职位定价中的决策困境与策略选择

职位定价的两种方法——职位评估与市场定价之间经常地存在不一致和冲突,因而企业薪酬决策中面临着两难选择的决策困境和潜在风险。分析了市场定价与职位评估这两种方法的理论基础和冲突的根源,比较了两种方法对不同职位定价所产生的薪酬效应,在此基础上提出了解决职位定价决策困境的基本思路,认为应该在薪酬决策之前进行战略分析和价值链分析,并针对不同的职位采取不同的策略。     

激励陷阱研究

企业中激励陷阱主要包括职务晋升激励陷阱和股权激励陷阱。 1．晋升陷阱。职务晋升是企业吸引和留住人才的重要手段,是组织经常采用的一种激励员工的方式,但是如果职务晋升不当,也会伴随着绩效的下降,这就是职务晋升中的陷阱——“彼得原理”现象。晋升的激励陷阱主要表现为没把合适的人安排到合适的岗位上,因为职务晋升的依据是过去的工作业绩,能当好普通员工的人并不一定能成为一个好的主管,能当好下级经理的管理者很多都胜任不了高层管理工作。但不幸的是企业选拔管理者的依据恰恰是在较低的岗位上表现出来的能力,这就难免会把许多不称职的人选拔到更高的职位上。擅长某一项工作的员工一旦提拔,就要离开原来的工作岗位,如果他不能胜任管理职位,那么他就既不能发挥自已的长处,又要在管理岗位上苦苦支撑,对企业和个人都是一个损失。     

做出有效晋升决策的五个步骤

确定晋升方法。员工的方法很多，包括职位阶梯、职位调整、职位竞聘及职业通道。在本案例中，HR是出于人员调整需要而做出职位调整的晋升。在面对2个相对合适的候选人的情况下，既缺乏对员工管理潜能的了解．也没有对员工未来发展方向做一个调查与评估。     

浅析员工绩效的考评

人力资源管理的落脚点在对人力资源的有效配置与开发上。在对员工的绩效评价过程中,不断地发现人才、培养人才,从而不断地优化人力资源配置。员工工作绩效评价是人力资源管理中重要工作内容。首先,绩效评价是晋升和培训工作的依据。绩效评价所提供的信息有助于企业判断应当作出何种晋升工资方面的决策,通过考评,调整主管职位上的各级主管人员,淘汰那些不称职     

企业晋升公平激励与优化对策研究

我国企业晋升制度不健全、监督机制不完善、晋升文化扭曲等原因导致了我国企业晋升激励中存在性别歧视、玻璃天花板、看重关系等问题。企业要构建基于组织公平的晋升激励模型,并从培育正确的组织公平文化,不断完善晋升程序,选择和培训合适的晋升决策者,帮助员工树立正确的晋升观念,扩展我国企业晋升激励路径等五个方面保障企业晋升的公平激励效果。     

金融发展与地区实体经济资本配置效率-来自省级工业行业数据的证据

职位隔离是形成性别收入差距的重要机制.本文构建一个引入了职位晋升机制的收入差距分解方法,利用2006年中国综合社会调查数据,考察了职位隔离对性别收入差距的作用,且在统一的模型框架内识别和估计了职位内工资歧视(同工不同酬)和晋升歧视的程度.研究结果发现,女性过多地集中于职位"金字塔"结构的底层.尽管职位晋升的工资效应不存在显著的性别差异,但约41%的性别收入差距是由于职位隔离导致的.工资歧视是职位层级内部性别收入差距的主要来源.与之类似,职位晋升歧视能够解释1/4的性别收入差距.因此,除了同工同酬政策,促进职位晋升的机会平等是缩小性别收入差距的重要措施,意即"同酬"还需"同工".     

