Implications of Short Selling for Corporate Finance

Corporate managers often view short sellers as market manipulators whose actions drive their company's stock price below intrinsic value. But recent academic research suggests that some short sellers are effective in processing publicly available information and that their short selling may provide useful information to market participants. This article summarizes the authors’ own published research, which provides evidence of informed short selling by linking it to changes in corporate fundamentals. More specifically, the authors’ findings indicate that increases in short interest are reliable indicators of an economically (as well as statistically) significant decline in a company's operating performance over the following three years. And when examining changes in short interest around announcements of seasoned equity offerings, the authors also find a negative relation between an increase in short interest and future operating performance. In addition, they find that the greater the increase in short interest in the period leading up to the SEO announcement, the more negative is the stock‐price response to the announcement itself. The authors’ findings suggest that corporate managers can benefit from monitoring the short‐selling activity in their company's stock. Short‐selling data can be used to reassess corporate strategy or rethink major corporate decisions that have been announced but not carried out, and take preemptive actions to forestall impending future declines in performance and so preserve value.     

Short-sale refinancing and price adjustment speed to bad news: Evidence from a quasi-natural experiment in China

Short selling may accelerate stock price adjustment to negative news. However, the literature provides mixed evidence for this prediction. Using short-sale refinancing and a staggered difference-in-differences (DID) model, this paper explores the effect of short selling on stock price adjustment. Our results show that (1) short-sale refinancing improves the speed of stock price adjustment to negative news. This result holds after we control for endogeneity. (2) The positive relationship between short-sale refinancing and stock price adjustment speed is significant in subsamples of stocks with higher earnings management or lower accuracy of analyst forecasts, indicating that firms with more opaque information are more likely to be targeted by short sellers. In subsamples of stocks with a higher ownership concentration or lower ownership by institutional investors, short selling is more likely to increase the speed of stock price adjustment, indicating that ownership structure may influence negative news mining. (3) As short-sale refinancing exacerbates the absorption of bad news by stock prices, it increases crash risk. This study enriches the research on the economic consequences of short selling and provides empirical evidence supporting regulations on short selling in China.     

Short Interest,Returns, and Unfavorable Fundamental Information

Several months before information becomes public, the level of short interest contains value‐relevant information about publicly traded corporations. Short interest predicts future bad news, negative earnings surprises, and downward revisions in analyst earnings forecasts. This informational content is stronger for stocks that are harder to short. We also find that nearly half of the well‐known cross‐sectional relation between short interest and future stock returns is related to future changes in firms’ value‐relevant information. Our results suggest that short interest predicts future returns, in part, due to short sellers’ ability to uncover unfavorable information about firms.     

Does the stock market affect firm investment in China? A price informativeness perspective

This paper investigates the empirical relationship between firm-level investment and the stock market in China from a price informativeness perspective. We find that firm investment does not significantly respond to the stock market valuation, because stock prices contain very little extra information about the future operating performance of firms. This finding is further supported by the relative investment response test and the relative price information content test based on the informativeness proxy of price non-synchronicity combined with firm information transparency.     

卖空机制能够约束内部人减持吗？——基于融资融券制度的经验证据

本文以我国放松卖空管制为视角,探究其对内部人减持的影响。研究表明,卖空机制能够抑制企业内部人减持行为。机制分析发现,卖空对内部人减持的抑制作用是通过缓解股权高溢价实现的。进一步研究表明,卖空能够抑制大股东、董事以及管理层减持,但对监事减持无影响;卖空能够降低内部人减持的获利程度,并且在内部人减持动机更大时,对内部人减持的抑制作用更强;卖空通过约束内部人减持提升了股票定价效率,还有助于降低内部人增持行为。本文的研究结论丰富了卖空和内部人减持领域的文献,并对政府部门完善制度设计具有启示意义。     

金融同业活动与实体企业经营风险——来自地区层面同业存单业务的证据

本文研究了地区层面金融同业活动对实体企业经营风险的影响。基于各省份金融机构开启同业存单业务的研究表明,地区层面金融同业活动显著提升了当地上市企业股价大幅下跌的风险。进一步研究表明,随着同业存单业务的发展,当地上市企业债务融资成本和风险水平有所上升,而业绩表现和市场价值有所下降。上述发现表明,企业融资链条变长后,信贷市场道德风险上升,部分企业因风险偏好增强导致经营风险上升,更容易突然出现负面事件而导致股价大幅下跌。本文的发现揭示了金融同业活动存在监管规避的可能性及其影响实体企业的潜在路径,凸显了完善金融监管以更好服务实体经济发展的重要现实意义。     

Does CEO reputation matter for capital investments?

