整体上市能减轻大股东对小股东利益的侵占吗?

整体上市作为未来几年内国有企业改革的主要方向,在理论界和实务界引起关注①。但目前关于整体上市对中小投资者利益影响的实证研究非常缺乏。文章对我国整体上市企业是否可以减轻大股东对小股东侵占问题进行了实证研究。研究表明:整体上市能在一定程度上减轻大股东对小股东的利益侵占;整体上市的企业,随着流通比率的提高,大股东对小股东的利益侵占程度减少,而分拆上市的企业却没有这个现象;当控股股东是国家时,大股东对小股东的侵占程度更高,但整体上市时,国有股权对上市公司的掠夺会减轻。文章为我国整体上市治理和资本市场改善提供参考。     

对公司并购的反垄断规制:兼论我国的反垄断立法

反垄断法意义上的企业合并除了包括能产生企业主体资格消灭或变更的效果行为外 ,还包括多种其他行为 ,其侧重点并非在于被合并企业或公司之法律人格的变化 ,而在于企业合并产生或可能产生的对市场竞争的效果上 ,其对企业并购的规范是为了规制企业合并对竞争关系的影响。证券法意义上的收购 ,着重指证券流通市场上发生的公司并购 ,证券法对其进行规范的目的是为了维护证券市场的正常秩序与股东和债权人的合法权益。本文所指的公司并购是一种战略性的用语 ,它从并购方的角度出发 ,意指并购方通过股权运作 ,实现企业快速发展目标的行为。有关公…     

鄂武商股权之争

尽管资本意志是第一位的,但实现利润最大化,让全体股东受益,应是企业并购的最佳选择鄂武商(000501)的股权争夺战可谓是9月下旬证券市场的一个亮点。9月倒数第二周的五个交易日中鄂武商发布了六项公告,第一大股东位置两度易手。董事长王冬生愤怒地     

大股东限权：国企应率先垂范

在规范大股东行为、限制大股东权利方面，国有大股东应率先垂范，严格自律。国有大股东代表进入董事会，要学会与中小股东打交道，学会与不同意见董事交换意见获得认可、谅解，学会在多元环境中正确贯彻大股东方战略意图，学会维护大股东利益与兼顾所有股东权益相均衡     

证监会将努力推动并购重组

中国证监会近日发布了《上市公司收购管理办法》和《上市公司股东持股变动信息披露管理办法》。中国证监会主席周小川表示，中国证监会将努力推动上市公司并购重组市场的发展。周小川在“上市公司并购重组高级研讨会”上说，目前我国经济是经济全球化背景下正在转轨的新兴市场经济，这一历史特点决定了并购重组在我国有着巨大的意义和价值。在市场上，投资人发现被低估价值的企业并进行收购，诸多有发展潜力的企业通过并购重组进行主营业务调整，都会提升上市公司质量，改善产业结构。上市公司并购重组能够充分发挥资源配置作用，培养新的经…     

开除股东？慎用

股东除名条款是对股东资格的剥夺，是对股东最为严厉的处罚。股东除名制度在一定程度上对公司相关者利益及社会责任的实现提供了制度保障，但就怕成为大股东欺压小股东的杀手锏     

论企业并购目标的财务审查

随着我国社会主义市场经济的发展和经济体制改革的深化,优胜劣汰作为市场经济的基本法则已日趋明显,企业的并购热潮也随着经济的发展一浪高过一浪,构成了当今中国经济生活中最为壮观的,也是最为前沿的一道风景线。 企业并购是一项风险性很高的投资活动,能否一举成功,会直接影响企业今后的发展。因此一定要清楚地了解准备收购的到底是个什么样的企业,其现状如何。没有相当程度的了解,除非卖价十分便宜,收益大于将来可能产生的一切损失,否则根本不应仓促决定并购。在西方的企业兼并收购过程中,并购方事先要对自身和被并购的企业进行必要的财务评价,以确定合理、适当的收购价格,同时当双方初步达成收购协议以后,并购方还应进行并购前的审查(Due Diligence)。审查的重点一般包括营运、法律、财务等方面的调查,本文着重从股份制企业的角度,仅就财务方面的审查做一探讨。     

公司治理中大、小股东监督行为分析

在现代公司治理中大股东和小股东是两个不同的利益亚集团，它们从自身利益出发对公司的监督程度也不一样，本文通过一个简单的博弈模型分析了小股东的“搭便车”倾向，监督相对于帕累托最优下的不足，以及对我国公司治理的启示。     

大股东与中小股东斗争的“阴谋”与“阴谋”

