The New Comparative Political Economy

With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s the field of comparative political economy has undergone major revision. Socialism is no longer considered the viable alternative to capitalism it once was. We now recognize that the choice is between alternative institutional arrangements of capitalism. Progress in the field of comparative political economy is achieved by examining how different legal, political and social institutions shape economic behavior and impact economic performance. In this paper we survey the new learning in comparative political economy and suggest how this learning should redirect our attention in economic development.JEL classification: B53, O10, O20, P0     

Robust political economy

This paper introduces the idea of “robust political economy.” In the context of political economic systems, “robustness” refers to a political economic arrangement's ability to produce social welfare-enhancing outcomes in the face of deviations from ideal assumptions about individuals' motivations and information. Since standard assumptions about complete and perfect information, instantaneous market adjustment, perfect agent rationality, political actor benevolence, etc., rarely, if ever actually hold, a realistic picture and accurate assessment of the desirability of alternative political economic systems requires an analysis of alternative systems' robustness. The Mises-Hayek critique of socialism forms the foundation for investigations of robustness that relax ideal informational assumptions. The Buchanan-Tullock public choice approach complements this foundation in forming the basis for investigations of robustness that relax ideal motivational assumptions. JEL Code B53, P16, P26     

Poverty traps and the robust political economy of development assistance

Robust political economy emphasizes the lack of benevolence and omniscience of would be reformers. In addition, we consider the effects of biased decision-making for the robustness of the policy implications. This paper examines the robustness of the policy implications of models based on coordination failures and poverty traps. In particular, we address the revival in ‘big push’ type models and its policy implications. We argue that attempts to promote economic development through ‘big push’ models lack robustness. JEL Code O1, O20, P26, P41     

Back to the BOG, Austrian-style

Robust political economy begins with assumptions of self-interested planners who lack perfect information. In such a world, the social planner does not necessarily outperform the decentralized outcome. Crampton and Farrant (2005) argue that the inability to engage in economic calculation reduces the ability of social planner to extract consumer surplus. Thus, the lack of calculation improves the welfare of the median citizen which contrasts with conventional wisdom. We argue that they overstate their results. First, the calculation argument fails because of its underdevelopment, not because of the empirical record. Second, the welfare implications cannot be adequately addressed by assuming diminishing marginal utility of income or using the median welfare standard. Third, robust political economy has not developed a model that yields meaningful welfare comparisons. Thus, robust political economy remains in its early stages. JEL Code P0, P16, P50 With apologies to Gordon Tullock     

Psychology,social evolution and liberalism: a Hayekian trinity

Abstract

The work of Friedrich Hayek describes an extensive political economy, with explicit consideration of the psychological limits to human understanding, the market as a mechanism of information gathering and social coordination, and the relationship between market processes and the free society, where moral and political issues are relevant within a framework of continuous adaptation. Although the survival characteristics of social institutions largely defy rational enquiry, political liberalism secures the diversity that is necessary for evolutionary social adaptation.     

Converting social conflict: Focal points and the evolution of cooperation

We examine the ability of focal points to transform situations of potential conflict into situations of cooperation. In performing this function, focal points convert “worst-case scenarios” into “better-case scenarios,” which are easier for political economic systems to handle. Focal points thus contribute to the ability of political economies to perform well in the face of less than ideal conditions, enhancing systemic robustness. JEL Code P0     

Policy making and rent-dissipation: An experimental test

We present a transfer-seeking model of political economy that links the theory of Becker (1983) with Tullock-type models of politically contestable rents. In our model the size of the transfer is determined endogenously, and over-dissipation of rents is predicted even under conditions of risk-neutrality and perfect rationality. We implement an empirical test of this model by collecting behavioral data in a laboratory experiment. We confirm the existence of behavior that leads to over-dissipation of rents in games with both symmetric and asymmetric political power. To the extent that the transfer-seeking costs are social costs, our findings imply that the total costs of running government might be greatly underestimated if the value of the rent is used as a proxy for the rent-seeking cost. We also confirm the hypotheses that lowering the political power of one player can lead to smaller rent-seeking expenditures and to larger transfers Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, D72     

‘Catholic in its faith,Catholic in its manner of conceiving science’: French Catholic political economy in the 1830s

Abstract

This paper addresses a group of Catholic political economists in France in the 1830s, which was described by the Dublin Review as ‘Catholic in its faith, and Catholic in its manner of conceiving science’. A first section clarifies how contemporaries perceived this group. This is followed by an analysis of Villeneuve-Bargemont's Economie politique Chrétienne in order to outline a standard Catholic approach to political economy. Finally, that standard is used to chart the work of other Catholic economists within that group and to contrast it with the approach followed by other contemporary social political economists.     

