An empirical study of the value-relevance of using proportionate consolidation accounting for investments in joint ventures

This research examines bond risk premiums to determine whether creditors of companies with investments in joint ventures reflect legal or implicit measures of the debts of joint ventures. The legal view suggests that the amount of potential loss from an investment in a joint venture is limited to the investment. The implicit view suggests that the operations of the joint venture and the venturer are interdependent. Equity method accounting reflects the legal view and proportionate consolidation reflects the implicit view.The study examines whether bond risk premiums are more highly associated with accounting numbers from proportionate consolidation than equity method accounting. The study uses data from 10Ks, the Wall Street Journal, and Moody's Bond Record from May 1, 1995 through April 30, 1998. These 4 years are used because US interest rates were fairly stable during this period, which is an important factor when examining bond risk premiums. Additionally, the companies in the study needed to remain stable across the window of study – no mergers, acquisitions, buy-outs, or liquidations – in order to maintain a comparative sample over the entire time period. The risk premium model uses measures of default that change between equity method accounting and proportionate consolidation. Differences in the explanatory power of the model determine how creditors view the joint venture debts.The study shows that approximately half of equity investments represent investments in joint ventures. Furthermore, the average joint venture uses debt to finance about two-thirds of the assets. The results show that proportionate consolidation fails to improve the explanatory power of the model when examining the entire set of companies that invest in joint ventures. However, the data reject the null hypothesis of no improvement with proportionate consolidation when examining companies who guarantee the debt of their joint venture. The policy implication of this study indicates that a change to proportionate consolidation would provide more value-relevant information to creditors when companies guarantee the debt of the joint venture.     

Asymmetric wealth gains in joint ventures: Theory and evidence

I examine the causes of asymmetric wealth gains (instances where one partner gains and the other partner loses) and the extent of these gains in joint ventures. I argue that asymmetric gains arise as the common benefits created by the venture are offset by the negative wealth effects of resource appropriation for one parent. Using a sample of 412 joint ventures I find that in 42% of the ventures one parent gained and the other lost. In addition, I find that when the abnormal returns of parents within a venture were compared, firms that gained more from forming the venture experienced [−1,0] returns of +3.22% and firms that gained less experienced [−1,0] returns of −1.37%. Additional analyses showed that asymmetric wealth gains tended to occur in ventures where one parent had relatively high valued resources and the other parent had relatively lower valued resources thus suggesting that resource appropriation may be an important cause of this pattern of gains.     

Auditing standards,increased accounting disclosure,and information asymmetry: Evidence from an emerging market

The interest in accounting disclosure and audit quality by academics, practitioners, and regulators heightened following the various financial reporting scandals, and subsequent legislative and professional response to these scandals. An important question is whether the implementation of stricter auditing standards such as those mandated by the US Sarbanes-Oxley Act would improve the information environment of firms whose shares are publicly traded. In this paper, I investigate the link between information asymmetry, measured by bid-ask spread, and increased accounting disclosures following the adoption of new auditing standards in China—an environment in which disclosure hitherto was relatively low. I report the following primary results of the statistical analyses. First, information asymmetry cost is substantial in the Chinese order-driven emerging markets. Second, the firms in the sample experienced significant reductions in their bid-ask spreads subsequent to the adoption of the new auditing standards. Third, the reductions in the bid-ask spreads were abrupt and permanent. However, no significant result is found for firms in the control group with foreign ownership, whose financial statements were prepared in accordance with international accounting standards and were audited with international auditing standards. The results have implications for policy makers and regulators in general, and those in emerging markets in particular.     

Information asymmetry,mutual funds and earnings management: Evidence from China

This paper investigates how information asymmetry and mutual fund ownership affect listed companies’ earnings management. We show that (1) reducing information asymmetry improves firms’ earnings management behavior; (2) relative to short-term mutual funds, long-term mutual funds promote earnings quality by adopting a monitoring role; and (3) by dividing firms into high/low information asymmetry groups, we find that the information environment significantly increases the effect of long-term mutual funds on firms’ earnings management. In this paper, we provide new evidence for the role that institutional investors play in a typical emerging capital market. Our results have clear policy implications: to increase earnings quality, it is essential to improve information transparency and develop long-term institutional investors.     

