The 2008 financial crisis: Stock market contagion and its determinants

In this paper, we investigate worldwide contagion and its determinants during the 2008 financial crisis. Utilizing an international sample of returns from 2003 to 2009, we consider both uni- and bi-directional contagion. After controlling for crisis-related volatility, we find strong evidence that cross-market linkages increase among many financial markets. In contrast to previous crises, contagion following the 2008 global financial crisis is not confined to emerging markets. The United States and other mature financial markets in the sample transmit and receive contagion. Country markets are less influenced by regions than they are by other country markets. We also construct variables that represent relative changes in economic variables before and during the crisis. We find that both economic fundamentals such as trade structure, interest rates, inflation rates, industrial production, and regional effects, and investors’ risk aversion contribute to international contagion.     

Global financial crisis and emerging stock market contagion: A volatility impulse response function approach

By employing the volatility impulse response (VIRF) approach, this paper presents a general framework for addressing the extent of contagion effects between the BRICSs’ and U.S. stock markets and how the BRICSs’ stock markets have been influenced in the context of the 2007–2009 global financial crisis. Our empirical results show during the period of 2007–2009 global financial crisis, there are significant contagion effects from the U.S. to the BRICSs’ stock markets. Yet, the degree of stock market reactions to such shocks differs from one market to another, depending on the level of integration with the international economy. Besides, the strengthened degree of stock market integration among the U.S. and BRICS has adverse effect such that if the 2007–2009 global financial crisis occurs today it may result in heavier impact on stock market volatility nowadays compared to the crisis-era.     

Crisis transmission: Some evidence from the Asian financial crisis

We used a crisis measure of financial market as defined by Sexena (1998) to study the nature of crisis transmission and the channels through which the 1997 crisis was transmitted among Asian financial markets. Estimated with a vector autoregression (VAR) and an OLS model on Asian financial markets from January 1990 to December 1998, we found that:

1.

During the crisis period, crisis transmission was more significant than during other noncrisis periods;

2.

Comparing the crisis transmission within the industrialized countries (Taiwan, Korea, and Japan), within the emerging countries (Thailand, Malaysia, The Philippines, and Indonesia), and between the industrialized and emerging groups, it is shown that

2.1.

The crisis transmission among the three industrialized countries was not significant.

2.2.

The crises originated from Thailand and Malaysia were transmitted to other emerging countries.

2.3.

The crisis transmission between industrialized and emerging countries was not found to be significant. There was evidence showing that Singapore served as an intermediary transmitting crisis between industrialized and emerging countries during this particular crisis.

3.

The transmission through the wake-up call effect was found to be more significant than other transmission channels. Trade relationship and cash-in effects only existed in Korea, Thailand, and Malaysia.

     

Financial globalization, financial crises and contagion

Two observations suggest that financial globalization played an important role in the recent financial crisis. First, more than half of the rise in net borrowing of the U.S. non-financial sectors since the mid-1980s has been financed by foreign lending. Second, the collapse of the U.S. housing and mortgage-backed-securities markets had worldwide effects on financial institutions and asset markets. Using an open-economy model where financial intermediaries play a central role, we show that financial integration leads to a sharp rise in net credit in the most financially developed country and to large asset price spillovers of country-specific shocks to bank capital. The impacts of these shocks on asset prices are amplified by bank capital requirements based on mark-to-market.     

Do institutions prevent contagion in financial markets? Evidence from the European debt crisis

ABSTRACT

The recent European Sovereign Debt Crisis brought in attention a number of structural problems in the European Union. Part of the effort to correct these problems in the countries that were mostly affected by the crisis were a number of policy responses from the European Union, the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the Local Governments. In this study, we attempt to assess the success of these responses to constrain the contagion of the crisis from the banking sector to the real economy sectors of the Eurozone countries. Our results show that policy announcements from the EU/ECB/IMF affect the transmission of shocks generated in the banking sector to the market. Moreover, policy responses of the national governments also seem to play a role in the contagion of the crisis.     

Linkages between Indian and US financial markets: impact of global financial crisis and Eurozone debt crisis

This paper examines inter-linkages between Indian and US equity, foreign exchange and money markets using the vector autoregressive-multivariate GARCH-BEKK framework. We investigate the impact of global financial crisis (GFC) and Eurozone debt crisis (EZDC) on the conditional volatility and conditional correlation estimates derived from the multivariate GARCH model for Indian and US financial markets. Our results indicate that there is significant bidirectional causality-in-mean between the Indian stock market returns and the Rs./USD market returns, and significant unidirectional causality-in-mean from the US stock market returns to the Indian stock market returns. As regards volatility spillovers, we find that volatility in the Indian stock market rises in response to domestic as well as US financial market shocks but Indian financial market shocks do not impact the US markets. Further, impact of the recent crisis episodes on the covariance matrix is found to be significant. We find that volatility in the Indian and US financial markets significantly amplified during GFC. The conditional correlations across asset markets were significantly accentuated in the wake of the two crisis episodes. The impact of GFC on cross-market conditional correlations is higher for majority of the asset market pairs in comparison to the EZDC.     

