Understanding Conflicting Interests of a Government and a Tobacco Manufacturer: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Rice is the staple food of nearly half of the population of the world, most of whom live in developing countries. Ensuring a domestic supply of rice from outside sources is difficult for developing countries as less than 5% of the total world’s production is available for international trade. Hence, in order to ensure domestic food security, e.g., food availability and access, governments provide subsidies in agriculture. In many occasions, public money used for the subsidy goes toward promoting undesirable crops like tobacco. Although the strategic interaction between governments and manufacturers is critical, it has not been studied in the literature. This study fills this gap by considering a game between a government (of a developing country) and a tobacco manufacturer in which the government decides on a mix of subsidies and the tobacco manufacturer decides on declaring a purchasing price of tobacco. We provide a numerical study to show that controlling the output harvest price is more effective in reaching the desired end result for both the government and the tobacco manufacturer. A subsidy in fertilizer results in the measurable increase in the government spending but does not have significant effect in reaching the production target. The fertilizer subsidy should be provided only when the output price is too high to be affordable for the population.     

政府补贴与股价崩盘风险

本文以中国A股市场2007－2014年上市公司的数据为样本,基于企业寻租理论,实证检验了政府补贴对股价崩盘风险的影响,旨在为财政政策经济后果的研究提供新的经验证据。研究发现,政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间呈显著正相关关系;在制度环境水平较低的地区,政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间正相关关系更强;在产业政策支持的行业,政府补贴与上市公司股价崩盘风险之间正相关关系更强;进一步分析表明,企业寻租是两者正向关系的主要原因。本文的研究结果表明,管理层可以借助政府补贴粉饰公司业绩和隐藏公司负面消息。     

Strategic Decentralization and Channel Coordination

In this paper, we show that under certain conditions, strategic decentralization through the addition of a retailer in the distribution channel can increase a manufacturer's profits. The specific case on which we focus is the quantity coordination (double marginalization) problem for a manufacturer selling durable goods in a two-period setting. We show that the standard solution that coordinates a channel for non-durables does not coordinate the channel for durables. In particular, even though a manufacturer can achieve channel coordination by offering per-period, two-part fees, the equilibrium wholesale price in the first period is strictly above the manufacturer's marginal cost. This is in stark contrast to the two-part solution for non-durables where the equilibrium wholesale price is equal to marginal cost. We also identify a strategy that solves both the channel coordination and the Coase problem associated with durable goods. In this strategy, at the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer writes a contract with the retailer specifying a fixed fee and wholesale prices covering both periods. We show that by adding a retailer and using this contract, the manufacturer makes higher profits than it could if it were to sell directly to consumers.     

When and how should infant industries be protected?

This paper develops and analyzes a welfare maximizing model of infant industry protection. The domestic infant industry is competitive and experiences dynamic learning effects that are external to firms. The competitive foreign industry is mature and produces a good that is an imperfect substitute for the domestic good. A government planner can protect the infant industry using domestic production subsidies, tariffs, or quotas in order to maximize domestic welfare over time. As protection is not always optimal (although the domestic industry experiences a learning externality), the paper shows how the decision to protect the industry should depend on the industry's learning potential, the shape of the learning curve, and the degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign goods.Assuming some reasonable restrictions on the flexibility over time of the policy instruments, the paper subsequently compares the effectiveness of the different instruments. Given such restrictions, the paper shows that quotas induce higher welfare levels than tariffs. In some cases, the dominance of the quota is so pronounced that it compensates for any amount of government revenue loss related to the administration of the quota (including the case of a voluntary export restraint, where no revenue is collected). In similar cases, the quota may even be preferred to a domestic production subsidy.     

A Signalling Model of Firms' Foreign Direct Investment Relocation Decision

We analyse whether the foreign government can influence the multinational firm's relocation decision, through signalling the amount of subsidy it can grant. The foreign country is one of two possible types which differ on their investment conditions. Comparing the results obtained with an adverse selection model (the government knows the country type but the firm does not) with the results of a signalling model, we conclude that relocation is more likely, and the necessary subsidy is smaller, in the signalling model than with adverse selection. This can explain the proliferation of Investment Support Agencies worldwide.     