This paper examines the association between CEO reputation and corporate capital investments. The efficient contracting hypothesis predicts a positive association between CEO reputation and wealth effects of corporate capital investments. In contrast, the rent extraction hypothesis predicts that the wealth effects of capital investments are negatively associated with CEO reputation. We find that the stock market's responses to announcements of capital investments are more favorable for firms with more reputable CEOs. Moreover, CEO reputation mitigates the negative stock price reaction associated with announcements of capital investments by firms with high free cash flow and low growth opportunities. Additional analysis indicates that firms with more reputable CEOs exhibit significantly better post-investment operating performance improvements than those with less reputable CEOs, especially in firms with high free cash flow and low growth opportunities. Collectively, our results suggest that the efficient contracting hypothesis dominates the rent extraction hypothesis in terms of net economic impact of capital investments on the investing firm.     

金融同业活动与实体企业经营风险——来自地区层面同业存单业务的证据

本文研究了地区层面金融同业活动对实体企业经营风险的影响。基于各省份金融机构开启同业存单业务的研究表明,地区层面金融同业活动显著提升了当地上市企业股价大幅下跌的风险。进一步研究表明,随着同业存单业务的发展,当地上市企业债务融资成本和风险水平有所上升,而业绩表现和市场价值有所下降。上述发现表明,企业融资链条变长后,信贷市场道德风险上升,部分企业因风险偏好增强导致经营风险上升,更容易突然出现负面事件而导致股价大幅下跌。本文的发现揭示了金融同业活动存在监管规避的可能性及其影响实体企业的潜在路径,凸显了完善金融监管以更好服务实体经济发展的重要现实意义。     

Further Evidence on Insider Selling Prior to Seasoned Equity Offering Announcements: The Role of Growth Opportunities

Previous research documents significant abnormal net selling by insiders prior to seasoned equity offering announcements. This study documents that the abnormal net selling is significantly greater for growth firms than for mature firms. It also shows that growth firms experience poorer post-issue long-term price performance, which suggests greater overpricing for growth firms. Further analysis shows that greater insider selling prior to the offering announcement is associated with a greater price run-up prior to the announcement and is not associated with a more negative market reaction to the announcement. Overall, the results suggest that investors may be overly optimistic about future prospects of growth firms.     

Short selling and the independence of business-related analysts: Evidence from an emerging market

This paper investigates whether short-sale deregulation improves analysts' independence in an emerging market where conventional mechanisms mitigating conflicts of interest are either ineffective or absent. Short selling reduces the effectiveness of analysts' favourable opinions in creating or sustaining overvalued stock prices, thus decreasing the incentives of institutional clients of brokerages to exert pressure on related analysts to initiate coverage and issue biased opinions. Using a difference-in-difference approach, we find strong evidence that stocks that are eligible for short sales experience a greater reduction in coverage by related analysts than stocks that are ineligible for short sales. When covered firms become eligible for short sales, the quality of forecasts and recommendations issued by related analysts improves considerably. Further analyses show that shortable firms with a significant reduction in related analysts' coverage are more likely to underperform and to experience stock price crashes in the future. Altogether, our results are consistent with short selling effectively restoring related analysts' independence in emerging markets.     

Convertible calls and corporate taxes under asymmetric information

This paper develops a signalling model of call of convertible securities (bonds or preferred stock) in the presence of corporate taxes and asymmetric information about future earnings. In equilibrium, managers with relatively unfavorable information call to force convertible holders to convert to common stock (in spite of the loss of corporate tax benefits if the convertibles are bonds), while those with relatively favorable information do not call. The model predicts that the announcement period common stock returns are more negative at the call of convertible bond than at the call of convertible preferred stock. Furthermore, we predict that when the importance of the tax deductibility of interest differs among firms, so does the stock price reaction to the announcement of convertible debt call. Specifically, the loss of equity value at the announcement decreases with the amount of non-debt tax shield that the calling firm owns, decreases with the book value of convertible debt called, and increases with corporate taxes.     

Mimicking repurchases

We study the tendency of firms to mimic the repurchase announcements of their industry counterparts. We argue that a firm, by repurchasing its shares, sends a positive signal about itself and a negative one about its competitors. This induces the competing firms to mimic the behavior of the repurchasing firm by repurchasing themselves. Using a broad sample of US firms from the period 1984–2002, we show that, in concentrated industries, a repurchase announcement lowers the stock price of the other firms in the same industry. The other firms react by repurchasing themselves to undo these negative effects. Repurchases are chosen as a strategic reaction to other firms’ repurchase decisions and are not motivated by the desire to time the market, i.e., to take advantage of a significantly undervalued stock price. Therefore, repurchasing firms in more concentrated industries experience a lower increase in value in comparison with their counterparts in less concentrated industries in the post-announcement era. Alternative methodologies used to estimate long-term performance confirm that it is only the repurchasing firms in low concentration industries that outperform the market, their non-repurchasing peers, and their counterparts in more concentrated industries by amounts that are economically and statistically significant.     

Can Short Restrictions Actually Increase Informed Short Selling?

We use the 2008 short selling regulations to test whether short sale restrictions can increase informed short selling. For the preborrow requirement, we find more negative price reactions to short interest announcements though no reliable increase in the price impact of short sales volume. For the stocks with banned short sales, we find an increase in the price impact of short sale volume though no reliable change in the price reaction to short interest announcements. Both restrictions, however, are associated with increased informed trading. Our results suggest that short restrictions will not reduce informed short selling and may actually result in an increase by increasing the proportion of informed short sellers..     

