Who invests more in advanced abatement technology? Theory and evidence

We study firm investment in abatement technology under a heterogeneous‐firm framework. We find that more‐productive firms make more (less) investment in abatement technology if investment and productivity are complements (substitutes). Under linear demand, firms’ abatement investments exhibit an inverted U‐shape with respect to productivity level. This finding is in contrast to results in existing studies. We also find that in response to tightened environmental regulations, more‐productive firms raise their respective investments in abatement technology, whereas less‐productive firms do the opposite. More‐productive firms have lower pollution emission intensity. The key theoretical predictions are confirmed by empirical tests using Chinese data.     

Do people who care about others cooperate more? Experimental evidence from relative incentive pay

We experimentally study ways in which social preferences affect individual and group performance under indefinitely repeated relative incentives. We also identify the mediating role that communication and leadership play in generating these effects. We find other-regarding individuals tend to depress efforts by 15% on average. However, selfish individuals are nearly three times more likely to lead players to coordinate on minimal efforts when communication is possible. Hence, the other-regarding composition of a group has complex consequences for organizational performance.     

Who benefits from big government? A life satisfaction approach

Which impact does government size have on life satisfaction, and how do effects of bigger government differ between income groups in society? Previous studies typically employed country averages and thus neglected possibly heterogeneous happiness effects between income groups. This paper addresses empirically the effects of government spending on subjective well-being of individuals belonging to different income groups. Our analysis is based on individual data from 25 European countries participating in the European Social Survey. In contrast to most previous studies we take account of the endogeneity between relative income position and reported life satisfaction by an instrumental variable approach. Our results suggest, first, that most government spending categories, including social protection, are on average negatively related to individual well-being. Secondly, estimated marginal effects of health, education and social protection spending at different income levels show that spending increases always have a stronger negative effect on high income groups’ well-being than on low income groups’ life satisfaction. For all government spending categories, marginal happiness effects of higher public spending are clearly negative for income groups at the top.     

Who would pay more for a fragrance-free laundry detergent? How health information affects valuation

Fragrance allergy is a lifelong condition, and the probability of being affected increases with frequent exposure to fragrance. Currently, fragrance-free laundry detergents are not common in supermarkets. We used a contingent valuation among Austrian consumers in a within-respondent treatment to estimate how willingness to pay is influenced by health information. We found that higher income groups have a higher willingness to pay for fragrance-free detergents. Informing consumers about health impacts substantially increases this difference. Our simulation shows that lower-income groups benefit from health information only if low-priced fragrance-free detergents are available on the market.     

Who trades quickly?

We examine differences among US equity market participants according to how quickly, on average, they execute their orders. When traders who execute faster buy (sell), market prices tend to rise (decline). Those who trade more quickly take liquidity more, use smaller trade sizes, transact more frequently, and spread their trading across more venues. Although faster traders are net liquidity demanders, they pay a lower cost to trade. Our results indicate that systematic differences exist across market participants according to how fast they transact, and those with a shorter time to execution exhibit traits that are consistent with information-based trading.     

Who Gains from Boycotts? A Welfare Analysis of Consumer Activism

This paper explores the welfare consequences of product boycotts by linking product and labor markets. Consumers' threat of boycott can affect the firm's decision such as production location, size of operation and wage rate. Such conscientious action, however, can actually result in a welfare loss of the workers of concern as well as consumers themselves. The analysis suggests that consumers set their goals by studying the labor market and coordinating with local groups rather than demanding what may seem righteous.     

Who was colonized and when? A cross-country analysis of determinants

The process of colonization has shaped the economic and demographic contours of the modern world. In this paper, we study the determinants of the occurrence and timing of colonization of non-European countries by Western European powers. Of particular interest is the role of early development measures that are known to be strong correlates of present-day levels of income. We show that non-European societies with longer histories of agriculture and statehood and higher levels of technology adoption in 1500 were less likely to be colonized, and tended to be colonized later if at all. We also find that proximity to the colonizing powers, disease environment, and latitude are significant predictors of the occurrence and timing of colonization, although their impacts are less robust to choice of country sample. Our models have high explanatory power, and their support for the significance of early development is robust to the use of alternative indicators of early development and disease, to the use of instruments to focus on the exogenous component of early development, and to the joint estimation of the colonization and timing equations to correct for potential selection bias.     

