Measuring the Economic Effects of Competition Law Enforcement

Summary  Together with a move from a rules-based legal approach to a more economic approach in competition cases, the economic effects of competition law enforcement have received increasing attention. Measuring these effects is important for external accountability of the Competition Authority, for quality control of its decisions and for evaluating the effectiveness of the competition law. This raises many issues in measurement, including the choice of counterfactual, the choice of effects to be measured, and the proper use of available data. The papers in this Special Issue of De Economist discuss these and related issues, based on a broad range of experience in competition law enforcement.      

论执法人员在执法活动中的失误及其补救

执法人员在执法过程中造成的失误 ,给公民、法人和社会组织的合法权益造成了损失。究其原因是多方面的 ,既有主观的 ,也有客观的。主观方面表现为执法人员素质低下 ,对法律、法规的理解不透 ;客观方面表现在法律不健全及各方面的干扰 ,造成了执法方面的失误。因此 ,就要求我们对执法人员造成的失误要及时补救 ,这样做才能体现社会主义法制的优越性 ,树立执法机关的形象 ,维护公民、法人和社会组织的合法权不受侵害     

Financial Market Competition: The Effects of Transparency

European and US financial markets are faced with increased competition for order flow. Fundamental in the competition process is the organization of the trading process, since this directly influences the performance and trading costs of those markets. In this paper we examine the effects of public quote disclosure and the disclosure of transaction information on market liquidity and price efficiency. Our results indicate a clear trade-off between efficiency and liquidity. These findings could explain why a variety of co-existing trading structures can be optimal among competitive financial markets.     

Competition in the Pay-TV Market

This paper discusses competition in the emerging pay-TV market. Economic features of the industry are described, and the current state of the market in the UK is summarized. Two simple formal models of the industry are analyzed: First the danger of two vertically integrated pay-TV networks entering into collusive agreements to exchange programming with each other is discussed; second, the private and social incentives for signing exclusive contracts for premium programming are analyzed. J. Japan. Int. Econ., December 1999, 13(4), pp. 257–280. Nuffield College, Oxford OX1 1NF, United Kingdom. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D43, L13, L41, L82.     

Enforcement,Socioeconomic Diversity,and Tax Filing Compliance in the United States

In this article, we examine the determinants of tax filing compliance in the United States. We use county‐level data on non‐filing rates for the tax year 2000, obtained directly from the Internal Revenue Service. We include explanatory variables identified in the “rational compliance” framework, including an enforcement index against identified non‐filers, the audit rate of filers, and the average penalty rate for both filers and non‐filers. We also examine the role of socioeconomic diversity on tax compliance, testing whether within‐county heterogeneity in household income, language, race, and religion can help explain variation in non‐filing rates. We find that non‐filing is increasing with heterogeneity by race, although not by income or language, and that non‐filing is decreasing with heterogeneity by religious membership. As for enforcement variables, we find that non‐filing rates tend to fall with the enforcement index. Other variables have somewhat mixed results.     

Competition Policy in Indonesia and the New Anti-Monopoly and Fair Competition Law

This paper explores the role of competition policy in shaping a business environment that will encourage firms to improve their efficiency and competitiveness. After discussing the scope and objectives of competition policy, and whether a liberal trade and investment regime can substitute for, or should complement, a competition law, the paper offers an assessment of Indonesia's new competition law. Its shortcomings include a serious lack of clarity about objectives and a confusion between objectives and the means to achieve them; a failure to distinguish between various kinds of monopoly; a tendency to prohibit certain activities and agreements between firms without a clear analysis of the underlying economics involved; unnecessary and counterproductive exemptions from the provisions of the law; and failure to confront the reality that the principal obstacle to competition in the past has been unwarranted government intervention in markets.     