Discriminatory Prices,Predation and Signal-Jamming in a Horizontal Differentiation Model

We study the effects of predation in an asymmetric duopoly model à la Hotelling in which the incumbent is able to price discriminate while the entrant sets a uniform price. We show that when the discount factor is high (low) enough and the incumbent accommodates entrance the incumbent initially sets a uniform price (discriminatory prices) and then engages in price discrimination. Under certain conditions, the entrant prices aggressively in order to discourage predation from the incumbent: predation actually does not occur and all equilibrium prices are lower with respect to the case in which the threat of predation is absent. In a T-period model, we derive conditions under which the equilibrium prices increase over time until they stabilize at the level that would result in the absence of the threat of predation.     

Strategic Trade Policies Under Monopsony and Uncertainty: The Exporter’s Non-Linear Responses Based on the Organization of Its Industry

Players’ access to information, their market power, and the timing and rationale of their decisions are important but often neglected in the making of strategic trade policies. I examine optimal decisions in a monopsonistic market with asymmetric information to determine an exporting country’s policy strategies. The large importing country first sets a producer subsidy and later imposes an import tariff after learning about the welfare-maximizing exporter’s reactions to the subsidy. I assume that at the time of their decisions, the n exporting firms have incomplete information and rely only on noisy signals from their own domestic market to account for the uncertainty in the international market. I find that import tariff and producer subsidy can be substitute rather than exclusively independent policies. Results also show that the exporting country’s optimal reaction is non-linear and is based on the structure of its export industry; the exporting country’s government facing a large importer subsidizes (or taxes) its export when the number of exporting firms is low (or high) relative to a threshold number of firms. More important, before giving out subsidies, the exporting country’s government requires more collusion of its firms especially when the large importer targets a fixed domestic price.     

Pricing Policy and Partial Collusion

We study the pricing policy equilibria emerging in a partial collusion duopolistic framework where firms in the first stage of the game choose non-cooperatively the pricing strategy (perfect price discrimination or uniform pricing), and from the second stage onward collude on prices. We show that for intermediate discount factors and high firms’ asymmetry, the unique equilibrium is characterized by only the smaller firm choosing price discrimination. In the case of intermediate discount factors and low firms’ asymmetry, there are two possible equilibria: both firms price discriminate or no firm price discriminates. When the discount factor is particularly high or particularly low both firms price discriminate in equilibrium.     

补贴策略在网络零售平台竞争中真的有效吗？——基于寡头竞争模型的理论与实证研究

文章基于双边市场理论与经典寡占模型，在推导出网络零售平台竞争静态结果的基础上，结合数值模拟方法推导出长期动态最优补贴率的选择，研究补贴策略在网络零售平台竞争中的应用。数理模型推导发现：(1)从短期看，为了在激烈的竞争中“活下去”，网络零售平台通过补贴获得更多用户和更高的市场份额，且消费者价格敏感度越大，补贴率的增加对用户数量增长的促进作用越大；(2)从动态和长期看，为实现可持续运营，最优补贴力度将随时间变化而呈倒U形变动趋势--即初始阶段逐步提高补贴力度，过了某个时段后将逐渐平缓降低补贴力度。文章选取中国三个主要网络零售平台上市财报数据进行经验分析，证实了数理模型推导出的主要结论。文章回答了网络零售平台是否应采取补贴策略、补贴力度的确定以及补贴力度如何随时间而变化等基本问题，对理解网络零售平台补贴策略的基本逻辑，对优化网络零售平台治理，均有重要的借鉴价值。     

Visualization service investment strategies for a self-operated fresh agricultural product e-tailer

