CROSS-AUTOCORRELATION BETWEEN A SHARES AND B SHARES IN THE CHINESE STOCK MARKET

Listed companies in China, upon meeting certain requirements, can issue two types of shares: A shares and B shares. Local investors in China can only buy and sell A shares, while foreign investors can only buy and sell B shares. We argue that foreign investors may receive news about China faster than domestic Chinese investors because of information barriers in China. Since foreigners participate in the B-share market, the price movements of B shares should reflect the common information that the foreigners have. Rational A-share investors can therefore condition their trading decisions on the previous price movements of B shares. As a result, returns on B shares should lead the returns on A shares. Using daily prices of A and B shares, we demonstrate that returns of B shares are correlated with those of A shares and that this correlation depends on the information transmission mechanism at work. The pattern of the asymmetric cross-autocorrelation is robust to the inclusion of lagged realized returns and trading volumes.     

FOREIGN OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS AND MARKET SEGMENTATION IN CHINA'S STOCK MARKETS

We study market segmentation in China's stock markets, in which local firms issue two classes of shares: class A shares available only to Chinese citizens and class B shares available only to foreign citizens. Significant stock price discounts are documented for class B shares. We find that the price difference is primarily due to illiquid B‐share markets. Relatively illiquid B‐share stocks have a higher expected return and are priced lower to compensate investors for increased trading costs. However, between the two classes of shares, B‐share prices tend to move more closely with market fundamentals than do A‐share prices. Therefore, we find A‐share premiums rather than B‐share discounts in China's markets. JEL classification: G15     

Corporate governance and market segmentation: evidence from the price difference between Chinese A and H shares

This paper empirically examines whether the price difference between Chinese A shares, which are traded in the domestic market, and their matching H shares, which are traded in the Hong Kong market, can be explained by firms’ corporate governance characteristics. We find that the A- to H-share price premiums are higher for firms in which the controlling shareholders and corporate insiders have greater potential to expropriate wealth from outside investors. This result is robust when we use a variety of corporate governance variables specific to listed Chinese companies to explain the A-share price premiums and when we control for differences between domestic and foreign investors in required returns, degree of speculative trading, liquidity, information, and demand elasticity. Our findings highlight the important role of corporate governance in explaining the price difference in segmented stock markets.     

The effect of market segmentation on stock prices: The China syndrome

China has an A-share market that is open only to local investors and a B-share market that is open only to foreign investors. Contrary to what has been observed in other markets with a similar segmented structure, the China B shares trade at a discount relative to the A shares. We show that the phenomenon can still be explained by basic economic principles. Specifically, the existence of the H-share and the “red-chip” markets in Hong Kong provide good substitutes for the B-share market. We find that when more H shares and red chips are listed in Hong Kong, the B-share discount becomes larger. This is consistent with the model of differential demand elasticity proposed by Stulz and Wasserfallen (Stulz, R., Wasserfallen, W., 1995. Review of Financial Studies 8, 1019–1057).     

Stock price reactions to earnings announcements: evidence from Chinese markets

We examine the stock price reactions to changes in earnings per share (EPS) in the Chinese stock markets. We find that domestic A-share investors do not correctly anticipate the changes in earnings and fail to adjust new earnngs information quickly, but international B-share investors can predict earnings changes better than A-share investors. As a result, abnormal returns (ARs) can be obtained by trading on the earnings information, but for A shares only. An explanation is that most A-share holders are individuals with short-term investment horizon while most B-share holders are large institutions that trade on more detailed and accurate financial information not immediately available to A-share holders.     

Market liberalization within a country

China's B-share market, which used to be restricted to foreign investors, was partially opened up in February 2001 to Chinese local investors. We take this as a controlled experiment in cross-border trading on a small scale. We find mild but positive effects on the B-share market, with higher volumes, lower levels of volatility, lower bid–ask spreads and more liquidity after liberalization. Between A- and B-shares, price disparities narrowed; the correlation and the co-integration relationships became stronger; and the flow of information became more balanced. More new individual investors entered into the B-share market without crowding out existing institutional investors. Even though the liberalization measure is partial and one-way, it has helped to improve the quality of the B-share market, and our results lend no support to the popular claim that liberalization does nothing but help the existing foreign shareholders to cash out.     

Further evidence on the efficiency of the Chinese stock markets: A note

This paper examines the efficiency of the Chinese A-share and B-share markets following the deregulation of the B-share market which widened ownership to include domestic investors. Applying parametric and non-parametric variance ratio tests to the daily data of 370 shares over 1996–2005, the paper finds that A-shares are more efficient than B-shares, although the efficiency of both markets has improved following the regulatory change. Overall, the results suggest that the Chinese stock markets are characterised by information asymmetry, although the timely access to high quality information that domestic investors enjoy has improved the efficiency of the B-share market.     

