Prices or Quantities Can Dominate Banking and Borrowing*

The possibility of intertemporal banking and borrowing of tradable permits is often viewed as tilting the various policy debates about optimal pollution control instruments towards favoring such time-flexible quantities. This paper shows that this view can be misleading, at least for the simplest dynamic extension of the original “prices versus quantities” information structure. The model of this paper allows firms to know and act upon the realization of uncertain future costs two full periods ahead of the regulators. For any given circumstance, the paper shows that either a fixed price or a fixed quantity is superior in expected welfare to time-flexible banking and borrowing. Furthermore, the standard original formula for the comparative advantage of prices over quantities contains sufficient information to completely characterize the regulatory role of intertemporal banking and borrowing. The logic and implications of these results are analyzed and discussed.     

The Emergence of Market Power in Emission Rights Markets: The Role of Initial Permit Distribution

This paper offers an analytical model of emission permit markets in which a large number of regulated emitters participate, and derives formulae that estimate the degree of market distortion. These formulae clearly show the entire dependence of the ratio of market prices to competitive levels on the permit initial distribution as well as the existence of a threshold for effective market power. While the findings challenge a well-known conception of the Coase Theorem, they have significant policy implications vis-à-vis the Kyoto Protocol and the related policy debates on excess emission rights known as hot air.     

Market Power in Laboratory Emission Permit Markets

Many proposals suggesting the use of markets tocontrol pollution assume markets will becompetitive. When markets do not exhibitcompetitive characteristics, however, shouldthey still be expected to result in efficiencyimprovement relative to traditional approaches? This paper employs experimental economicmethods to examine the effect of marketstructure on the use of marketable emissionspermits. Results indicate that in a market withone dominant firm and a number of fringe firms,strategic manipulation occurs repeatedly in thelaboratory as predicted by market power models,undermining the allocative and dynamicefficiency benefits such markets offer. Whenfirms compete in a downstream product marketdominated by the same single firm, marketefficiency can actually be reduced with theimplementation of permit markets. Final marketefficiencies reflect initial endowments and areinfluenced by competitive conditions elsewherein the economy, indicating that policy-makersshould carefully consider whether markets areappropriate in such circumstances.     

A Note on Market Power in an Emission Permits Market with Banking

In this paper, we investigate the effect of market power on equilibrium path of an emission permits market in which firms can bank current permits for use in later periods. In particular, we study the market equilibrium for a large (potentially dominant) firm and competitive fringe with rational expectations. We characterize the equilibrium solution for different permits allocations and discuss the large firm’s stock-holding constraints needed for credible market manipulation.     

On the Effects of Suggested Prices in Gasoline Markets

There is a widespread suspicion that suggested prices act as a focal point for individual firms when setting their prices. Oil companies announce suggested prices for gasoline stations in the Dutch retail market. We show that, compared to the gasoline spot market price, suggested prices contain additional information that explains retail price changes. We conclude that suggested prices have a horizontal coordinating effect in the sense that retail prices react to information that suggested prices contain and that is unrelated to firms’ costs (i.e., the information that firms use under normal competitive conditions).     

Prices versus Quantities in a Second-Best Setting

The choice between taxes and tradable permits has been independently analysed by two distinct research traditions. The first proceeds from Weitzman's partial equilibrium stochastic model and concludes that a tax should be preferred if the marginal abatement cost curve is steeper than the marginal environmental benefit curve. The second utilises deterministic general equilibrium models with pre-existing distortionary taxes. It concludes that non-revenue-raising instruments (e.g., grandfathered tradable permits) are costlier than revenue-raising ones (e.g., a tax on every unit of pollution or auctioned permits). To build a bridge between these two traditions, we introduce in Weitzman's model a positive cost of public funds due to pre-existing distortionary taxes. The tax admits a greater comparative advantage over the permits, as compared to Weitzman's classical result. Then, we assume that the regulated industry blocks any proposal that poses it too high an expected burden. This may require a transfer to firms, in the form of freely-allocated permits or lump-sum tax rebate. It turns out that if this acceptability constraint is binding, then the comparative advantage of taxes over permits is still reinforced. Quantitatively, even if the marginal benefit function is 50% more steeply sloped than the marginal cost function, the price instrument should be preferred. We also compare the expected net benefit of these two instruments to a contingent instrument which leads to the ex post optimum. The superiority of the contingent instrument over the quantity one is higher than in first-best.     