Motivated by the fact that numerous fresh agricultural product e-tailers utilize the visualization technology to improve service quality, this paper examines visualization service investment strategies for a fresh agricultural product e-tailer. A supply chain comprised of one manufacturer and one self-operated e-tailer is constructed. We first investigate two service investment strategies in the game theory model: the manufacturer investment and the e-tailer investment. Our analysis reveals that there are two investment cases in the supply chain: one member intends to the service investment (a “win-win” situation) and neither is willing to offer the service (a “lose-lose” dilemma). Then we extend the theory model. The impacts of consumer preference heterogeneity, demand uncertainty and consumer preference for the product quality difference on the investment strategies are explored by the method of multi-agent modelling. We find that: (i) when consumer preference heterogeneity is small, the e-tailer should invest in the service; (ii) if consumer preference or demand uncertainty is moderate, it is difficult to reach an agreement between two players. Further, the government subsidy factor is considered. The issue of how the government subsidy affects service investment strategies is discussed. In fact, it is not necessary to provide a subsidy all the time. Only when the free-riding behavior happens, the government should grant a moderate amount of subsidy to coordinate the supply chain members. An excessive subsidy hurts two sides’ benefits instead.     

社会认可、政府补贴与促进准公共物品私人供给

政府可以补贴公共物品,也可以直接成为公共物品的提供者。假定私人的社会捐助行为能够得到社会的认可,社会的自发均衡可能在政府的作用下发生改变,得出政府在促进准公共物品私人供给中的作用既可以是通过补贴的方式,也可以通过提供正确舆论导向的方式增强社会责任感。     

Endogenous Market Structures in the Presence of a Socially Responsible Firm

We consider the endogenous selection of strategic contracts in an asymmetric duopoly with substitutable goods. the duopoly comprises a typical managerial firm with a sales delegation and a socially responsible firm (CSR firm) with a linear combination of social welfare and quantity as its managerial delegation contract. In particular, we examine how the equilibrium market structure changes from the case wthere both firms adopt sales delegation contracts to the case wthere one of the firms becomes a CSR firm, after the owners of the firms select their strategic contracts. We show that two market structures that are asymmetric with respect to their strategic contracts can become equilibrium market structures under the pure strategic contract class. Furthermore, we consider a unique mixed strategy equilibrium to examine how the risk domination between the two asymmetric equilibrium market structures affects equilibrium selection. there, we find that the competition wthere the firm with the sales delegation and the CSR firm have a price contract and a quantity contract, respectively, risk-dominates the competition wthere the firms have a quantity contract and a price contract, respectively. Finally, by deriving the order of social welfare among the four subgames, we show that the social incentive does not coincide with the private incentive in the robust equilibrium with respect to risk domination in the endogenous selection game of the strategic contracts of the asymmetric duopoly with the firm with a sales delegation and the CSR firm.     

高质量发展视域下棉花目标价格补贴方式的重构

改进棉花补贴方式是深化棉花目标价格改革的重要内容。通过梳理和分析2014年以来我国棉花目标价格补贴方式及其利弊,探讨了不同补贴方式存在的套补空间,进而提出了适宜当前棉花产业高质量发展的新型棉花目标价格补贴方式--按有效补贴面积进行补贴。新型补贴方式以"面积优先、突出质量、兼顾产量"为导向,运用乘法模型整合了植棉面积、产量和质量等因素,不仅能够体现优质优补,还能够减少政策漏洞。统计模拟结果显示,新型补贴方式能够使套补者获得的补贴溢额比重由0.18‰降至0.08‰。     

EQUILIBRIUM STATE PRICES IN A STOCHASTIC VOLATILITY MODEL1

In a stochastic volatility model, the no-free-lunch assumption does not induce a unique arbitrage price because of market incompleteness. In this paper, we consider a contingent claim on the primitive asset, traded in zero net supply. Given a system of Arrow-Debreu state prices, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for consistency with an intertemporal additive equilibrium model that we fully characterize. We show that the risk premia corresponding to the minimal martingale of Föllmer and Schweizer (1991) are consistent with logarithmic preferences, while the Hull and White model (1987) (volatility risk premium independent of the asset price) is consistent with a class of utility functions including constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) ones.     