Stock market recovery from the 2008 financial crisis: The differences across Europe

This study investigates the influence of the 2008 financial crisis on a number of European stock markets. The sample includes EU benchmark indices as well as European markets with slowed or hampered recovery over a period of ten years (2004–2014) thus allowing a comparison on their development before, during and after the crisis. We utilize a novel approach based on a combination of stochastic modeling and continuous wavelet transform. It enables a robust distinction between expected and unexpected spillover effects as well as assessment of the expected speed of European stock markets recovery. It further quantifies the temporal boundaries of absorption of negative and positive shocks coming from the US stock market and explains the observed asymmetry. The studied European markets are divided into several groups and expectations are built on the speed of their recovery. We find that the major reasons for the discrepancies observed between actual and expected recovery for some of the markets are due to structural breaks in the co-movement with US market as well as to weak domestic fundamentals.     

How likely is contagion in financial networks?

Interconnections among financial institutions create potential channels for contagion and amplification of shocks to the financial system. We estimate the extent to which interconnections increase expected losses and defaults under a wide range of shock distributions. In contrast to most work on financial networks, we assume only minimal information about network structure and rely instead on information about the individual institutions that are the nodes of the network. The key node-level quantities are asset size, leverage, and a financial connectivity measure given by the fraction of a financial institution’s liabilities held by other financial institutions. We combine these measures to derive explicit bounds on the potential magnitude of network effects on contagion and loss amplification. Spillover effects are most significant when node sizes are heterogeneous and the originating node is highly leveraged and has high financial connectivity. Our results also highlight the importance of mechanisms that go beyond simple spillover effects to magnify shocks; these include bankruptcy costs, and mark-to-market losses resulting from credit quality deterioration or a loss of confidence. We illustrate the results with data on the European banking system.     

Individual financial risk tolerance and the global financial crisis

We investigate individual investors’ tolerance towards financial risk by focusing on changes associated with the global financial crisis (GFC) of 2007–2009. Financial risk tolerance (FRT) is analysed longitudinally controlling for demographic, socio‐economic and regional variations. In absolute terms, the change in FRT is small and contrasts with a popular view that risk tolerance is an elastic psychological state overly influenced by the pervading market conditions. Even in the presence of significant financial events, FRT tends to be a reasonably stable attribute in the shorter term but possibly influenced and reshaped by events more gradually over time.     

Financial sector structure and financial crisis burden

We consider an overlapping generations model in the presence of financial intermediation. The paper focuses on the analysis of the consequences of a sudden negative repayments shock on financial intermediation capacity and consequently on the economy as a whole. The model exhibits a property of the ‘chain reaction’ when a single macroeconomic shock can lead to the exhaustion of credit resources and subsequently to the collapse of the banking system. To maintain the capability of the system to recover, a regulatory intervention is needed even in presence of the state guarantees on agents’ deposits in the banks. We compare the results for an intermediated economy with those derived for the market economy and draw some broad conclusions regarding the crisis consequences depending on the financial sector structure. We also compare the model predictions with the stylised facts about the Russian financial crisis of 1998.     

Economists in the 2008 financial crisis: Slow to see,fast to act

We study the economics- and finance-scholars’ reaction to the 2008 financial crisis using machine learning language analyses methods of Latent Dirichlet Allocation and dynamic topic modelling algorithms, to analyze the texts of 14,270 NBER working papers covering the 1999–2016 period. We find that academic scholars as a group were insufficiently engaged in crises’ studies before 2008. As the crisis unraveled, however, they switched their focus to studying the crisis, its causes, and consequences. Thus, the scholars were “slow-to-see,” but they were “fast-to-act.” Their initial response to the ongoing Covid-19 crisis is consistent with these conclusions.     

Stock market dependence in crisis periods: Evidence from oil price shocks and the Qatar blockade

This paper examines the correlation and the dependence patterns of the Qatar stock market with other markets using copula statistical theory and exploiting new datasets covering the period August 1998 to June 2018. To examine the crisis –specific change in the average degree of dependence we decomposed the data into the time periods before and after oil price shocks and the 2017 political crisis among the Gulf Cooperation Council members (i.e. the Qatari blockade). Our findings from the static copula modelling show that the correlations between the Qatari and the other stock markets significantly change after the oil price and the blockade crisis as well. The degree of change in the correlation is time varying and differs from county-group to another. Moreover, our findings reveals that the 2008 global financial crisis has a stronger impact than the price shocks and political crisis. The findings of the paper are of interest and allow for formulating a reliable and dynamic portfolio design framework for investors and risk managers.     