Political Economy and the Idea of Development

This paper explores the questions: what are the main organizing concepts of the older political economy of Smith and Marx; and how do they differ from those typical of more recent work in political economy? Special emphasis is placed on the importance of an idea of development in the older political economy, and on how that idea has been replaced in the newer political economy by notions of power and interest. The paper considers how the absence of a concept of development in the newer versions of political economy limits the scope and depth of these versions. Recent criticism of the idea of development is also considered. In light of this criticism, the paper considers weaknesses in the concept of development in the older political economy. However, rather than fully accepting the critique of the idea of development, the paper suggests that weaknesses in the classical construction can be corrected by paying closer attention to how we understand the ends of the development process.     

Widening Wicksell’s conception of political economy: his “thoroughly revolutionary programme”

Abstract

Knut Wicksell’s opinion that political economy is a “thoroughly revolutionary programme” has often been neglected in the literature. Actually, Wicksell aimed at implementing such a programme in order to enlarge political economy as a “practical science”. It is articulated around three main features: a criticism of the marginal theories, the redefinition of society as a whole, and the advent of social justice. Indeed, Wicksell claimed that economic and social problems may be solved only by a complete social reorganisation. Hence, I show that Wicksell’s social reform programme drives his particular view of and approach to political economy.     

Thoreau's economic philosophy

Abstract

This paper provides an encompassing portrayal of Thoreau's economic thought. It is analyzed against the background of the history of economic thought and the economic thinking of his time. Thoreau's economic thought is an extensive examination of the ideas of classical political economy, and particularly of Jean-Baptiste Say, and it is a fundamental critique thereof. Thoreau recognizes that some aspects and foundations of the modern conception of the economy lead to an alienation of the human being from itself as well as to an alienation from nature. I demonstrate that this critique is a result of Thoreau's specific approach to the economy, which, based on his particular understanding of the human being and his philosophy of nature, seeks the meaning of the economy for human life and for nature. In this philosophical approach, which I characterize as an economic philosophy, Thoreau's deeper defiance of classical political economy and his original place within the history of economic thought are grounded. It leads Thoreau to an alternative conception of an economy of moderation, which is identified and described in detail. I conclude with considerations on the potential meaning of Thoreau's thought for current economic research.     

Robust political economy: The case of antitrust

The notion of robust political economy is applied to antitrust. It is argued that the universalizability of policy rules is crucial if both the knowledge problem and the incentive problem in antitrust are taken seriously. Policy recommendations of Williamson are compared with those of Hayek. It is further argued that the notion of universalizability is central not only with regard to antitrust but also with regard to a host of other policy areas. JEL Code B52, B53, D02, D80, K21, K40, L40. The author thanks his collaborators Lorenz Blume, Kim Eun Young, Janina Satzer and Michael Seebauer as well as Anne van Aaken for helpful comments and suggestions.     

Institutions and growth in limited access societies

We build a dynamic political economy model with a two-class society, workers and the elite, in which the elite formation, the innovation rate and fiscal policy are endogenous. The model generates a mapping between institutions and patterns of growth consistent with empirical evidence. Ex ante, when facing constraints in choosing institutions, the elite may delegate policy control to some of its members, even though such delegation exacerbates the conflict within the elite and causes policy failures. Committing to such institutional arrangements prevents more harmful outcomes, such as rapid entry and subsequent deterioration of the elite?s economic and political power.     

Can economic, land use and climatic stresses lead to famine, disease, warfare and death? Using Europe's calamitous 14th century as a parable for the modern age

Although many of today's ecological, climatic and socio-economic problems seem unprecedented, similar events have occurred in the past. As such, historic periods of climatic and economic volatility can be used as a way of developing frameworks for analyzing today's predicament. Western Europe's “middle ages” (circa 11-14th century) may be one such case. By the 12th century, medieval Europe had shifted from the subsistence agrarian economy that emerged following the collapse of the Roman Empire to one where spatially dispersed trade in agricultural commodities helped support a complex society that devoted considerable resources to cultural works. This shift was facilitated by new institutional arrangements centred on monastic orders that provided access to both new agricultural and food processing technologies as well as trade routes. These institutional arrangements contributed to population growth and land clearing. All of these factors increased the wealth of society but also concentrated this wealth in a small number of communities that were dependent on an ever-increasing and exploited hinterland for resources. Ultimately, this created a tightly coupled continent-wide subsistence system that was vulnerable to the weather, economic and disease shocks of the 14th century when Europe's population declined by perhaps 50%. In exploring this history, the goal of this paper is to draw on a diverse theoretical body of literature (that includes resiliency theory, landscape ecology, political science and ecological economics) to develop a series of hypotheses about how large-scale complex civilizations can become vulnerable to climate change.     