Infant industry protection with oligopoly and learning-by-doing

I use a simple two-period learning-by-doing model to examine optimal home country protection policy. In some cases, as in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (Oxford Economic Papers 40 (1988), 246–68), the home government will impose an import ban to protect the home firm from foreign competition. On the other hand, a protective tariff often provides greater welfare than when an import ban is imposed. In these cases, the first-period dynamic tariff is greater than the static Brander and Spencer ‘profit shifting tariff’. Protection in the form either of a tariff or an import ban encourages the home firm to invest in current output which reduces future costs. In addition to dynamic profit shifting, protection can bc valuable because the home firm does not consider the effect of its current learning on future consumer surplus. Tariffs can thus encourage the growth of infant industries while benefiting consumers in the future. Furthermore, the home firm can have an incentive to price below cost if the potential cost savings are sufficiently valuable.     

Subsidies for FDI: Implications from a model with heterogeneous firms

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of subsidies to attract multinational corporations when firms are heterogeneous in their productivity levels. I show that the use of a small subsidy raises welfare in the FDI host country, with the consumption gains from attracting more multinationals exceeding the direct cost of funding the subsidy program through a tax on labor income. This welfare gain stems from a selection effect, whereby the subsidy induces only the most productive exporters to switch to servicing the host's market via FDI. I further show that for the same total subsidy bill, a subsidy to variable costs delivers a larger welfare gain than a subsidy to the fixed cost of conducting FDI, since a variable cost subsidy also raises the inefficiently low output levels stemming from each firm's markup pricing power.     

The political economy of international factor mobility

We model the endogenous determination of policy towards international factor mobility. In a common agency setting, domestic interest groups bid for protection from the government and the incumbent politicians maximize a welfare function that depends both on domestic voters' welfare and contributions collected. We characterize equilibrium policies in the price space and show how the degree of complementarity among inputs determines the outcome. We establish a similar result for quotas, allowing for partial rent capturing. For the strategic environment under consideration, we also establish a general equivalence result between tariffs and quotas if capturing is complete.     

Strategic trade policies with first-mover and second-mover advantages in a vertical structure

With strategic trade policies, we consider first- and second-mover advantages in a vertical structure given the two-part tariff contract (composed of the input price and the fixed fee) of an upstream firm, where a home and a foreign final-good firms export to a third-country market. We find that the upstream firms’ and governments’ preference orderings over sequential versus simultaneous play and over free trade versus a regime of subsidies contrast with early results in the strategic trade policy. Thus, the endogenous market structure is that (i) the potential leader chooses the Leader role with quantity strategies, and the equilibrium trade regime is unilateral subsidy regardless of the nature of goods; (ii) with price strategies, the potential leader chooses the simultaneous timing, and the equilibrium trade regime is bilateral taxes (free trade) when goods are substitutes (complements).     

政府补贴、资源误置与制造业生产率

政府对部分企业进行补贴,会影响企业的市场进入、退出和规模,导致资源在企业之间的误置,不利于制造业生产率.本文用1998—2007年我国工业企业面板数据,研究政府补贴的资源误置效应对制造业生产率的影响及微观机制.从生产率的分解上看,我国制造业中存在企业之间的资源误置效应,对制造业生产率具有负面作用.实证研究发现,政府补贴是导致这种资源误置的重要因素,补贴会改变市场的广延边际和集约边际,导致资源在受补贴企业和未补贴企业之间的误置,降低制造业的生产率,并且这种资源误置效应在国有资本比重高的行业中更严重.具体来看,广延边际方面,补贴阻碍了市场进入和市场退出,受补贴企业相对于未补贴企业的市场进入和市场退出概率均较低;集约边际方面,补贴有利于受补贴企业扩大生产规模,并挤出未补贴企业的市场份额.本文的启示在于,政府补贴需要在一般均衡框架下考虑其对企业动态和资源配置的影响.     

The economic advantage of learners in a spot/futures market

This article examines the economic advantage of learners in a futures market. We develop a dynamic model of learning in which a spot market and futures market both exist for a real good. The economy is composed of producers who can engage in hedging activities, speculators who trade in the futures market, and consumers who are described by an inverse demand function for the underlying commodity. Producers and speculators are heterogeneous and are differentiated based upon the predictive equations they employ when formulating forecasts of next period's spot price. We derive the dynamic rational‐expectations equilibrium of the model and show that learners enjoy an economic advantage in the futures market. © 2003 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 23:151–167, 2003