Testing for financial contagion based on a nonparametric measure of the cross‐market correlation

When contagion is defined as a significant increase in market comovement after a shock to one country, we propose a test for financial contagion based on a nonparametric measure of the cross-market correlation. Monte Carlo simulation studies show that our test has reasonable size and good power to detect financial contagion, and that Forbes and Rigobon's test (2002) is relatively conservative, indicating that their test tends not to find evidence of contagion when it does exist. Applying our test to investigate contagion from the 1997 East Asian crisis and the 2007 Subprime crisis, we find that there existed international financial contagion from the two financial crises.     

Endogenous crisis dating and contagion using smooth transition structural GARCH

Detecting contagion during financial crises requires the demarcation of crisis periods. We develop a method for endogenously dating both the start and finish of crises, along with measuring contagion effects. Identification is achieved by coupling smooth transition functions with structural GARCH. In an application to US equity, bond and REIT returns for 2001–2010, we identify four phases; a pre-crisis period to July 2007, two phases of crisis up to and following October 2008, and a post-crisis phase from mid-May 2009. We detect significant contagion during the crisis and find evidence that the post-crisis period has not returned to pre-crisis relations.     

Trade credit and company performance during the 2008 financial crisis

We investigate whether the 2008 financial crisis had an impact on companies’ trade credit, and whether changes in trade credit mitigated the crisis’s impact on firm profitability. We document that the availability of trade credit decreased, and that this decline is more pronounced, the higher the companies’ pre‐crisis reliance on short‐term debt. We further report evidence that the redistribution hypothesis holds during crisis periods. Finally, we show that the crisis had a negative impact on company performance, but that this impact was lower (greater) for firms that report an increase in trade receivables (payables) in crisis compared to pre‐crisis periods.     

Capital and income financialization: Accounting for the 2008 financial crisis

Financialization is recognised as a key feature of the 2008 financial crisis. We argue that a lesson is the need for an accounting framework which focuses upon financialization allowing it to be monitored and controlled by stakeholders. We argue that financialization has been permitted through the failure of accounting to distinguish distributable income from capital gains/transfers and to distinguish productive from speculative capital. We introduce an accounting presentation (4S accounting) which effectively makes these distinctions. We use a stylized example to illustrate how it should be applied to the financial reporting of banks.     

International linkage of the Russian market and the Russian financial crisis: A multivariate GARCH analysis

This study considers the linkage of the Russian equity market to the world market, examining the international transmission of the Russia's 1998 financial crisis utilizing the GARCH–BEKK model proposed by Engle and Kroner [Engle, R.F., Kroner, K.F., 1995. Multivariate simultaneous generalized ARCH. Economet. Theor. 11, 122–150]. We find evidence of direct linkage between the Russian equity market with regards to returns and volatility, while the weakness of the linkage suggests that the Russian equity market was only partially integrated into the world market. At the time of the crisis, evidence of contagion is clear.     

Volatility Spillovers and Contagion During the Asian Crisis: Evidence from Six Southeast Asian Stock Markets

Using a multivariate generalized autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (GARCH-M) model, we investigate volatility spillovers in six Southeast Asian stock markets around the time of the 1997 Asian crisis. We focus on interactions with the U.S. market as a world financial market, and with the Japanese market as a regional financial market. We also use bivariate GARCH-M models to examine the behavior of individual markets and their interactions with other markets in the region. All models lend support to the idea of the "Asian contagion," which started in Thailand and rapidly spread to other markets.     

An asymmetric dynamic conditional correlation analysis of linkages of European financial institutions during the Greek sovereign debt crisis

This article employs the asymmetric dynamic conditional correlation (DCC) model to assess impacts of the recent sovereign debt crisis on the time-varying correlations of five European financial institutions holding large amounts of Greek sovereign bonds (National Bank of Greece, BNP Paribas, Dexia, Generali, and Commerzbank). Contrary to the results of preceding studies, we find significant increases in the correlations between several combinations of the financial institutions’ stock returns after the inception of the sovereign debt crisis, indicating contagion effects. Moreover, our findings show that the parameter of the standardized negative residuals is statistically significant in the case of DCC estimates between two specific institutions. This suggests that the conditional correlation of stock returns between the two institutions is more significantly influenced by negative shocks than by positive innovations to return.