Intraday trading volume and international spillover effects

The objective of this paper is to explore whether lagged trading activity in one market contributes to the return and volatility process in other markets, using 5-min concurrent data from German and British equity market. Our results lend support to our initial premise that if international investors have access to the same information set as domestic traders, then after observing foreign trading activity, market makers adjust prices to reflect their expectation of the security value, conditional upon all available information, including prior trades. Our findings clearly indicate that intraday trading volume contains predictive power for cross-border return and volatility processes. Moreover, these volume effects are found to be asymmetric in the sense that the impact of positive volume changes upon foreign stock market volatility is greater than is the impact of negative changes.     

A Model of Returns and Trading in Futures Markets

This paper develops an equilibrium model of a competitive futures market in which investors trade to hedge positions and to speculate on their private information. Equilibrium return and trading patterns are examined. (1) In markets where the information asymmetry among investors is small, the return volatility of a futures contract decreases with time-to-maturity (i.e., the Samuelson effect holds). (2) However, in markets where the information asymmetry among investors is large, the Samuelson effect need not hold. (3) Additionally, the model generates rich time-to-maturity patterns in open interest and spot price volatility that are consistent with empirical findings.     

Price Comovement and Institutional Performance Following Large Market Movements

This paper investigates the price comovement of stocks actively traded by institutions and the investment performance of foreign and domestic institutional investors in Taiwan's stock markets during periods of large market movements. Stocks of small size, high share turnover, and high return volatility tend to move together with the market when markets rise sharply. In short-term holdings, foreign investors and domestic mutual funds can outperform the market by trading small-size, high-turnover, and high-volatility stocks.     

市场摩擦对特质风险溢价的影响效应——基于A股主板市场的实证分析

与国外发达市场相比,我国A股主板市场的市场摩擦因素对市场微观结构和资产定价的影响更大。在防范和化解系统性风险的过程中,进一步分析市场摩擦如何作用于特质风险定价效应的问题具有重要的理论和现实意义。本文通过采用多维市场摩擦指标来代理信息不对称、交易成本、买卖限制、卖空限制、风险对冲和外部冲击,检验中国股市特质风险和预期收益率的关系,并判断出市场摩擦因素间的差异性影响机制。回归发现,市场摩擦和特质风险因子(特质波动率和特质偏度)都具有定价效应。各维度市场摩擦因素降低了股票流动性,进而增强了特质波动率的负向定价效应,部分解释了“特质波动率之谜”,但市场摩擦对特质偏度因子溢价的影响较为微弱。同时,基于特质波动率和特质偏度因子的投资策略能够产生超越CAPM、三因子和五因子模型的绝对收益,并印证了市场摩擦对特质风险因子绝对收益的影响作用。     

The Effectiveness of Price Limits and Stock Characteristics: Evidence from the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges

We examine the effectiveness of price limits on Chinese A shares and investigate the characteristics of those stocks that hit their price limits more frequently. We find that the effect of price limits is asymmetric for the A shares in upward and downward price movements and different for bullish and bearish sample periods. During a bullish period price limits effectively reduce stock volatility for downward price movements, but not for upward price movements; while during a bearish period price limits effectively reduce stock volatility for upward price movements, but not for downward price movements. Second, price limits delay efficient price discovery for upward price movements, but not for downward price movements. However, we do not find evidence to suggest that price limits harmfully interfere with the stock trading processes in the Chinese A share markets. Finally, we find that actively traded stocks hit their price limits more often and tend to hit the lower limit more frequently when overall market conditions are bearish. Stocks with high book-to-market values of equity hit their upper price limits more frequently, while stocks with a high ratio of tradable shares tend to hit their price limits less frequently.JEL Classification: G10, G14, G15     

The informativeness of domestic and foreign investors’ stock trades: Evidence from the perfectly segmented Chinese market

This paper uses the perfect market segmentation setting in China's stock market to compare the information content of the stock trades of domestic and foreign investors. We study 76 firms that issue both A-shares (for domestic investors) and B-shares (for foreign investors) and compare the price discovery role of the two segmented markets in China. Before Feb 19, 2001, the A-share market led the B-share market in price discovery, as the signed volume and quote revision of the A-share market had strong predictive ability for B-share quote returns, but not vice versa. After Feb 19, 2001, because some domestic investors were allowed to invest in the B-share market, we find evidence for a reverse causality from the B-share to the A-share market. Nevertheless, the [Hasbrouck (1995). One security, many markets: determining the contributions to price discovery, Journal of Finance 50, 1175–1199.] information share analysis reveals that A-shares continue to dominate the price discovery process.     

Disagreement and asset prices

How do differences of opinion affect asset prices? Do investors earn a risk premium when disagreement arises in the market? Despite their fundamental importance, these questions are among the most controversial issues in finance. In this paper, we use a novel data set that allows us to directly measure the level of disagreement among Wall Street mortgage dealers about prepayment speeds. We examine how disagreement evolves over time and study its effects on expected returns, return volatility, and trading volume in the mortgage-backed security market. We find that increased disagreement is associated with higher expected returns, higher return volatility, and larger trading volume. These results imply that there is a positive risk premium for disagreement in asset prices. We also show that volatility in and of itself does not lead to higher trading volume. Instead, only when disagreement arises in the market is higher uncertainty associated with more trading. Finally, we are able to distinguish empirically between two competing hypotheses regarding how information in markets gets incorporated into asset prices. We find that sophisticated investors appear to update their beliefs through a rational expectations mechanism when disagreement arises.     

