恶性竞争没有胜利者

近年来,国内企业竞争对手间恶性竞争、恶意竞争的案例不断发生。从动因的角度来看,企业竞争策略可以分为良性竞争、恶性竞争和恶意竞争。良性竞争即从社会、经济、管理的方面来解释,促进企业间的良性发展为标准,竞争者之间的竞争导致双赢和行业得到良性发展。恶性竞争是竞争结果导致企     

心理契约知识型员工人力资源管理

企业间的竞争越来越激烈,如何管理好知识型员工对企业的核心竞争力至关重要,从心理契约的角度,提出企业管理知识型员工的策略。     

全面客户体验与零售业的发展

从现代市场竞争的焦点来看,企业间的竞争主要是客户之争。作为零售企业来讲,要夺取市场,争夺客源,就必须赢得顾客的心。从这个意义上来讲,市场就是消费者的心。从国内外实践和理论分析来看,今天的消费者心理最需要的不仅是产品和服务,更需要的是体验。因此,我国零售业的发展应该转到为顾客提供“全面客户体验”的经营理念上来。     

浅谈如何做好建筑施工企业员工培训

企业间的竞争是人才的竞争,培训作为培养人才的一种重要手段,已成为企业在竞争激烈的市场上能否取胜的一项关键性工作。由于建筑施工企业内部结构和人员结构的复杂性,如何做好员工培训工作就成了企业的头等大事。文章从不同层面、不同角度对企业如何做好员工培训进行了探讨。     

论价格战的两面性

价格战是企业实施成本领先战略的必然后果 ,价格战不是低级的竞争策略 ,而是一种必不可少的竞争策略 ,它与价值战不是对抗性的 ,而是相互补充的。价格战从某种角度来说 ,于国、于企业、于消费者都有好处 ,但并不是所有的企业 ,都适合打价格战 ,在不恰当的时机 ,对不恰当的产品 ,发动价格战的结果可能是害人又害己。     

服务创新视角下的业务延伸研究

同质化中间产品的竞争为企业实施业务延伸创造了机会。业务延伸是一种服务创新过程控制策略,基于产品层次模型,对业务延伸进行了定义,从顾客价值等式角度探讨了业务延伸的实施条件。构建了消费者剩余模型,分析了材料损耗率和加工效率对消费者剩余的影响。研究表明,业务延伸能实现产品创新和服务差异化,增强完全产品竞争力,最大化消费者剩余,强化客户合作关系。     

基于顾客体验与顾客共创价值策略研究

技术的发展使企业间产品与成本的差异性越来越小,顾客体验研究受到广泛关注。从顾客体验的角度分析企业与顾客在产品产生和消费,以及消费后各个环节的有效互动进而与顾客共同创造价值的策略,并分析了实施该策略能够帮助企业获得持续的竞争优势和避免营销短视。     

浅谈高校后勤企业人才流失的原因与对策

企业之间的竞争,国家之间的竞争,归根结底还是人才的竞争。人才优势和人才竞争是企业间竞争中最为本质的内容,面对目前高校后勤企业普遍存在的人才流失的现象,文章从人才流失的原因入手,讨论了人才流失对企业的影响,并提出了应对的策略。     

浅析网络经济下中小企业的营销策略创新

网络经济时代,企业间的竞争异常激烈.中小企业经营者只有认清营销环境的复杂性,找出自身的不足,分析网络消费者的心理,创新营销策略,才能有效增强企业的市场竞争力.     

战略联盟中的互信机制

20世纪90年代以来,战略管理的研究出现了一个转折点,即研究的重点由竞争转向合作,提出了战略联盟的观点。随着世界经济的一体化,企业尤其是跨国企业的竞争日益激烈,无论是竞争的强度、方式、手段和策略,还是竞争的范围及结果都大大超过了以往。为了企业的长远发展目标和应对强大的市场竞争压力,提升企业核心竞争力,许多企业开始对企业间的竞争关系进行战略性调整．纷纷从对立竞争转向合作竞争,其合作竞争的主要形式就是建立企业间的战略联盟。     

Backward Integration by a Dominant Firm

This paper studies the welfare consequences of a vertical merger that raises rivals' costs when downstream competition is a la Cournot between firms with constant asymmetric marginal costs. The main result is that such a vertical merger can nevertheless improve welfare if it involves a downstream firm whose cost is low enough. This is because by raising the input price paid by the nonmerging firms the merger shifts production away from those relatively inefficient producers in favor of the more efficient firm. Yet, there is a trade-off between the gain in productive efficiency and the loss in consumers' surplus caused by the higher downstream price that follows a higher input price. It is also shown, through an example, that this result extends to price competition with differentiated products.     