Accounting conservatism in a setting of Information Asymmetry between majority and minority shareholders

Following LaFond and Watts (2008), we examine the relation between information asymmetry (as measured by PIN, probability of information-based trading) and accounting conservatism but focus on a country – Taiwan – whose institutional background is different from that of the United States. Due to the disparate degree of conservatism across the world, the conclusions of LaFond & Watts (2008) might not be universally applicable. Our findings support, in general, the applicability of their conclusion to a Taiwan data set. We find, however, that the effect of PIN appears weaker when auditor tenure is taken into account, thus supplementing their conclusions.     

Accounting for climate change and the self-regulation of carbon disclosures

Adopting a form of “critical dialogic engagement” (Bebbington et al., 2007), this paper explores how dominant environmental discourses can influence and shape carbon disclosure regulation. Carbon-related disclosures have increased significantly in the last five years, and many of these disclosures remain voluntary. This paper considers both the construction of self-regulated carbon disclosure practices and the role that this kind of carbon information may have in climate change-related decision making. Our preliminary findings indicate that the methodological diversity underpinning carbon disclosures may inhibit the usefulness of climate change-related data. To explore these issues, this paper focuses on the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) and the use of the Greenhouse Gas (GHG) Protocol as a reporting model within it.     

Empirical evidence of the value of monitoring in joint ownership

Joint ownership of assets by two partners can have an adverse effect on the incentives to invest and can result in unstable and inefficient organizational structures. Control sharing, however, plays an important role in economic, political, and social institutions. There is scarce empirical evidence on the benefits of joint ownership in corporate finance. We analyze acquisitions of corporate assets by joint ventures to empirically ascertain the value of joint ownership in economic activities. The results indicate that firms experience significantly larger returns in joint acquisitions than in full-control acquisitions and that this difference is restricted to the sample of firms in which both partners share equal ownership in the target. These findings suggest that monitoring in joint ownership structures ameliorates the possibility of value-destroying corporate decisions.     

Voluntary disclosure and information asymmetry in Denmark

This paper examines if the level of voluntary disclosure affects information asymmetry for industrial companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. Economic theory suggests that disclosing more information should lower the information asymmetry component of a firm's cost of capital [Leuz, C., & Verrecchia, R. E. (2000)]. The results indicate that voluntary disclosure is negatively associated with proxies for information asymmetry. The results are robust even after controlling for various firm characteristics introduced in related literature. Despite differences in institutional settings the findings in our paper are similar to the ones based on US data.     

Improving earnings quality: The effect of reporting incentives and accounting standards

We investigate the different effects on earnings quality of accounting standards and reporting incentives for Germany over the period 1994 to 2005. To this end, we control for reporting incentives at the firm level, instead of the country level, by using the timing of voluntary IFRS adoption as a proxy for reporting incentives. We then include reporting incentives in an analysis of earnings management and information asymmetry. Contrary to common expectation, we find that IFRS reporting potentially decreases earnings quality on average; but also that reporting incentives appear to have lower effects on earnings quality in IFRS statements than in GGAAP statements. Thus, IFRS may lead to more homogenous earnings quality across firms.     

UK Accounting Disclosure Practices and Information Asymmetry During the First Quarter of the Twentieth Century: The Effects on Book Returns and Dividend Cover

During the first quarter of the twentieth century there was marked information asymmetry as between senior managers and shareholders. The differences in information provision can be dichotomised into 'volume' and 'distortion' effects. This paper measures the (matched pair) differences between two standard measures of corporate performance, returns on equity capital and equity dividend cover, based on internal and then published data, in each case derived from a broadly-based set of quoted companies in UK industrial sectors. The results suggest that levels of information distortion were low until 1914, and material and much higher, after rather than during the First World War.     

上市公司会计信息失真的原因分析和治理

以上市公司本身、会计师以及会计师事务所为分析目标,对会计信息失真的动机和原因进行了分析,并从建立产权清晰、权责明确的现代企业制度、逐步培育完善经理人市场、完善注册会计师制度等方面提出了具体的解决对策。     

The contract,accounting and trust: A case study of an international joint venture (IJV) in the United Arab Emirates (UAE)

This paper reports on the results of a case study that examines the effect of the contract and accounting on inter-organisational trust in an international joint venture (IJV). The empirical setting of the research was an IJV relation between a United Arab Emirates (UAE) firm and its western partner. Data were gathered from multiple sources, including documents, observations, interviews and discussions with managers. The paper aims to explore the process of trust development and the role of the contract and accounting in this. We find that trust developed differently for the partners. Moreover the trust concerns of the partners were not the same. Based on this we conclude that trust was not automatically reciprocated. Instead it needs relating to other items such as the contract, accounting and also the institutional environment. The open-book accounting we observed could only be termed ‘partial’ because the western partner had access to the local partner's books but not the vice versa. But this partial open-book accounting created conflicts between the partners. We argue that developing one kind of trust through one particular medium may help one party but may damage the relationship between the partners.     