Speculative dynamics and price behavior in the Shanghai Stock Exchange

This article examines the extent to which the trading behavior of heterogeneous investors manifests in stock price changes of asset portfolios which constitute the Shanghai Stock Exchange. There are three major findings that materialize. Firstly, reliable statistical evidence of a negative relation between the conditional first and second moments of the return distributions of stock prices lends support to the volatility feedback effect. Secondly, ‘feedback’, or momentum-type investors, are not present in this market as is often detected from the daily price changes of other industrialized markets. Finally, trade volume as a proxy for ‘information-driven’ trading suggests that such investors play a statistically significant role in stock price movements. Parameter estimates from this latter group of investors imply that a rise in stock prices from a high volume trading day is more likely than a rise resulting from a low volume trading day.     

Cross-listing and subsequent delisting in foreign markets

Employing a sample of stocks cross-listed and subsequently delisted from foreign markets, we examine the consequences of delisting to investors in terms of price, risk, and liquidity. We also provide a direct comparison between the firm's performance after a foreign cross-listing and after its subsequent delisting. We find a positive cross-listing and negative delisting effect on stock price, both of which dissipate in the long run. No significant changes in the market risk are found for either event. Foreign cross-listing and delisting are associated with increasing and decreasing long term trading volume respectively. Further analysis reveals that firms delist in response to low host market return and low firm trading volume in the host market. The changes in liquidity and market risk from delisting relate those from cross-listing. Finally, our results show that the bonding hypothesis fails to explain the listing premium and the delisting loss.     

Locals,foreigners, and multi-market trading of equities: Intraday evidence from Thailand

We study stock market orders and trades in a developing country, Thailand, where foreign ownership limits partially segment local and foreign investors into two distinct markets. Some foreigners forgo voting rights and distributions to trade on the “local board”, while some locals forgo such benefits and pay a price premium to trade on the “foreign board”. Regardless of nationality, these cross-market traders typically submit orders when liquidity is high, fill orders at relatively beneficial prices, exploit patterns in stock prices across markets, display profitable holding-period returns, and enhance price discovery. This suggests that skilled, informed trading that affects market quality does not depend on trader nationality.     

The Post-Issue Market Performance of Initial Public Offerings in China's New Stock Markets

In this paper, we investigate the post-issue market performance of initial public offerings (IPOs) in China's new stock markets. Our analysis focuses on whether and how institutional features unique to China differentially affect IPO performance. These features include the existence of dual-class shares for the same underlying firms (A-shares issued to domestic investors and B-shares issued to foreign investors) and the unusually long time lag between the offering and listing dates. Our sample consists of 277 A-share and 65 B-share IPOs that were listed on China's new stock markets during the 1992–1995 period. Our study has a number of interesting results. First, A-share IPOs are much more severely underpriced during the initial return period than B-share IPOs. Second, B-share IPOs underperform A-share IPOs (and the market) during the post-issue periods for up to three years. Third, the results of multivariate regression analyses strongly suggest that economic factors determining the post-issue performance of IPOs differ across the A-share and B-share samples.     

Why do closed-end country funds trade at enormous premiums during currency crises?

We investigate the response of US traded country fund premiums to currency crises in related foreign (local) markets. Our analysis includes 25 currency crises over the past decade involving 18 funds investing in 12 emerging markets, and 7 funds investing in 6 developed markets. We find that fund premiums and the volatility of the premiums increase dramatically in response to a currency crisis, both for emerging and developed markets funds, and that these effects dissipate slowly over time. Our results show that country fund shares and net asset values (NAVs) have differential risk exposures and that these differences are exacerbated during a crisis. While the NAV returns show sensitivity to changes in the local market index, share returns are sensitive to changes in both local and world market indices. Therefore, in response to a currency crisis, when local stock markets decrease in value, fund NAVs react more strongly than their share prices which have a strong global component. We also show that the high premiums observed during currency crises are not due to the reluctance of investors to trade and realize losses.     

Locals, foreigners, and multi-market trading of equities: Intraday evidence from Thailand

We study stock market orders and trades in a developing country, Thailand, where foreign ownership limits partially segment local and foreign investors into two distinct markets. Some foreigners forgo voting rights and distributions to trade on the “local board”, while some locals forgo such benefits and pay a price premium to trade on the “foreign board”. Regardless of nationality, these cross-market traders typically submit orders when liquidity is high, fill orders at relatively beneficial prices, exploit patterns in stock prices across markets, display profitable holding-period returns, and enhance price discovery. This suggests that skilled, informed trading that affects market quality does not depend on trader nationality.