从美国航空市场的发展看市场竞争形态的演变

本文借助经济学模型分析了70年代前后美国航空运输业的市场竞争形态 ,指出管制时期的政府垄断给该行业造成的诸多不便以及驱赶消费购买的定量假设 ;进而着重分析了放松管制时期的美国民航运输在以自由竞争为核心的市场化改造过程中所呈现的兴旺发达的业态情景。最后结合我国民航运输现状 ,借鉴美国成功经验 ,提出引入市场竞争机制 ,尽早放松政府管制的政策建议。     

当前价格执法存在的问题及对策

价格执法是当前市场经济条件下的一个重要课题，本文探讨了当前价格执法存在的主要问题，原因和问题解决的对策。     

刍议节能执法的机制创新

节能执法机制应不断作出创新：宏观上,利用市场和行政两种调节手段形成宏观上的＂推拉双动力＂节能机制;微观上,交错运用＂科技节能＂和＂管理节能＂形成微观上的节能＂双动力节能机制＂;执法体制上,形成多部门相配合的＂节能执法联动机制＂;激励机制上,形成对政府、企业到个人的环环相扣的＂节能倒逼机制＂。     

德国二板市场:法兰克福新市场

一、富有活力的德国"新市场" 1997年3月10日,德国交易所股份公司设立的证券主板市场之外的二板市场--"新市场"正式启动."新市场"启动后,显示出了强大的生命力,并日益成为德国证券业的支柱之一.金融分析家认为,由于越来越多的新经济类企业在此挂牌上市,使新市场不断膨胀.虽然人们目前还不能确定它未来的地位是否替代主板市场--由30个德国最大企业组成的德国达克斯市场,但它与达克斯并驾齐驱已日趋明显,而达克斯也在不断地吸收新市场上成长最快的企业.     

Assessing the Effects of Antitrust Enforcement in the United States

Summary  This article reviews empirical evidence informing an assessment of cartel and merger antitrust enforcement in the United States and makes some reasonable inferences from it. It also explains why an objective assessment based on hard evidence is not possible for the critical deterrence effects of enforcement, or for any of the effects of enforcement against single-competitor exclusionary conduct. Finally, this article describes the reporting by the U.S. Department of Justice of consumer savings from its antitrust enforcement actions, and details the construction of the savings estimates from cartel and horizontal merger enforcement. The views expressed herein are not purported to represent those of the U.S. Department of Justice.     

Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes? or Measuring and Evaluating the Effectiveness of Competition Enforcement

Summary  This article surveys, discusses and classifies methods for ex-post evaluation of the efficiency of competition authorities: court appeals, peer reviews, case studies, event studies, (authorities’ own) bottom-up calculations of consumer gains, deadweight-loss estimates, cross-country panel studies etc. Based on empirical estimates from other types of studies and on a simple oligopoly model, one conclusion is that many bottom-up calculations are based on exaggerated estimates of gains from cartel enforcement, relative to those from merger enforcement. Another conclusion is that authorities’ ex-post self evaluations are of limited value, relative to external evaluations. “Who watches the guardians?”, by Juvenal, 2nd century Roman poet and critic.     

Alchian and Allen Revisited: Law Enforcement and the Price of Weed

Alchian and Allen (1964) theorized that the imposition of a fixed fee or a unit cost in a market with multiple quality grades of the good would encourage consumption of the higher quality grades. Using newly available data on marijuana prices by state, we empirically test the hypothesis that the price of higher quality marijuana will be higher in states with more strict enforcement of marijuana possession laws. Consistent with the Alchian-Allen theorem, the relative price of both medium- and high-quality marijuana are found to be greater in states with stricter law enforcement, suggesting an increase in demand for such varieties.     

Effects of U.S. Trade Remedy Law Enforcement under Uncertainty: The Case of Steel

This paper investigates the impact of U.S. trade remedy law enforcement on import penetration of foreign-manufactured steel into the U.S. steel market. Given the quasi-judicial process for implementation of the two provisions relevant to U.S. steel imports, section 701 (countervailing duty) and section 731 (antidumping duty), I derive the probability-augmented model to be used as the theoretical basis for the research. The results obtained in this paper indicate that the trade remedy policy was effective. However, the elasticity-measured degree of effectiveness was small.     