职位隔离对高管薪酬性别差异的影响

目前国内对性别工资差异研究很多，但对高管人员薪酬性别差异的分析还较少。本文利用2005-2010年沪深两市A股上市公司数据，在综合考虑不同性别在不同职位层级上的代表性的同时，采用Brown分解法分析了高管人员的性别薪酬差异问题。结果表明我国上市公司女性高管在较高层级的职位上代表性不足，同时也存在着“玻璃天花板效用”。女性高管在职位晋升方面受到了严重的歧视，在每一个职位层级上，女性高管职位晋升的门槛值都显著高于男性高管职位晋升的门槛值。男性高管和女性高管存在明显的性别薪酬差距，其中，超五成的薪酬差异是同一职位内的，四成以上的差异是职位间的；而有超七成的薪酬差异无法用教育程度、工作经验等可观测因素解释。     

现阶段企业绩效考核存在的问题与对策分析

绩效考核是企业进行培训教育、薪酬调整、职位晋升的重要依据,它对提高企业经济效益,提升员工工作效率,改善员工工作行为方式起着非常重要的作用,本文从现代企业绩效考核存在的问题,进行系统分析,提出相应的解决对策。     

知识型员工的全面认可激励研究：基于4家科研院所的问卷调查

为有效激励知识型员工,基于激励理论和实践发展,构建了“薪酬激励-工作认可-个人成长”三位一体的全面认可激励理论模型,并对北京市4家科研院所的216名知识型员工开展问卷调查。结果表明：知识型员工对全面认可激励实施现状整体认同度不高,其中对工作认可的认同度相对较高,对薪酬激励和个人成长的认同度相对较低。知识型员工全面认可激励的问题主要表现在三个方面：一是薪酬与业绩不匹配,在行业内缺乏竞争力;二是绩效考核科学性不足,员工决策参与度不高,上下级情感沟通不畅;三是培训效果不理想,晋升机制不完善,荣誉激励不充分。为进一步优化知识型员工激励机制,提出以下对策建议：一是建立以价值贡献为核心的薪酬体系,开展对标管理来增强竞争力和创新力;二是完善绩效考核体系,健全沟通反馈机制,重视员工情感激励;三是制定系统化培训体系,规范晋升标准和流程,强化荣誉激励机制。     

人员盲目晋升对企业产生的不良影响和对策

从员工晋升现状谈起,分析人员盲目晋升对企业产生的负面影响,全方位改变企业用人方略,提出企业可采取的解决方案。     

Job matching when employment contracts suffer from moral hazard

We consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth-constrained workers suffer from moral hazard. Specifically, effort on the job is non-contractible so that parties that are matched negotiate a bonus contract. Higher unemployment benefits affect the workers' outside option. The latter is improved for low-skilled workers. Hence they receive a larger share of the surplus, which strengthens their effort incentives and increases productivity. Effects are reversed for high-skilled workers. Moreover, raising benefit payments affects the proportion of successful matches, which induces some firms to exit the economy and causes unemployment to increase.     

Gross job flows in Ukraine

This paper documents and analyses gross job flows and their determinants in Ukraine using a dataset of more than 2200 Ukrainian firms operating in manufacturing and non‐manufacturing for the years 1998–2000. Job destruction dominates job creation in both 1999 and 2000. Another clear‐cut result of our analysis is the strong positive effect of new private firms on net employment growth. We also find an inverse relationship between job reallocation and size for both manufacturing and non‐manufacturing, while only in the latter sector is employment growth inversely related with size. The main focus of the paper is the effect of trade flows on employment adjustment in manufacturing. Our results show that both employment growth and job reallocation at the firm and two‐digit sector level are affected by strong exposure to import competition and product market competition in export markets. These effects are more pronounced when we consider trade flows to the world at large and to the EU than when the analysis is based on trade flows to the CIS. JEL Classifications: E24, F14, J63, P23.     

Worker flows, job flows and firm wage policies

Like many transition economies, Slovenia is undergoing profound changes in the workings of the labour market with potentially greater flexibility in terms of both wage and employment adjustment. To investigate the impact of these changes, we use unique longitudinal matched employer‐employee data that permits measurement of employment transitions and wages for workers and enables links of the workers to the firms in which they are employed. We can thus measure worker flows and job flows in a comprehensive and integrated manner. We find a high pace of job flows in Slovenia especially for young, small, private and foreign‐owned firms and for young, less educated workers. While job flows have approached the rates observed in developed market economies, the excess of worker flows above job flows is lower than that observed in market economies. A key factor in the patterns of the worker and job flows is the determination of wages in Slovenia. A base wage schedule provides strict guidelines for minimum wages for different skill categories. However, firms are permitted to offer higher wages to an individual based upon the success of the worker and/or the firm. Our analysis shows that firms deviate from the base wage schedule significantly and that the idiosyncratic wage policies of firms are closely related to the observed pattern of worker and job flows at the firm. Firms with more flexible wages (measured as less compression of wages within the firm) have less employment instability and are also able to improve the match quality of their workers. JEL Classifications: J23, J31, J41, J61, P23, P31.     