The effect of financial reporting quality on CEO compensation structure: Evidence from accounting comparability

This study examines the effect of accounting comparability on the design of CEO compensation structure. After controlling for firm-specific attributes, we find that accounting comparability is positively associated with CEO equity-based compensation intensity and pay-performance sensitivity. This suggests that the improved comparability increases the usefulness of equity-based compensation and a firm is willing to offer more equity-based compensation contracts to CEOs and increase their pay-performance sensitivity. Further, we find that the impact of comparability on the CEO’s compensation contract increases with information asymmetry, which is consistent with the notion that accounting comparability is a quality of financial reporting that facilitates the use of equity-based compensation in a poor information environment. Our analysis also reveals that the effect of accounting comparability on CEO compensation structure is greater when a firm’s corporate governance is strong, consistent with the complementary relation between comparability and the exiting corporate governance in determining CEO compensation schemes. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms utilize more equity-based compensation as a proportion of total compensation under greater accounting comparability and enhance the alignment between equity-based compensation and firm performance.     

信息不对称与金融市场脆弱性

在金融市场中,信息起着至关重要的作用.作为金融市场中普遍存在的现象,信息不对称是导致金融市场脆弱性的主要原因之一.本文对金融市场中的信息不对称现象进行了详细的分析,同时提出了相应的解决措施.     

The effect of earnings surprises on information asymmetry

We examine the effect of earnings surprises on changes in information asymmetry. We hypothesize and find that asymmetry is lower (higher) in the quarter following positive (negative) earnings surprises compared to firms that meet the consensus analyst earnings forecast. The relations between earnings surprises and information asymmetry are stronger when the surprises are more likely to capture investors’ attention. Examining the source of these changes, we show that decreased information search activities is the most important factor for asymmetry declining after positive surprises; for negative surprises, decreased uninformed trading plays a dominant role increasing asymmetry.     

资本市场中会计信息消费者结构的比较研究

通过对中外会计信息消费结构的比较可以发现,实施虚假消费的会计信息消费者倾向于与会计信息生产者合谋,侵占其他会计信息消费者的利益.优化会计信息消费者结构就是要找出具有强烈消费需求动力的会计信息消费者,促使其成熟,扩大他们的消费影响力.     

保险上市公司会计信息披露:基于"四性"的研究

保险公司上市后,其会计信息的公开披露成为保险公司必须履行的一项强制性义务.现已颁布的相关法律和制度,对此提出了新的要求,而目前保险上市公司会计信息披露缺乏真实性、充分性、及时性和主动性.因此,应尽快推行新企业会计准则,提高会计信息披露的规范化建设,健全公司治理结构,强化对保险公司的监管和审计.     

Information asymmetry and accounting restatement: NYSE-AMEX and NASDAQ evidence

We examine the impact of accounting restatement announcement on firms’ value and information asymmetry for both auction market (NYSE-AMEX) and dealer market (NASDAQ) using a public sample of restatement announcements from 1997 to 2005. In both markets, we document economically and significantly negative mean cumulative abnormal returns around the announcement dates. The restatements attributed to auditors are associated with more negative returns than those attributed to management and the SEC. However, there is no significant difference between market reactions arising from the core and non-core restatements. We also find a significant increase in volume, number of transactions, average order size, volatility, and various measures of spreads after the restatement announcement indicating that restatement announcements diminish company prospects and contribute to increased uncertainty and information asymmetry. Finally, we find that the information asymmetry in the NASDAQ market around the event date is less pronounced than in the NYSE-AMEX market.     

Voluntary disclosures and information production by analysts

We analyze the voluntary disclosure decision of a manager when analysts scrutinize the quality of disclosure. We derive an equilibrium in which managers voluntarily disclose unfavorable information only if sufficiently precise, but disclose favorable news with lower levels of accuracy. We show that analysts cover good news disclosures with higher scrutiny. To the extent analysts rely on mandatory financial reports to interpret voluntary disclosures, we show that more precise financial reports may lead to more precise but less frequent voluntary disclosures. Moreover, a slant toward conservatism in financial reports can lead to less precise yet more frequent voluntary disclosures.