Incentives for Investment in Advanced Pollution Abatement Technology in Emission Permit Markets with Banking

We examine the incentives that firms have to invest in cleaner abatementtechnology when the banking of permits is allowed in emission permittrading schemes. We show that under certainty permit banking can distortincentives for investment and lead to a sub-optimal amount of investmentspending. Under imperfect information, aggregate abatement costuncertainty and investment irreversibility provide arguments for allowingbanking. We generalize the model to consider these, showing that somebanking is desirable but that it need not be the case that the privatebanking solution is optimal.     

Permit markets,carbon prices and the creation of innovation clusters

Innovation clusters combining public and private effort to develop breakthrough technologies promise greater technological advances to slow down climate change. We use a multi-country model with an emission trading system to examine whether and how international climate policy can incentivize countries to create such innovation clusters. We find that a minimal carbon price is needed to attract applied research firms, but countries may nevertheless fail to invest in complementary research infrastructure. We construct a mechanism that leads to innovation clusters when emissions targets are set before uncertainty surrounding technological developments is resolved. It is a combination of low permit endowments for the country with the lowest costs to build the needed infrastructure, compensation for this country by profits from permit trade, and maximal possible permit endowments for the remaining countries. We outline how the EU-ETS can be further refined according to this mechanism.     

Prices and market structure: an empirical analysis of the supermarket industry in Chile

This article investigates empirically the relationship between market structure and consumer prices in the supermarket industry in Chile. A panel of monthly data from 16 cities in the period January 1998–September 2006 is used. We find that, the more concentrated the industry in a city, the higher the prices, while the participation of major national chains in cities tends to lower prices. In terms of magnitude, this latter effect prevails over the former. Moreover, the dominant local chain is found to behave differently depending on whether or not one of the national chains is present in the city. Finally, we find that prices rise when a national chain acquires another chain and both were previously in a city (inmerge) while if only one of the two was present (outmerge), prices fall.     

Food Prices and Market Structure in Sweden

This paper examines retail grocery price levels across a large panel of stores in Sweden. We explain price variation across stores by market structure variables to capture differences in competition intensity and a number of store– and region–specific factors. Most of the explained variation in prices can be attributed to store–specific factors such as size and chain affiliation. Overall, the relation between market structure variables and food prices is weak, and effects are small in percentage terms. Nevertheless, higher local concentration of stores, higher regional wholesaler concentration and a lower market share of large stores are all correlated with higher prices.
JEL classification : D 43; L 13; L 81     

Trading Hot-Air. The Influence of Permit Allocation Rules,Market Power and the US Withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol

After the conferences in Bonn and Marrakech, it is likely that international emissions trading will be realized in the near future. Major influences on the permit market␣are the institutional detail, the participation structure and the treatment of hot-air. Different scenarios not only differ in their implications for the demand and supply of permits and thus the permit price, but also in their allocative effects. In this paper we discuss likely the institutional designs for permit allocation in the hot-air economies and the use of market power and quantify the resulting effects by using the computable general equilibrium model DART. It turns out that the amount of hot-air supplied will be small if hot-air economies cooperate in their decisions. Under welfare maximization, more hot-airis supplied than in the case where governments try to maximize revenues from permit sales.     

Can Allowing to Trade Permits Enhance Welfare in Mixed Oligopoly?