Creation of jobs and firm-sponsored training in a matching model of unemployment

We offer a search and matching model with firms that create job vacancies and are willing to sponsor general skills training. The spillover of skilled labor between firms has the dual effect of increasing job vacancies and enhancing firms’ incentives for free riding. The former effect is combined with a reduction in search costs to cause a positive feedback between the supply of skilled labor and the creation of job vacancies, suggesting that firms encourage each other. On the other hand, with the latter effect, search costs are reduced, inducing firms to take a free ride on each other’s investments, thereby decreasing the supply of skilled labor and the creation of job vacancies. A reduction in search costs can lead to different results depending on which of the two mechanisms is actualized. Additionally, our analysis allows for “labor poachers,” or firms absorbing skilled labor in the market, to consider direct competition between training firms and poaching firms.      

Job creation and job types – New evidence from Danish entrepreneurs

We extend earlier analyses of the job creation of start-ups versus established firms by considering the educational content of the jobs created and destroyed. We define education-specific measures of job creation and job destruction at the firm level, and we use these measures to construct a measure of “surplus job creation”, defined as jobs created on top of any simultaneous destruction of similar jobs in incumbent firms in the same region and industry. Using Danish employer-employee data from 2002–2007 that identify the start-ups and that cover almost the entire private sector, these measures allow us to provide a more nuanced assessment of the role of entrepreneurial firms in the job-creation process than in previous studies. Our findings show that although start-ups are responsible for the entire overall net job creation, incumbents account for more than one-third of net job creation within high-skilled jobs. Moreover, start-ups “only” create approximately half of the surplus jobs and even less of the high-skilled surplus jobs. Finally, our approach allows us to characterise and identify differences across industries, educational groups and regions.     

Hold-up and the inefficiency of job assignments

This paper examines the trade-off between job assignments and incentives for specific investments. Under an incomplete contract, employees tend to underinvest in firm-specific human capital. To defuse this hold-up problem, the employer chooses an inefficiently low promotion standard. This result provides an explanation of the Peter Principle. However, if human capital investments also have an impact on promotion, the optimal standard might be inefficiently high.     

Individual incentives in the supply of public inputs

The free-rider hypothesis states that, in the decision on public-goods and private-good provision, individual incentives are such that public goods will tend to be undersupplied. This paper examines the free-rider argument as it applies to public intermediate goods. It is shown that, unlike in a static model, in a dynamic world there may exist incentives for firms to act cooperatively in determining the supply of public intermediate goods. In a dynamic context there is a cost to free riding: what one firm does now affects what others will do in the future. Provided future profits are not discounted too heavily, the free-rider problem may disappear when a time dimension is added to the theory.     

On the persistence of job creation in old and new firms

We analyze the persistence of new jobs in new and old firms. This measure assesses the sustainability of job creation in different circumstances. We find that new jobs in Austria last significantly longer in new than in old firms.     

Employment Protection Versus Flexicurity: On Technology Adoption in Unionised Firms*

We analyse how different labour‐market institutions – employment protection versus ‘flexicurity’– affect technology adoption in unionised firms. We consider trade unions’ incentives to oppose or endorse labour‐saving technology and firms’ incentives to invest in such technology. Increased flexicurity – interpreted as less employment protection and a higher reservation wage for workers – unambiguously increases firms’ incentives for technology adoption. If unions have some direct influence on technology, a higher reservation wage also makes unions more willing to accept technological change. Less employment protection has the opposite effect, as this increases the downside (job losses) of labour‐saving technology.     

Executive compensation: a calibration approach

Summary. We use a version of the Grossman and Hart principal-agent model with 10 actions and 10 states to produce quantitative predictions for executive compensation. Performance incentives derived from the model are compared with the performance incentives of 350 firms chosen from a survey by Michael Jensen and Kevin Murphy. The results suggest both that the model does a reasonable job of explaining the data and that actual incentives are close to the optimal incentives predicted by theory. Received: August 12, 1997; revised version: October 27, 1997