Fast or fair? A study of response times

This paper uses a modified dictator game to investigate the relationship between response times and social preferences. We find that faster subjects more often chose the option with the highest payoff for themselves. Moreover, our within-analysis reveals that, for a given individual, payoff maximizing choices are reached quicker than choices expressing social preferences.     

Who moves? A logit model analysis of inter-provincial migration in Canada

This paper addresses the topic of inter-provincial migration in terms of the basic question: ‘Who moves?’. Panel logit models of the probability that an individual changes his or her province of residence from one year to the next over the 1982–1995 period are estimated using tax-based longitudinal data. It is found that moving is (i) inversely related to the home province's population size, presumably reflecting local economic conditions and labour market scale effects, while language also plays an important role; (ii) more common among residents of smaller cities, towns, and especially rural areas than those in larger cities; (iii) negatively related to age, marriage, and the presence of children for both men and women; (iv) positively related to the provincial unemployment rate, the individuals’ receipt of unemployment insurance (except Entry Men), having no market income (except for Entry Men and Entry Women), and the receipt of social assistance (especially for men); (v) (slightly) positively related to earnings levels (beyond the zero earnings point) for prime aged men, but not for others; and (vi) more or less stable over time, with men's rates declining slightly and women's holding steadier or rising slightly, indicating a divergence in trends along gender lines.     

Do dictatorships redistribute more?

This paper examines the effect of political institutions on fiscal redistribution for a country-level panel from 1960–2010. Using data on Gini coefficients before and after government intervention, we apply a measure of effective fiscal redistribution that reflects the effect of taxes and transfers on income inequality. Our findings clearly indicate that non-democratic regimes demonstrate significantly greater direct fiscal redistribution. Subsequently, we employ fiscal data in an attempt to enlighten this puzzling empirical finding. We find that dictatorial regimes rely more heavily on cash transfers that exhibit a direct impact on net inequality and consequently on the difference between market and net inequality (i.e., effective fiscal redistribution), whereas democratic regimes devote a larger amount of resources to public inputs (health and education) that may influence market inequality but not the difference between market and net inequality per se. We argue that the driving force behind the observed differences within the pattern on government spending and effective fiscal redistribution is that democratic institutions lead survival-oriented leaders to care more for the private market, and thus to follow policies that enhance the productivity of the whole economy.     

When do more selfish politicians manipulate less,not more?

We model the political manipulation of deficits in a political budget cycle model. Assuming that a share of voters suffers from debt illusion the incumbent can increase her re-election chances by expanding government spending. However, the optimal manipulation may exceed the amount necessary to maximize re-election chances (over-manipulation) if the deficit is not very costly (low repayment obligation). Then, more selfish politicians (higher ego rents and, therefore, increased re-election motivation) reduce the over-manipulation. Conversely, “excessive” spending may wrongly be interpreted as opportunistic government manipulation. Theoretical results are supported empirically, with very robust evidence in a sample of 87 democracies.     

Richer and cleaner—At others’ expense?

In rich economies emissions of many pollutants tend to grow at a slower rate than GDP. This could be a result of shifting comparative advantages. If so, net imports of dirty products to these economies will increase and rather than reduced, emissions will be relocated to other countries. In this paper we investigate if decoupling in a rich, open economy coincides with such pollution leakages abroad. Based on historical observations and model projections, we find little evidence to support this hypothesis. Historically, decoupling coincides with falling pollution leakages. Projections over a period of decades indicate a weakening of the decoupling, but that leakages will increase.     

Are social entrepreneurs more risk-averse?

We have a conventional wisdom that risk-seeking behaviours are related to commercially oriented entrepreneurs. For this reason, most studies have focused on the context of commercial entrepreneurship, and thus we do not know the risk propensity of social entrepreneurs. Using the PSM method, contrary to our wisdom, we find that social entrepreneurs tend to more have about 15% risk-seeking propensity than commercial entrepreneurs.