对利益的追逐是资本的本性,因此公司内部大股东与中小股东之间的斗争永远不会停止,大股东侵犯中小股东权益的案例也时时见诸报端。大股东与中小股东之间的斗争不外乎“阴谋”与“阳谋”两种。何为“阴谋”宁就是大股东利用现有立法上的漏洞损害中小股东的利益,这种情况下,中小股东往往哑巴吃黄连——有苦说不出。何为“阳谋”宁就是大股东采用违法手段损害中小股东的利益,如此行事已属明目张胆打上家门了。“阴谋”的手段,可以是大股东采取通过更换董事会成员,增加自己一方的代表成员,实现对董事会的控制,为大     

资本市场

上海石化200多富翁大闹股东大会；国内汽车业最大并购上汽南汽合作敲定；小股东要成立权益保障委员会；国美36亿元曲线收购大中电器；中国投资50亿美元入股摩根士丹利。     

Managerial response to constitutional constraints on shareholder power

Research summary: We examine whether top managers engage in misconduct, such as illegal insider trading, illegal stock option backdating, bribery, and financial manipulation, in response to the presence, or absence, of governance provisions that impose constitutional constraints on shareholder power. Within the agency framework, shareholders typically oppose governance provisions that limit their power because those provisions could undermine shareholder influence and increase agency costs. However, when shareholders support provisions that constrain their power, managers could respond positively by refraining from self‐interested behavior in the form of managerial misconduct. We find this to be especially true in industries where these governance provisions are particularly relevant to managers and in scenarios where CEOs do not also serve as board chair. Managerial summary: In recent years, shareholders have become central to organizations and the managers who run them. Shareholders and managers establish a rapport with one another, such that the behavior of one affects the behavior of the other. One of the most consequential decisions shareholders can make pertains to the reach of their influence: They can choose to impose strict governance over firms they own or they can allow for constitutional constraints that limit shareholder power. When they act in the mutual interest of managers by allowing such constraints, we find that managers respond in kind by refraining from bad behavior, such as illegal stock options backdating, insider trading, and financial manipulation. This is especially true in industries and scenarios in which shareholder pressure is most relevant to managers. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Shareholders and stakeholders: How do directors decide?

This study examines how directors make decisions that involve shareholders and other stakeholders. Using vignettes derived from seminal court cases, we construct an index of directors' shareholderism as a general orientation on this issue. In a survey of the entire population of directors and CEOs in public corporations in one country, we find that directors' personal values and roles play an important part in their decisions. Directors and CEOs are more pro‐shareholder the more they endorse entrepreneurial values—specifically, higher achievement, power, and self‐direction values and lower universalism values. While employee representative directors exhibit a lower baseline level of shareholder orientation, they nonetheless often side with shareholders. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

With greater power comes greater responsibility? takeover protection and corporate attention to stakeholders

Using takeover protection as an indicator of corporate governance, this study examines how an exogenous shift in power from shareholders to managers affects corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders. Two competing hypotheses are entertained. The shareholder view predicts that stronger takeover protection will lead to a decrease in corporate attention to shareholders and non‐shareholding stakeholders alike, as managers divert resources from shareholders to the pursuit of their private interests. The stakeholder view, in contrast, predicts that stronger takeover protection will increase corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders. Because catering to non‐shareholding stakeholders contributes to the long‐term value of the firm, managers will be more likely to attend to those stakeholders when relieved from short‐termism triggered by the threat of hostile takeovers. Using a sample of 878 U.S. firms from 1991 to 2002, the study finds that an exogenous increase in takeover protection leads to higher corporate attention to community and the natural environment, but has no impact on corporate attention to employees, minorities, and customers. Additional analyses show that firms that increase their attention to stakeholders experience an increase in long‐term shareholder value. These findings provide additional evidence that relief from short‐termism is a likely source of the increase in corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders following the increase in takeover protection. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Divesting ownership in a rival

We examine the consumer welfare effect of a firm's partial ownership of a competitor and compare the implications of alternative forms of divestiture. We identify conditions under which turning voting shares into non-voting shares is preferable to selling the shares to the firm's current shareholders (an option frequently chosen). We also show that selling the voting shares to a large independent shareholder is preferable to selling them to small shareholders. We provide additional theoretical results and apply them to the divestiture of Portugal Telecom's holdings in PTM.     