Are Short Sellers Informed? Evidence from the 2007–2008 Subprime Mortgage Crisis

This paper examines the short selling activities around financial firms’ announcements of asset write‐downs during the 2007–2008 subprime mortgage crisis. We find that short sellers accumulate short positions prior to write‐down announcements, and that stocks experience significantly negative returns around such announcements. These results suggest that the return predictability of short interests is due to short sellers’ informational advantage. Furthermore, we show that short sellers increase their positions significantly in the announcement month and keep increasing their positions afterward, suggesting the feedback effect of the disclosed write‐downs on financial firms’ existing exposures. The valuable information contained in the short interest should encourage regulators to mandate stock exchanges disclose short selling activities more frequently.     

卖空者与内幕交易——来自中国证券市场的证据

本文研究上市公司内部人减持、年报、诉讼、分析师评级、停复牌以及高送转等重大公告前后卖空交易行为的变化,系统考察卖空者是否参与内幕交易以及何种因素影响卖空者参与内幕交易,发现卖空率较高的股票具有较低的未来收益,表明卖空者拥有信息优势,属知情交易者;卖空者拥有非常精确的择时交易能力,在重大利空公告前显著增加卖空量,而在利好公告前则显著减少卖空头寸,表明卖空者作为知情交易者的信息优势源自内幕消息;公司内、外部投资者的信息不对称程度越低或公司所在地的法治水平越高,卖空者参与内幕交易的行为就越少。因此,监管机构应密切关注公司重大消息发布前后卖空量的异常变动,同时,完善信息披露规则、健全证券分析师制度并强化法律法规的执行力度,才能有效防范卖空者参与内幕交易。     

Margin trading,short selling,and bond yield spread

Using a quasi-natural experiment, this study examines the effects of margin trading and short selling on bond yield spread in China. It finds that both margin trading and short selling can reduce bond yield spread. Additionally, it finds that margin trading lowers firms’ debt ratios and increases their credit ratings, which explains the reduced spread. In other words, margin trading can impact investors’ decisions by revealing positive information about a firm. Another finding is that short selling lowers the bond yield spread by decreasing earnings management, suggesting that short selling has an impact on investors’ decisions through its effect on corporate governance. Our results suggest that margin trading transmits positive information and short selling impacts firms’ policies. These results provide support for future regulations of margin trading and short selling.     

Can CEO dismissals be proactive?

We find significant variation in the prior stock returns of firms that dismiss their CEOs between 1996 and 2008. 49% of firms that dismiss their CEOs do so in the absence of negative industry-adjusted stock returns prior to dismissal (37% dismiss in the absence of negative raw returns). We find evidence for two reasons why boards may dismiss CEOs early, i.e., in the absence of significant poor prior stock performance. First, we find that early dismissals are more likely to be associated with corporate scandals, suggesting that CEOs that are found to engage in unethical or illegal activities are dismissed although their actions may not have a significant adverse impact on firm value. Second, we find support for the argument that early dismissals are proactive actions by boards to dismiss low ability CEOs. We find that firms with more equity-based compensation for directors and higher independent director ownership are more likely to dismiss their CEOs early. Boards with strong incentives are more likely to be proactive and act on their private information about the CEO than boards with poor incentives. Early dismissal firms experience a short-lived decline in operating performance around the date of CEO dismissal, and their operating performance recovers immediately after the CEO is replaced. On the other hand, the operating performance of late dismissal firms declines significantly prior to dismissal and improves substantially after dismissal. We also find that CEOs that are dismissed early are not more likely to find new CEO positions than CEOs that are dismissed late, supporting the idea that early dismissal CEOs may not have different ability than late dismissal CEOs.     

放松卖空管制能够抑制并购商誉泡沫吗？

本文以我国放松卖空管制作为切入点,系统检验了其对并购商誉泡沫的影响。研究发现,放松卖空管制之后,超额商誉显著下降,同时商誉资产也显著下降,且该效应在民营控股公司中更显著;机制检验发现,卖空通过吸引更多分析师跟踪、增加对管理者的激励来抑制商誉泡沫;进一步研究发现,在市场化水平较高、行业竞争度较低的情形下,卖空机制对商誉泡沫的抑制作用更强。本文的研究结论丰富了卖空和并购商誉领域的文献,并为以市场导向原则化解并购商誉泡沫提供了新思路和新范式。     

Return Performance Surrounding Reverse Stock Splits: Can Investors Profit?

We examine the long-run return performance of over 1,600 firms with reverse stock splits. These stocks record statistically significant negative abnormal returns over the three-year period following the month of the reverse split. The sample firms experience poor operating performances over the four years that include and follow the year of the reverse split, which suggests informational inefficiencies. Because these stocks have unique financial characteristics, we also show that they would be very difficult to sell short. Thus, arbitrageurs would be restricted in their ability to earn abnormal profits, even if they correctly anticipated a price decline.