We compare the effects of tradable emission permits (TEP) and non-tradable emission permits (NTEP) in a mixed oligopoly, where public firms and private firms compete in a product market. If all technologies and initial endowments of emission permits are symmetric among public and private firms and if the emission constraint is exogenous and binding, social welfare is greater (resp. smaller) under TEP than under NTEP when the weight of social welfare in each public firm's objective function and the degree of convexity of the production cost function and that of the abatement cost function are small (resp. large).     

中国农产品价格波动对CPI的影响分析

近期引起中国农产品价格上涨的诱因很多。通过2006年1月—2011年8月的月度数据检验金融危机前、危机期间和危机后农产品价格与居民消费物价指数的互动关系表明,三个阶段的二者关系变化显著,而且危机前后农产品价格对CPI的影响比危机期间更明显,这一结果反映出当前中国农产品品质不能适应消费者对农产品质量的需求。     

Prices vs. Quantities: The Irrelevance of Irreversibility*

We explore the efficacy of price and quantity controls in a dynamic setup in which the decisions of some agents are irreversible. The assumption of irreversibility is shown to improve the performance of a tax relative to that of a system of tradable quotas and significantly alter the equilibrium behavior of agents. We nevertheless conclude that taking into account the fact that agents’ decisions may be irreversible does not lead to policy implications significantly different from those reached in a simpler model in which irreversibility is ignored.     

Response of Asset Prices to Monetary Policy under Abenomics

In this paper, I investigate the causes of the recent sharp response of the yen and Japanese stock prices to the discussion of, and the subsequent implementation of bold monetary easing by the Bank of Japan as demanded by Prime Minister Abe. I present statistical evidence that the response of the two asset prices have indeed been unusually large relative to the past experience with nonconventional monetary policy (NCM) even after allowance is given for the rise in global economic activity and asset prices. I also point out that the rally has been led by speculative trading by foreign investors, while domestic investors have largely stayed on the sidelines. I discuss possible reasons for such foreign investor behavior. Simply put, the unprecedented political pressure raised hopes of the adoption of bold measures by the Bank of Japan. I discuss, however, the possibility that the room for further action by the Bank is quite limited apart from what might be called a targeted helicopter drop of money. I also point out the possibility that investor behavior may have not been based on economic fundamentals. The asset price volatility since April 2013 is interpreted in the light of such discussions.     

基于特征价格的城市交通对房价影响分析

因城市交通的改善能明显改变周边物业的可达性和用地性质,促进土地开发强度,带来周边房地产价值的上涨。因而文章从房地产市场中消费者的角度,讨论了城市交通成本的影响因素,在此基础上构建城市交通成本与房地产价格相互影响的特征价格模型,并从理论上对模型提出了验证方法,最后以重庆市的交通为例进行了实证分析。     

汇率传递、宏观经济冲击对我国物价水平影响的实证分析

从实证的角度研究中国的汇率传递及宏观经济冲击和货币政策冲击相关因素对物价水平的影响.结合中国实际情况,在原有研究的基础上改进了一个包括所有这些相关变量的VAR模型.通过脉冲响应函数和方差分解的方法,我们发现,供给和需求冲击是物价水平波动的最主要原因,汇率和货币政策冲击在物价波动过程的作用并不明显,这与已有的研究结果有很大的不同,这表明仅仅依靠货币政策并不能降低当前的高物价水平.     

应对资产价格波动的货币政策选择与均衡框架构建

资本市场的快速发展,使资产价格波动与货币政策效果之间的关联性不断加大.货币政策是否应当和应该如何对资产价格波动作出反应,多年来吸引了众多学者和货币政策制定者的高度关注.综合已有的理论实践和我国货币政策操作的现实,虽然目前资产价格还不具备作为我国货币政策独立调控目标的条件,但是有必要将其作为货币调控的辅助监测指标纳入中央银行货币政策操作的视野.央行应尽快建立与资产价格监测相关的指标体系,形成考虑资产价格波动因素的货币政策传导机制,构建均衡实体经济与虚拟经济的货币政策操作框架.