盈余管理的制度背景分析

我国上市公司的盈余管理由来已久。本文认为,由于市场制度不完备、竞争制度不规范、公司治理制度不合理使得中国上市公司盈余管理不力的行为很难禁止。盈余管理的不力行为不利于我国市场资源的优化配置。因此,通过对中国上市公司盈余管理的制度背景进行相关分析,了解我国上市公司盈余管理中存在的一些问题就显得十分有必要。     

上市公司盈余管理动机文献综述

当前,公众对上市公司如何利用盈余来增加企业价值非常关注。在国家宏观经济改革的背景下,中国的资本市场进一步完善,美欧等西方发达国家利用盈余管理调整而出现的问题层出不穷,这些问题逐渐在中国显现。随着中国"一带一路"政策的实施,进一步带动世界一体化进程的加快,沿线国家公司之间的贸易更加紧密,我们在吸收、借鉴其他国家上市公司管理经验的时候,更要加大对盈余管理的关注。通过对盈余管理的涵义、动机和影响因素等方面进行探讨,提出独立董事与盈余管理的关系;控股股东与盈余管理的关系等盈余管理的影响因素,使有关的利益相关者对企业价值评价有更加深入的了解。     

防范上市公司盈余管理行为的政府监管策略研究

盈余管理是一种机会主义行为,其给市场环境与企业的长远发展都带来了负面影响。是盈余管理行为的监管主体,要以构建上市公司盈余管理政府监管模型对被监管者的最优化行为进行分析,改进盈余管理的会计准则,提高I值和F值标准,加大投机性盈余管理的U值,使会计师事务所真正成为政府监管的主体。     

我国上市公司盈余管理行为研究

上市公司盈余管理问题随着我国资本市场的日渐发展和上市公司的大量涌现逐渐清朗明晰,会计界和实务界对盈余管理进行研究,将其作为一个新的课题。盈余管理正反两方面的作用使得盈余管理备受关注。对上市公司盈余管理的行为,特别是它的动机进行深入系统的分析,有助于使用者正确理解盈余管理行为,作出对盈余管理行为的正确评价。     

低碳上市公司盈余管理与投资价值分析

本文以低碳产业上市公司为研究样本,采用面板数据分析了盈余管理对投资价值的影响。研究发现盈余管理行为影响了投资者对企业价值的评估,上市公司可能利用研发项目进行盈余管理。     

会计盈余价值相关性实证研究——基于沪深股市的实证研究

随着资本市场的不断完善和发展,上市公司数量的不断增加,我国上市公司盈余质量的研究也逐渐进入大家的研究视角。盈余质量是衡量企业盈余的优劣程度,它直接影响债权人和投资者作出决策,也直接影响投资收益和公司价值,对上市公司的质量评价有着重要的意义,而会计盈余之所以重要就在于其价值相关性。以2007年至2012年度沪、深两市A股上市公司为研究对象进行实证分析,在最基本的简单盈余资本化模型基础上,进一步探讨了会计盈余的价值相关性。研究结果表明,上市公司的每股收益对年末股价有显著的解释能力,这一结果支持了相关的结论。     

新会计准则下提高上市公司盈余质量的对策

在盈余质量的诸多影响因素中,会计准则作为盈余产生时必须遵守的规范,对盈余质量的影响重大。规范上市公司盈余管理行为,应关注上市公司相关会计事项,建立健全上市公司内部会计控制制度;完善公司治理结构;加强外部监督;大力培育和发展资产评估中介行业;构建统一的市场信息平台。     

上市公司盈余管理研究

盈余管理是企业经营者在会计准则允许的范围内通过对企业会计报表的外部收入进行控制和调整,从而达到自身效用或企业市场价值最大化。社会关注的焦点伴随中国市场经济体制和证券金融市场的逐步发展和完善,国有企业制度的改革进一步深化,也逐渐转向了盈余管理问题。一般来说,上市公司的盈余管理在两项业绩表现中:一方面上市公司经理可以选择专注于披露财务信息,提供更高质量的会计信息,使报告更好地显示公司经济利润;另一方面,公司在盈余管理的作用下,会计信息质量可能降低,这样会带来盈余管理过高的后果。目前,中国的公司治理结构有待改善,会计信息的扭曲可能会更加严重,会计准则建设滞后,独立审计缺乏功能,投资者不够成熟。盈余管理在这些情况下会被理解为会计信息欺诈。会计信息欺诈导致用户无法准确的判断会计报表并作出决策,这样资源的优化配置难以在股票市场完成。本文首先对盈余管理的概念进行阐述,然后分析盈余管理的计量方法及其在实证中的应用,然后对我国上市公司的盈余管理现状进行分析,找出其进行盈余管理的动机和目的。     