Marx 200: The Abiding Relevance of the Labour Theory of Value

ABSTRACT

Marxist political economy is alive and well, and not just because of the habitual turn to Marx in response to any crisis of capitalism. Both through Capital and through the continuing evolution of Marxism, Marxist political economy offers valuable insights that can illuminate the modalities of social and economic reproduction and the relationships between (different aspects of) the economic and the non-economic. Marxism’s presence has been felt through its own internal debates and debates with other approaches to political economy, and even through its influence on those reacting against Marxism. The key to the continuing relevance and analytical strengths of Marxist political economy lies in its capacity to provide a framework of analysis for unifying disparate insights into and critiques of the contradictions of capitalism across the social sciences. The instrument for forging that unity is Marx’s theory of value, the potential of which is examined and illustrated with reference to the Sraffian critique and two key concepts in Marxian political economy: the value of labour power and financialisation. They are explored in the light of the processes of commodification, commodity form and commodity calculation.     

公共服务均等化的基本逻辑

公共服务均等化实际上是公民社会和市场经济发展到一定阶段纳税人权利意识凸显出来的必然要求和具体体现.公共服务均等化理念的产生及其实施背后有着深刻的政治、经济和社会逻辑.不同国家的社会经济状况各不相同,因而会对公共服务均等化不同维度的逻辑进行强调,这一状况使得不同国家的公共服务均等化在标准的选择以及制度安排上出现差异.在公共服务均等化已成为我国社会经济生活的重要目标的情况下,弄清楚公共服务均等化的基本逻辑是非常重要的.     

Foreign Investment and National Interests in the Russian Oil and Gas Industry

This article examines the political economy of foreign direct investment in the Russian oil and gas industry in order to explain the limited role of foreign capital in this sector. There are three forms of foreign direct investment in the Russian oil and gas industry: (1) joint ventures, (2) investment within the framework of a production sharing agreement (PSA) and (3) foreign equity investment. The development of these three forms of foreign direct investment is analysed with special reference to the interests of the parties involved, before a conclusion on the political factors determining the conditions for foreign investment is made.     

The political economy of civil society

The dichotomy between intended and unintended outcomes of individual and collective action is central to political economy. It concerns the relationship of markets and states and their link to the constitution of society. As such, this dichotomy points to the patterns of connectivity that provide the social embedding of markets and states. The present paper argues that civil society is best understood as the principal locus of connectivity in which markets and states operate. Civil society so configured is neither separate from the body politic and commercial society nor subordinate to them but instead constitutes the primary objective structure of the social domain. It embeds the causal arrangements that determine the crisscrossing of both intended and unintended outcomes in specific contexts. Within the social domain, dispositions of the means-end type interact with non-instrumental dispositions. One important implication is that civil society is compatible with a range of different political economies and specific socio-economic arrangements. Based on a typology of three distinct paradigms of civil society, we argue that the proximity paradigm is conducive to the discovery of political economies that foster greater openness and specificity compared with the political and the economic paradigm. This paper suggests that the theory of civil society in general and the proximity paradigm in particular are indispensable heuristic tools to identity the unrealized capacities inherent in any given social configuration. A proximity heuristic is applied to the discussion of credit arrangements and policy. We conclude that a hierarchy of policy principles is necessary to preserve the primacy of social connectivity over means-end relationships and the conditions for context-specific arrangements and policy options.     

Political viability of public pensions and education. An empirical application

Public intergenerational transfers (IGTs) may emerge from the failure of private arrangements to provide optimal economic resources for the young and old. We investigate the political sustainability of the public system of IGTs by seeking to determine the outcome if the decision to reallocate economic resources per se was put to the vote. Exploiting the particular nature of the data from the National Transfer Accounts data in a political economy application in which generations cooperate under certain conditions, we show that most of the developed countries would vote in favour of a joint public education and pension system.     

Professors Malthus and Jones: Political economy at the East India College 1806–1858

Abstract

T. R. Malthus was the first Professor of Political Economy in Britain, being appointed in 1805 to the new East India College, whose purpose was to provide an education fitted to the training of East India Company recruits prior to their departure for India. Malthus was succeeded on his death in 1834 by Richard Jones, whose own period at the College ended just before the College closed in 1858, consequent upon the conversion of the Company into the Indian Civil Service and the introduction of entry by competitive open examinations. This paper considers the function and nature of the teaching of political economy within the College, and emphasizes the manner in which institutional imperatives constrained the development of political economy as an administrative pedagogy.