但改善的幅度有限,难以通过增加审计收费达到购买标准审计意见的目的.特别值得关注的是,上市公司通过增加审计费用成功地将带强调事项段的审计意见变更为标准审计意见,实现了再融资目的.     

Consequences of the Abandonment of Mandatory Joint Audit: An Empirical Study of Audit Costs and Audit Quality Effects

This paper focuses on the unique Danish setting in examining the consequences of abandoning a mandatory joint audit regime. We study the effects on audit costs (measured by audit fees) and audit quality (measured by abnormal accruals) of the abandonment of the mandatory joint audit in Denmark in 2005. We perform our analysis on non-financial listed Danish companies for the 2002–2010 period. Our results show that a joint audit is associated with higher fees, but that the association between joint audit and abnormal accruals is insignificant. This suggests that the higher audit fees cannot be explained by higher audit quality. Our results are robust to alternative measurements of fees and audit quality. Additional analyses show that the fee premium related to a joint audit decreases over time and that the Big 4 concentration in our sample has increased since the switch from mandatory to voluntary joint audit. Our results are consistent with the motivations driving the regulatory change in Denmark and are of interest to regulators and actors in the audit market.     

论审计收费对独立性的影响

审计独立性是注册会计师执行鉴证业务的灵魂。笔者针对目前我国审计收费模式和收费价格方面所存在的问题,进行了分析,阐述对独立性的影响,并提出了改进的建议。     

Audit Fees in a Joint Audit Setting

Abstract

This paper uses the uniqueness of the French audit environment to conduct an in-depth study of audit pricing issues associated with the requirement to hire two independent auditors (joint audit). I use a model derived from Simunic's [(1980). The pricing of audit services: Theory and evidence. Journal of Accounting Research, 18(1), 161–190] seminal work to examine to what extent audit fees are influenced by the number of Big 4 joint auditors (zero, one, or two). After controlling for well-known drivers of audit fees that are specific to audit client firms (size, complexity, and risk), for governance characteristics and for auditor selection, the paper shows that the decision to hire two Big 4 auditors as joint auditors does not require the payment of a higher Big 4 premium compared to the choice of one Big 4 auditor paired with a smaller auditor, other things being equal. The choice of two Big 4 auditors thus appears to be a rational economic choice for large and international firms.     

审计师变更、审计收费与审计委员会效率

本文首先研究了审计委员会与外部审计师变更之间的关系,发现设立审计委员会的公司,外部审计师发生变更的可能性显著降低。表明审计委员会能有效缓解管理层与外部审计师之间就如何运用公认会计原则产生的分歧,并在相互的冲突中向外部审计师提供支持。本文还研究了外部审计师变更时,设立审计委员会与年报审计收费变化之间的关系。无论从变化方向和变化数量的角度,公司设立审计委员会都与审计收费变化显著负相关。这说明外部审计师显著降低了对已设立审计委员会公司的审计收费。这为审计委员会能够改善内部控制环境,降低外部审计的控制风险提供了间接证据。