Managing the marketing budget in a cost-constrained environment

Marketing costs have been rising rapidly while both manufacturing and general management costs have been declining. As a result, those concerned with realigning corporate assets to maximize shareholder returns are requiring that marketers start proving their worth or be gradually starved of resources. Reflecting such pressures, marketing managers are being asked to provide more convincing evidence that planned marketing strategies will indeed yield more value for the company and its shareholders. Likewise, those charged with planning the marketing budget are being asked to more thoroughly justify requested budget increases. Whole new financial measures are needed for evaluating the relative productivity of specifically proposed marketing budget expenditures vis-à-vis shareholder value. The paper reviews several procedures that can help address these challenges and presents a detailed example of the application of one of the approaches.     

A Trade Union Congress Perspective on the Company Law Review and Corporate Governance Reform since 1997

This article examines the Company Law Review and other corporate governance reforms introduced by the Labour government since 1997. It argues that an opportunity has been missed to implement fundamental change by giving employees and other key stakeholders rights in companies equal to those of shareholders. However, reforms that aim to make the existing system work better by promoting responsible shareholder activity have been introduced, and proposals to increase company disclosure on employee and other stakeholder relationships are in the pipeline. The potential of the reforms to offer trade unions new tools for promoting workers’ interests is examined.     

Corporate governance antecedents to shareholder activism: A zero‐inflated process

Research summary: Shareholder activism has become more widespread, yet the role of corporate governance as antecedent to shareholder activism remains equivocal. We propose a new conceptual model that characterizes the stochastic of observable shareholder activism as a compound product of two latent components representing (1) shareholder activists' propensity to target a company and (2) executives' propensity to settle activists' demands privately. Our model explicitly decouples corporate governance expectations for the two latent components embedded in activism process, and thus allows us to relax assumptions of homogenous shareholder interests and constrained managerial discretion where corporate managers are expected to negotiate privately and settle only value‐creating activist demands. Bayesian analysis of zero‐inflated Poisson regression reveals that corporate governance relationships with activism vary across shareholder demands and private settlements. Managerial summary: Increasing shareholder activism has generated debates as to whether activism promotes managerial accountability and responsibility or instead encourages managerial short‐termism. Our research model allows for heterogeneous interests among a company's shareholders. We theorize and empirically investigate a broader role of corporate governance: governance mechanisms need to ensure that executives are not (1) ignoring activists' value‐increasing demands or (2) accommodating activists' value‐decreasing demands in a private, opaque manner that disenfranchises other shareholders. Our results indicate that corporate governance implications differ for visible shareholder demands in contrast with private activism. A plausible application of our model is that it provides estimates of the probability of the numbers of shareholder demands to be received by a firm and the probability of privately settling a demand. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

创始股东控制权威与经理人职业操守——基于社会资本的“国美电器控制权争夺”研究

在家族型上市公司中,创始股东往往会利用控制权威剥夺中小股东的利益,从而造成公司价值的损减。这时,经理人是否会为了保持"公司价值最大化"的职业操守与创始股东争夺上市公司的控制权?本文基于社会资本分析视角,将创始股东控制权威视为对经理人的社会资本控制,将经理人保持职业操守赢得的收益归为从内外部社会关系网络中取得的社会资本支持。然后,根据上述两个概念构建了经理人决策模型,详细解读了国美电器治理实践中的"控制权冲突"事件。经研究得知:理性的经理人会综合权衡创始股东控制权威和保持职业操守对其社会资本的影响,并以此选择是否争夺创始股东的控制权。     

Risk Sharing,the Cost of Equity and the Optimal Capital Structure of the Regulated Firm

This paper considers the relationship between the regulator’s pricing decision and the allocation of risk between consumers and shareholders. Consumers are willing to trade-off price variations against a lower expected price. Prices are higher in adverse economic conditions, but shareholder returns are not necessarily lower. It might be optimal to insure shareholders against market risk, so that consumers could thereby achieve a lower expected price. The allocation of risk between consumers and shareholders depends on the capital structure of the regulated firm, and a very special set of conditions must apply for the social optimum to be 100% debt finance with the firm operating on a ‘not-for-profit’ basis.      

Investor activism,managerial responsiveness,and corporate social performance

We study relationships between shareholder proposal activism, managerial response, and corporate social performance (CSP). We find that shareholder proposal activism reduces CSP. We infer that rather than pressuring firms to improve CSP, activism may engender diversion of resources away from CSP into political activities used by managers to resist external pressures and retain discretion. We also find that managers are more likely to settle proposals filed by ‘salient’ shareholders (i.e., those with power, legitimacy, and urgency). Settlement with salient shareholders, however, also reduces CSP, suggesting that managers' responses are symbolic; i.e., they settle with salient shareholders to demonstrate conformance but continue to resist making the substantive changes to core policies that may compromise their discretion. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.