Strategic behavior in a service industry

A model of service duopoly is formulated, where the arrival of customers and their service time in the firm are stochastic. The firms first choose the service capacity, and given the capacity they then choose the price in a Bertrand competition. Capacity choices have a negative externality on the competitor, since increased capacity in one firm decreases its expected full price (price plus cost of waiting) and leads to a flow of customers from the other firm. If the firms choose capacities strategically, it is optimal to underinvest compared to the non‐strategic case, but this result may arise in different ways. By underinvesting the firms commit themselves to longer queues (lower quality) to relax price competition. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Competing for Consumers with Self‐Control Problems

I examine strategic implications of competing for consumers with self‐control problems. For investment goods, like health clubs, I find that the equilibrium sign‐up (lump‐sum) fees decrease when competition intensifies, similarly to prices in standard oligopoly models. However, the equilibrium attendance (per‐unit) price increases due to firms' deteriorated ability to take advantage of consumers' self‐control problems. Moreover, firms earn less profit due to consumers' self‐control problems—the firms have a unilateral incentive to charge per‐unit fees lower than the marginal cost; however, they cannot make up the lost margins by increasing the lump‐sum fee, due to competition. I also show that for plausible parameter regions the market adjusts to consumers' self‐control problem in such a way that firms play the standard equilibrium strategies that they would have engaged in with fully rational consumers, with identical market outcomes. Most of the results are qualitatively the same for leisure goods (for example, credit cards); however, some results are reversed: the per‐unit fees are higher than marginal cost and decrease as competition intensifies.     

Price Competition When Consumersare Uncertain About Which Firm Sells Which Quality

In this paper we analyze the properties of price equilibria in a duopoly market where firms sell vertically differentiated products, consumers being uncertain about which firm sells which quality. Both existence and properties of price equilibria are characterized by the beliefs of the consumers' population about the distribution of quality between firms.     

公用事业民营化项目中的管制结构与风险

为了防止投资于公用事业的民营企业赚取超额利润，维护广大消费者的利益，政府应当对经营公用事业的公司进行管制。管制结构一般有价格帽，价格帽加成本传递、收入帽、收益率管制等。文中分析了各种管制下的民营公司承担的风险，并做了实证分析。     

Reference Dependence and Market Competition

This paper examines the implications of consumer reference dependence for market competition. If consumers take some product (e.g., the first product they consider) as the reference point when evaluating others and they exhibit loss aversion, then the more “prominent” firm whose product is taken as the reference point by more consumers will randomize between a high and a low price. We also find that consumer loss aversion in the price dimension intensifies competition while that in the product dimension softens competition. With consumer reference dependence, asymmetric prominence can arise as an equilibrium outcome when firms advertise before engaging in price competition.     

Discriminatory input pricing and strategic delegation

This paper examines how discriminatory input pricing by an upstream monopolist affects the incentives that owners of downstream duopolists offer their managers. Regardless of the mode of competition (quantity or price), owners of downstream firms induce their managers to be more profit‐oriented and to behave less aggressively when the monopolist is allowed to price‐discriminate than when he charges a uniform price. If the monopolist price‐discriminates, managerial downstream firms always earn more than owner‐managed profit‐maximizing firms. However, if the monopolist charges a uniform price, managerial downstream firms earn more than profit‐maximizing counterparts under price competition and earn less under quantity competition. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

RECENT ADVANCES IN OLIGOPOLY THEORY FROM A GAME THEORY PERSPECTIVE

Abstract. This paper surveys the contribution that recent developments in game theory have made to the understanding of oligopoly theory. It is argued that conventional models suffer from the problem that there are a number of solution concepts offered with little guidance as to which should be selected, and this is related to the static nature of the models employed. One important development in game theory has been the analysis of repeated games, and when applied to oligopoly theory this suggests that outcomes may be more cooperative than conventional theory suggests. Related to this is the requirement that firms employ credible threats to punish cheating from cooperative outcomes, and the paper examines the extent to which imperfect information may restrict the scope of firms to employ such punishments. One way in which firms may seek to make threats credible is through strategic investments, for example in production capacity, and the paper explores how competition over price or output is integrated with competition over instruments for strategic investment.     

基于成本差异的最佳贸易与产业政策选择

本文讨论了存在成本差异的第三国市场模型的最佳贸易与产业政策选择问题，讨论了社会成本和私人成本、本国和外国成本差异情况下的Cournot竞争和Bertrand竞争的情况。本文发现，在Cournot竞争下，政府首先行动时，当政府基金影子价格低于4／3时，政府对出口进行补贴，并且本国越有成本优势，补贴越高，补贴的利润转移效应越大；当政府基金影子价格高于4／3时，政府对出口征收出口税，且本国越有成本优势，征税越多。在Bertrand竞争下，当政府先行动时，对出口征收出口税；当政府后行动时，对出口进行补贴。当本国企业具有劣势时，事后补贴是最佳政蓑。     

Price and Nonprice Competition with Endogenous Market Structure

This paper examines the effect of the intensity of short-run price competition and other exogenous variables that affect gross profit margins—such as the degree of product differentiation and the consumers' responsiveness to quality—on market structure and on advertising and R&D expenditure. A key result is that more intense short-run competition can lead to lower concentration in industries with high advertising or R&D intensity, unlike exogenous-sunk-cost industries. Also, price competition has a negative effect on advertising or R&D expenditure. A case study is also presented, which is consistent with the theoretical results of the paper.