Identity and the Self-Reinforcing Effects of Norm Compliance

When making political and economic decisions (e.g., voting, donating money to a cause), individuals consider the expectations of groups with which they identify. These expectations are injunctive norms, shared beliefs about appropriate behavior for identity group members, and individuals' choices reflect trade-offs between adherence to these norms and other preferences. We show that when those who identify moderately/strongly with the group pay a cost as a consequence of avoiding a norm violation, they subsequently view the norms as stronger than those that paid no cost. This is evident in their greater willingness to pay an additional cost to punish/reward other group members for violating/complying with the norm. They also view other norms associated with the identity as stronger. In this way, costly norm compliance may be self-reinforcing.     

Jobs in the Bureaucratic Afterlife: A Corruption-Facilitating Mechanism Associated with Law Enforcement

This article starts with an observation that the employment of former regulatory officers by a regulated firm might be an integral part of the corruption-facilitating mechanism (CFM). The article hypothesizes that such employment constitutes the deferred payment for the corruption previously supplied. Although anecdotal evidence of this kind of corruption abounds, it has proven difficult to substantiate. The article provides an explanation for why this deferred payment arrangement might be attractive to both demanders and suppliers of corruption. It also offers tentative empirical support for the hypothesis that it plays a role as CFM in Korea, with the implication that this CFM hypothesis can be generalized to a host of regulatory countries.     

Deviations from the Mandatory Adoption of IFRS in the European Union: Implementation,Enforcement, Incentives,and Compliance

In this paper, we evaluate the common assumption that European Union (EU) firms began using international financial reporting standards (IFRS) in 2005 when the EU formally adopted IFRS. Although the incidence of firms using local (or some other) GAAP declined between 2005 and 2012, it is still non‐trivial. By 2012 the incidence of non‐IFRS financial statements was still in excess of 17 percent (87 percent of which were fully consolidated). We estimate a model of the non‐adoption of IFRS as a function of implementation features of the IFRS regulation, country‐specific enforcement, and firm‐specific reporting incentives. As expected, being specifically required by EU‐wide and country‐specific rules to adopt IFRS is positively associated with IFRS adoption but does not constitute a complete explanation. Proxies for enforcement are significantly associated with non‐adoption, but the marginal effects of the enforcement variables are weak. We find that larger firms, firms with foreign operations and more analyst following, and firms that issue new debt and equity were more likely to adopt IFRS, both when the regulation was initially imposed and in subsequent years. We conclude that many EU firms do not use IFRS; that some firms exploited definitions, exemptions, and deferrals to avoid adopting IFRS while some firms simply failed to comply with the regulation; and that firms responded to their incentives in deciding whether to adopt IFRS.     

Local Intergovernmental Competition and the Law of 1/n

This article proposes an empirical framework based on a synthesis of the seminal “Law of 1/n” and “Leviathan” theories, which models the relationship between government spending and the number of jurisdictions in a federal system as determined by the interplay of the costs related to centralized government (which fall as the number of jurisdictions increases) and the costs of distributive politics (which rise as the number of jurisdictions increases). Using a panel of U.S. state and local government spending data, empirical tests based on this combined framework show that the effect of intergovernmental competition predicted by the Leviathan model is partially offset by the Law of 1/n. This result helps explain the inconsistent findings in the previous empirical literature.     

市场过程理论的过程竞争:与新古典经济学完全竞争的对比

新古典经济学视野内的完全竞争,由于排斥了时间、知识和人类行动因素,成为缺乏争胜竞争活动的抽象概念和理想状态。市场过程理论则将竞争理解为一个争胜动态过程,特别关注过程竞争发现知识的功能,强调过程竞争内生各种竞争活动的动态效率特征。在过程竞争看来,包括广告、产品差异、市场势力等被新古典经济学贴上不完全竞争或垄断标签的活动,实际上都是有效率的争胜竞争形式。市场过程内生的垄断具有效率特征,不应该成为反垄断的对象。