浅议我国创业板上市公司IPO盈余管理

随着创业板市场的壮大,创业板市场IPO盈余管理问题日益引起广大学者的关注。创业板上市公司IPO过程中,为了使投资者高估企业盈利能力,提高股票发行价格,往往会进行盈余管理。然而严重的盈余管理不利于企业的健康可持续发展。本文旨在分析创业板上市公司在IPO过程中的盈余管理现状,在此基础上,为有效控制创业板上市公司盈余管理提供政策建议。     

盈余管理方式对企业投资支出的影响——以农业类上市公司为例

农业类上市公司投资效率低,盈余管理动机强。农业类上市公司追求利益的同时可能会影响其自身的资源分配。本文通过实证分析研究应计盈余管理和真实盈余管理两种方式分别对农业类上市公司的投资支出的影响。结论表明,两种盈余管理方式对投资支出的影响不同,农业类上市公司采用应计盈余管理提高利润,会被市场识别,抑制企业投资支出;采用真实盈余管理调低利润,造成表面盈利的假象,促进企业投资支出。整体上看,我国农业类上市公司的投资水平并不理想,整体的盈利水平较弱。农业类上市公司需重视企业投资,合理应用资本。     

Does family involvement explain why corporate social responsibility affects earnings management?

We investigate how family involvement in the ownership, management, or governance of a business affects its engagement in earnings management both directly and indirectly through its corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities. Using a sample of S&P 500 companies, we find that family firms tend to have higher CSR performance, which can help them to maintain legitimacy and preserve socio-emotional wealth. Family firms also engage in less accrual-based earnings management, although they are indistinguishable from non-family firms in terms of real earnings management. In contrast to previous research, we find that CSR performance is not significantly associated with either accrual-based or real earnings management behavior after we account for the effect of family involvement. Our findings suggest that the association between CSR performance and family involvement is the primary driver of the relation between CSR performance and earnings management documented in previous research.     

Executive Compensation and Earnings Persistence

Governing boards utilize executive compensation contracts in an attempt to align executive actions with corporate goals. The objective is to ensure that executive performance provides value to the organization in terms of successful outcomes. A key performance criteria typically specified in CEO compensation contracts is earnings targets. However, using earnings as a performance evaluation may be problematic because some firms exhibit robust and sustained earnings over time (high earnings persistence), and other firms, such as high growth oriented firms, exhibit weak or sometimes negative earnings over time (low earnings persistence). Our study reveals that the effect of high earnings persistence results in firms that focus more heavily on cash compensation (salary and bonus) rather than on equity compensation (stock options, etc.) to compensate executive performance. Additionally, for firms characterized by low earnings persistence, our study indicates that cash flows from operations act as a supplementary performance measure to accounting earnings, and become increasingly important as a means to justify executive cash compensation.     

经济增加值与企业业绩评价

20世纪 80年代美国出现的评价企业业绩的经济增加值 (即EVA ,EconomicValueAdded)法是一种比传统会计利润更加有效的指标和评估体系。EVA的计算因考虑了全部资金成本 ,并对因遵守公认会计原则而扭曲经济真实的报表项目进行调整 ,使得EVA更准确地反映了企业创造的真实经济利润。作为企业业绩评价指标 ,EVA因此有着明显优势。     

How Powerful CFOs Camouflage and Exploit Equity-Based Incentive Compensation

While numerous studies have examined the impact that powerful CEOs have on their compensation and overall firm decisions, relatively little is known about how powerful CFOs influence their compensation and important firm financial reporting and operational outcomes. This is somewhat surprising given the critical role CFOs play in the financial reporting process of a firm. Using managerial power theory (Bebchuk and Fried in J Econ Perspect 17:71–92, 2003) and the theory of power and self-focus (Pitesa and Thau in Acad Manag J 56(3):635–658, 2013), we predict that powerful CFOs employ a two-part strategy to camouflage excessive incentive compensation above what efficient contracting would dictate. First, powerful CFOs use their power and influence to negotiate shorter incentive pay duration to maximize the present value of their performance—based compensation. Second, when their incentive equity compensation vests, we suggest that CFOs manage earnings to further enhance their personal income. Consistent with our theoretical expectations, we find higher levels of income-increasing accrual-based earnings management and real transactions management, a potentially unethical practice, in firms with powerful CFOs who have short pay durations. We discuss the implications of our analysis in the context of mitigating CFO power and managing the ethical environment “tone at the top.”     

基于研究方法视角的盈余管理分析

本文通过对盈余管理国内外规范研究的分析评述，阐述了盈余管理的内涵及相关理论，并对盈余管理的动机进行了分析，从研究方法的角度对盈余管理的实证研究进行了综述，最后结合国内情况，对如何进一步研究盈余管理提出了建议。     

Driver Management That Drives Carrier Performance

The trucking industry provides the majority of transportation services in the United States. Truck drivers, particularly their driving performance, which influences how customers perceive motor carriers, are integral to the success of their firms. Hence, driver management is a topic of great interest to the trucking industry, logistics practitioners, and logistics researchers. Although the logistics literature does address issues relating to driver management, advice is scarce regarding how motor carriers might manage drivers to improve operational performance and thus the bottom line. Our results shed light on the processes whereby some formal controls directly influence operational performance, whereas others indirectly influence operational performance; that is, in the latter case, the influence of formal controls on operational performance is mediated by certain informal controls. According to our findings, motor carrier firms that employ a combination of formal and informal controls perform better operationally than firms that do not do so. And, thus, those employing such a combination of controls will realize a larger market share.     

CEO regulatory focus and myopic marketing management

This study details the mechanisms on how CEO regulatory focus affects the salience of the gains versus losses involved in myopic marketing decision-making, and how such CEO psychological attributes interact with internal equity-based compensation, external pressure from equity analysts, and environmental turbulence to affect firms’ myopic marketing management propensities. We find that when faced with short-term earnings pressure to meet earnings expectations and when time is no longer a resource, predominantly promotion-focused are more likely to engage in myopic marketing management to benefit from the temporary stock price increase, which comes from meeting or beating earnings expectations. Conversely, predominantly prevention-focused CEOs are less prone to such short-termist actions which results in long-term value loss. For the moderating variables, we find that: (1) equity-based compensation tends to attenuate myopic marketing tendencies of promotion-focused CEOs but have no impact on prevention-focused CEOs, (2) whether equity analysts improve monitoring or aggravate short-term earnings pressure depends on the CEO’s regulatory focus, and (3) environmental turbulence does not increase the myopic marketing management tendencies of predominantly promotion-focused CEOs but rather intensifies the relunctance of prevention-focused CEOs to take short-termist actions. We further find that myopic marketing management mediates the impact of CEO regulatory focus on future firm performance. These findings have important implications for firms and boards when selecting new CEOs and structuring the compensation of existing CEOs. Firms need to simultaneously consider the fit between the CEOs’ regulatory focus, firms’ needs, the business environment, as well as CEO compensation structure.     

上市公司盈余质量评价方法研究综述和建议

目前,我国对上市公司盈余质量评价方法大多局限于定性描述,研究方法比较单一,没有形成系统的理论,研究的广度、深度需要扩展。对盈余质量的关注不应该只限于学术范围,应把盈余质量的研究方法纳入现有的会计教育体系,建立专门的上市公司盈余质量评级机构,监督上市公司的盈余调整行为,并通过比较和组合,挖掘其潜在的财务预测信息,避免盲目扩张带来损失,以提高现行会计盈余信息的决策相关性。     

Earnings persistence,fundamentals, and anticipation of breaking earnings strings

Using a sample of firms with consecutive earnings growth for more than 20 quarters (earnings strings), I assess the relationship between earnings persistence and the extent to which investors are able to anticipate breaks of earnings strings. I find that firm‐specific earnings persistence exhibits a concave trend during earnings strings. Stock returns are significantly and positively associated with earnings persistence. Upon breaks of earnings strings, investors’ reactions are more negative for firms with higher earnings persistence—especially those with smaller institutional holdings and analyst coverage, and those with insider selling activities—before the break. Additional analyses show that variations in firms’ economic performance (fundamentals) explain the varying earnings persistence during earnings strings. Copyright © 2015 ASAC. Published by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is There a Gold Social Seal? The Financial Effects of Additions to and Deletions from Social Stock Indices

This study investigates the financial effects of additions to and deletions from the most well-known social stock index: the MSCI KLD 400. Our study makes use of the unique setting that index reconstitution provides and allows us to bypass possible issues of endogeneity that commonly plague empirical studies of the link between corporate social and financial performance. By examining not only short-term returns but also trading activity, earnings per share, and long-term performance of stocks that are involved in these events, we bring forward evidence of a ‘social index effect’ where unethical transgressions are penalized more heavily than responsibility is rewarded. We find that the addition of a stock to the index does not lead to material changes in its market price, whereas deletions are accompanied by negative cumulative abnormal returns. Trading volumes for deleted stocks are significantly increased on the event date, while the operational performances of the respective firms deteriorate after their deletion from the social index.